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Abstract 
The thesis is a comparative study of administrative law and risk 
regulation in the European Union and the United States. The analysis 
proceeds from the premise that the main objective of administrative law 
is to reconcile the exercise of bureaucratic power with liberal democratic 
values. In this way, administrative law constructs the legal legitimacy of 
administrative regulation, including administrative risk regulation. As 
such, administrative law systems are expressions of legal culture. The 
thesis argues that the most important differences between European and 
American risk regulation are better explained as expressions of the 
normative commitments of the two constitutional systems rather than as 
the product of different attitudes toward technological risk. 
Methodologically, the thesis is a comparative study of legal doctrine and, 
thus its goal is to understand the unique contribution of law as a 
discourse to the social phenomenon of risk regulation. 
After setting out the theoretical framework in chapter 1, the thesis 
compares three major aspects of EU and US administrative law in the 
context of risk regulation. Chapter 2 addresses the institutional 
structures of the two administrations, as well as European and American 
theories of delegation. Chapter 3 considers legal approaches to defining 
the public interest in risk regulation through a study of the roles of the 
precautionary principle and cost-benefit analysis in the two jurisdictions. 
Chapter 4 considers the concept of administrative rationality in the EU 
and the US, with a focus on the role of science in risk regulation. In 
chapter 5, the thesis pulls together the various strands of doctrine 
discussed in the earlier chapters and synthesises them into general 
reconciliations of administrative risk regulation with EU and US 
constitutional values. The final chapter, chapter 6, reflects on the 
normative visions of administration implied in the two jurisdictions’ 
administrative law doctrines. 
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1 
Introduction— 
Administrative Law, 
Risk, and Legitimacy 
This thesis is an essay in comparative administrative law. Its aim is to 
explore the different ways in which administrative law constitutes, 
structures, and legitimates public administration in the European Union 
and the United States. Administrative law is a broad and not always 
clearly defined field. In its most general sense, it is that body of law that 
is concerned with the reconciliation of the exercise of power by 
bureaucracies with constitutional and rule of law values.1 In this way, 
administrative law is fundamentally concerned with the legitimation of 
bureaucratic power. My primary interest in this thesis is in analysing and 
comparing the concept of legitimate administration in EU and US law. 
Administrative regulation is a complex phenomenon and can fruitfully 
be explored from many disciplinary and methodological perspectives. In 
recent years, interdisciplinary scholarship has come to the fore, and 
much valuable work has been done that combines legal analysis with 
economic, political science, and sociological perspectives. Often, however, 
the broader perspective of interdisciplinary scholarship comes at the 
expense of disciplinary depth. In this thesis, I have chosen to take the 
other side of that trade-off and analyse administration solely from the 
perspective of law. Even more unfashionably, my focus will be on legal 
doctrine, by which I mean authoritative legal materials and the processes 
of reasoning about those materials applied in judicial proceedings. In 
other words, this thesis is concerned with the ways in which lawyers 
make sense of the phenomenon of public administration within the 
                                           
1 Cf. Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Hart 
2007) 24. 
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framework of constitutional democracy. Thus, I am interested in 
administrative law as an idealist system, rather than as an object for 
empirical study.2 This type of analysis may seem old fashioned, even 
misguided, in the face of challenges to the coherence of law as an 
academic discipline. As an intellectual descendent of the American legal 
realists, I am acutely aware that law is not autonomous, but is instead a 
product of its social context.3 Nonetheless, law is a distinct discourse for 
analysing social problems, with its own modes of reasoning and its own 
distinctive normative commitments.4 Moreover, law is a real locus of 
power in liberal democratic systems, including the EU and the US, both 
of which espouse the rule of law. Thus, for all its artificiality, an 
understanding of law as an intellectual system must be part of our 
understanding of social relations. And, as an object of comparative study, 
law is all the more interesting for its social constructedness.5 
This thesis is thus unapologetically a comparative study of legal 
doctrine, rather than a study of administrative regulation more generally. 
My intention, however, is to go beyond merely describing legal rules and 
to try to tease out some of the broader principles and normative 
commitments that animate the doctrine. By doing so, we may begin to 
understand not just how the EU and US address regulatory problems 
differently, but also how the EU and US legal systems understand 
regulatory problems differently.6 A better understanding of these deep 
conceptual differences should open up new avenues for comparative 
analysis and new possibilities for regulatory learning and cooperation. 
                                           
2 Cf. Mashaw, ‘Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, 
and Critical Stories of Legal Development’ (1990) 6 J.L.Econ&Org. 267, 
267–69. 
3 Fisher, Horwitz, and Reed, American Legal Realism (OUP 1993) 164–71. 
4 Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition (3d ed., Stanford 
2007) 150–51; Monaghan, ‘“Marbury” and the Administrative State’ 
(1983) 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1, 4. 
5 Örücü, The Enigma of Comparative Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2004) 123–27. 
6 Cf. Bell, French Legal Cultures (Butterworths 2001) 14–16; Ewald, 
‘Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It like to Try a Rat?’ (1995) 
143 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1889, 1987–89. 
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This thesis is about administrative law, but it is also about risk 
regulation. Risk regulation may be defined as the field of regulation that 
attempts to identify and prevent or ameliorate potential adverse effects of 
technology. My concern in this thesis is only with technological risk. In 
recent years, the rhetoric of risk regulation has expanded from its origins 
in health, safety, and environmental regulation to areas such as criminal 
law and financial market regulation.7 These domains of risk present 
many fascinating problems and deserve to be studied, but they also 
present distinct issues that cannot be addressed within the scope of a 
single thesis. Limiting the discussion to issues of technological risk 
allows for deeper analysis of the special problems associated with 
regulation of technological risk, in particular the role of scientific 
expertise in administrative decisionmaking. 
In addition to being limited to a certain type of risk, the thesis is 
limited to a certain aspect of regulation, namely standard setting, which 
can be defined as the promulgation of generally applicable rules 
permitting or prohibiting products or processes8 under specified 
conditions.9 Standard setting broadly encompasses activities such as 
setting air quality standards, setting limits on pesticide residues in food, 
or authorising the marketing of particular products. It excludes, however, 
other types of regulatory activities, such as enforcement actions or the 
                                           
7 Black, ‘The Emergence of Risk Based Regulation and the New Public 
Management in the UK’ [2005] PL 512, 516–18; Fisher, ‘The Rise of the 
Risk Commonwealth and the Challenge for Administrative Law’ [2003] PL 
455, 456–60; Monahan and Skeem, ‘Risk Redux: The Resurgence of Risk 
Assessment in Criminal Sanctioning’ (2014) 26 Fed.Sentencing.Rptr. 158; 
Rothstein, Borraz, and Huber, ‘Risk and the Limits of Governance: 
Exploring Varied Patterns of Risk-Based Governance Across Europe’ 
(2013) 7 Regulation & Governance 215, 216–18. 
8 Some common types of risk regulation include restrictions on products 
(e.g., restrictions on the sale of pesticides) and restrictions on processes 
(e.g., limits on the discharge of effluent into a water body). For brevity, I 
will henceforth just use the term “products” to refer to any risk-
producing phenomenon. 
9 Cf. Fisher, ‘Drowning by Numbers: Standard Setting in Risk Regulation 
and the Pursuit of Accountable Public Administration’ (2000) 20 OJLS 
109, 111–12. 
36 Administrative Legitimacy and Risk Regulation 
  
funding of research. A focus on standard setting is particularly 
appropriate in a comparative analysis involving the EU because the large 
majority of the EU’s regulatory activities take this form.10 Limiting the 
range of administrative actions under consideration also helps to focus 
the inquiry on a narrower range of legal issues. 
Several aspects of risk regulation make it an attractive topic for a 
study of comparative administrative law. For the last forty years or more, 
risk regulation has become an increasingly important regulatory focus on 
both sides of the Atlantic. One by-product of the prominence of risk 
regulation is that many of the most important administrative law debates 
of recent years have occurred in this context. In particular, risk 
regulation has been the main point of reference for debates over the 
proper role of scientific and technical expertise in regulatory 
decisionmaking.11 Additionally, risk regulation is often held up as a prime 
example of divergent European and American regulatory approaches12 
                                           
10 Brandsma and Blom-Hansen, ‘Controlling Delegated Powers in the 
Post-Lisbon European Union’ [2015] JEPP 1, 1. The increasing role of the 
EU in implementing the norms it produces should not be ignored. E.g., 
van Cleynenbreugel, Market Supervision in the European Union: Integrated 
Administration in Constitutional Context (Brill 2014) 9–12. For now, 
however, the focus of risk regulation at EU-level remains on norm 
production (standard setting). 
11 Azoulay, ‘The Judge and the Community’s Administrative Governance’ 
in Joerges and DeHousse (eds.), Good Governance in the European Union 
(OUP 2002) 112–14; Edley, Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial 
Control of Bureaucracy (Yale 1990) 118–23; Fisher (n.1), chs. 3, 6; 
Joerges, ‘Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and the European 
Court of Justice: Legal Frameworks for Denationalized Governance 
Structures’ in Joerges, Ladeur, and Vos (eds.), Integrating Scientific 
Expertise into Regulatory Decision-Making (Nomos 1997) 296; Stewart, 
‘The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in 
Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the 
Clean Air Act’ (1977) 62 Iowa.L.Rev. 713, 737–40. 
12 E.g., Alemanno, ‘The Science, Law and Policy of Neonicotinoids and 
Bees: A New Test Case for the Precautionary Principle’ (2013) 4 EJRR 
191, 200–03; Brickman, Jasanoff, and Ilgen, Controlling Chemicals: The 
Politics of Regulation in Europe and the United States (Cornell 1985); 
Jasanoff, Designs on Nature (Princeton 2005); van Zwanenberg and 
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and, as such, we might expect to find interesting differences in the ways 
EU and US law address the issue. 
My intention, however, is for the analysis of risk regulation presented 
in this thesis to be more than just a case study for the investigation of 
administrative law doctrine. A great deal of valuable comparative work 
has been done on EU and US risk regulation, but most of this 
scholarship has focused on regulatory outcomes13 or on the operation of 
specific regulatory concepts in isolation (e.g., precaution).14 As a 
consequence, this work tends to downplay or even ignore the importance 
of systemic legal concerns in the practice of risk regulation.15 The failure 
to attend to legal context leaves an important gap in the scholarship 
because, as this thesis will show, much of the legal discourse on risk 
regulation is an outgrowth and reflection of administrative law principles 
that developed in response to normative concerns other than risk. For 
example, theories of delegation are crucial to understanding how the EU 
and US courts construe administrative authority to regulate risk, but 
those theories developed long before risk regulation was a common 
regulatory activity. My hope is that this thesis will contribute to the 
comparative literature on risk regulation, as well as the literature on 
administrative law, by demonstrating the connections between 
administrative law doctrines and the ways in which risk is framed and 
regulated in the two jurisdictions. 
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I address two issues. 
First, I examine in some detail the concept of risk and the complications 
of risk science. Although these issues are not the focus of the thesis, a 
basic knowledge of them is necessary both to understand the particular 
                                                                                                                   
Millstone, BSE: Risk, Science, and Governance (OUP 2005) 19–28; Vogel, 
The Politics of Precaution (Princeton 2012). 
13 E.g., Harrington, Morgenstern, and Sterner, Choosing Environmental 
Policy (RFF 2004); Wiener, Rogers, Hammitt, and Sand (eds.), The Reality 
of Precaution: Comparing Risk Regulation in the United States and Europe 
(RFF 2011); Vig and Faure (eds.), Green Giants?: Environmental Policies of 
the United States and the European Union (MIT 2004). 
14 E.g., Sunstein, ‘Beyond the Precautionary Principle’ (2003) 151 
U.Pa.L.Rev. 1003. 
15 Fisher (n.1), 14–16. 
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challenges posed by risk regulation and to evaluate the adequacy of the 
responses. Second, I explain my methodological approach. One weakness 
of doctrinal scholarship is that it tends to cover up its own theoretical 
commitments. By explaining my methodology in detail, I hope to clarify 
my understanding of the methods and goals of doctrinal analysis, as well 
as to define the boundaries of the thesis. 
I. The Concept and Perception of Risk 
A. The Meaning of Risk 
One of the problems with the term “risk” is that it is a portmanteau word 
that is used to convey different meanings in different contexts. Indeed, 
many of the controversies over risk regulation could be reframed as 
debates about the meaning of “risk” itself. Although the meaning of risk 
continues to be debated, it is no longer seriously disputed that it is a 
complex concept with empirical, normative, psychological, social, and 
political dimensions, and there is an enormous literature exploring 
various aspects of the concept.16 
                                           
16 It is not possible in the space of this thesis to attempt to address this 
literature comprehensively. Two good brief overviews of some of the key 
concepts are Fisher, ‘Risk and Environmental Law: A Beginner’s Guide’ in 
Richardson and Wood (eds.), Environmental Law for Sustainability (Hart 
2006) and Lee, EU Environmental Law (2d ed., Hart 2014), 28–44. Other 
useful general works include Beck, Risk Society (Sage 1992) (offering an 
influential sociological account of the role of risk as an organising theme 
in contemporary society); Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable 
Story of Risk (Wiley 1998) (chronicling the history of the concepts of 
probability and risk); Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle (Harvard 1993) 
(elaborating an empiricist and expert-driven approach to risk regulation); 
Douglas and Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (University of California 1983) 
(discussing the role of culture in the identification and evaluation of risk); 
Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin, The Government of Risk (OUP 2001) 
(reviewing several existing approaches to the regulation of health risks); 
Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere (Yale 2010) (discussing the limits of 
expert evaluation in the appraisal of risks); Rodricks, Calculated Risks 
(2d ed., CUP 2006) (providing a nontechnical review of issues in 
toxicology and quantitative risk assessment); Schrader-Frechette, Risk 
and Rationality (University of California 1991) (giving a philosophical 
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Broadly speaking, risk can be understood as incorporating two types 
of judgments about a technology. On one hand, risk is an empirical 
phenomenon, i.e., a probabilistic prediction of observable physical events 
that the technology may cause.17 The classic example of this type of risk 
is the probability that a specific exposure to an identified chemical will 
result in the exposed individual contracting cancer. An empirical 
conception of risk underlies scientific, and in particular quantitative, risk 
assessment and tends to deemphasise the personal or social significance 
of technological hazards. On the other hand, risk can also be understood 
as a set of value judgments about a technology.18 On this view, the 
significance of a risk is assessed not solely (or even at all) in terms of the 
probability of a physical response, but also in terms of the values that a 
technology implicates. For example, a risk of harm that is involuntarily 
imposed on an individual may be judged to be worse than a statistically 
equivalent risk that is voluntarily incurred because involuntarily imposed 
risks infringe values of personal autonomy and bodily integrity in a way 
                                                                                                                   
account of risk that focuses on the role of values but also defends the use 
of quantitative risk assessment); Steele, Risks and Legal Theory (Hart 
2004) (discussing how various legal theorists have formulated and used 
the concept of risk, including contexts other than risk regulation); 
Sunstein, Risk and Reason (CUP 2004) (developing a theory of risk 
regulation based on an empiricist view of risk). 
Several reports discussing risk and its regulation have also been 
commissioned by government bodies. Some important examples include: 
Expert Group on Science and Governance, Taking European Knowledge 
Society Seriously (European Commission 2007) 31–42; National Research 
Council, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society 
(NAP 1997); National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal 
Government: Managing the Process (NAP 1983) (the “Red Book”); Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution, 21st Report: Setting 
Environmental Standards (HMSO 1998) (particularly chapter 4). 
17 E.g., Breyer (n.16), 10–29; Rodricks (n.16), 202–04; Sunstein (n.16), 
29–33. 
18 Ackerman and Heinzerling, Priceless (New Press 2004) 210–23; Kysar 
(n.16), 222–24; Wynne, ‘Creating Public Alienation: Expert Cultures of 
Risk and Ethics on GMOs’ (2001) 10 Science as Culture 445, 456–57. 
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that voluntarily incurred risks do not.19 Although these two aspects of 
risk are conceptually distinct, in practice individual appraisals of risk 
incorporate both types of judgments and may not be fully analysable into 
empirical and normative components.20 
In addition to conceptual analyses of risk, a large body of scholarship 
has examined risk as a cognitive phenomenon.21 Much of this work has 
focused on the role of heuristics in individuals’ judgments about risk.22 A 
heuristic is simply a cognitive short-cut that can be used when better 
information is unavailable or the available information is too complex to 
be easily digested into an intuitive judgment.23 For example, people tend 
to view risks associated with unfamiliar technologies to be worse than 
those associated with familiar ones.24 Heuristics and values are not the 
same things. Heuristics are psychological processes by which people 
make empirical estimations.25 Values are one way in which people give 
meaning to social and empirical phenomena.26 The relationship between 
the two, however, is complex and there is controversy regarding how they 
should be distinguished.27 The central role of cognition in the formation 
                                           
19 Schrader-Frechette (n.16) 97; Slovic (ed.), The Perception of Risk 
(Routledge 2000) 94. 
20 National Research Council, Science and Decisions: Advancing Risk 
Assessment (NAP 2009) 31–32. 
21 The pioneering work was done by Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and 
Amos Tversky. Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (CUP 1982); Kahneman and Tversky, 
Choices, Values, and Frames (CUP 2000); Slovic (n.19). 
22 Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (Penguin 2012); Sunstein, Laws of 
Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (CUP 2005) 35–49, 64–88. 
23 Sunstein (n.22), 36. 
24 Slovic (n.19), 140–43. 
25 Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (n.21), 3–4. 
26 Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Harvard 1995) 2–4. 
27 See, e.g., the debate between Sunstein, who interprets heuristics as a 
form of bounded rationality, and Kahan and Slovic, who see values at 
work in cognitive heuristics. Kahan, Slovic, Braman, and Gastil, ‘Fear of 
Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk’ (2006) 119 HLR 
1071 (reviewing and critiquing Sunstein (n.22)); Sunstein, ‘Misfearing: A 
Reply’ (2006) 119 HLR 1110; and Kahan and Slovic, ‘Cultural 
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of judgments about risk adds another layer of complication to risk 
evaluation. It also raises difficult questions about how regulators should 
respond to public judgments about risk that may be based on heuristics, 
particularly the extent to which such judgments may justify the 
imposition of regulatory controls.28  
The complex nature of individuals’ judgments about risks raises a 
number of interesting legal, regulatory, and policy problems. Most 
fundamentally, the complexity of risk and the multiplicity of perspectives 
means that regulatory judgments about risk will always be controversial 
to some degree.29 The inevitable persistence of controversy creates a need 
for some process by which “closure” on the characterisation of risks can 
be reached so that regulatory decisions can be made.30 As will be 
explained in the following chapters, administrative law principles are 
often central to determining how and when closure on risk evaluation will 
be reached and by whom. 
B. The Regulation of Risk 
Although there is broad agreement that risk is a complex concept that 
incorporates both empirical and normative judgments, the issue of how 
regulators should respond to the phenomenon of risk remains highly 
controversial. That controversy persists, in part, because the nature of 
risk as a concept cannot resolve disputes about how society should 
respond to it. Rather, normative questions about risk regulation can only 
be answered by reference to political theories about (among other things) 
the role and limits of government, the nature of democracy, and the 
                                                                                                                   
Evaluations of Risk: “Values” or “Blunders”?’, 119 Harv.L.Rev.Forum 
1110 (2006). 
28 See the discussion cited ibid. 
29 Douglas and Wildavsky (n.16), 4. 
30 Jasanoff, ‘Science, Politics, and the Renegotiation of Expertise at EPA’ 
(1992) 7 Osiris 194, 201; Stirling, ‘Risk, Uncertainty and Precaution: 
Some Instrumental Implications from the Social Sciences’ in Berkhout, 
Leach, and Scoones (eds.), Negotiating Environmental Change (Edward 
Elgar 2003) 62–63. 
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proper ends of regulation.31 And with respect to the focus of this thesis—
administrative risk regulation—there is yet another layer of questions 
regarding the role of the administration and its relationship with other 
organs of government. Failure to address these questions explicitly helps 
to explain why writers on different sides of risk regulation debates so 
often seem to talk past one another. A goal of this thesis is to make 
explicit the links between normative commitments of the EU and US legal 
systems and the approach taken by those systems toward risk. 
Although it is an oversimplification, one can usefully divide views on 
the appropriate goals and scope of risk regulation into two competing 
frameworks.32 The first framework conceptualises risk in terms of threats 
to safety, i.e., the propensity of a product to cause physical harm to 
humans or the environment, and understands the end of risk regulation 
to be the prevention or amelioration of those harms. The risk-as-safety 
framework relies heavily on science to characterise hazards and to 
predict their likelihood.33 It is not, however, limited to empirical concerns, 
but may also consider other factors such as the distribution of risks in 
society, as well as public perceptions of risk to the extent that those 
perceptions may themselves cause harm.34 The risk-as-safety framework 
is often associated with welfarist approaches to regulation that seek to 
maximise the net benefits of technology for society, but it is also 
compatible with other normative approaches.35 The risk-as-safety 
framework does not, however, consider the broader social significance of 
technology. In this framework, the proper domain of risk regulation does 
                                           
31 Craig, Public Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America (Clarendon 1990) 3–5. 
32 Cf. Exert Group (n.16), 24–27 (discussing “regimes of innovation”); 
Stirling (n.30), 53–55 (making a similar distinction between ways of 
framing the social problem of technological risk). 
33 E.g., Alemanno (n.12), 195–97; Breyer (n.16), 10–19; Graham and 
Wiener, Risk Versus Risk (Harvard 1995); Graham, ‘Saving Lives through 
Administrative Law and Economics’ (2008) 157 U.Pa.L.Rev. 395; 
Sunstein (n.16), 160–66. 
34 Graham (n.33), 516–24; Sunstein (n.22), 118–19. 
35 Graham (n.33), 438–48. 
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not extend to questions such as the ethical evaluation of technology or 
the effects of technology on social relations. 
Within the risk-as-safety framework, risk evaluation is usually 
understood as a three stage process: risk assessment, risk management, 
and risk communication. This conceptual division was first suggested by 
the US National Research Council in the Red Book,36 and has since been 
embraced by international organisations37 and the European 
Commission.38 Within this schema, risk assessment refers to the analysis 
and characterisation of a risk qualitatively and quantitatively, and it is at 
this stage that scientific analysis of risk is emphasised. Risk management 
concerns formulation of a regulatory response to the risk characterised at 
the risk assessment phase. This step includes consideration of risk 
acceptability as well as the choice of interventions to address 
unacceptable risk. The final stage, risk communication, focuses on 
communicating information about risks and regulatory responses to the 
public. Although this framework is more flexible than its critics 
sometimes portray it,39 it is nonetheless designed to focus on a fairly 
narrow range of concerns regarding technology and is not well-suited to 
more open-ended consideration of the social significance of technological 
innovation.40 
In contrast to the “risk-as-safety” framework, the second framework 
may be termed “technology choice”.41 Though it is also concerned with 
                                           
36 Red Book (n.16), 18–19. 
37 Codex Alimentarius Commission, UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization, Procedural Manual (17th ed., UN 2007) 112–18. 
38 European Commission, ‘Communication on the Precautionary 
Principle’ COM(2000) 1 final, 2. 
39 Cf. van Zwanenberg and Millstone (n.12), 26. 
40 Expert Group (n.16), ch. 7. 
41 After Rayner and Cantor, ‘How Fair Is Safe Enough? The Cultural 
Approach to Societal Technology Choice’ (1987) 7 Risk Analysis 3. The 
term “technology choice” elides a number of related, but somewhat 
different approaches. Some useful literature in this vein includes Expert 
Group (n.16); Lee, ‘Beyond Safety? The Broadening Scope of Risk 
Regulation’ (2009) 62 CLP 242; Schwarz and Thompson, Divided We 
Stand: Re-Defining Politics, Technology and Social Choice (University of 
Pennsylvania 1990) 106–20; Stirling, ‘“Opening up” and “Closing down”: 
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safety, the “technology choice” framework is concerned with a broader 
range of social consequences of technology. It treats technology itself, 
rather than technology’s possible harmful effects, as the thing to be 
regulated.42 The technology choice framework is concerned with how and 
by whom technology is governed in society. Rather than seeking to 
maximise social welfare, it tends either to focus on maximising social 
virtue or to adopt a deontological approach to regulation.43 This 
difference is manifested in an emphasis on assessing the consistency of 
technology with a society’s values independently of considerations of 
safety.44 To a much greater extent than the risk-as-safety framework, the 
technology choice framework focuses on the distribution of both possible 
adverse effects and possible benefits of technology.45 It is open to asking 
whether new technologies are likely to benefit society and allows the 
restriction or prohibition of technologies due to lack of benefit, even 
without a showing of possible harm, a course of action that is generally 
excluded in the risk-as-safety framework.46 
In the following chapters, I will argue that the risk-as-safety 
framework predominates in the jurisprudence of both the EU and the US 
courts and that this preference can be explained by certain core 
normative commitments of European and American administrative law. 
That is not to say that preference for the risk-as-safety approach is—or 
should be—uncontroversial. To the contrary, the persistent framing of 
risk in terms of safety is the source of much of the public controversy 
surrounding the regulation of technology. The normative origins of the 
preference for a risk-as-safety framework do, however, demand that 
                                                                                                                   
Power, Participation, and Pluralism in the Social Appraisal of Technology’ 
(2008) 33 STHV 262.  
42 Rayner and Cantor (n.41), 6; Wynne (n.18), 447–48 (objecting to the 
reduction of the social significance of technology to questions of risk). 
43 Kysar (n.16), 41–45. 
44 Scott, ‘On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in 
the EU and WTO’ in Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: 
Toward a Common Law of International Trade? (OUP 2000) 143–44; cf. 
Anderson (n.26), 163–67. 
45 Rayner and Cantor (n.41), 6. 
46 Lee (n.41), 248. 
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critics of that framework confront those normative commitments and 
their significance for administrative law generally, and not just within the 
confines of technology regulation. 
C. Risk Science 
If the concept of risk were not complex enough in itself, additional 
problems arise with respect to risk science. Few would dispute that 
science has a necessary and legitimate role to play in risk regulation. 
Science is necessary in the first place for the identification, and to some 
extent the definition, of technological risks.47 Many adverse effects of 
technology are not directly observable, for example substances that cause 
disease only after long periods of latency. Even some immediate adverse 
effects may be difficult to link to specific causes. Asthma attacks, for 
example, may be caused by a variety of air pollutants, but they also have 
other causes and the link between the two can only be established 
through medical and epidemiological methods. In addition to being 
crucial for our understanding of technological risk, science frequently 
plays an important role in formulating responses to risk. Science is 
necessary to establish safe levels of exposure (when they exist), to identify 
lower risk substitutions, and to develop new technologies to prevent 
exposures. Without science, the range of possible responses to risks 
would be much more limited, and the ability to calibrate and evaluate 
responses would be much more crude. 
There are, however, a number of difficulties with using science in risk 
regulation. First, as the last section showed, many aspects of risk are not 
readily susceptible to scientific analysis. But the problems of risk science 
run deeper. At bottom, they stem from the fact that all risk science is to a 
greater or lesser degree uncertain and ambiguous. Understanding the 
sources of that uncertainty is necessary for the analysis of the role of 
science within regulatory programmes. 
When discussing risk science, it is useful to review some basic 
aspects of scientific inquiry itself. On the standard empiricist account, 
scientific knowledge is based on observation of the natural world and the 
                                           
47 Beck (n.16), 72. 
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testing of hypotheses. A hypothesis is a statement of a relationship 
between natural phenomena that is capable of falsification through 
empirical observation.48 In the main, hypotheses can only be falsified; 
they cannot be (directly) confirmed. A hypothesis gradually achieves 
acceptance through the accumulation of observations that are consistent 
with the hypothesis and by the falsification of alternative hypotheses.49 
As such, though it is often stated otherwise, scientific knowledge is 
generally of a negative character. Science may be able to tell us what is 
not, but it is only able to provide us with ever more confident hypotheses 
of what is.50 
One consequence of the structure of scientific knowledge is that 
science is best at answering questions that are readily capable of 
experimental testing. “Does substance X cause cancer?” is a difficult, but 
tractable, question for science to answer. “Is substance X safe?” is much 
harder, not just because of the definitional issues surrounding the 
concept of “safe”, but also because any answer to the question would 
have to account for, at a minimum, a wide range of possible adverse 
effects, which would necessitate a much more complex experimental 
undertaking. And even when science has the tools to answer questions 
about whether a product may cause specific adverse effects, reliable 
information is often unavailable.51 Indeed, creating (and funding) 
mechanisms for producing this much-needed information has become an 
important focus of risk regulation policy.52 Because of these constraints, 
science’s ability to provide answers to more complex (call them “real 
world”) questions is quite limited. In most circumstances, all science can 
do is provide relevant information. 
                                           
48 Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge 2002) (1959) 17–20. 
49 Salmon, The Foundations Of Scientific Inference (University of 
Pittsburgh 1966) 18–24. 
50 For an introduction to scientific method and some of the philosophical 
problems associated with it, see Nola and Sankey, Theories of Scientific 
Method: An Introduction (Acumen 2007) 12–31. 
51 Rodricks (n.16), 209–13. 
52 Wagner, ‘Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to 
Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment’ (2004) 53 
Duke.L.J. 1619, 1736–45. 
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1. Quantitative risk assessment 
Generally, we want to know more about a substance than simply whether 
it is capable of causing specific adverse effects. We want to know how 
likely the adverse effect is to come to pass, whether it is a mere 
theoretical possibility or a substantial threat to many people. Relatedly, 
many regulatory programmes seek to establish “safe” levels of exposure 
to chemical substances, which require regulators calculate levels of 
exposure at which adverse effects are not expected to occur (or at least 
are expected to be quite rare).53 It was through efforts to answer these 
sorts of questions that the science of quantitative risk assessment first 
developed.54 At its most basic, quantitative risk assessment simply seeks 
to determine the probability that a specific adverse effect will occur in a 
subject at a given level of exposure to a substance.55 It thus incorporates 
a narrowly empirical conception of risk. More advanced approaches to 
risk assessment attempt to predict the risk of adverse effects in real-
world circumstances by estimating the level of exposure that would be 
expected in those circumstances. In theory, science is fully able to 
answer those questions. In practice, however, reliable answers are 
difficult to establish. 
The obstacles to quantitative risk assessment are far greater than a 
mere lack of good data. The problem, rather, is that much of the data 
that would be necessary to perform an accurate quantitative risk 
assessment cannot be gathered through existing methodologies.56 Some 
of it cannot be gathered for ethical reasons. For example, it would 
obviously be improper to use human subjects to test for toxic effects.57 
                                           
53 E.g., Regulation 1907/2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) &c. [2006] O.J. 
L396/1, art. 60(2); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y, § 136a(c)(5). 
54 Rodricks (n.16), 205. 
55 Ibid., 217. 
56 See generally McGarity, ‘Substantive and Procedural Discretion in 
Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating 
Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA’ (1978) 67 Geo.L.J. 729. 
57 Cf. NRDC v. EPA, 658 F.3d 200, 206 (2d.Cir.2011). 
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Consequently, scientists use animal tests as a substitute, but at the 
expense of introducing a source of uncertainty.58 Beyond ethical 
concerns, some data cannot be gathered for practical reasons. Much risk 
regulation is concerned with exposure to substances at very low doses, at 
which effects would only be expected to occur in a few subjects in a 
thousand or even a million. Experiments cannot directly test for effects at 
these levels because the numbers of research subjects required to 
achieve statistically valid results would be prohibitively expensive 
(putting aside the ethical concerns with running a single experiment on 
thousands of animals). To accommodate this problem, scientists typically 
test for adverse effects at high doses and use those results to estimate 
their occurrence at lower doses.59 That approach also creates uncertainty 
because, despite significant research, there is no scientific consensus on 
methods for extrapolating from high to low does.60 
When risk assessment moves from the lab to real-world situations, 
the problems become exponentially greater. Risk assessment requires an 
estimate of individuals’ exposure to the substance in question, but 
measuring exposures in real-world situations is extremely difficult. Take 
for instance the expected exposure to a farm worker applying a pesticide. 
Any risk assessment will have to account for multiple paths of exposure 
(including inhalation, ingestion, and dermal exposure), none of which are 
easily measured. Exposure also depends on numerous variable factors, 
such as operator behaviour or weather conditions.61 As a result of these 
complications, risk assessors are often forced to rely on educated guesses 
regarding likely exposure under various circumstances.62 
These issues and many others will crop up in any quantitative risk 
assessment. They are sometimes termed trans-scientific issues because, 
while they are theoretically answerable through conventional scientific 
analysis, practical obstacles put the answers beyond the capabilities of 
                                           
58 McGarity (n.56), 743–45; Rodricks (n.16), 68–69. 
59 McGarity (n.56), 734–36. 
60 Rodricks (n.16), 239–43. 
61 Wynne, ‘Uncertainty and Environmental Learning: Reconceiving 
Science and Policy in the Preventive Paradigm’ (1992) 2 GEC 111, 119. 
62 Rodricks (n.16), 213–14. 
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current scientific research.63 Although advances in research techniques 
may eventually make some trans-scientific questions answerable, several 
decades of work on quantitative risk assessment techniques has not 
achieved much progress.64 To overcome the problem of trans-science, 
risk assessors rely on what the US National Research Council calls 
“inference options” or “science-policy judgments”.65 Science-policy 
judgments are assumptions that are used to bridge gaps in empirically 
verifiable data. They are science judgments in the sense that they must 
be scientifically plausible. They are nonetheless policy judgments 
because the choice among the various scientifically plausible alternatives 
must be made by reference to normative considerations.66 Because most 
regulatory risk assessments are carried out for the purposes of protecting 
health and the environment, regulators tend to use science-policy 
judgments that are conservative, in that they tend to err on the side of 
overstating risk.67 But even when that goal is assiduously pursued, the 
uncertain nature of science-policy judgments means that we cannot be 
sure the risk has not been underestimated. In contemporary practice, 
regulators in both the EU and the US typically rely on elaborate risk 
assessment guidelines that specify default science-policy judgments and 
procedures for departing from those defaults.68 By relying on guidelines, 
rather than case-by-case determinations, regulators attempt to minimise 
subjectivity in individual risk-science judgments.69 In this way, EU and 
US regulators are able to prepare routine risk assessments that are 
                                           
63 Weinberg, ‘Science and Trans-Science’ (1972) 10 Minerva 209; see also 
McGarity (n.56), 733–36. 
64 Rodricks (n.16), 260–72. 
65 Red Book (n.16), 28; For an updated assessment of regulatory practice, 
see National Research Council (n.20), ch. 2. 
66 National Research Council (n.20), 36. 
67 Rodricks (n.16), 230. 
68 E.g., EPA, Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment (3d ed., GPO 
2006); EFSA, ‘Guidance on the assessment of exposure of operators, 
workers, residents and bystanders in risk assessment for plant 
protection products’ (2014) 12 EFSA Journal 3874. 
69 Red Book (n.16), 4. 
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objective in the narrow sense that competent risk assessors applying the 
same risk assessment guidelines will achieve similar results.70 
2. Risk assessment and complexity 
Although it can be extremely useful for regulators, the information 
provided by quantitative risk assessments is inevitably limited in 
important ways. Quantitative risk assessments typically provide a 
numerical assessment of one causal relationship only (e.g., cancer risk). 
They often do not account for cumulative exposures. They are only 
beginning to consider the possibility of synergistic effects (in which 
exposure to two or more substances creates risks that are greater or 
lesser than the sum of the risks from exposure to the substances 
individually), and then only in a rudimentary way.71 Although they suffice 
for some types of regulatory programmes, they are an incomplete basis 
for many of the most pressing risk regulation problems. Issues such as 
climate change, genetically modified organisms, and industrial releases to 
the environment pose far more complex risk assessment issues. 
Accordingly, these problems call for broader approaches to risk 
assessment. 
Many of the most highly salient risk regulation issues share one 
essential feature: complexity. All issues of risk, but particularly issues of 
ecological risk, concern effects on systems. The need to address systems 
creates problems for risk science because natural systems tend to be 
open-ended and poorly understood, and usually are not susceptible to 
the kind of experimental verification that is the gold standard for 
scientific knowledge.72 These characteristics of systems create 
complexity, a situation in which cause-effect relationships cannot be 
isolated and the universe of possible outcomes often cannot be 
                                           
70 Rodricks (n.16), 214. 
71 National Research Council (n.20), 219. 
72 Ibid., 16–21; additional sources on the problems of quantitative risk 
assessment in complex systems include Jaeger, Renn, Rosa, and Webler, 
Risk, Uncertainty, and Rational Action (Earthscan 2001) 159–208; 
O’Brien, Making Better Environmental Decisions: An Alternative to Risk 
Assessment (MIT 2000); Stirling (n.30); Wynne (n.61). 
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foreseen.73 Additionally, complex systems are adaptive, in that the 
introduction of a new element into the system (say an industrial release) 
may change the operation of the system itself.74 An element of complexity 
that is often relevant to risk regulation is human behaviour. Risk 
assessments often rely on assumptions about how people will behave in 
certain circumstances, yet human behaviour does not obey physical laws 
and is difficult to predict, especially over long time frames.75 
Complexity does not render scientific analysis useless. Laboratory 
science can often provide useful information on possible (and sometimes 
impossible) effects. Knowledge of system behaviour gained through 
empirical observation can provide a basis—often a highly reliable basis—
for predicting likely effects. Yet complexity does fundamentally change 
the nature of the information that science can provide. Most importantly, 
scientific analysis of complex situations inevitably takes on an 
interpretive character as scientists move from verifiable data and 
relationships to predictions about systemic effects.76 One consequence of 
the interpretive nature of this type of analysis is that divergences of 
opinion are more likely to arise among scientists. Whereas routine 
quantitative risk assessment methodologies provide a process for 
ensuring consistency in results and for identifying discrete points of 
disagreement, the interpretive analysis required for risk assessment in 
complex systems is less easily rationalised. 
In this type of risk assessment, scientific judgment comes to the fore. 
In the sense I am using it, scientific judgment is like other forms of 
judgment. It is a partly, sometimes largely, intuitive process by which 
scientists consider the available data, their theoretical knowledge, and 
their experience in the field to arrive at a conclusion about the most 
                                           
73 Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided Tour (OUP 2011). 
74 Ibid. 
75 Stirling (n.30), 46–47; Wynne (n.61), 119; see also Bernstein (n.16), 
330–32. 
76 Renn, Risk Governance (Earthscan 2008) 74–79. 
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likely answers to scientific problems.77 Such judgments cannot be 
reduced to schematic form and reproduced,78 although they may be 
falsifiable (at least in theory). For regulators, the task of responding to 
divergent scientific opinions requires the exercise of policy judgment. As 
such, regulators have to engage with scientific and non-scientific 
information through some form of deliberation, in the sense of “careful 
consideration with a view to decision”.79 Because many such decisions 
are made administratively, principles of administrative law have 
considerable influence on how this deliberation is conducted, by whom, 
and under what constraints. 
Beyond complexity, risk assessment must also contend with 
ignorance. Ignorance, put simply, is the fact, established by Hume, that 
we cannot know what we do not know.80 We may observe relationships in 
the world and infer a causal connection, but because we cannot observe 
causation directly we can never wholly exclude other possible 
explanations for the relationship.81 As a result, it is never possible to be 
certain that a product will not produce adverse effects. Moreover, 
ignorance is ubiquitous and irreducible. We can never be more or less 
ignorant about anything. For these reasons, ignorance poses challenges 
for risk assessors and risk regulators. It cannot be managed in the same 
way as known risks, even highly uncertain known risks. Nor can it be 
                                           
77 Cf. Dunbar and Khlar, ‘Scientific Thinking and Reasoning’ in Holyoak 
and Morrison (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning 
(OUP 2012). 
78 Kitcher, The Advancement of Science (OUP 1993) 93–105.  
79 This is the first sense of “deliberation” given by the OED. I do not mean 
to restrict it to the sense linked with theories of civic republicanism. E.g., 
Sunstein, ‘Beyond the Republican Revival’ (1988) 97 YLJ 1539. 
80 This is the sense in which ignorance is most often used in the risk 
regulation literature, e.g., Stirling (n.30), 46–47; Lee (n.16), 32; see also 
Funtowicz and Revetz, Uncertainty and Quality in Science for Policy 
(Kluwer 1990) 87–88. Smithson uses the term “meta-ignorance” to 
distinguish this definition of ignorance from other senses. Smithson, 
‘Social Theories of Ignorance’ in Proctor and Schiebinger (eds.), 
Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance (Stanford 2008) 210. 
81 Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Steinberg ed., 2d 
ed., Hackett 1977) (1776) 15–18. 
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ignored without leaving society exposed to potential harm. Accordingly, 
ignorance calls for its own regulatory strategies.82 
3. Science and objectivity 
Before leaving the topic of risk science, a brief word must be said about 
the deeper epistemological basis of science. Since at least Plato,83 
philosophers have been troubled by whether and how humans can know 
the world, and those preoccupations have spawned numerous critiques 
of the objectivity and completeness—or even the possibility—of scientific 
knowledge. Of particular relevance for present purposes, most 
contemporary philosophers would agree that scientific knowledge is to 
some extent the product of social practices and—to that extent—what 
counts as scientific knowledge is determined by those practices as well as 
by correspondence with reality.84 Some sociologists of science, building 
on the work of Thomas Kuhn,85 go further and take the position, 
commonly referred to as social constructivism, that scientific “facts” are 
nothing more than products of social discourse.86 Proponents of social 
constructivism maintain either that there is no mind-independent reality 
or, if there is, that humans cannot know it.87 One consequence of the 
social constructivist view is that science should not be privileged over 
                                           
82 Stirling (n.30), 55–60; Wynne (n.61), 126–27. 
83 Plato, Theaetetus (Williams ed., Levett trans. (Burnyeat rev.),  
Hackett 1992). 
84 Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World (OUP 1999) 225–30; Kitcher 
(n.78) 87–89; Laudan, Science and Values (University of California 1984) 
33–41; Longino, Science as Social Knowledge (Princeton 1990) 58–61. 
85 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (50th anniversary ed., 
University of Chicago 2012) (1962). 
86 Two canonical works in this vein are Latour and Woolgar, Laboratory 
Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts (2d ed., Princeton 1986) and 
Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (Princeton 1985); see 
also Latour, Science in Action (Harvard 1987). A good short introduction 
to the constructivist view is Barnes and Bloor, ‘Relativism, Rationalism, 
and the Sociology of Knowledge’ in Hollis and Lukes (eds.), Rationality 
and Relativism (MIT 1982). 
87 Radder, ‘Normative Reflexions on Constructivist Approaches to Science 
and Technology’ (1992) 22 Soc.Studs.Sci. 141, 155–57. 
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other discourses—such as folk wisdom or religion—as a way of knowing 
the world. Perhaps more importantly, it calls into question the distinction 
between expert and lay knowledge regarding issues deemed scientific.88 If 
accepted, the social constructivist view would have important 
implications for risk regulation. Notably, it would cast doubt on the 
necessity for scientific evidence as a basis for regulation, as well as the 
priority generally accorded to scientific views on certain issues. 
Although a number of thinkers adhere to the social constructivist 
position, it has come under strong philosophical critique and is rejected 
by most contemporary philosophers of science.89 In addition to its serious 
conceptual problems,90 some commentators have also pointed out the 
severe difficulties of engaging in normative argument within the social 
constructivist framework. As Radder points out, if risks are merely 
artefacts of discourse, it is difficult to find a stable perspective from 
which to assign them a normative value.91 For this reason, some 
commentators have suggested that many proponents of constructivism 
actually embrace at least limited forms of realism.92 
This is a debate that obviously cannot be settled in a thesis about 
legal doctrine.93 Fortunately, for many issues, it may not matter. One can 
be a committed realist and still accept the inherent uncertainty and 
ambiguity of risk science.94 For example, one need not accept the social 
                                           
88 Barnes and Bloor (n.86), 27; Eden, ‘Public Participation in 
Environmental Policy: Considering Scientific, Counter-Scientific and Non-
Scientific Contributions’ (1996) 5 Pub.Understanding.Sci. 183, 191–92; 
Wynne, ‘May the Sheep Safely Graze? A Reflexive View of the Expert-Lay 
Knowledge Divide’ in Lash, Szerszynski, and Wynne (eds.), Risk, 
Environment and Modernity (Sage 1998) 57–61. 
89 Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science (3rd ed., Routledge 2012) 281–82; see 
also Goldman (n.84), 248–54; Kitcher (n.78), 160–69; Longino (n.84), 76–82.  
90 Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge (Clarendon 2006). 
91 Radder (n.87), 156–57 & n.60; see also van Zwanenberg and Millstone, 
‘Beyond Skeptical Relativism: Evaluating the Social Constructions of 
Expert Risk Assessments’ (2000) 25 STHV 259, 260–61. 
92 Van Zwanenberg and Millstone (n.91), 262. 
93 It may well be unresolvable. Chakravartty, A Metaphysics for Scientific 
Realism (CUP 2007) 16–26. 
94 Kitcher (n.78), 164–65. 
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constructivist view to agree that the drawing of policy-relevant 
conclusions from scientific data requires an exercise of judgment, that 
those judgments will often, perhaps always, depend on policy-laden 
considerations, and that a system of administrative law must account for 
the contestable nature of those judgments.95 Thus, the realist and the 
antirealist must largely face the same legal problems when considering 
the role of science in administrative risk regulation. The debate does 
matter, however, for the question whether science should be given some 
degree of priority in decisionmaking on risk and whether science can 
serve as a meaningful constraint on administrative discretion. The 
constructivist position implies scepticism on both counts, whereas those 
who reject constructivism generally see the priority of science as flowing 
from its epistemic superiority on certain matters and believe that 
scientific evidence can constrain administrative discretion. 
My analysis in this thesis will reject strong constructivism. I do so, in 
part, because I find the critiques of constructivism persuasive, but more 
importantly because both the EU and US courts apparently reject 
constructivism. Both accept that, at a minimum, science is capable of 
providing information about risks that other perspectives are not, though 
they also acknowledge that scientific evidence is often uncertain and 
indeterminate.96 Rather than rejecting this core premise, it is more 
interesting from a comparative perspective to investigate how the two 
jurisdictions have integrated this understanding of science into their 
jurisprudence. In later chapters, I will argue that the courts’ judgments 
about the capacities of science are themselves bound-up with the 
normative concerns of administrative law. These connections will be most 
clearly illustrated in chapter 4, which analyses the idea of administrative 
rationality as it pertains to risk regulation, but they will also be 
addressed in chapter 6, which considers the normative commitments of 
the two systems of administrative law. 
                                           
95 Van Zwanenberg and Millstone (n.91), 261. 
96 The courts’ views on science are discussed in chapter 4. 
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II. Methodology and Scope 
A. Old-Fashioned Doctrinal Analysis 
As stated at the outset, my basic methodological approach in this thesis 
is traditional doctrinal legal analysis or what is sometimes known as legal 
idealism. Legal idealism analyses legal materials, especially judicial 
decisions, in an effort to uncover the principles that inform those 
materials and to reassemble those principles into a coherent normative 
picture. In the idealist vision, administrative law is “part of the general 
fabric of . . . public and constitutional law” and contributes “to the 
construction of an operationally effective and symbolically appropriate 
normative regime”.97 Put differently, administrative law reconciles 
bureaucratic power “with our fundamental (but perhaps malleable) 
images of the legitimacy of state action”.98 
In contrast to interdisciplinary approaches or empirical legal 
scholarship, legal idealism may seem a distinctly old-fashioned 
methodology. Some would even question its relevance in a world in which 
the law-in-action is widely assumed to deviate from the law-in-the-
books.99 No one doubts that law is much more than the text of judicial 
decisions. Doctrinal legal analysis nonetheless remains centrally 
important to the study of administrative law and public administration 
for two reasons. First, idealist legal discourse is a perspective for 
understanding administration that is distinct from other perspectives 
such as economics or sociology. Law is a specific form of social and 
cultural expression and comes with its own normative assumptions and 
frames for organising experience.100 One cannot form a complete picture 
of any legal phenomenon, much less engage in comparative legal 
                                           
97 Mashaw (n.2), 268. 
98 Ibid. 
99 E.g., McNollGast, ‘Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: 
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies’ (1989) 
75 Va.L.Rev. 431, 435–40; Unger, ‘The Critical Legal Studies Movement’ 
(1983) 96 HLR 561, 575–76. 
100 On framing, see Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the 
Organization of Experience (Northeastern 1986) 1–16; Jasanoff (n.12), 
23–25. 
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analysis, unless one understands this perspective. Second, legal idealism 
is the primary, often the exclusive, form of discourse used by EU and US 
courts. It is the form of reasoning in which litigants argue, judges 
deliberate, and decisions are justified. Whatever the shortcomings of legal 
idealism as a picture of reality, judicial decisions unquestionably have 
practical effects in the real world. Understanding this mode of discourse 
is therefore of the utmost practical importance. 
The choice of legal idealism as my methodology also informs my 
choice of research question. The objective of this thesis is to compare the 
ways in which EU and US administrative law, understood in idealist 
terms, reconcile the phenomenon of administrative risk regulation with 
constitutional democracy. In this respect, my analysis draws heavily on 
the concept of “administrative constitutionalism” developed by Elizabeth 
Fisher.101 Administrative constitutionalism resists succinct definition. It 
encompasses numerous concepts and relations, such as the scope (and 
limits) of administrative power; the institutional structure of the 
administration; the relationship of the administration to other 
constitutional bodies (the legislature, the executive, the courts); the 
mechanisms by which the administration is held to account; and the 
scope of individual rights. It is, in other words, not a single legal 
principle, or even a single conventional body of law, but rather a dense 
network of legal rules, principles, and conventions that defines the 
conceptual framework in which administration is understood, analysed, 
and evaluated from the perspective of law.102 Administrative 
constitutionalism thus encompasses much more than legal doctrine. In 
this thesis, administrative constitutionalism will be the theoretical lens 
by which I relate my doctrinal analysis to broader normative questions.103 
                                           
101 Fisher (n.1). 
102 Ibid., 22–26. 
103 Although I draw on Fisher’s theoretical work, I do not use her 
rational-instrumental (RI) and deliberative-constitutive (DC) paradigms as 
categories for analysis. As developed by Fisher, the RI and DC paradigms 
are ideal types that demonstrate how the strands of administrative 
constitutionalism interact to define world-views on administration. Ibid., 
27–28. Although the RI and DC paradigms are useful didactic tools, they 
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My focus on legal doctrine also accounts for my decision not to 
include case studies of specific regulatory programmes in this thesis. The 
omission is partly practical. Detailed comparison requires detailed 
analysis, and I do not believe it would be possible within a single thesis 
to give adequate attention to the nuances of legal doctrine and to provide 
robust empirical case studies. Because a fine-grained understanding of 
doctrine is a prerequisite for a legal analysis of regulatory practice, it 
seems preferable to focus on doctrine in this thesis and to defer case 
study work to later scholarship. There is also a methodological reason for 
not combining the two. Although case study research can provide 
valuable insights into the practice of regulation, it may not have as much 
value for understanding legal doctrine. In the main, courts decide cases 
on the basis of conceptual analysis and with an eye toward developing 
principles that will apply across a range of contexts. It is not clear that a 
focus on the detailed operation of a particular regulatory programme 
would provide much insight into that process. It might even be 
counterproductive. Because the cases that have driven the development 
of EU and US law on risk regulation have originated in a number of 
different regulatory programmes, a narrow focus on one or two 
programmes might skew the broader picture.104 Case studies would also 
complicate comparative analysis by multiplying the number of variables 
that would have to be considered and accounted for. None of this is to 
                                                                                                                   
are (by design) too generic to reflect the nuances of administrative 
constitutionalism in any specific jurisdiction. Ibid. That limitation is 
particularly important in a comparison of EU and US administrative law, 
inasmuch as each jurisdiction exhibits its own evolving paradigm of 
administrative-constitutionalism, neither of which is fully captured by 
either the RI or DC paradigm. For these reasons, I find it more useful to 
compare specific aspects of EU and US administrative constitutionalism 
directly rather than attempting to relate them to RI and DC paradigms. 
104 A similar point is made by Wiener who argues that a focus on 
particular case studies tends to skew general comparisons of EU and US 
risk regulation. Wiener, ‘The Rhetoric of Precaution’ in Wiener, Rogers, 
Hammitt, and Sand (eds.) (n.13), 24–27. 
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say that case study research is not extremely valuable.105 To the 
contrary, I see the doctrinal analysis in this thesis as important 
groundwork for future research of that type, whether undertaken by 
myself or others. 
B. Legitimacy and Administrative Risk Regulation 
Legitimacy is a broad concept that has many meanings and can be 
approached from many angles. According to the OED, legitimacy is “[t]he 
condition of being in accordance with law or principle,” but that 
definition clarifies little. Principle can easily be understood to encompass 
ideas as varied as democracy, morality, justice, efficiency, and many 
others, and conformity with each of these principles can be understood 
as different species of legitimacy. In keeping with my methodological 
commitment to legal idealism, this thesis will focus on just one aspect of 
legitimacy: legal legitimacy. As will become clear in subsequent chapters, 
however, legal legitimacy cannot be analysed in isolation. Instead, it must 
be understood in relation to other forms of legitimacy, including 
functional legitimacy and democratic legitimacy. 
1. Legal legitimacy 
In this thesis, I am primarily interested in legal legitimacy. In the sense I 
am using it, an institution or action is legally legitimate when it can be 
reconciled with authoritative legal materials (constitutions, treaties, 
statutes, judge-made law) and legal values in a way that respects the 
accepted rules of legal reasoning within a particular legal system.106 For 
something to be legally legitimate, it is not necessary that the legal 
community be unanimous in its acceptance of any particular 
justification. In most cases there will be multiple, divergent justifications, 
and for any particular thing being studied there will likely be someone 
who rejects its legitimacy outright. It is sufficient that the explanation by 
                                           
105 Excellent examples include Jasanoff (n.12); van Zwanenberg and 
Millstone (n.91); and Vogel (n.12). 
106 This understanding of legal legitimacy is obviously grounded in the 
positivist tradition of jurisprudence. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon 
1991) (1961); Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (Ashgate 2002). 
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which something is reconciled with authoritative materials and legal 
values is recognised as an admissible form of justification by a 
substantial segment of the legal community, even if members of the 
community find the explanation unconvincing. 
Used in this way, legal legitimacy may seem like a synonym for 
“legality” or “lawfulness”, but there is an important difference. Legality 
and lawfulness can be understood as being synonymous with formal 
legality, i.e. the extent to which all applicable legal requirements are 
satisfied. Formal legality essentially involves box-ticking, though that is 
not to say that it cannot engender real controversies of its own. But in 
the way I am using it, legal legitimacy requires more than box-ticking; it 
requires that the thing under examination not only meet the formal 
requirements for legality but also that it admit of explanation in terms of 
the values that animate a legal system. While an investigation of formal 
legality invites a process of thinking along lines of proof, an analysis of 
legal legitimacy, because of its focus on explanation, encourages 
consideration of relationships among the thing being analysed, legal 
materials, and legal values so that even if part of the explanation 
eventually proves unsatisfying, the remainder may continue to provide 
insight and a basis for reconstruction of the unsatisfactory bit.107 
2. Other forms of legitimacy 
Although my focus is on legal legitimacy, other forms of legitimacy will 
also be relevant to the analysis. Taking a somewhat broader perspective, I 
will at points consider how legal legitimacy interacts with and contributes 
to the functional legitimacy of risk regulation. I will also consider how 
legal legitimacy overlaps with conceptions of democratic legitimacy. 
“Functional legitimacy” is a broad form of legitimacy. In Scott’s 
definition, functionally legitimate acts are “ones which are accepted and 
followed by those to whom they apply, irrespective of whether those 
                                           
107 Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Belknap 1981) 13–18. 
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subject to them agree with them”.108 Functional legitimacy is essential to 
the viability of democratic systems. This sense of legitimacy is often what 
is at issue when people discuss the legitimacy of bureaucratic 
government or of the European Union in general.109 Functional legitimacy 
is a psychological state. It concerns the way in which governmental 
institutions and actions are perceived and evaluated by the public. As 
such, it cannot be assessed solely in theoretical terms. One cannot, for 
example, analyse a regulatory process on paper and make a definitive 
judgment as to whether the process is functionally legitimate.110 Instead, 
analysis of functional legitimacy requires the tools of social science. 
Ultimately, the question whether an act is functionally legitimate vel non 
is an empirical question. As a consequence, functional legitimacy cannot 
be investigated directly through the methodology of legal idealism. 
Legal analysis is, however, relevant to assessments of functional 
legitimacy. It is a plausible (though not indisputable111) assumption that 
an act cannot be functionally legitimate in a liberal-democratic society 
unless it is legally legitimate. One common feature of all liberal 
democracies is the rule of law: the principle that official power in society 
is structured and limited by impersonal legal rules, made through public 
processes, and (more controversially) on which individuals may rely as a 
shield against the exercise of power that is not in accordance with those 
rules.112 Put simply, without the rule of law, there is no liberal 
                                           
108 Scott, ‘Governing Without Law or Governing Without Government? 
New-Ish Governance and the Legitimacy of the EU’ (2009) 15 ELJ  
160, 161. 
109 Ibid., 160–61. In the US context, see Farina, ‘The Consent of the 
Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World’ (1996) 72 Chi-
Kent.L.Rev. 987, 988–89; cf. Frug, ‘The Ideology of Bureaucracy in 
American Law’ (1984) 97 HLR 1276, 1285. 
110 Farina (n.109), 992. 
111 Hyde, ‘The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law’ [1983] 
Wis.L.Rev. 379, 385–86. 
112 The rule of law is, of course, a capacious concept, to which this brief 
definition cannot do justice. See Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive 
Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’ [1998] PL 467 
and Fallon, ‘“The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse’ 
(1997) 97 Colum.L.Rev. 1. 
62 Administrative Legitimacy and Risk Regulation 
  
democracy, which is the fundamental measure of legitimate government 
in modern Western societies.113 Legal legitimacy is therefore a necessary, 
but not a sufficient, component of functional legitimacy. 
In addition to questions of legal and functional legitimacy, 
administrative risk regulation raises issues of democratic legitimacy. 
Democratic legitimacy is concerned with whether governmental 
institutions or actions are consistent with a particular theory of 
democracy.114 Democracy, of course, is an essentially contested 
concept.115 As a consequence, a prerequisite for any analysis of 
democratic legitimacy is the specification of a theory of democracy. Only 
when we have a clear understanding of what democracy entails is it 
possible to assess the democratic character of an institution or action.116 
Unlike functional legitimacy, democratic legitimacy in the sense I am 
using it is a theoretical question. Like functional legitimacy, however, 
democratic legitimacy is not readily assessed with the tools of legal 
analysis. Instead, it is ultimately a matter of political theory.117 Although 
legal analysis in democratic systems will necessarily incorporate 
premises about democratic government, the validity of those premises 
cannot be assessed from within law itself. 
Because legal idealism is an essentially internal perspective on law 
and legal legitimacy, there are certain questions regarding the legitimacy 
of administrative risk regulation that I will not address. First, I will not 
enter into the complex debates on the legitimacy of the European Union 
itself118 or the related, but much less urgent, debates regarding American 
                                           
113 Oliver and Fusaro (eds.), How Constitutions Change: A Comparative 
Study (Hart 2011). 
114 Craig (n.31), 5. 
115 Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ (1955) 56 PAS 167, 183–87. 
116 Craig (n.31), 3–5. 
117 Ibid. 
118 A good overview is provided in Craig, ‘Integration, Democracy, and 
Legitimacy’ in Craig and de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (2d ed., 
OUP 2011). 
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federalism.119 One of the fascinations of the EU as an object of study is 
its category-transcending nature. The inability to fit the EU comfortably 
within existing theories of liberal democracy makes questions about its 
legitimacy both persistent and important. At the same time, however, the 
problems should not be overstated. Many aspects of the EU can be 
readily reconciled with conventional theories of democracy, and the fact 
that no theory of European democracy has yet gained widespread 
agreement should not be taken as evidence (or at least not strong 
evidence) that the EU is somehow fundamentally illegitimate.120 
Nor will I deal with debates regarding the fundamental legitimacy of 
bureaucratic administration. Bureaucracy, for all its problems, is 
necessary for modern governments to meet the demands of their 
populaces. For this reason, if no other, a largely unelected bureaucracy is 
a fact of life.121 There are, of course, powerful critiques to be made of 
bureaucracy, and we should perhaps not be so ready to acquiesce in its 
inevitability.122 But I will confess to an inability to imagine a world 
without it, much less how we could ever get to such a world from where 
we are now.123 Thus, though I will be intensely interested in the ways in 
which the EU and US legal systems construct the legitimacy of 
bureaucracy, and will at times be critical of those constructions, I will not 
question the validity of the project itself. 
3. Legitimacy as narrative 
Having described my understanding of legal legitimacy, I now need to 
elaborate further on my methodological approach to it. As used in this 
thesis, legal legitimacy is a reconciliation of a government institution or 
action with authoritative legal sources and rule of law values. It is not 
                                           
119 E.g., Galle and Seidenfeld, ‘Administrative Law’s Federalism: 
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power’ 
(2008) 57 Duke.L.J. 1933. 
120 Craig (n.118), 31–33; Moravcsik, ‘Reassessing Legitimacy in the 
European Union’ (2002) 40 JCMS 603, 611–13. 
121 Fisher (n.1), 19–21. 
122 Frug (n.109), 1381–88. 
123 Cf. Craig (n.31), 400–07. 
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merely a state, but also an explanation. Being an explanation, it is also a 
narrative. Understanding legitimacy as a narrative provides a 
methodological framework in which we can reconstruct and compare 
ideas of legitimacy across the two jurisdictions. 
A narrative is a “multidimensional purposive communication from a 
teller to an audience.”124 Because it is purposive, a narrative is “shaped 
in the service of larger ends.”125 Put in simpler terms, a narrative is a 
story told for a particular purpose. Narratives explain relationships 
between objects and events in a way that makes sense of them within a 
larger cognitive framework.126 In this way, narratives constitute meaning. 
Narratives that offer explanations of the world or aspects of it are 
sometimes referred to as myths to indicate that they are constitutive of a 
community’s sense of identity.127 Constitutional theorists often use the 
concept of myth in this sense, to describe a narrative that explains the 
mutually constitutive relationship between constitutions and national 
identity.128 My ambitions are more modest. The narratives I am interested 
in are those that explain how the exercise of power by bureaucratic 
administration is consistent with a particular constitutional system. 
These narratives both constitute the administration by describing its 
features and operations and legitimate it by reconciling those features 
with legal values that are themselves, to some extent, taken as given. 
                                           
124 Herman, Phelan, Rabinowitz, Richardson, and Warhol, Narrative 
Theory: Core Concepts and Critical Debates (The Ohio State University 
2012) 3. 
125 Ibid. 
126 White, The Edge of Meaning (University of Chicago 2001) 246–48. 
127 My theoretical approach in this regard is strongly influenced by the 
work of Lévi-Strauss. E.g., Myth and Meaning (Routledge 2001) (1978); 
see also Falck, Myth, Truth, and Literature (2d ed., CUP 1994) 34–54. 
128 E.g., Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Belknap 1993) 34–41; 
Arnold, The Symbols of Government (Yale 1935); Della Sala, ‘Political 
Myth, Mythology and the European Union’ (2010) 48 JCMS 1, 10–13; 
Weiler, ‘In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe’s Constitutional 
Sonderweg’ in Weiler and Wind (eds.) European Constitutionalism Beyond 
the State (CUP 2003); cf. Weiler, ‘In the Face of Crisis: Input Legitimacy, 
Output Legitimacy and the Political Messianism of European Integration’ 
(2012) 34 JEI 825, 832–35. 
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These legitimacy narratives do not operate linearly or deductively, but 
instead have multiple overlapping strands that grow or recede in 
prominence over time and in different contexts.129 In a similar vein, Lord 
and Magnette have argued that a complete theory of legitimacy requires 
the analysis of multiple “legitimacy vectors”, each of which corresponds 
to distinct values that are relevant to the overall concept of legitimacy.130 
Lord and Magnette use the term “vectors”, because “they sometimes 
reinforce, and at other times, pull against one another”.131 It is through 
the use of multiple strands, or vectors, that legitimacy narratives create a 
convincing view of the world, which is necessary for a narrative to have 
explanatory power. 
Three legitimacy vectors, in particular, will be central to my analysis: 
law, science, and democracy (or their alter-egos, law, fact, and policy). As 
Christopher Edley has shown, the primary preoccupation of 
administrative law is the drawing and re-drawing of boundaries between 
the domains of law, fact, and policy, as well as the boundaries between 
their corresponding modes of reasoning.132 By assigning issues to one or 
more of these categories, legal doctrine constitutes the meaning of 
phenomena (within legal discourse), controls the modes by which they 
are discussed and disputed, and assigns responsibility for 
decisionmaking to various actors in the administrative process.133 
Although Edley’s analysis is specific to the US, a similar use of these 
vectors is observable in EU legal doctrine.134 
                                           
129 E.g., Harlow, ‘Three Phases in the Evolution of EU Administrative Law’ 
in Craig and de Búrca (eds.) (n.118); Rabin, ‘Federal Regulation in 
Historical Perspective’ (1986) 38 Stan.L.Rev. 1189. 
130 Lord and Magnette, ‘E Pluribus Unum? Creative Disagreement about 
Legitimacy in the EU’ (2004) 42 JCMS 183. 
131 Ibid., 184. 
132 Edley (n.11), 29–36. This idea of boundary drawing (or boundary 
work) also animates much of the sociological literature on risk regulation. 
Jasanoff (n.12), 26–27. 
133 Edley (n. 11), 98–105; Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process (Eskridge 
and Frickey eds., Foundation Press 2006) 4–6. 
134 Fisher (n.1), 238–41. 
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If legitimacy is to be understood as a narrative or a story, then we 
need some idea of the identity of the tellers.135 A key feature of legal 
legitimacy narratives is that there is no single teller or group of tellers. 
Rather, they are told by a range of actors at a variety of times. 
Legislators, judges, administrators, and lawyers all take part in 
constructing the narrative. What unites these actors and makes the 
telling of a more-or-less coherent narrative possible is that the telling 
takes place within a single interpretive community: the legal 
profession.136 Within this interpretive community, courts and judges have 
a privileged position because their versions of the narrative are 
authoritative. For a number of reasons, however, courts are not the only 
tellers of legitimacy narratives. Foremost, judicial decisions are, by their 
nature, sporadic and fragmentary and thus do not provide an effective 
medium for the telling of complete and coherent narratives. Additionally, 
norms of judicial self-restraint tend to prevent judges from developing 
narratives beyond the circumstances of the specific case. These limits are 
particularly relevant in the EU, in which judgments are issued in the 
name of the whole court and dissents are not published. Nor can judicial 
opinions be the sole source of legitimacy narratives because not all 
judges are telling the same story. Rather, judges, like other actors in the 
legal community, may tell different narratives that reflect their own 
interpretation of the legal materials. Judicial reliance on competing 
legitimacy narratives is particularly evident in common law countries in 
which the issuance of multiple opinions in individual cases is used by 
judges as a way of advocating differing narratives.137 
Lawyers, by contrast, are more likely to tell relatively complete 
legitimacy narratives as part of their effort to persuade courts or agencies 
to accept their interpretations of legal materials. Works on advocacy 
                                           
135 Herman, et al. (n.124), 15. 
136 Bell (n.6), 8–10; see also Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The 
Authority of Interpretive Communities (Harvard 1980). 
137 A similar dynamic can be seen in the EU in exchanges between the 
Advocates General and the Court of Justice. Compare, e.g., Case C-
50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council [2002] ECR I-6677 
with ibid., Opinion of A.G. Jacobs. 
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commonly advise that cases are won or lost on how the issues are 
framed, which often means how they are situated within a legitimacy 
narrative. Lawyers thus tell competing legitimacy narratives as part of a 
broader competition among their clients to set the terms of debate. The 
advocacy quality of most lawyering, however, means that these narratives 
are limited to the interests at hand, and are therefore also inevitably 
incomplete. In the end, it falls to academic lawyers to tell complete 
legitimacy narratives, as they are the only actors within the legal 
community who have the institutional space and freedom to integrate a 
broad range of legal materials apart from any instrumental purpose.138 In 
large part, it is what we are for. 
This thesis, therefore, while primarily a work of analysis is also a work 
of creation.139 My task is to analyse the available legal materials and to 
construct one or more narratives that plausibly rationalise the existence 
of administrative risk regulation with authoritative legal materials and 
legal values. I can therefore make no claims of authority for the 
narratives presented, and alternative narratives will always be possible. 
That said, I am not advocating a standard of absolute relativism in legal 
scholarship.140 Although multiple interpretations will usually be possible, 
legal materials are not endlessly malleable. What I present in this thesis 
are the narratives that I find most satisfying and persuasive. They are 
descriptive in the sense that they reflect my understanding of the 
materials studied. They are prescriptive in that I argue they are the best 
way of making sense of those materials. My challenge is to persuade the 
reader on both counts. 
C. The Role of Legal Culture 
My approach to legitimacy as narrative—the telling of a story—makes it 
important to consider the ways in which legal materials are presented 
                                           
138 Posner, ‘The State of Legal Scholarship Today: A Comment on Schlag’ 
(2009) 97 Geo.L.J. 845, 854–55; van Gestel and Micklitz, ‘Why Methods 
Matter in European Legal Scholarship’ (2014) 20 ELJ 292, 295–96 . 
139 White (n.126), 221; White, The Legal Imagination (abridged ed., 
University of Chicago 1985) (1973) 245–50. 
140 Cf. Bell (n.6), 21 
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and debated, that is to say the vocabulary and grammar in which the 
narratives are told. Attention to these aspects of legitimacy narratives 
inevitably requires thinking about legal culture. Legal culture is 
troublesome as a basis for analysis, however, for two reasons: First, it is 
an indeterminate concept, which can mean different things depending on 
the analytical perspective taken.141 Second, evidence of legal culture is 
often elusive and frequently insufficient as a basis for drawing 
generalisations.142 Rather than being observed directly, the workings of 
legal culture must generally be inferred, which inevitably confers a 
subjective character on the evidence. 
As to the first problem, for the purposes of this thesis I am interested 
in the aspect of legal culture that John Bell calls the “internal 
perspective” of official legal culture.143 In describing the internal 
perspective, Bell states: 
[W]e are concerned here, for example, to 
explain the internal process of making sense of 
the Code as part of a legal argument. For this 
purpose, there are established ways in which 
interpretations can be accepted as valid. There 
are conventions within the legal community 
about what are appropriate arguments which 
support an interpretation—whether cases can 
be cited and from which courts, whether 
doctrinal legal writers can be cited as 
appropriate authorities. Education has an 
important role in the socialisation of 
participants into a culture.144 
Put differently, legal culture in the sense I am using it is the framework 
by which meaning is created out of legal materials. In the context of 
legitimacy narratives, it is the internal perspective of legal culture that 
provides the tools for explaining administrative risk regulation in terms of 
                                           
141 Nelken, ‘Using the Concept of Legal Culture’ (2004) 29 
Austl.J.Leg.Phil. 1, 8–9. 
142 Cotterrell, ‘The Concept of Legal Culture’ in Nelken (ed.), Comparing 
Legal Cultures (Dartmouth1997) 13. 
143 Bell (n.6), 17. 
144 Ibid., 7. 
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legal materials and values.145 At times, legal culture will itself be a source 
of those values. 
The second problem is more difficult. An essential aspect of legal 
culture is its pervasiveness.146 That pervasiveness makes legal culture 
crucial for understanding the operation of a legal system, but it also 
makes it difficult to get a hold of. Inevitably, analysis of legal culture is 
an act of interpretation and, as Bell notes, “[i]t has to be recognised that 
such analysis is a construction of the author.”147 In that sense, analysing 
legal culture is like constructing a legitimacy narrative and the two can 
even be seen as different manifestations of the same intellectual 
enterprise. But unlike legitimacy narratives, which are constructed from 
authoritative texts, legal culture is open-ended. The attendant danger is 
that subjective interpretation will outstrip evidence, and explanations of 
legal systems in terms of legal culture can quickly fall into speculation or 
oversimplification. To mitigate this danger, my focus will remain closely 
on administrative law doctrine and legal reasoning, rather than broader 
characterisations of legal culture (e.g., the oft-cited characterisation of 
American legal culture as a form of adversarial legalism).148 In this way, I 
hope to avoid the problem of relying on generalisations about culture that 
are difficult to substantiate. At the same time, however, limiting the 
analysis in this way necessarily sacrifices some of the explanatory 
richness of a broader approach. This is another area in which I believe 
future work may be valuable. 
D. Comparative Law 
The project of constructing legitimacy narratives used to explain 
administrative risk regulation within any one jurisdiction could easily fill 
a thesis. Why then add complexity by undertaking a comparative study? 
There are two reasons: one methodological and one practical. 
                                           
145 Ewald (n.6), 2127–28. 
146 Bell (n.6), 2–8. 
147 Ibid., 21. 
148 Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law  
(Harvard 2001). 
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Comparative analysis is worthwhile foremost because it enriches the 
explanatory power of the narrative methodology I have been describing. A 
signal feature of legal culture and of legitimacy narratives is their 
background character.149 Legal culture in particular is such an integral 
part of thinking and speaking about law that it becomes invisible, and its 
very pervasiveness makes it difficult to examine solely from within a 
particular legal tradition. Comparative analysis, on the other hand, tends 
to reveal the operation of legal culture. As Garapon puts it, “To grasp a 
culture . . . involves one in trying to formulate what is so obvious for the 
members that ‘it goes without saying’. The best way of abstracting oneself 
from one’s own culture is to look at it from the outside in confronting it 
with other cultures.”150 One of the goals of this thesis is to reveal some of 
what “goes without saying” in the administrative law of risk regulation, a 
goal which is made easier by the application of comparative analysis. 
The practical justification for comparison is that, in my view, trans-
Atlantic understandings of administrative law and risk regulation are in a 
bad state. Although there has been a lot of comparative work done in this 
area, the large majority of that work has focused on regulatory outcomes 
or on the operation of regulatory principles in isolation.151 As valuable as 
this work is, it does little to explain differences between the two 
jurisdictions regarding the role of law in risk regulation. In doing so, it 
tends to overlook an important source of normative, as well as 
instrumental, influence on regulatory processes.152 At times, it can even 
be counterproductive by analysing regulatory concepts outside of their 
                                           
149 Jasanoff (n.12), ch. 1. 
150 Garapon, Bien Juger, as quoted in Bell (n.6), 21. 
151 Fisher (n.1), 2. There are obviously important exceptions, including 
the work of Fisher and Jasanoff. Excellent comparative work on 
administrative law has also been done recently by scholars such as 
Ackerman, Bignami, and Craig, but their work has not focused on the 
specific topic of risk regulation. 
152 Fisher (n.1), 23–25. 
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administrative-constitutional context, with the predictable result that the 
meaning of those concepts becomes distorted.153 
This gap in scholarship is important because of the global positions of 
the EU and the US, both economically and as the leading exporters of 
regulatory norms.154 As economic leaders, the EU and the US must 
increasingly cooperate on regulatory matters, and even with rising doubts 
about globalisation, there is no immediate prospect of a return to purely 
national forms of regulation. The ability of the two systems to cooperate 
will inevitably be hampered if the two sides fail to understand why the 
other approaches problems in the way it does and how those approaches 
respond to that system’s specific needs. Similarly, the process of 
regulatory learning, either between the EU and US or between these and 
other jurisdictions, cannot achieve its full potential if the significance of 
regulatory principles and processes is not well-understood. Comparative 
lawyers have long warned of the dangers of transplanting legal artefacts 
from one context to another because of the possibilities of unexpected 
interactions.155 The reverse is also true, however; the potential benefits 
that might come from attending to foreign regulatory approaches may not 
be realised if the full meaning of those approaches is not understood. 
It should also be apparent from my focus on administrative 
constitutionalism and legal culture that my analysis is not going attempt 
                                           
153 The poster child for the perils of this sort of analysis is Marchant and 
Mossman, Arbitrary and Capricious: The Precautionary Principle in the 
European Courts (AEI 2004), which tries to analyse the EU courts’ 
jurisprudence on the precautionary principle without accounting for 
other basic aspects of EU law, such as proportionality and subsidiarity. 
As one might guess, the result is unrecognizable to a reader with a 
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equally bizarre to American readers. E.g., Portuese, ‘The Principle of 
Proportionality as a Principle of Economic Efficiency’ (2013) 19 ELJ 612. 
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America: Law, Politics, Expertise (unpublished PhD thesis, University 
College London) (2016). 
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to decide which system is “better”. Indeed, on such issues the concept of 
better seems hopelessly indeterminate. For the avoidance of doubt, I will 
say up front that I think both systems are reasonably sound responses to 
the particular problems and cultural traditions at work in their respective 
jurisdictions. Neither is perfect, but no legal or regulatory system is. Nor 
do I think that either system would be materially improved by moving 
substantially closer to the other. That is not to say that I think the two 
systems cannot learn from one another, but the lessons I have in mind 
are at the margin and do not call on either system to alter its basic 
administrative-constitutional commitments. My purpose, however, is not 
to suggest reforms but to deepen understanding, which for the foregoing 
reasons I believe is a worthwhile project in its own right. 
III. A Roadmap 
A single thesis obviously cannot compare every aspect of risk regulation, 
and my focus will be on the way in which administrative law legitimates 
and shapes administrative risk regulation in the two jurisdictions. Even 
narrowed in this way, the ground is too broad for a single study to tackle. 
To make the task manageable and to limit it to a coherent set of themes, I 
will focus on a handful of issues that I believe are particularly essential to 
defining and distinguishing EU and US legal approaches to risk 
regulation. In selecting themes and issues for analysis in the doctrinal 
chapters, I have attempted to balance two goals. First, of necessity, I have 
tried to cover a broad enough sample of issues to inform the reader about 
the most important administrative law doctrines that bear on risk 
regulation and to situate those doctrines within a broader administrative-
constitutional context. Chapter 2, for example, explains the institutional 
arrangements for administrative risk regulation in each of the two 
jurisdictions and lays essential groundwork for understanding the 
institutional suppositions that inform the doctrine. Chapter 2 also 
addresses theories of delegation, which are central to the definition of 
administration in both jurisdictions. 
Second, in choosing issues to include in the doctrinal analysis I have 
focused on those aspects of legal doctrine and administrative 
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constitutionalism that give the two systems of risk regulation their 
individual characters. In chapter 3, I look at the role of law in 
constituting and limiting the aims of risk regulation through an 
examination of the roles of the precautionary principle and cost-benefit 
analysis. Chapter 4 examines the concept of administrative rationality in 
the two legal systems, including the relationship between scientific and 
political reasoning in conceptions of administrative rationality. Chapter 5 
brings together the analysis of the foregoing chapters by reconstructing 
the narratives that legitimate administrative risk regulation in the EU 
and US legal systems. By offering integrated narratives, I aim to highlight 
the interconnectedness of the various issues under examination and to 
expose in a subtle way the unique characters of the two systems. Finally, 
in chapter 6, I reflect on the two narratives and the normative visions of 
administration they represent. In doing so, I identify some of the 
jurisprudential sources of conflicts over risk regulation and argue that 
responding to those conflicts requires thinking about the role of 
administration generally and not just about the special problems of risk. 
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2 
Institutional Structures 
and Delegation 
This chapter sets forth the broad constitutional and institutional 
framework for administration in the European Union and the United 
States. Aspects of this discussion will be familiar to many readers, but it 
is nonetheless worth taking time to examine the differences in the 
institutional arrangements of the two administrations because these 
arrangement are important—if often unstated—premises of many of the 
legal doctrines that govern the exercise of administrative power. 
Institutional arrangements, and in particular the internal organisation of 
administrative bodies, also control the way in which risk regulation 
standards are developed by determining the manner and timing by which 
various actors and considerations are introduced into the process. 
The chapter begins by defining the administration in the two 
jurisdictions. It then considers the broad institutional arrangements of 
the two systems, including the mechanisms by which other institutions 
control the administration and hold it to account. It next looks in some 
detail at the administrations’ internal structures, before drawing some 
broad comparisons between the roles of the administration in the two 
systems. Finally, this chapter considers the legal theory of delegation, 
which is the primary doctrinal mechanism by which the two systems of 
administrative law reconcile the exercise of bureaucratic power with 
democratic values. 
I. The Administration and Its Role in the Constitutional Order 
The analysis must begin by defining the administration in each system. 
This seemingly banal point actually raises one of the most important 
contrasts between the US and EU. Whereas the US definition of 
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administration is settled, the concept of EU administration is still very 
much evolving. This section also considers how the administration 
relates to other constitutional actors. In both systems, regulatory power 
is divided and shared among multiple institutions. Defining the 
administration thus not only requires an examination of the 
administration’s own powers and prerogatives, but also the mechanisms 
available to other institutions for controlling the administration and 
holding it to account. 
A. The US: Administration Within a Nation-State 
1. Defining the administration 
The concept of administration in US law is well-settled. The US federal 
administration1 can be defined as those federal bodies, other than the 
judiciary, that implement US statutes and government programmes, 
pursuant to a delegation of authority set forth in a statute. In US 
parlance, the work of administration is done by agencies.2 Within the 
field of risk regulation, six agencies are of particular importance: the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Consumer Products Safety 
Commission (CPSC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC). Many other agencies occasionally engage 
in risk regulation, but the bulk of US federal risk programmes are 
administered by these six. Of these agencies, EPA is far and away the 
                                           
1 In this thesis, I am concerned only with the US federal government and 
not with the administrations of the several states. Similarly, I am 
concerned with administrative arrangements at EU level and not with 
Member State administrations, although the nature of EU administration 
(discussed below) is such that the interaction between Member State and 
EU administrations will at times be important. 
2 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) defines “agency” as “each 
authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is 
within or subject to review by another agency”, but excludes, among 
other entities, Congress and the courts. 5 U.S.C. § 551. The Supreme 
Court has also interpreted the APA not to apply to the president and vice-
president. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992). 
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most important, both in terms of the number of programmes it 
administers and in terms of the role its activities have played in the 
development of the law in this area. 
An essential characteristic of the federal administration is that it has 
been created entirely by, and derives all of its powers from, statute.3 
Although the Constitution contemplates the establishment of 
“Departments” and the appointment of “Officers”, it creates no such 
entities or positions, nor does it contain any explicit provisions for their 
establishment or functioning. This constitutional lacuna has given rise to 
the great preoccupation of American administrative law, the place of the 
administration within the Constitution’s scheme of separated powers.4 
2. The US institutional framework 
As is well known, the US federal government is organised according to a 
tripartite separation of powers, with the legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers assigned to Congress,5 the president,6 and the federal courts,7 
respectively. Because the Constitution gives the president some 
supervisory authority over the departments, and because the 
administration can be viewed as primarily executing laws passed by 
Congress, the administration is generally viewed as part of the Executive 
Branch.8 Control and supervision of the administration is not limited to 
the president, however. To the contrary, each of the three branches has 
mechanisms for controlling the administration and holding it to account. 
Indeed, as Peter Strauss has argued, the Supreme Court’s case law in 
                                           
3 Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). 
4 Mashaw, Merrill, and Shane, Administrative Law: The American Public 
Law System (6th ed., West 2009) 39–45; I Pierce, Administrative Law 
Treatise (4th ed., Aspen Law & Business 2002) 35–37. 
5 U.S. Const., Art. I. 
6 U.S. Const., Art. II. 
7 U.S. Const., Art III. 
8 Lessig and Sunstein, ‘The President and the Administration’ (1994) 94 
Colum.L.Rev. 1, 12–13. 
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this area is best understood as requiring that all branches have a degree 
of authority over the administration.9 
As the repository of legislative authority, Congress’s greatest power 
over the administration derives from the requirement that all agencies be 
created by statute. Congress thus has broad power to shape the 
composition, powers, and procedures of agencies. The only structural 
limitation on this power is that Congress may not vest itself with 
supervisory authority over the administration at the expense of the 
president.10 In addition to passing laws,11 Congress must authorise the 
federal budget and frequently uses the appropriations process to 
influence agencies’ policies and priorities. Both houses of Congress also 
exercise oversight over administrative and executive departments by 
conducting hearings and investigations.12 The Senate (but not the House) 
must confirm the president’s nominees to high-level positions within the 
administration,13 and Congress may remove “civil Officers of the United 
States” by impeachment.14 
Article II, section 1 of the Constitution vests “the Executive power” in 
“a” president. This Vesting Clause (along with the Opinion Clause15) is 
interpreted to give the president general supervisory power over the 
administration.16 The president’s greatest constitutional power to 
influence the administration is the power to appoint all “Officers of the 
United States”, subject to confirmation by the Senate. The appointment 
power gives the president the ability to shape administrative policy by 
                                           
9 Strauss, ‘The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch’ (1984) 84 Colum.L.Rev. 573, 579–80. 
10 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 724–27 (1986). Strauss reaches a 
similar conclusion based on earlier case law. Strauss (n.9), 650–53. 
11 Congress’s non-legislative powers to influence the administration are 
exhaustively catalogued in Beerman, ‘Congressional Administration’ 
(2006) 43 San.Diego.L.Rev. 61. 
12 Ibid., 126. 
13 U.S. Const., Art II, § 2. 
14 Ibid., Art. II, § 4. 
15 U.S. Const. Art II, § 2 (“[H]e may require the Opinion, in writing, of the 
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject 
relating to the Duties of their respective Offices.”). 
16 See Strauss (n.9), 646–48; Lessig and Sunstein (n.8), 12–13. 
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selecting administrative officials who share his or her policy preferences, 
a fact that has become central to contemporary understandings of 
administrative accountability. Most officers serve at the (unreviewable) 
pleasure of the president, although some—including the heads of some 
agencies—may only be removed for cause, which is understood to 
preclude removal of an official solely for political reasons. 
The extent of the president’s power over the administration is a topic 
of considerable debate, but there is no disagreement that it is broad.17 
The principal question discussed in the literature is whether the 
president is an “overseer”, i.e. limited to exercising those oversight 
powers specifically granted by the Constitution or statute, or a “decider”, 
i.e. constitutionally empowered to substitute his or her judgment for that 
of lower ranking executive or administrative officials. Supreme Court case 
law and constitutional tradition tend to favour the former interpretation, 
yet a strong minority of academics argue forcefully for the latter.18 The 
question has never been squarely answered by a court, however.19 
Though the constitutional position is unresolved, three points about 
presidential control over the administration are uncontroversial and 
important for the analysis in this thesis. First, numerous empirical 
studies have documented that presidents exercise enormous influence on 
                                           
17 Compare Lessig and Sunstein (n.8), 118–19, with Calabresi and 
Prakash, ‘The President’s Power to Execute the Laws’ (1994) 104 YLJ 
541, 568–70. The principal arguments in this debate are reviewed from 
different perspectives in Kagan, ‘Presidential Administration’ (2001) 114 
HLR 2245, 2319–31, Stack, ‘The President’s Statutory Powers to 
Administer the Laws’ (2006) 106 Colum.L.Rev. 263, 270–74, and Strauss, 
‘Overseer or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law’ (2007) 
75 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 696, 705–6. A lengthy historical analysis is offered in 
Bruff, Balance of Forces: Separation of Powers Law in the Administrative 
State (Carolina Academic Press 2005). 
18 I find the analysis presented in Strauss (n.17) in favour of the 
“overseer” hypothesis persuasive. The leading proponents of the “decider” 
thesis are Calabresi and Prakash (n.17). Their argument, though forceful, 
depends too much in my view on a hermeneutical analysis of 
constitutional text and pays insufficient attention to the long history of 
insulating administrative decisionmaking from direct presidential control. 
19 Strauss (n.17), 704. 
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administrative decisionmaking.20 Second, for at least the last four 
decades, presidents have expended considerable effort to extend their 
control over the administration.21 Third, these presidential efforts have 
been accompanied by a considerable development—both by academics 
and the courts—of the intellectual and doctrinal support for a strong 
presidential role in administrative decisionmaking. Defenders of “weak” 
presidentialism are a minority these days.22 This last point is of 
particular importance because it has caused a substantial evolution in 
US legitimacy narrative.23 
Finally, the Constitution establishes an independent judiciary with 
the Supreme Court at its apex. Unsurprisingly, given its culture of 
“adversarial legalism”,24 the availability of judicial review is an important 
part of US legitimacy narratives.25 The Constitution does not, however, 
confer a right to judicial review, and the availability and scope of review 
are extensively regulated by statute.26 Unlike the practice in the EU, 
judicial review is generally only available to individuals. Congress 
normally does not have standing to seek judicial review of administrative 
action.27 Nor, absent unusual circumstances, may an agency or the 
president seek judicial review.28 
Largely absent from this institutional picture are the several states. In 
contrast to the EU, in which the Member States have an important role in 
supervising the administration, US states have no formal role in federal 
                                           
20 Stack (n.17), 298 (listing studies). 
21 Kagan (n.17), 2272–2319. 
22 See sources cited note 17 above. 
23 Chapter 4, section II.C. 
24 Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law  
(Harvard 2001). 
25 Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action (Little, Brown & Co. 
1965) 320 (“The availability of judicial review is the necessary condition, 
psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power which 
purports to be legitimate, or legally valid.”). 
26 Stack (n.17), 300. 
27 Herz, ‘United States v. United States: When Can the Federal 
Government Sue Itself?’ (1992) 32 Wm.&Mary.L.Rev. 893, 913. 
28 Tennessee Valley Authority v. EPA, 278 F.3d 1184, 1193 
(11th.Cir.2002). 
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administrative processes. Although the states’ views carry great weight 
with federal administrators, their rights in most standard-setting 
proceedings are no different from the rights of private individuals to 
participate and to seek judicial review.29 The lack of formal state 
involvement in federal administrative processes gives the US 
administration a greater degree of unity and autonomy than its EU 
counterpart because there is no need to seek the approval of state 
governments as, for example, in the EU’s comitology process. 
B. The EU: Administration Beyond the Nation-State 
1. Defining EU administration 
Defining the EU administration is difficult, both because of the EU’s sui 
generis nature—somewhere between an international organisation and a 
federal government—and because of its unique and uniquely complex 
institutional architecture. Of particular relevance to this thesis, the line 
between administrative and legislative acts is less sharp in the EU than 
in the US. Although I will distinguish the two on formal grounds, the 
EU’s institutional processes give administrative acts (at least of the kinds 
used to set risk standards) certain characteristics that in the US might 
be described as legislative. 
To understand EU administration, we must briefly consider the 
nature of the Union itself. The EU is an organisation established by 
Treaty. It began life in 1952 as the European Coal and Steel Community, 
to which the European Economic Community and the European Atomic 
Energy Community were added in 1957.30 The EU began to take on its 
modern form in the 1980s, first with the Single European Act of 1986, 
which took the initial steps away from intergovernmentalism, and then 
with the establishment of the European Union by the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1993. The 2007 Treaty of Lisbon is the latest in a series of 
                                           
29 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923); see also 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 536–37 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
30 This history is recounted in Chalmers, Davies, and Monti, European 
Union Law: Text and Materials (3d ed., CUP 2014) 11–39. 
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significant post-Maastricht treaty revisions that have increased the scope 
of European-level competences and the ability of the EU to act 
independently of the control of the Member States.31 Notably, the Treaty 
of Lisbon merged the formerly separate European Community (the 
successor of the EEC) and the European Union into a single legal entity 
with competence over not only economic integration, but also a number 
of other governmental and regulatory fields of common interest to the 
Member States.32 
What exactly the European Union is today is a topic of considerable 
academic debate.33 Formally, it remains an international organisation, 
established by treaty with the consent of each Member State. It is not, 
however, an international organisation in the traditional sense because 
its decisionmaking processes are not fully within the control of the 
Member States, and its power to make binding law is (usually) not 
subject to the consent of any individual Member State. But the EU is not 
a nation-state either because (among other reasons) it is not a self-
authenticating legal order. Though the Member States may not be in full 
control of its decisionmaking, the force of EU law depends in the last 
instance on acts of the Member States as sovereigns, i.e. the Treaties. 
The EU’s uncertain constitutional status complicates the search for 
the “administrative” in EU law. At one extreme, the entirety of the EU can 
be conceived of as administrative. This thesis has been advanced by Peter 
Lindseth who argues that, because the EU only exercises power on the 
basis of a delegation from the Member States, its norm-setting power 
should also be understood solely in terms of delegated, rather than 
constitutive, authority.34 In Lindseth’s conception, the validity of any EU 
                                           
31 See generally, Craig, The Treaty of Lisbon: Law, Politics, and Treaty 
Reform (OUP 2013). 
32 Before Lisbon, the EC, not the EU, had competence to regulate risk at 
European level. For ease of reference, I will use the term EU to refer to 
both the EU and the EC. 
33 These debates are summarised in Chalmers, et al. (n.30), 7–11. 
34 Lindseth, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of 
Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community’ (1999) 99 
Colum.L.Rev. 628, 649–51. 
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regulation, whether in the form of EU legislation or of a delegated or 
implementing act, would be measured by reference to whether it 
furthered identifiable goals set forth in the Treaties, and it would be the 
responsibility of the courts to enforce the bounds of this delegation.35 
Although the EU does bear some resemblance to an administrative body, 
in that it ultimately derives its authority from democratically superior 
bodies, Lindseth’s argument is unconvincing. His approach depends on a 
highly instrumental conception of the EU, yet the Treaties themselves 
express an intention that the EU should be a constitutive body capable of 
generating its own normative order. That intention is notably expressed 
in the articles on consumer, health, and environmental protection, in 
which the Treaties establish ambitious and open-ended objectives, 
including commitments to a high level of protection, sustainable 
development, and the precautionary principle.36 Elaboration of these 
values requires a political process that can only be described as 
constitutive in nature.37 The overriding impression of these provisions is 
of a European vision of health and environmental protection, separate 
from national approaches to those problems. 
At the other end of the spectrum, it could be argued that all EU 
standard setting constitutes legislative activity and that no distinction 
should be made between legislative and administrative acts. Outside of 
narrow areas, the EU’s regulatory powers are limited to rule generation, 
and historically there was formally no hierarchy of norms in EU law.38 
After Lisbon, which introduced specific categories of “delegated 
                                           
35 Ibid., 657–62. 
36 See generally, Arts. 11, 12, 169, and 191 TFEU. 
37 Additionally, Article 10 TEU, which states, “The functioning of the 
Union shall be founded on representative democracy. . . . Citizens are 
directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament”, and 
Article 9 TEU, which confers EU citizenship on all citizens of the Member 
States, suggest that the EU understands itself to derive a measure of 
political authority directly from European citizens. Lenaerts, ‘The 
Principle of Democracy in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice’ 
(2013) 62 Int’l&Comp.L.Q. 271, 275–79. 
38 Bieber and Salomé, ‘Hierarchy of Norms in European Law’ (1996) 33 
C.M.L.Rev. 907, 915–17. 
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legislation” and “implementing acts”, the view that all EU standard 
setting should be thought of as legislation is no longer tenable, 
however.39 Additionally, by introducing the idea of an “ordinary legislative 
procedure”, Lisbon created a special status for EU acts adopted via this 
method.40 Even before Lisbon, the EU courts had at least implicitly 
recognised such a hierarchy in the context of acts adopted by the 
Commission pursuant to a legislative delegation.41 Additionally, the Court 
of Justice has tended to apply stricter procedural requirements and 
substantive scrutiny to standards adopted by the Commission.42 It is the 
existence of these separate and additional legal controls that sets 
administrative standard setting apart from legislation in the EU. 
For purposes of this thesis, I will define EU administrative acts as 
those taken by the Commission, or less commonly the Council, pursuant 
to a delegation contained in legislation adopted through one of the EU’s 
legislative processes. I will use the term “administration” to refer to the 
various institutions that cooperate in the production of these acts. That 
definition includes, but is not limited to, the Commission, European 
agencies, expert committees, and comitology committees. These various 
actors are described in the following section. 
2. The EU institutional order 
The unique nature of the EU has also resulted in an unusually complex 
institutional structure. At the top of the institutional hierarchy are the 
EU Institutions: the European Council, the European Parliament, the 
Council of Ministers (Council), the European Commission, and the Court 
of Justice of the European Union.43 Of these Institutions, the 
Commission, Parliament, Council, and Court of Justice are most 
                                           
39 Case C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v. Parliament and Council, 
nyr, paras. 60–61. 
40 Craig (n.31), 250–52. 
41 Case 23/75, Rey Soda v. Cassa Zucchero [1975] ECR 1279,  
paras. 9–11. 
42 E.g., Case C-343/09, Afton Chemical Ltd. v. Secretary of State for 
Transport [2010] ECR I-7027, Opinion of A.G. Kokott, paras. 53–54. 
43 Article 13 TEU. 
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important for the administrative process. As the EU’s main 
administrative body, the Commission is responsible for most 
administrative decisions and for the functioning of the administration 
generally. The Commission is responsible to the Parliament, which in 
conjunction with the Council acts as the EU legislature. Finally, the EU 
courts are responsible for upholding the rule of law and ensuring the 
legal accountability of the other Institutions. 
The Parliament is the EU’s only directly elected Institution. Like the 
US Congress, the Parliament’s greatest power over the administration is 
its role in the legislative process, by which the terms of delegated power 
are fixed. Unlike Congress and the Member State legislatures, however, 
Parliament’s role in the legislative process is circumscribed and it has 
very limited rights to initiate legislation.44 The Parliament also possesses 
other powers for holding the administration to account. It must ratify the 
European Council’s nominee for Commission President and subsequently 
approve the full slate of Commissioners.45 It may form committees of 
inquiry and require members of the Commission to appear before it.46 It 
may censor the Commission or any Commissioner, and it may force the 
resignation of the Commission as a whole.47 As discussed below, it may 
comment on proposed implementing acts, and it may reject delegated 
acts adopted by the Commission in some circumstances.48 Additionally, 
the Parliament exercises considerable control over the EU budget, which 
it may use to influence administrative priorities.49 
The Council is primarily a legislative body. It is comprised of one 
representative “at ministerial level” of each Member State.50 All EU 
legislation must be approved by the Council, but like the Parliament, it 
generally may not initiate legislation. Like the Parliament, the Council 
                                           
44 Article 294 TFEU; Chalmers, et al. (n.30), 100–01. 
45 Article 17(7) TEU. 
46 Article 226 TEU. 
47 Article 17(8) TEU. 
48 Below, section II.B.4. 
49 Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union (7th ed., 
Palgrave Macmillan 2010) 185. 
50 Article 16(2) TEU. 
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may reject delegated acts and comment on implementing acts. In 
increasingly rare circumstances, the Council also acts as an 
administrative body by adopting implementing acts instead of the 
Commission.51 
The Commission is primarily an administrative institution, but it also 
plays an important part in the legislative process. Normally, only the 
Commission may propose legislation to the Parliament and Council,52 
and it retains the right to modify its proposal or to withdraw it entirely at 
any time prior to final disposition by the Council.53 This powerful role 
gives the Commission a great degree of influence on the content and 
scope of the delegations under which it will subsequently adopt 
administrative acts. 
The Court of Justice of the European Union includes two courts, the 
Court of Justice and the General Court.54 Direct access to the EU courts 
by private litigants is limited to addressees of the act in question or those 
who can show “direct and individual concern”, meaning that the act must 
affect the applicant directly without the need for any further intervening 
act55 and that it must only affect a group of individuals whose 
membership is fixed and numerable.56 In the past, this restrictive test for 
standing was a serious hurdle for private parties seeking judicial review 
of administrative action.57 The Treaty of Lisbon liberalised standing 
somewhat by providing that in suits “against a regulatory act . . . which . 
. . does not entail implementing measures” the applicant need only show 
                                           
51 Article 291(2) TFEU. 
52 Article 17 TEU. 
53 Articles 293 and 294 TFEU. 
54 Article 19 TEU. Before Lisbon, the Court of Justice was known as the 
European Court of Justice and the General Court was known as the 
Court of First Instance. For ease of reference, I use the terms Court of 
Justice and General Court throughout. 
55 Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law (8th ed.,  
OUP 2014) 388. 
56 Ibid., 372. 
57 Harlow, ‘Towards a Theory of Access for the European Court of Justice’ 
(1993) 12 YEL 213, 241–45. 
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direct concern.58 The Court of Justice has interpreted “regulatory acts” to 
mean acts of general applicability that are not adopted through a 
legislative procedure.59 Accordingly, this provision will apply to most 
administrative measures, provided they do not require further 
implementation. Additionally, applicants who cannot show standing may 
still be able to access the EU courts indirectly via a reference from a 
national court.60 One aspect of EU judicial practice that is quite distinct 
from the US is the common phenomenon of EU Institutions or Member 
States suing other Institutions over the legality of legislative or 
administrative acts.61 This possibility gives the Institutions and Member 
States an additional route for exercising control over the administration 
indirectly, via the courts. 
Finally, the Member States have an important place in the EU 
administrative constellation. Under the Treaties, the default assumption 
is that Member States are responsible for the implementation of EU law. 
Article 291 TFEU provides that the Member States’ powers of 
implementation may be transferred to the Commission only when 
“uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are 
needed,” thus arguably creating a principle of executive subsidiarity.62 
And even when implementing powers are exercised at EU level, the 
Member States retain important roles. In some regulatory programmes, 
Member States are responsible for much of the preparatory work for EU-
level decisions. Additionally, the Member States exercise direct oversight 
of Commission implementing acts through the comitology process, 
described below.63 Finally, the Member States are responsible for 
virtually all enforcement of EU law, meaning that the EU administration 
                                           
58 Article 263 TFEU. 
59 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (n.39), paras. 60–61. 
60 E.g., Case C-132/03, Ministero della Salute v. Codacons [2005] ECR I-
4167. This process has been more frequently used by regulated entities. 
61 E.g., Joined Cases C-14/06 and C-295/06, Parliament v. Commission 
[2008] ECR I-1649. 
62 Schütze, ‘Executive Federalism in the (New) European Union’ (2010) 47 
C.M.L.Rev. 1385, 1411. 
63 Below, section II.B.4. 
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cannot set policy or fine-tune its risk standards through enforcement 
actions, a technique that is common among US agencies. 
C. Sameness and Difference in the US and EU 
Institutional Orders 
The foregoing rough sketches of the institutional architecture of the US 
and the EU reveals many important differences, but what is perhaps 
more striking are the broad similarities. First, both systems have complex 
institutional structures characterised by divided powers and checks and 
balances. By design, these systems create competition among 
institutions, which has the benefit of inhibiting the concentration of 
power, but at the cost of creating complex dynamics, the effects of which 
are hard to assess ex ante. Inevitably, these dynamics affect the way in 
which the administration does its work in that, at least over the medium- 
to long-term, the administration will have to maintain a measure of 
support from each institution. 
The second similarity is that in both systems, the idea of 
administration is grounded in a theory of delegation, by which 
administrative bodies implement regulatory programmes established in 
the first instance by a legislature, which by hypothesis is the primary 
institution for expressing democratic preferences. The full implications of 
the delegation approach to administration are explored in Part III. For 
now, the important point is that a theory of delegation entails the 
subordination of the administration to other institutions to some degree. 
In the US, this subordination is nearly total, particularly if one accepts 
the view that the president is entitled to override administrators’ 
decisions. By contrast, the degree of subordination of the EU 
administration is less. The Commission’s constitutional status as a 
coequal Institution with the Council and the Parliament give it 
prerogatives in the administrative process, which it may enforce 
judicially.64 Additionally, the Commission’s legislative role provides it with 
a powerful weapon for defending its position. 
                                           
64 E.g., Case C-257/01, Commission v. Council [2005] ECR I-345. 
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The third similarity is that a strong judiciary is central to the 
functioning of both systems. With so much institutional competition, a 
central referee is essential. But in neither system is the courts’ role 
passively neutral. Rather, both systems’ courts have asserted themselves 
in defining the role of the administration within the broader 
constitutional structure. Indeed, the ambiguities created by the division 
of powers among the other institutions has created greater opportunities 
for the courts to shape the role of the administration. 
Despite these many similarities, there is one crucial difference 
between the two systems. Whereas the American federal government is a 
self-sufficient sovereign, the EU remains dependent in multiple ways on 
its Member States. Although US policymakers take state concerns quite 
seriously, no action of the federal government is dependent on state 
assent. The EU, by contrast depends in many ways on Member States for 
both resources and legitimacy.65 Not only can the Member States block 
EU initiatives either through their representation on the Council or their 
role in comitology, the EU must rely on the Member States for most 
aspects of implementation. This situation leaves the EU with two options: 
it must either negotiate the multitude of Member State perspectives to 
find solutions that command broad support (at the cost of time, 
resources, and possible policy dilution) or it must evade Member State 
control (at the cost of deepening scepticism about its own democratic 
legitimacy). In practice, it does some of both, although its preference is 
for the former. In chapter 4, I will argue that this dynamic has affected 
the way in which the EU courts understand the process of administrative 
decisionmaking. 
                                           
65 Joerges, ‘Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and the European 
Court of Justice: Legal Frameworks for Denationalized Governance 
Structures’ in Joerges, Ladeur, and Vos (eds.), Integrating Scientific 
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II. Administrative Institutions 
Having explored the broad institutional landscapes of the US and the EU 
and the administration’s place within them, this section turns to the 
administration itself by looking at each jurisdiction’s administrative 
institutions. 
A. US Administrative Bodies and Process 
1. Agencies 
The primary organisational unit of US administration is the 
administrative agency, and virtually all administrative risk standard 
setting is undertaken by and within agencies. Although US agencies vary 
considerably in their organisational details and capacities, they are 
sufficiently similar to allow for reasonably accurate generalisations about 
their structure and workings. 
Agencies are self-contained government entities. They have, in 
European parlance, legal personality. They may act on their own behalf 
and they generally have the authority to take legally binding decisions 
without having to seek the approval of any other government body.66 
Unlike the situation in the EU, in which the administration of regulatory 
programmes is undertaken by a complex set of institutions, American 
administrative agencies are “one stop shops”, with capacities for 
research, policy development, adjudication, rulemaking, and enforcement 
all contained within a single organisational structure under the 
leadership of a single responsible agency head (although that “head” may 
be a multimember commission). 
Broadly speaking, there are two types of US agencies: independent 
agencies (sometimes called “independent regulatory commissions”) and 
executive agencies. The distinction between the two is entirely formal. An 
independent agency is one whose head does not serve at the pleasure of 
the president, whereas the heads of executive agencies may be removed 
at will.67 Additionally, independent agencies are almost always headed by 
                                           
66 I Pierce (n.4) 4–5. 
67 Mashaw, et al. (n.4), 28. 
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a multi-member commission rather than an individual. It is generally 
assumed that insulation from the president’s removal power gives the 
independent agencies a greater ability to set regulatory policy 
independently of presidential preferences. The extent of that freedom is 
much debated, however.68 In practice, most of the tools by which the 
president exercises oversight over administrative agencies apply equally 
to independent and executive agencies, and the analysis in this thesis is 
applicable to both types of agency. Of the six main risk regulation 
agencies, the CPSC and the NRC are independent agencies. 
All agency heads are appointed by the president, subject to Senate 
confirmation. Agency heads may or may not possess technical 
qualifications. While the FDA Administrator is almost always a physician, 
most EPA Administrators have been lawyers. As a practical matter, the 
agency head is responsible for providing broad policy direction, 
representing the agency within the Executive Branch and before 
Congress, and making final decisions on issues of particular importance 
or public controversy.69 Legally speaking, however, the agency head is 
responsible for every act of the agency.70 That responsibility extends to 
an agency’s expert reports and conclusions, and in US law agency heads 
are normally deemed to be experts in the areas for which their agencies 
are responsible.71 In most cases, statutory delegations of regulatory 
authority are made to the agency head, rather than to the agency as an 
organisation.72 In fact, an anachronistic convention persists by which 
lawsuits often name the head of the agency as the respondent, rather 
                                           
68 Foote, ‘Independent Agencies Under Attack: A Skeptical View of the 
Importance of the Debate’ [1988] Duke.L.J. 223, 232–36. 
69 Mashaw, et al. (n.4), 19–23; McGarity, ‘The Internal Structure of EPA 
Rulemaking’ (Autumn, 1991) 54 LCP 57, 65. 
70 McGarity (n.69), 60–61; Metzger, ‘Ordinary Administrative Law as 
Constitutional Common Law’ (2010) 110 Colum.L.Rev. 479, 495. 
71 E.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C.Cir.1976). 
72 E.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (delegating 
authority to the Secretary of Labor to promulgate workplace safety 
standards). 
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than the agency as a body.73 In this case, legal theory mirrors popular 
perception, and the public will usually hold the agency head, if not the 
president himself, responsible for all acts of the agency.74 
Agencies are staffed by a combination of political appointees and 
career civil servants. Relative to their European counterparts, US 
agencies tend to have a large number of political appointees.75 This thick 
layer of appointees means that politically responsible individuals can be 
more involved in the day-to-day work of agencies. That involvement 
comes at the cost, however, of frequent turnover in agency management. 
It also creates opportunities for undue political pressure to be applied to 
an agency’s technical analysis.76 The vast majority of employees in US 
agencies are career civil servants who are appointed through a merit 
system and shielded from termination for political reasons.77 Civil 
servants undertake background research, interact directly with the 
public, recommend courses of action, and draft the text of most agency 
standards. Thus, despite the presence of political appointees, civil 
servants play a large role in shaping administrative policy. 
Agencies are usually organised into a number of offices or bureaus, 
typically based on either subject matter (e.g., the Office for Prevention, 
Pesticides, and Toxic Substances within EPA) or regulatory function (e.g., 
                                           
73 14 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3655 
(3d ed., West 1998). Indeed, in the extremely narrow circumstances in 
which judicial review is not provided for by statute, review must be 
sought against the agency head personally. Fallon, Meltzer, and Shapiro, 
Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System (4th ed., 
Foundation 1996). 
74 Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design (Stanford 2004)  
25–27. 
75 Spiller and Urbiztondo, ‘Political Appointees vs. Career Civil Servants: 
A Multiple Principals Theory of Political Bureaucracies’ (1994) 10 
Eur.J.Pol.Econ. 465, 481–86. Up-to-date statistics on the number of 
political appointees are hard to come by, but they certainly number in 
the several thousands. Ackerman, ‘The New Separation of Powers’ (2000) 
113 HLR 633, 704. 
76 Such pressure was widely seen as a problem during the Bush 
administration. Doremus, ‘Scientific and Political Integrity in 
Environmental Policy’ (2008) 86 Tex.L.Rev. 1601, 1603–19. 
77 Mashaw, et al. (n.4), 164–68. 
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NHTSA’s Office of Rulemaking and Office of Enforcement).78 Frequently, 
the heads of these divisions are political appointees. Regulatory 
standards are usually the work of a particular division; however, all 
agencies operate some form of intra-agency review process for soliciting 
input from other parts of the agency.79 
All of the risk regulation agencies also undertake substantial scientific 
research. EPA, for example, operates a network of thirteen national 
laboratories.80 The research divisions of the agencies may be called upon 
to support regulatory activities, for example by providing specialised 
expertise on a particular issue. They may also engage in research that is 
unrelated to immediate regulatory needs, although the results of this 
work may lead to new regulatory initiatives.81 US agencies’ capacity for 
both independent decisionmaking and scientific analysis means that 
most aspects of risk standard setting take place within a single 
organisation. Nonetheless, a complete picture of the US administration 
also needs to account for a handful of other institutional actors. 
2. Other participants in the administrative process 
Research Agencies and Scientific Committees. Although agencies’ scientific 
and research capacities are primarily “in house”, agencies also have 
access to expertise from other government bodies. One such source are 
research agencies, such as the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry or the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 
which have research capacities but no regulatory powers. The reports 
authored by these agencies tend to carry great weight with regulators. 
                                           
78 Ibid., 19–23. 
79 EPA has one of the most formalised intra-agency review processes, the 
details of which are set out in EPA Office of Policy, EPA’s Action 
Development Process (revised March 2011). Some commentators argue 
that this review process hampers EPA’s effectiveness by impeding the 
agency’s ability to issue timely regulations and by biasing it toward 
conservatism in regulatory approach. E.g., McGarity (n.69), 91–92. 
80 http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa#pane-5. 
81 Powell, Science at EPA (RFF 1999) 21–43. 
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Additionally, agencies may sometimes receive advice from advisory 
committees of outside experts. Some advisory committees, such as EPA’s 
Science Advisory Board, are standing institutions. Others are convened 
on an ad hoc basis, often by the National Academy of Sciences (a 
federally chartered, non-governmental institution) at the request of a 
particular agency.82 US advisory committees generally do not develop 
scientific analyses in the first instance. Instead, their function is usually 
to review and critique work done by the relevant agency in a form of peer 
review.83 A few risk regulation statutes require the agency to consult 
expert committees before regulating, but more often the decision whether 
to do so is in the discretion of the agency. Agencies tend to be reluctant 
to resort to advisory committees because of the time and cost involved, as 
well as the burdensome procedures required by the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act.84 Accordingly, agencies generally only consult advisory 
committees when the scientific issues are novel or controversial.85 
The President. Besides agencies, the other significant actor in the 
administrative process is the president. As Chief Executive, the president 
has, at a minimum, general managerial authority over the agencies. 
Additionally, presidents endeavour to coordinate the work of the various 
administrative agencies and to impose a degree of prioritisation on 
agencies’ work.86 The president’s managerial functions are exercised by 
the Executive Office of the President (EOP), often simply referred to as the 
White House. Within the EOP, the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) (itself located within the Office of Management and Budget 
                                           
82 Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers (Harvard 
1990) 45–49. 
83 Ibid., 95–97. 
84 Croley and Funk, ‘The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Good 
Government’ (1997) 14 Yale.J.Reg. 451, 472. 
85 US EPA, Peer Review Handbook (3d ed., GPO 2006) 45. 
86 Kagan (n.17), 2272–81. 
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(OMB)) has primary responsibility for regulatory oversight through its role 
in the regulatory review process mandated by Executive Order 12,866.87 
3. US administrative process 
The procedures used by US administrative agencies to set risk standards 
vary widely among agencies and programmes, and it would not be 
possible to describe a single typical process. Nonetheless, certain features 
are typical of US administrative processes. First, administrative actions 
are usually developed by a single agency, with initiation of the action, 
policy development, and expert analysis all taking place within one 
organisation. A trend in US administration, particularly at EPA, has been 
toward greater interaction between career staff and the agency’s political 
leadership early in the process.88 Second, agencies will usually consult 
widely with stakeholder groups while developing proposed actions. These 
consultations are more informal (and some would say more fruitful) than 
the formal consultation that takes place after an action is proposed.89 
Third, the final decision on the content of the regulatory proposal will 
either be made by the agency head or another high-level political 
appointee to ensure that the action is consistent with the agency’s policy 
objectives. Finally, “major” agency actions involving large regulatory costs 
must be submitted to the OIRA for review to ensure that the action 
conforms to all applicable executive orders.90 
Once OIRA has cleared the proposed action, it will generally be 
published for public comment. The comment process is one of the 
distinctive features of US administrative procedure and an important part 
of its legitimacy narrative. Virtually all rulemakings require notice-and-
comment, in which a proposed rule is published and the public is invited 
to comment within a set time.91 But even in contexts other than 
                                           
87 Sunstein, ‘The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and 
Realities’ (2013) 126 HLR 1838. That process also includes review of the 
agency’s cost-benefit analysis, discussed in chapter 3, section II.B.3. 
88 EPA (n.79), 10–11. 
89 Elliott, ‘Re-Inventing Rulemaking’ (1992) 41 Duke.L.J. 1490, 1495. 
90 This process is detailed in chapter 3, section II.B.3. 
91 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
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rulemaking, agencies often are required to announce proposed decisions 
and to allow for public comment. Normally, any member of the public 
may comment without the need to demonstrate an interest in the 
outcome, and in most cases the agency must respond to all significant 
public comments.92. Most comment processes are conducted online.93 
Notice-and-comment serves at least three important functions. First, 
it provides the agency with additional information relevant to the action. 
Although the agency will almost certainly have consulted with affected 
groups when developing the proposed action, it is always possible that it 
overlooked important information. Open comment creates an opportunity 
for these sources to come forward and, to the extent they have an interest 
in the outcome, they have a strong incentive to do so.94 Second, it allows 
the agency to gauge reaction to its proposals. Third, and most 
importantly as a legal matter, the notice-and-comment process lays the 
groundwork for possible subsequent judicial challenges. Normally, a 
court reviewing a final agency action will not consider arguments that 
were not first presented to the agency.95 It also creates a record on which 
a reviewing court can assess the reasonableness of the agency’s action.96 
In addition to these three functions, the notice-and-comment process 
has considerable, if hard to quantify, noninstrumental importance.97 By 
giving any person the right to put issues before the agency and demand a 
response, it creates a mechanism for direct accountability of the 
administration to the public. Although this accountability mechanism 
carries only a very attenuated possibility of sanction, it may do much to 
support the perception that the bureaucracy is subject to public 
                                           
92 I Pierce (n.4), 443–44. 
93 www.regulations.gov. 
94 Seidenfeld, ‘A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State’ 
(1992) 105 HLR 1511, 1560. 
95 National Wildlife Federation v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 562 (D.C.Cir.2002). 
96 Pedersen, ‘Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking’ (1975) 85 YLJ  
38, 78–82. 
97 These noninstrumental values may contribute to the constitutional 
acceptability of administrative regulation. Metzger (n.70), 489–90. 
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control.98 For individuals who have a direct stake in the results of the 
action, it has a dignitary value by providing an opportunity for them to 
make their case before the agency.99 Finally, it deepens the legitimising 
power of the giving reasons requirement by assuring that the agency 
responds to the issues that are of public concern, rather than merely 
providing generic justifications. 
After the public comment period closes, the agency will prepare its 
response. The agency is free to withdraw or modify its proposed action or 
to proceed with it in its original form. If the modifications to the proposal 
are substantial, the agency may be required to submit the modified 
proposal to a new round of comment.100 Once a decision is made, the 
agency publishes its action along with a detailed statement of reasons. 
Judicial review is then available to any individual with standing. Despite 
the significant number of cases, review is only sought in a small fraction 
of administrative actions.101 
B. EU Administrative Bodies and Process 
1. The European Commission 
The most important EU Institution in administrative matters is the 
Commission, a body with no close equivalents outside the EU. The 
Commission itself is composed of a president and up to twenty-seven 
additional Commissioners. Each Member State nominates one 
Commissioner, although the Treaties require Commission members to act 
solely in the interest of the Union and prohibit them from taking 
instruction from their home state governments.102 Apart from certain 
                                           
98 West, ‘Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and 
Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy 
Analysis’ (2004) 64 Pub.Admin.Rev. 66, 72–73. 
99 Verkuil, ‘The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure’ (1978) 78 
Colum.L.Rev. 258, 293. 
100 American Coke and Coal Chemicals Institute v. EPA, 452 F.3d 930, 
938–41 (D.C.Cir.2006). 
101 Coglianese, ‘Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law’ [2002] 
U.Ill.L.Rev. 1111, 1129. 
102 Article 17(3) TEU. 
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ministerial matters, Commission decisions are taken collectively and 
decisionmaking authority may not be delegated to a single 
Commissioner.103 The Commission prefers to act by consensus, but when 
a vote is taken measures are carried by an absolute majority.104 
The terms of the Commission and the Parliament coincide, and the 
Commission is “responsible to the European Parliament”.105 To reinforce 
the Commission’s political accountability, the Treaty of Lisbon made 
adjustments to procedures for nominating and electing the 
Commissioners.106 Under Lisbon, the European Council nominates the 
Commission President, who must then be elected by an absolute majority 
of Parliament. In making its selection, the European Council must “tak[e] 
into account the elections to the European Parliament”.107 As the Lisbon 
reforms were implemented in the 2014 election of Jean-Claude Junker, 
each parliamentary political group nominated a “Spitzenkandidat” before 
the election, and urged the European Council to nominate the 
Spitzenkandidat of the grouping that won the most seats. Although the 
European Council denied that it was under any obligation to do so, it 
ultimately followed that course.108 Once the president has been elected by 
the Parliament, he or she works with the Council to select the remaining 
members of the Commission. The full slate of Commissioners is then 
subject to a vote of consent in Parliament.109 
                                           
103 Case C-137/92 P, Commission v. BASF [1994] ECR I-2629,  
paras. 62–63. 
104 Chalmers, Davies, and Monti (n.30), 64; Commission Rules of 
Procedure [2000] OJ L308/27, art. 8. 
105 Article 17(8) TEU. 
106 The responsibility of the Commission to the Parliament is also 
reinforced by the new provisions in Article 290 on delegated acts, 
discussed below. Schütze, ‘“Delegated” Legislation in the (New) European 
Union: A Constitutional Analysis’ (2011) 74 MLR 661, 685. 
107 Article 17(7) TEU. 
108 ‘EU Leaders Decline to Endorse Juncker’, EU Observer, May 28, 2014; 
‘The Battle for the European Commission: Has Merkel Lost Her Touch?’, 
Economist, June 3, 2014; ‘Jean Claude Juncker Nominated for European 
Commission President’, Financial Times, June 27, 2014. 
109 Article 17(7) TEU. 
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Each Commissioner is responsible for a substantive portfolio. These 
portfolios are not fixed, but are defined as part of the process of forming a 
new Commission and are subject to modification during a Commission’s 
term.110 In the current Commission, at least five Commissioners have 
portfolios directly involved in risk regulation: Agriculture and Rural 
Development; Climate Action and Energy; Environment, Maritime Affairs, 
and Fisheries; Health and Food Safety; and Internal Market, Industry, 
Entrepreneurship, and SMEs.111 Beyond the Commissioners, the 
remainder of the Commission staff is the EU’s central civil service. 
Organisationally, this service is divided into a number of Directorates-
General (currently thirty-three),112 each of which focuses on a specific 
subject matter or administrative function. The DGs with primary 
responsibility for administering EU risk regulation programmes are 
Agriculture and Rural Development, Enterprise and Industry, 
Environment, and Health and Consumers (SANCO). DG staffs are 
relatively small, with few having more than 1,000 total employees. DG 
Environment and DG SANCO, for example, have 500 and 855 staff 
members, respectively.113 By contrast, US EPA employs around 16,000 
people; its Office of Pesticide Programs alone has about 850 employees.114 
Multiple DGs may have responsibility for a single regulatory programme. 
                                           
110 Commission Rules of Procedure (n.104), art. 3. 
111 European Commission, Press Release, ‘The Juncker Commission: A 
Strong and Experienced Team Standing for Change’, IP 14/984, 
September 10, 2014. Note that all of these Commissioners have 
substantial responsibilities other than risk regulation. 
112 In addition to the DGs, the Commission houses eleven “services” that 
provide support across subject areas. Most of the services are 
administrative in character (e.g., the Publication Office), but others may 
have policy relevance, such as the Commission Legal Service and the 
Bureau of European Policy Advisers. 
113 European Commission, 2014 Human Resources Key Figures Card, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/ 
hr_key_figures_en.pdf. The Commission has a total staff of just over 
33,000. Ibid. By way of comparison, the six key US risk regulation 
agencies collectively employ over 35,000 people. 
114 See EPA Budget and Spending, http://www2.epa.gov/ 
planandbudget/budget. 
100 Administrative Legitimacy and Risk Regulation 
  
For example REACH, the EU’s main regulatory programme for chemicals, 
is jointly administered by DG Enterprise and DG Environment. Each DG 
has its own institutional character and priorities, which will reflect the 
way it approaches regulatory problems.115 The importance of DG 
assignment is demonstrated by the public struggle between DG 
Enterprise and DG Environment over which would take the lead on the 
REACH regulation.116 
The Commission’s standard setting powers are derived principally 
from Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. Under Article 290, the EU legislature 
may “delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-legislative acts 
of general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential 
elements of the legislative act.” Article 291 provides that “[w]here uniform 
conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are needed, those 
acts shall confer implementing powers on the Commission.” These are 
the provisions that allow the Commission to issue risk regulation 
standards administratively. The differences between the two articles and 
their procedural consequences are explored in section 4 below. 
2. Other EU administrative bodies 
Although it may be seen as generally responsible for the implementation 
of EU law at EU level, the Commission is only one of a number of bodies 
that participate in EU administration. Largely because of the 
Commission’s limited human and cognitive resources—but also because 
of the Member States’ desire to limit the Commission’s power—much of 
the work of administration, particularly the information gathering and 
analytical aspects, is done by bodies other than the Commission.117 In 
                                           
115 Nugent, The European Commission (Palgrave 2001), 159–61. 
116 Fisher, ‘The “Perfect Storm” of REACH: Charting Regulatory 
Controversy in the Age of Information, Sustainable Development, and 
Globalization’ (2008) 11 JRR 541, 551. 
117 Dehousse, ‘Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation of European 
Governance’ in Joerges and Dehousse (eds.), Good Governance in 
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particular, the Commission often lacks necessary scientific expertise.118 
As a result, the Commission must supplement its own expert resources 
when setting risk standards. As the Commission’s powers in this field 
have expanded, the supporting institutional structure has become more 
complex. This section briefly summarises this development and then 
examines in detail the structure of European agencies, which have 
emerged as the Commission’s main partner in developing risk standards. 
Early Approaches: Member States and Committees. Historically, the 
Commission turned to the Member States to supply the necessary 
expertise. One early approach was to assign complex scientific analyses 
to a particular Member State, whose national regulatory bodies would 
complete the analysis and return the results to the Commission for 
further action.119 Though efficient, that approach has limitations. Not all 
Member States are equally capable of undertaking the necessary 
analysis, and other Member States might take issue with the assigned 
Member State’s analysis. The need for some form of Union-level scientific 
review led to the establishment of the first EU expert committees, which 
could provide advice to the Commission that was not the product of a 
single Member State.120 These committees were composed of scientists 
from throughout the Union with expertise on specific topics of regulatory 
concern. Some committees were set up on an ad hoc basis, but standing 
committees were established to support the most important programmes. 
These standing committees garnered a fair amount of prestige, and their 
opinions tended to carry great weight with the Commission.121 
                                           
118 The Commission does possess some high-level research capacities in 
its Joint Research Centre, whose mission is “is to provide EU policies 
with independent, evidence-based scientific and technical support 
throughout the whole policy cycle”. https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/about. 
Though its work is well-regarded, the JRC does not have the resources to 
supply all the Commission’s needs for scientific advice. 
119 Krapohl, Risk Regulation in the Single Market (Palgrave Macmillan 
2008) 70–74 
120 Ibid., 75–76; Vos, Institutional Frameworks of Community Health and 
Safety Legislation (Hart 1999) 140–43. 
121 Vos (n.120), 140. 
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In many ways the expert committee system worked well. It provided a 
relatively efficient and low cost way for the Commission to obtain expert 
input and also provided a forum in which unsettled or contentious 
scientific issues could be debated.122 The system also had significant 
drawbacks, however. Perhaps most important, the committee members 
typically served on a part-time basis, and most maintained full-time 
employment elsewhere, usually with national regulatory bodies or 
academic institutions. As a result, committee members did not always 
have the time necessary to meet the Commission’s need for information 
in a timely way.123 Additionally, although the Commission provided the 
committees with a basic secretariat, their resources for conducting 
investigations were extremely limited.124 Instead, committees typically 
reviewed the work of a rapporteur Member State and relied on the 
rapporteur to conduct any follow-up investigation.125 Finally, the lack of 
an institutional home made it difficult for outsiders to follow the 
committees’ work, and the committees were frequently criticised for not 
being sufficiently transparent.126 
Although reliance on expert committees was already falling out of 
favour in some areas,127 it was the BSE crisis that caused the EU to 
reassess the provision of expert advice, including a massive review and 
                                           
122 Vos and Wendler, ‘Food Safety Regulation at the EU Level’ in Vos and 
Wendler (eds.), Food Safety Regulation in Europe (Intersentia 2006)  
67–69. 
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Contraventions or Maladministration in the Implementation of 
Community Law in Relation to BSE &c.’, A4-0020/97/A (1997) (Medina-
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overhaul of the EU’s risk regulation policies and procedures.128 A key 
finding of the Parliament’s investigation into the crisis was that the 
committee system had failed. The expert committees had been unable to 
identify potential risks, had been slow to respond to new information, 
and had succumbed to political pressure.129 In response, the Commission 
vowed to introduce substantial institutional changes.130 The result was a 
shift to the use of European agencies as the main suppliers of scientific 
and technical expertise to the Commission in the area of risk regulation. 
B. Agencies. European Agencies are another example of institutional 
innovation adapted to the unique nature of the EU. Despite their name, 
European agencies differ in many ways from agencies found in national 
governments, and the contrast with US agencies is particularly stark.131 
Perhaps the most important difference is that the EU legislature has until 
recently declined to delegate substantial decisionmaking powers to 
agencies.132 Historically, this reticence was a consequence of the Court of 
Justice’s hoary decision in Meroni,133 which the Commission Legal 
Service interpreted as absolutely barring the delegation of discretionary 
decisionmaking powers to entities other than the Commission, despite 
calls from academics for a less restrictive reading.134 The Court of Justice 
relaxed Meroni somewhat in United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council, in 
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which it upheld conferral on the European Securities Markets Authority 
(ESMA) of the power to prohibit short-selling temporarily if it found 
certain conditions to exist.135 The court reasoned that the powers 
conferred on ESMA were “precisely delineated and amenable to judicial 
review” and did not, therefore, run afoul of Meroni.136 The court’s 
emphasis on the narrow range of discretion permitted by the delegating 
legislation, however, suggests that delegated powers calling for a large 
degree of policy judgment must still be conferred on the Commission. 
Apart from legal obstacles, there are practical impediments to 
according agencies significant decisionmaking powers. The Commission 
would likely view any such delegation as a threat to its claimed role as 
the European executive.137 Similarly, there are political risks for the 
Parliament and Council because their ability to influence decisionmaking 
in the agencies is not well tested.138 There are also legitimacy concerns, 
in that decisionmaking by agencies would be even further removed from 
direct democratic legitimation than decisionmaking by the Commission. 
For now at least, the agencies active in the field of risk regulation have 
largely been denied substantial decisionmaking powers. 
The second way in which European agencies differ from their 
American counterparts is in their leadership. In the US, agencies are led 
by presidential appointees, which presumably makes them responsive to 
presidential policy preferences.139 By contrast, the leadership of 
European agencies is not beholden to a single political institution. All of 
the European risk management agencies are governed by a Management 
Board, most members of which are appointed by the Member States.140 
                                           
135 Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council (Short-
Selling), nyr, paras. 41–55.  
136 Ibid., para. 53. 
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The Management Board appoints the agency’s Executive Director.141 
Together, the Management Board and Executive Director are responsible 
for setting the agencies’ work programmes, overseeing fiscal and 
budgetary matters, supervising the agency’s staff, and establishing the 
agency’s procedural rules.142 
The Management Board and Executive Director are not responsible 
for the agencies’ substantive work, such as providing scientific advice to 
the Commission on regulatory matters. Instead, that work is performed 
by expert committees housed within the agencies and supported by the 
agency’s permanent staff.143 These expert committees are ultimately 
responsible for the quality of the agency’s scientific and technical advice. 
A further important distinction between US and EU agencies is that the 
members of an EU agency’s expert committees are not career agency 
staff. Rather, in a holdover from earlier practice, the members of an 
agency’s expert committees are usually independent scientific experts 
selected from among the Member States.144 
The choice to rely on committees composed of independent experts, 
rather than career staff, may affect the way in which scientific advice is 
provided to decisionmakers. Because the membership of expert 
committees is temporary and rotating, members may not develop the 
same sense of identification with the agency’s regulatory mission that is 
said to characterise experts in US agencies.145 Additionally, committee 
members may not develop the same level of expertise in regulatory 
programmes and policies possessed by US agency scientists who often 
spend a significant part of their career with the agency. These 
distinctions could be either advantages or disadvantages. On one hand, 
the transient membership of EU expert committees may provide fresh 
insight and help prevent the agency’s advice giving from falling into 
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cognitive ruts.146 On the other, the lack of long-term agency affiliation 
may cause expert committees to be less adept at aligning their advice 
with the agency’s policies and priorities. The changing composition of 
committees may also affect EU agencies’ ability to attract permanent 
staff. If the advice used for regulatory decisionmaking is provided by 
committees rather than staff, a career with the agency may be less 
attractive to bright and ambitious experts who could never rise above 
providing support to committee members. Finally, reposing authority for 
providing scientific advice in a committee, the members of which have 
responsibilities to other institutions, may make collaboration among 
experts and other participants in the regulatory process more difficult. 
3. Formulating administrative standards 
As in the US, the procedures used by the EU administration to adopt risk 
regulation standards are too varied to allow for description of a generic 
process. But also as in the US, EU administrative procedures to have 
certain key characteristics that are common to the majority of regulatory 
programmes. 
As an organisational matter, responsibility for initial development of 
new regulatory actions will usually fall to a bureau within one of the 
DGs. Under the Commission’s new Better Regulation initiative, 
Commission staff must seek political clearance for new initiatives early in 
the development process.147 The Commission is also likely to consult 
early with stakeholders and Member States. Once an initial proposal is 
developed, the Commission will almost always have to seek expert 
advice.148 Most often, this process will involve referring the proposal to an 
                                           
146 Blais and Wagner, ‘Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the 
Problem of Rulemaking Ruts’ (2008) 86 Tex.L.Rev. 1701. 
147 European Commission, ‘Better Regulation Guidelines’, SWD(2015) 
111 final, 11–15. 
148 Risk legislation often explicitly requires the Commission to consult 
experts. E.g., Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 concerning the Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) &c. 
[2006] OJ L396/1, art. 70. But even in the absence of legislative 
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agency for an opinion. After considering the expert opinion and any 
minority views, the Commission will move toward a final decision. 
Depending on the outcome of the expert consultation, the Commission 
may undertake additional consultations. Once it is ready to proceed, the 
Commission will prepare a proposed action. 
Notably absent from the EU administrative process is a horizontal 
requirement to submit proposed actions to open public consultation.149 
The issue of public participation in administrative processes has been a 
contentious one in the EU.150 In its 2001 Communication ‘European 
Governance: A White Paper’, the Commission committed to expanding 
public participation as a means of enhancing the legitimacy of EU action, 
but resisted calls to establish a universal right to participation.151 Many 
risk regulation programmes require some form of public participation, 
but the nature of the requirements vary. At times, participation occurs 
through consultation with advisory committees composed of stakeholders 
in the relevant area.152 Other programmes require more open comment 
processes, but often limit comment to specific aspects of the proposed 
action.153 If the Commission is required to prepare an impact assessment 
for the action, the impact assessment process will normally include a 
twelve week, internet-based consultation on the impact assessment.154 As 
far as my research shows, no EU risk programme requires all aspects of a 
regulatory action to be submitted to an open public comment process. 
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4. Comitology and the control of delegated acts 
Once the Commission has finalised its proposed action, it is not 
immediately empowered to adopt that action. Instead, the Commission’s 
exercise of its discretion is subject to a complex system of control 
mechanisms, either those described in Article 290 TFEU, as elaborated in 
the Common Understanding on Delegated Acts,155 or to the “comitology” 
procedures set forth in the so-called Comitology Regulation.156 These 
procedures add yet another layer to the networked aspect of EU 
administration. 
The story of these control mechanisms is long and complex, but may 
be briefly recounted as follows:157 Early in the history of the EEC, it 
became apparent that it would be necessary to delegate to the 
Commission the power to adopt implementing measures. This need was 
particularly acute in the field of agriculture, in which orders had to be 
issued rapidly to adjust to changing market circumstances. The Member 
States, however, were unwilling to grant such power to the Commission 
without some mechanism for controlling its exercise. Thus was born the 
comitology process, by which the Commission would be required to 
submit draft implementing measures to a committee of Member State 
representatives before the measures could take effect. A number of 
procedures developed for this process ranging from an advisory 
procedure, in which the Commission merely had to take “utmost 
account” of the committee’s opinion, to a regulatory procedure, in which 
the lack of a positive opinion from the committee required the submission 
of the measures to the Council for further review. From the beginning, 
the Commission resisted comitology on the ground that it intruded into 
the Commission’s “executive” prerogatives. The Parliament also resented 
comitology because it was generally excluded from the process, a concern 
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that became more acute as its powers increased.158 As a result, the entire 
comitology process simmered as a political and legal issue for decades. 
The Lisbon Treaty brought about a new political and constitutional 
settlement on comitology. Henceforth, implementing measures would be 
divided into two categories: delegated acts and implementing acts. 
Delegated acts are “non-legislative acts of general application to 
supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative 
act”. “Implementing acts” are not defined in the Treaties, but presumably 
are all those implementing measures that are not “delegated acts”, i.e., 
those that do not “amend or supplement” the basic act. The dividing line 
between the two is far from clear.159 The Commission set out its 
understanding of the divide at length in a 2009 Communication, in which 
it conveyed the sense that delegated acts should be reserved for 
significant issues of policy, whereas implementing acts would cover more 
run-of-the-mill situations in which established policies are applied to 
specific facts.160 Recently, the Commission has proposed legislation that 
would classify existing delegations as either delegated or implementing 
acts according to these principles.161 
The Commission’s working assumption appears to be that all future 
legislation will specify the nature of any delegation in the basic act. Thus, 
although the decision whether to characterise a delegation as the power 
to adopt delegated or implementing acts will be guided by the Treaty 
provisions, the choice in borderline cases will be made politically in the 
legislative process. In a recent case, the Court of Justice has confirmed 
that although the choice between delegated and implementing acts is 
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subject to judicial review, “the EU legislature has discretion when it 
decides to confer a delegated power . . . or an implementing power” and 
that accordingly “judicial review is limited to manifest errors of 
assessment”.162 
The categorisation of an act as delegated or implementing has 
important procedural consequences. Article 290 abolished the comitology 
process for delegated acts. Instead, the Commission adopts delegated 
acts on its own, subject to a possible veto by either the Council or the 
Parliament. Additionally, legislation may give either the Council or the 
Parliament the power to revoke a delegation. Article 290 imposes no 
requirements on the Commission to consult with expert or Member State 
committees before adopting delegated acts. Under pressure from the 
Council, however, the Commission agreed in the Common Understanding 
to consult the Member States before adopting delegated acts.163 The 
details of this consultation are not spelled out in the Common 
Understanding (presumably, they will vary based on the legislative 
context), and thus far the process remains opaque.164 
Note, however, that the Common Understanding is not the only 
source of requirements that the Commission engage in some form of 
consultation. Much existing legislation that the Commission has 
proposed to transfer to the Article 290 procedure requires various forms 
of consultation as part of the process of developing a delegated act. For 
example, the Commission has proposed that the adoption of Restrictions 
under REACH be treated henceforth as delegated acts.165 REACH 
requires the Commission to consider the opinions of the ECHA’s Risk 
Assessment and Socio-economic Committees before adopting 
                                           
162 Case C-427/12, Commission v. Parliament and Council, nyr, para. 40; 
Brandsma and Blom-Hansen, ‘Controlling Delegated Powers in the Post-
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Restrictions.166 Such requirements appear to remain untouched. More 
difficult to assess is whether the EU courts will extend the requirements 
for expert consultation found in the case law to measures adopted under 
Article 290. Inasmuch as the courts have found these requirements to 
flow form “the nature of things”, i.e., the subject matter of the act, it 
seems they likely will, but that has not yet been confirmed.167 
If a measure is designated an implementing act, the comitology 
process continues to apply, although the procedures have been 
simplified. Under the new Comitology Regulation, there are two 
procedures: an advisory procedure and an examination procedure. As 
before, the advisory procedure only requires the Commission to take 
“utmost account” of the Committee’s opinion.168 The examination 
procedure imposes greater constraints. If the committee delivers a 
positive opinion by a qualified majority, the Commission must adopt the 
proposed measure. If the committee delivers a negative opinion, the 
Commission may not adopt the proposed measure. If the committee fails 
to reach an opinion, then the Commission may (but need not) adopt the 
proposed measure, except that the Commission may not adopt the 
measure when (among other circumstances) the measure “concerns . . . 
the protection of the health or safety of humans, animals or plants.”169 
Thus, in the risk regulation context, the Commission will normally only 
be able to adopt the proposed measure when the Committee delivers a 
positive opinion. Discussion in committees is not limited to approving or 
rejecting the Commission’s proposal, and the Comitology Regulation 
contemplates that negotiations on the content of the draft act will take 
place. “[A]ny committee member may suggest amendments” and the 
Commission may modify its proposal at any time before the final 
committee vote.170 
                                           
166 REACH (n.148), arts. 70–73. 
167 Angelopharm (n.148), paras. 30–34. 
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In the event that the comitology committee delivers a negative opinion 
or no opinion in circumstances that preclude the Commission from 
adopting the proposed measure, the Comitology Regulation provides that 
the Commission may either submit amended measures to the comitology 
committee or submit the original measure to an appeal committee,171 
which is comprised of representatives of the Member States at a higher 
political level.172 Voting in the appeal committee is also by qualified 
majority. If the appeal committee delivers a positive opinion, the 
Commission must adopt the measure; if it delivers a negative opinion, it 
may not adopt the measure; and if it delivers no opinion, the Commission 
may adopt the measure.173 Note that the exception for acts concerning 
the protection of health or safety does not apply when the appeal 
committee fails to deliver an opinion. 
5. The “networked” EU administration 
The notion that the EU employs a networked administration has been 
introduced in the foregoing description, but the concept merits some 
additional exploration. The term “network administration” is used to 
mean an organisational structure in which multiple, at least partially 
independent actors must coordinate with one another in the delivery of 
regulation. Coen and Thatcher suggest three key characteristics of 
network administration: the involvement of actors from different 
institutional levels (i.e., “multi-level governance”), a move away “from 
previously well-established levels to organisations or individuals whose 
main role is linking and co-ordinating actors”, and a shift toward 
consultation and negotiation as the basis of decisionmaking.174 Network 
administration is in many ways a logical response to the special problems 
                                           
171 Ibid., art. 5(3)–(4). 
172 Rules of Procedure of the Appeal Committee [2011] OJ C183/13, art. 
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of EU administration. It allows the Commission to access expert and 
manpower resources that it lacks itself. It creates avenues for 
intergovernmental oversight and negotiation in a legal system that 
depends crucially on not only the acceptance of Member States but also 
their willingness to participate in implementation. It may also create 
opportunities for horizontal accountability as various actors in the 
network check one another.175 Finally, it may reinforce the EU’s notably 
weak democratic credentials through the participation of Member States 
with stronger claims to democratic legitimacy.176 
The networked nature of EU administration affects the process of 
administrative decisionmaking, rendering it less hierarchical and 
potentially more “deliberative”. This potential for deliberative 
decisionmaking has been identified by some theorists as a particular 
virtue of EU administration. Analysing the comitology process, Christian 
Joerges and Jürgen Neyer have characterised EU administrative 
decisionmaking as a form of “deliberative supranationalism”.177 In their 
view, the interactions among the Member States and the Commission in 
the comitology process deepen the quality and legitimacy of 
decisionmaking because the participants put aside their roles as 
representatives of preformed interests and engage in a deliberative 
process in search of a common, European interest. This process is to be 
contrasted with self-interested intergovernmental bargaining in which the 
outcomes are a function of power relationships among the participants. 
Deliberative processes can also overcome the problem of incorporating 
scientific knowledge into decisionmaking processes by creating a forum 
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in which expert advice is interrogated from a social perspective and, 
conversely, in which political positions can be assessed in light of 
evidence.178 Joerges and Neyer support their theoretical analysis with 
considerable empirical work, which in their view indicates that 
decisionmaking in comitology committees is deliberative in practice. 
Despite that evidence, however, many remain sceptical that deliberative 
supranationalism is an accurate model of how comitology operates in 
practice and maintain that committee discussions more closely resemble 
bargaining, in which interests are traded off amongst the participants 
with little regard for the European good.179 
Putting aside comitology, networked administration clearly has 
several advantage for the EU system in that creates opportunities for 
interaction between the Institutions and the Member States. It also has 
some significant disadvantages, however. To begin, there is the problem 
of coordination. The multiplicity of actors involved in EU administration 
almost necessarily increases inefficiencies. More subtle, but also more 
difficult to address, is the possibility that the various actors will not 
share common goals and will attempt to use their position within the 
network to pursue objectives that are at cross purposes. Perhaps the 
most fundamental objection to networked administration is that it 
hampers accountability. When administrative action is the product of 
many actors, no one actor owns the action, which is another way of 
saying there is no one actor who is responsible. This situation creates the 
possibility for displacement of blame as various parts of the network 
point fingers at one another for poor policy outcomes.180 Conversely, it 
will be unclear whom to praise for positive outcomes, thus undermining 
                                           
178 Joerges, ‘Good Governance’ (n.177), 329; Case C-77/09, Gowan 
Comércio Internacional e Serviços Lda v. Ministero della Salute [2010] ECR 
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incentives for good performance. Networked administration can also 
create problems for traditional forms of legal accountability, particularly 
judicial review, in that no forum may have jurisdiction to review the acts 
of the network as a whole.181 Further, as Harlow and Rawlings show, the 
fact that networked administration may generate a measure of internal 
accountability does nothing to address the problem of public 
accountability, which is only exacerbated by the diffusion of 
decisionmaking across multiple actors.182 
These are problems with which legal doctrine must deal if it is to 
maintain a cogent legitimacy narrative. To some extent, the Court of 
Justice has addressed these concerns (or ignored them) by holding the 
Commission responsible for the entirety of the administrative process.183 
Thus, the courts will annul administrative acts regardless of where in the 
administrative process the error occurred.184 There are advantages to this 
solution. It prevents obvious gaps in the scope of legal protection and it 
allows for the application of legal concepts developed in the context of 
nation states to the EU. This latter is of particular importance as most 
EU administrative doctrine is judge-made, and the courts frequently 
justify their decisions by reference to the legal traditions of the Member 
States. There are also limits to this approach, however. For example, the 
court’s jurisprudence has not yet developed analytical tools for dealing 
with the full complexity of the comitology process, such as the division of 
decisionmaking power between the Commission and the committee. 
Much as the EU institutional architecture at a macro level is 
characterised by an interpenetration of the Member States and the EU 
legal order, the EU administration’s internal organisation is characterised 
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by plurality. This plurality is the inevitable result of numerous 
institutional choices, which themselves may be seen as efforts to walk a 
line between supranational norm production and national sovereignty. 
The challenge for administrative law is to reconcile these innovative 
institutional forms with a legitimacy narrative based on traditional 
understandings of constitutionalism. 
C. Two Different Visions of Administration 
Whereas the broad institutional structures of the US and the EU revealed 
many similarities, the institutional and procedural arrangements of the 
two administrations themselves show almost nothing but difference. 
These differences are so substantial that it seems difficult to attribute 
them purely to historical accident or regional variation. Instead, the 
internal structures of the two administrations reveal very different visions 
of the administrative process. 
These different visions are exemplified by a single fundamental 
institutional choice: the unitary nature of US administration versus the 
EU’s networked structure. US administrative agencies are built for 
efficiency. Historically, one of the drivers for increased reliance on 
agencies in the US was the need to handle high volumes of 
decisionmaking for which Congress is ill-suited. US agencies are self-
sufficient, in part, so that they may address issues quickly, as they 
come.185 In keeping with the goal of efficiency, US agencies tend to be 
organised hierarchically, with clear lines of internal accountability (at 
least on the org chart). A second key purpose of agencies is to bring 
expertise to bear on regulatory problems. That, is they embody a 
normative choice about how regulatory problems should be addressed.186 
In Mashaw’s phrase (drawn from Weber), they were created to “exercise 
                                           
185 Of course, this goal is not always achieved, and the efficiency 
deficiencies of US agencies are notorious (if, perhaps, overblown). Edley, 
Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy (Yale 
1990) 48–52. 
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power on the basis of knowledge”.187 To fulfil this mission, US agencies 
are endowed with substantial expert resources and capacities for 
research. A necessary corollary of this administrative vision is that expert 
evaluation and political judgment cannot be separated; the administrator 
must be both expert and politically accountable. Finally, US 
administration has frequently been purposely directed at finding federal 
solutions to social problems at the expense of state regulation, not least 
in the area of risk regulation. Accordingly, US agencies act autonomously 
of the several states; even in programmes in which administration is 
shared, there is no question that the federal administration is in charge 
of the content of federal programmes. 
Conversely, US agencies have not typically been thought of as fora in 
which political deliberation takes place. With the exception of a brief 
flirtation with “surrogate political processes” in the early 1970s;188 
administrative policy comes from Congress and from the president, either 
directly or via the agency head. That is not to say that agencies do not 
have substantial space to develop and elaborate regulatory policy; 
unquestionably they do. Indeed, they could not fulfil their Weberian role 
if they did not.189 But the processes by which administrative 
policymaking are legitimated politically and democratically lie for the 
most part outside the agency. Public participation, despite its importance 
in the broader US legitimacy narrative, only indirectly supports 
democratic legitimacy. 
The EU’s networked approach reflects a different understanding of 
administration. Despite the Commission’s aspiration to being the source 
of administrative policy, EU administrative arrangements have grown up 
to reflect the weak legitimacy of the Commission as a generator of norms 
and the desire of the Member States to retain a degree of control over the 
detailed implementation of EU law. Because of its networked nature, a 
primary task of the EU administration is to find, rather than impose, a 
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European policy. The Commission may be the most important 
protagonist in the process, but administrative risk standards only 
become valid through interaction between the Commission and the 
Member States. In this way, EU administration attempts to be self-
legitimating in a way that US administration does not. 
But EU administration is not simply a constitutive process of 
negotiation or supranational deliberation, it also has instrumental 
aspects. Like its US counterpart, it must solve regulatory problems posed 
by the legislature, and it too is expected to deliver those solutions in a 
timely and effective way. To accomplish this task, the EU administration 
must be able to access expertise. But even in this respect, the 
Commission is denied the necessary tools for independence. Expertise is 
not simply handed up the hierarchy, as in a US agency, but developed 
through a process that itself has aspects of deliberation. Taken together, 
the EU administration seems arranged to facilitate a process of achieving 
legitimacy by achieving assent. It is perhaps not surprising then that the 
weaknesses of EU administration are most evident when the political 
issues are most divisive and significant assent is withheld.190 
There are of course many complications with this neat contrast. 
Although US agencies may be unitary organisations on paper, the size 
and complexity of some agencies belie the notion of a “single” agency. 
And, just as the Commission’s discretion is constrained by the actions of 
other administrative bodies, a US agency’s political leadership is 
constrained by the preparatory work of a large permanent 
bureaucracy.191 Conversely, although the Commission usually enjoys no 
formal authority over European agencies, it has many tools for 
influencing the conduct of agency business.192 The reality may therefore 
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be that the differences between the “unified” US administration and the 
“networked” EU administration are narrower than they appear. The 
differences are substantial nonetheless and (what is more important for 
the present analysis) those differences have influenced the way the two 
legal systems understand the process of administrative decisionmaking, 
which in turn has influenced the ways in which those systems have 
responded to the legal problems raised by administrative risk regulation. 
III. Delegation 
One important institutional aspect of administrative risk standard setting 
shared by both the EU and the US administrations is that the 
administration derives its power to set standards from legislative 
delegations. The concept of delegation is essential to EU and US 
legitimacy narratives because it provides both a source of legal authority 
(the administration’s power to set standard is underpinned by legislation) 
and a source of democratic legitimacy (the democratically accountable 
legislature has authorised the exercise of administrative power).193 For 
the concept of delegation to fulfil these functions, the legislature must be 
able to specify the scope of the administration’s authority and to set 
conditions on the manner of its exercise. It would also seem axiomatic 
that the legislature must be able to override the exercise of administrative 
authority through subsequent legislation. Delegation does not exclude 
the possibility of administrative policymaking or even broad 
administrative discretion; it does however relegate the administration to a 
subordinate policymaking role. These basic principles of delegation are 
common to both the EU and the US. Nonetheless, the details of 
delegation theory have developed somewhat differently in the two 
systems, largely as the result of their different institutional structures. 
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A. US 
American delegation theory developed in response to constitutional 
challenges to the administrative state. In the early days of agencies, it 
was argued that because the Constitution vests “[a]ll legislative powers” 
in Congress, administrative agencies could not exercise rulemaking 
power. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of administrative rulemaking by making a distinction 
between “the legislative power” and the ability to make rules more 
generally.194 Only Congress, the Court held, could exercise legislative 
power, but that did not prevent it from delegating the power to apply the 
principles announced in legislation in specific situations, including 
through the making of generally applicable rules.195 Such delegations are 
valid, provided that Congress has provided an “intelligible principle” in to 
guide the agency’s exercise of rulemaking power.196 Confusingly, this 
principle has come to be known as the “nondelegation doctrine” to reflect 
the notion that core legislative power cannot be delegated. 
The effect of the nondelegation doctrine on US law has been famously 
feeble. Only twice has the Supreme Court relied on the doctrine to 
invalidate administrative delegations. Both of those cases were decided in 
1935 and concerned aspects of the National Industrial Recovery Act, a 
New Deal statute that attempted a transfer of authority to the president 
that has no parallel in other US legislation.197 Other statutes delegating 
exceedingly broad authority to the administration, including statutes 
whose only apparent intelligible principle is that the agency act in the 
“public convenience, interest, or necessity”,198 have been upheld against 
nondelegation challenges.199 Part of the weakness of the nondelegation 
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doctrine is attributable to its tenuous conceptual distinctions.200 
Formulation of legal rules to define the necessary specificity with which 
Congress must legislate proved difficult for courts faced with a wide array 
of factual scenarios and increasing demands for government intervention 
brought about by industrialisation.201 By the 1970s, the nondelegation 
doctrine was generally assumed dead.202 
The wave of risk regulation legislation enacted in the 1970s launched 
a new round of nondelegation challenges, arguing that the authority 
apparently conferred by these statutes to determine the socially 
acceptable level of safety across broad sectors of the economy accorded 
too much discretion to the administration. Those challenges first reached 
the Supreme Court in the Benzene case, in which Justice Rehnquist 
argued in a concurrence that the Occupational Safety and Health Act was 
unconstitutional because it left to OSHA the determination of when a 
threat to worker health was sufficiently serious to require regulation.203 
Although his opinion was joined by no other justice, his arguments 
influenced the plurality, which justified its somewhat counterintuitive 
construction of the statute on nondelegation grounds.204 Benzene 
encouraged further nondelegation challenges. In an important case, 
International Union, UAW v. OSHA,205 the D.C. Circuit held that a 
different section of the OSH Act, as written, violated the nondelegation 
doctrine, but that the statute could be saved if the agency were to adopt 
criteria cabining its discretion.206 On remand, the agency did as the court 
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instructed, and a subsequent challenge was rejected.207 The logic of 
International Union was used to more dramatic effect in American 
Trucking Associations v. EPA (ATA)208 to declare the Clean Air Act’s 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards programme unconstitutional, 
pending action by EPA to narrow its own discretion by rule.209 
The logic of these cases is important because, as we will see, it was 
utterly repudiated by the Supreme Court. In both International Union and 
ATA, the DC Circuit held that to be valid, a legislative delegation must 
contain sufficient content to place identifiable boundaries on the range of 
permissible administrative outcomes and that the greater the scope of 
administrative power, the narrower the identifiable range had to be.210 
The court did not go so far as to suggest that the criteria had to point to a 
single, “right” outcome, nor did it exclude the possibility that the 
boundaries established might admit of arguable cases. What it essentially 
held was that the statute had to establish sufficient criteria so that the 
agency’s decisionmaking process would be reproducible (in the court’s 
words, it had to provide “determinate criteri[a]”).211 That is, two 
administrators applying the statutory criteria would arrive at the same 
range of potential outcomes, although they might differ regarding the 
best choice within that range. Failing the provision of such criteria in the 
authorising statue, it was incumbent upon the agency to establish its 
own binding criteria that would achieve the same effect. What doomed 
the statutes in International Union and American Trucking was that the 
criteria were so open-ended that two decisionmakers, both faithfully 
applying the statutory language, could arrive at two very different sets of 
possible outcomes. It was not enough for the agency to explain how it 
had arrived at the range of outcomes in a given case; it had to show why 
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it was required, either by statute or its own established policy, to reach 
that result.212 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed in Whitman v. American 
Trucking Associations.213 In doing so, the Court explicitly rejected the 
argument that an “intelligible principle” had to establish determinate 
criteria.214 For the Court, there was nothing unintelligible in the statutory 
principle that NAAQS should be set at the level “requisite to protect 
public health with an adequate margin of safety”,215 and there was no 
constitutional bar to the delegation of that kind of policy judgment to the 
administration.216 Nor did the lack of determinate criteria leave the 
agency’s discretion unbounded. The agency’s judgment still had to be a 
reasonable application of the “requisite to protect” standard, which the 
courts were competent to review in light of the agency’s reasons and the 
factual record produced.217 
In effect, the Court reaffirmed the constitutional legitimacy of 
administrative policymaking, even as to the essential aspects of a 
regulatory programme, a point that was central to its earlier decision in 
Chevron218 (discussed in chapter 3). In so doing, it put to rest a purely 
instrumental understanding of US administration and affirmed a 
constitutive role for agencies in formulating regulatory policy. It also 
affirmed that the administration’s power to make policy is subject to the 
superior authority of Congress, but left unresolved what, if any, 
additional limits the Constitution places on administrative 
policymaking.219 The ruling is central for understanding contemporary 
US jurisprudence on administrative risk regulation because it undercuts 
arguments that agencies must set risk standards solely on the basis of 
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an objective (presumably scientific) analysis. To the contrary, it reaffirms 
the principle that agencies may also rely on their own understandings of 
good public policy in reaching their decisions. 
One might be tempted to conclude that, following Whitman, the 
nondelegation doctrine really is dead, but that would premature. 
Although the doctrine has been rendered toothless in its classic form,220 
it persists in the courts’ practice of interpreting statutory grants of 
authority narrowly when a broader interpretation would raise questions 
about the constitutional legitimacy of agency authority. This 
reinterpretation of the nondelegation doctrine has been advanced by 
Professor Sunstein, who identified a number of “nondelegation cannons” 
according to which agencies would be found to have authority to take 
certain types of action only if Congress had explicitly granted that 
authority.221 Some of the canons identified by Sunstein include a 
presumption that agencies do not have the power to act extraterritorially 
or to promulgate regulations with retroactive effect.222 
Sunstein’s thesis can be broadened beyond specific canons of 
construction to explain decisions in which courts have construed 
statutes in nonobvious ways to narrow the scope of administrative 
discretion.223 One prominent example is the Benzene decision. Another is 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,224 in which the Court held 
that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not give FDA authority 
to regulate tobacco, even though nicotine fell within the literal terms of 
the statute’s definition of “drug”.225 In these and other cases, the courts 
                                           
220 Which is to say, it is not enforced by the courts. We should not, 
however, make the mistake of assuming something is constitutional 
simply because the courts will not declare it unconstitutional. Sager, 
‘Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms’ 
(1978) 91 HLR 1212. 
221 Sunstein (n.200), 330. 
222 Ibid., 331–35. 
223 Rabin, ‘Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective’ (1986) 38 
Stan.L.Rev. 1189, 1215 n.65 (making a similar point using historical 
examples). 
224 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
225 Ibid., 131–32, 161. 
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have expressed doubt that Congress could have intended the agency’s 
result, even if the language of the statute would seem to permit it. In 
Benzene, it was the perception that OSHA’s interpretation would allow, or 
even compel, the agency to impose potentially ruinous costs on any 
industry even over minor safety concerns.226 In Brown & Williamson, it 
was the notion that Congress had somehow without saying so authorised 
an administrative agency to regulate a substance with a unique legal, 
historical, and cultural status.227 These decisions depend not on any 
easily articulable rule of construction, but on the courts’ subjective sense 
that the issue is just too important for administrative resolution.228 
The continued relevance of nondelegation concerns, if not the 
nondelegation doctrine as such, to judicial decisionmaking is important 
for understanding US administrative law, particularly in the area of risk. 
There seems to be a limit, although it has not been well defined, on the 
extent to which administrative risk regulation can get ahead of the 
courts’ understanding of Congress’s policy goals. This unarticulated 
boundary is best explained in terms of the necessarily subordinate place 
of the administration in regulatory policymaking. Even as the courts have 
approved an expansive role for the administration in defining and 
elaborating risk regulation policy, they have not let go of the premise that 
all such policymaking must be sanctioned by legislation. The limits are 
thus grounded in delegation theory, but they also reflect a sensitivity 
regarding the exercise of executive power, which is itself related both to 
the ideal of separated powers and, perhaps, to a residual aversion to 
regulatory controls on private behaviour.229 The subjective nature of this 
sensitivity is reflected in the fact that the Supreme Court often divides 
                                           
226 Benzene (n.203), 646. 
227 Brown & Williamson (n.224), 159–61. 
228 A similar idea, for example, explains the majority opinion in Gonzalez 
v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267–68 (2006), in which the Court held that the 
Attorney General could not use his authority under the Controlled 
Substances Act to prohibit physician-assisted suicide. It also appears to 
animate part of Justice Scalia’s dissent in Massachusetts v. EPA. 
Massachusetts (n.29), 558–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
229 Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution (Harvard 1993) 36–37. 
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along ideological lines on such questions, even when so many of its 
administrative law decisions are unanimous. Note too that this sensitivity 
is fluid because it relates to the extent to which the action in question 
appears novel or seems to breach prevailing social understandings.230 
Thus, OSHA’s assertion of authority to require that workplace exposure 
to any carcinogen be reduced to the extent feasible seemed to the 
Supreme Court in 1980 like an extravagant assertion of administrative 
authority to unsettle social and economic expectations. Yet the Court in 
2001 found it obviously appropriate for an agency to determine when air 
pollutants threaten public health, even though that determination almost 
certainly has more profound social and economic effects. This dynamism 
is particularly relevant to risk regulation, which is fundamentally 
concerned with social responses to technology. 
There is, of course, nothing wrong with the Supreme Court defining 
the permissible bounds of administrative authority, even if doing so at 
times requires an exercise of subjective judgment. Constitutional courts 
must sometimes make tough decisions about constitutional values. The 
problem with nondelegation as it continues to operate in the US case law 
is that it almost always does so sub silentio. It is detectable only in the 
Court’s rhetoric, not in its reasoning. As a consequence, it can be difficult 
at times to rationalise the cases on the basis of the Court’s stated 
reasons. Worse, it leaves unarticulated the reasons why the Court feels 
the limits of administrative authority were breached, making it difficult 
for the administration and Congress to respond. 
B. EU 
Turning to the EU, we can see that the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence 
on delegation has developed from somewhat different premises, although 
the result is similar. Unlike the US situation, there has never been 
serious doubt in the EU as to the constitutionality of delegating power to 
adopt rules of general applicability to the administration. From the 
founding of the EEC, the Treaties have explicitly provided that the 
legislature may confer on the Commission (or in some cases the Council) 
                                           
230 Cf. Rabin (n.223), 1319–21. 
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the power to take implementing measures, and from an early time that 
provision has been understood to allow for the delegation of rulemaking 
powers.231 Further, the Court of Justice has held that the power to 
delegate must generally be interpreted broadly to allow the EU to 
effectively fulfil the objectives of the Treaties.232 
Nonetheless, the EU courts have, to a greater extent than the US 
courts, made an effort to put constitutional limits on the delegation of 
legislative authority to the administration. Even as the early case law 
established the legitimacy of broad delegations, it simultaneously 
affirmed that the “essential elements” of the legislative programme must 
be adopted by the legislature itself.233 For the most part, the court has 
applied the concept of “essential elements” narrowly so as to allow the 
delegation of significant policymaking authority to the administration.234 
Recent case law, however, confirms that the Court of Justice is willing to 
draw difficult lines and rule some delegations out-of-bounds.235 The court 
has not, however, provided clear guidance as to how distinguish essential 
from non-essential elements, instead applying something like a gestalt (or 
Rorschach) test to the legislation in question.236 The court has indicated, 
however, that aspects of legislation that require “political choices” or may 
interfere with fundamental rights are more likely to constitute essential 
                                           
231 Article 211 of the Treaty of Rome empowered the Commission to 
“exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the 
implementation of the rules laid down by the latter”. 
232 Case 25/70, Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v. 
Köster, Berodt & Co. [1970] ECR 1161, para. 6; Rey Soda (n.41), paras. 
9–11; Case C-240/90, Germany v. Commission [1992] ECR I-5383,  
paras. 36–39. 
233 Rey Soda (n.41), para. 9. 
234 Ibid., para. 10; Germany v. Commission (n.232), para. 37. 
235 Case C-355/10, Parliament v. Council, nyr, paras. 64–67; see also 
Case 22/88, Industrie- en Handelsonderneming Vreugdenhil BV v. 
Minister van Landbouw en Visserij [1989] ECR 2049, paras. 17–20. 
236 Chamon, ‘How the Concept of Essential Elements of a Legislative Act 
Continues to Elude the Court: Parliament v. Council’ (2013) 50 C.M.L.Rev. 
849, 856. 
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elements.237 Some cases have also suggested that delegation is 
appropriate when the relevant choices turn on technical analysis.238 
The Court of Justice’s delegation jurisprudence also differs from the 
US case law in that one of the court’s principal concerns is that the 
legislature (or one branch thereof) not be able to use delegation to 
circumvent the institutional balance set up by the Treaties. That concern 
was especially salient in the past, when the EC Treaty set forth 
numerous different legislative procedures for different areas of EC 
competence. In particular, the Court of Justice was careful that 
delegation not be used to undercut the role of the Parliament in 
legislation (although it frequently took a narrower view of the 
Parliament’s role than did Parliament itself).239 Because of the centrality 
of this concern, the court’s reasoning often focuses more on whether the 
prerogatives of all the relevant Institutions have been respected and less 
on the nature of the delegation itself.240 Indeed, the Court of Justice has 
relied in part on the comitology system to uphold broad delegations of 
authority precisely because it ensured the ongoing involvement of the 
Council in delegated decisionmaking.241 
Although the EU courts will uphold broad delegations of policymaking 
authority to the Commission, there is precedent to suggest that they, like 
                                           
237 Parliament v. Council (n.235), paras. 76–78. Other cases, however, 
have allowed the delegation of questions touching on individual rights. 
E.g., Germany v. Commission (n.232), paras 32–33; Case 41/69, ACF 
Chemiefarma NV v. Commission [1970] ECR 661, paras. 64–66. 
238 Short-Selling (n.135), para. 52; Case C-66/04, United Kingdom v. 
Parliament and Council (Smoke Flavourings) [2005] ECR I-10553,  
para. 55. 
239 Case C-156/93, Parliament v. Council [1995] ECR I-2019, para. 18; 
Case C-133/06, Parliament v. Council [2008] ECR I-3189, paras. 45–50. 
240 Compare Whitman, in which the focus on the Supreme Court’s 
analysis is solely on whether the Clean Air Act’s provisions established 
an intelligible principle. Whitman (n.213), 912–13. Although it plays a 
lesser role, the question whether delegation may unsettle institutional 
prerogatives is sometimes raised in US materials. E.g., Benzene (n.203), 
684 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Ely (n.202), 131–34. 
241 E.g., Köster (n.232), para. 9; Rey Soda (n.41), para. 13; Bergström 
(n.157), 46–53. 
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the US courts, will at times construe legislation narrowly to avoid 
nondelegation concerns. In Alliance for Natural Health,242 which 
concerned the authorisation of nutritional supplements, the court read 
the ambiguous language of Directive 2002/46243 as requiring the 
Commission to evaluate substances for authorisation on the basis of 
whether they are safe for human health, and only on that basis.244 The 
court expressed a concern that the grounds on which the administration 
could base its decision must be clearly defined for the delegation to be 
consistent with Meroni.245 As a consequence, the permissible grounds for 
the administration’s decision would have to be limited to the protection of 
health, as required by the Treaties, and not expanded to include other 
considerations unless the those considerations were clearly authorised by 
the delegating legislation.246 
Advocate General Kokott applied similar reasoning in her opinion in 
Smoke Flavourings.247 The directive at issue required the Commission to 
consider several factors when determining whether to authorise smoke 
flavouring products, but also permitted the Commission to consider 
“other legitimate factors” that might bear on the authorisation.248 The 
Advocate General argued that the range of factors that could be 
considered “legitimate” had to be “delimited by reference to the general 
                                           
242 Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, R. ex p. Alliance for Natural 
Health v. Secretary of State for Health [2005] ECR I-6451. 
243 Directive 2002/46/EC on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to food supplements [2002] OJ L183/51. 
244 Alliance for Natural Health (n.242), paras. 83–86. 
245 Ibid., paras. 90–92. 
246 Nondelegation concerns may also explain the General Court’s 
otherwise surprising judgment in Case T-74/00, Artegodan GmbH v. 
Commission [2002] ECR II-4945, in which the court read the relevant 
legislation narrowly to limit the Commission’s ability to revisit its earlier 
authorisation of a prescription weight loss aid. Ibid., para. 211. The court 
seemed concerned that the Commission not be given too much latitude to 
reconsider its risk assessment criteria and thereby limit the rights of 
traders. Ibid., paras. 194–95. 
247 Above n.238. 
248 Regulation 2065/2003 on smoke flavourings used or intended for use 
in or on foods [2003] L309/1, art. 9. 
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main aims of the present basic regulation, the aims of the legal basis in 
Article 95(1) EC, the criteria laid down and the regulatory context”.249 
Specifically, any other legitimate factors had to bear on “the fundamental 
safety requirements for the use and marketing of smoke flavourings [or] 
the conditions of production”.250 A more open-ended interpretation, by 
contrast, would be an unlawful delegation regulatory power to the 
Commission. The court, however, did not rule on this aspect of the case. 
Alliance for Natural Health and Smoke Flavourings are particularly 
relevant for risk regulation because they are examples of the courts 
narrowly construing the range of factors that the administration may 
consider when setting risk standards. In both cases, the courts appeared 
to limit the Commission to regulating on the basis of safety. As discussed 
in chapter 1, however, the range of public concerns with regard to new 
technologies extends well beyond safety. These cases suggest that the EU 
administration’s authority to take non-safety concerns into account may 
be limited. They can also be understood as expressing a tendency toward 
interpreting delegations to the administration in technical terms.251 
Potentially more important, Alliance for Natural Health also addressed 
the types of reasons given by the administration. The court read Meroni 
to require that “[delegated] power is clearly defined and that the exercise 
of that power is subject to strict review in light of objective criteria.”252 
That holding could be read as limiting the grounds for administrative 
regulation to rationales that the court deems “objective” and requiring 
regulation for other reasons to be adopted by the Union legislature.253 For 
                                           
249 Smoke Flavourings (n.238), Opinion of A.G. Kokott, para. 64. 
250 Ibid., para. 65. 
251 Alliance for Natural Health (n.242), para. 78; Smoke Flavourings 
(n.238), Opinion of A.G. Kokott, paras. 59, 66; see also chapter 4, 
section I. 
252 Alliance for Natural Health (n.242), para. 90. 
253 This idea has been explored by some commentators. For example, 
Majone distinguishes between grounds of low politics, which are 
appropriate for independent agencies, and high politics, which are not. 
Majone, Regulating Europe (Routledge 1996) 294–96; see also Craig 
(n.142), 184. The point is touched on in Griller and Orator (n.134), 21–
23, in which it is argued that greater discretion to make decisions on 
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example, it might be that the consumer concerns that the Court of 
Justice upheld as sufficient to justify regulation in Fedesa254 could not be 
relied on by the Commission acting under delegated authority. 
There is reason, however, to be cautious about reading too much into 
the Alliance for Natural Health judgment. Foremost, the court’s reliance 
on Meroni is strange. That case, as we have seen, focused on the question 
of what powers may be delegated to bodies other than the EU 
Institutions, and the judgment’s limits on delegation have not been 
applied to delegations to the Commission. Although the Alliance for 
Natural Health judgment cites Köster, it does not attempt to reconcile 
Köster’s approval of broad delegations with the application of Meroni to 
the Commission. It may be, therefore, that the court’s discussion of 
delegation was ill-considered and will not be followed. Nonetheless, given 
the important role played by the administration in EU risk regulation, the 
meaning of Alliance for Natural Health is an important open question, 
particularly in light of the Smoke Flavourings opinion.  
C. Comparative Summary 
In summary, we have seen that delegation theory is largely similar in the 
two jurisdictions. In both the US and the EU, the courts have upheld 
delegation of extensive policymaking authority to the administration, 
while at the same time reaffirming the primacy of the legislature. The 
exercise of broad, but subordinate, policymaking authority by the 
administrations places them in an intermediate position. On one hand, 
their role is not purely instrumental. Cases like American Trucking 
Associations and Köster, show that both administrations enjoy a 
legitimate role in elaborating and specifying policy ends as well as means. 
On the other hand, however, both systems see legislative sanction as 
essential to the legitimacy of regulatory policy. As a consequence, 
administrative regulation must be both authorised by and consistent 
                                                                                                                   
nontechnical grounds requires stronger mechanisms for democratic 
legitimacy. Cf. Short-Selling (n.135), Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen,  
paras. 99–100. 
254 Case C-331/88, R. v. MAFF, ex p. Fedesa [1990] ECR I-4023. 
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with legislative enactments. This intermediate legal status creates a need 
for courts to police the boundaries of administrative authority. That is no 
easy task, however, as the question of how much policy authority is too 
much is necessarily one of degree, hence a question of judicial judgment. 
In determining the acceptable scope of administrative policy 
judgment, courts look to the overall institutional structure of the 
administration. For example, in upholding broad delegations to the 
Commission, the Court of Justice has relied in part on the comitology 
system to provide a degree of political monitoring. Similarly in the US, the 
increasingly direct involvement of the White House in the affairs of 
administrative agencies has occurred in tandem with the liberalisation of 
the Supreme Court’s delegation jurisprudence. Institutional 
considerations are only one part of the calculus, however. As will be 
explored in the next two chapters, courts have developed numerous 
substantive doctrines that are directed in part toward defining—and to 
some extend defending—the proper place of the administration within the 
two jurisdictions’ overall institutional orders. Indeed, I will argue that 
these substantive doctrines can only be adequately understood in light of 
the two systems’ institutional arrangements. 
  133 
3 
Substantive Principles for Risk Regulation: 
The Precautionary Principle and 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
This chapter analyses the role of two substantive principles—the 
precautionary principle and cost-benefit analysis—in EU and US 
administrative law. These principles have played outsized roles in debates 
over risk regulation and particularly in describing European versus 
American regulatory styles.1 Broadly understood, the precautionary 
principle and cost-benefit analysis are regulatory philosophies that 
provide normative frameworks for how regulators should act. Rather than 
analysing the relative merits of those philosophies or assessing the extent 
to which they accurately characterise EU or US risk regulation, the focus 
of this chapter is more narrowly on how those principles operate as legal 
concepts within EU and US administrative law. I will argue that the two 
legal systems conceptualise precaution and cost-benefit analysis in very 
different ways and that they use those concepts to solve different legal 
problems. At bottom, the EU and US approaches to the precautionary 
principle and cost-benefit analysis are grounded less in different 
commitments to particular regulatory philosophies, and more in different 
understandings of how the public interest is constituted and of the role of 
law in that process.2 Those understandings, in turn, may be traced to 
                                           
1 E.g., De Sadeleer, ‘The Precautionary Principle in EC Health and 
Environmental Law’ (2006) 12 ELJ 139, 171; Vogel, ‘The Politics of Risk 
Regulation in Europe and the United States’ (2003) 3 YEEL 1, 34–41; 
Wagner, ‘The Precautionary Principle and Chemical Regulation in the US’ 
(2000) 6 Hum.Eco.Risk.Assessment 459, 460. 
2 Feintuck, “The Public Interest” in Regulation (OUP 2004) 52–57. 
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differing basic theories underpinning the legitimacy of administrative 
regulation.3 
I. The Precautionary Principle 
A. The Precautionary Principle and 
Theories of the Public Interest 
The meaning of the precautionary principle is famously hard to pin down. 
Fisher elegantly defines the core of the principle as providing that “in 
cases where there are threats to human health or the environment the 
fact that there is scientific uncertainty over those threats should not be 
used as the reason for not taking action to prevent harm”.4 Thus stated, 
the core of the precautionary principle is negative. It provides that a 
particular reason (scientific uncertainty) is not sufficient to justify a 
particular outcome (no regulatory action). Beyond that essentially 
procedural proposition, however, there is enormous debate as to the 
principle’s normative content. For many, the precautionary principle 
implies not just a capacity, but also an obligation to act when there is a 
credible, if uncertain, threat of harm to health or the environment.5 But 
that normative commitment in turn gives rise to a host of additional 
definitional issues: When is a threat credible? What constitutes harm? 
How aggressively must regulators act?6 Because there is no general 
agreement on these issues, definitions of the principle are sometimes 
arrayed along a spectrum from weak to strong versions.7 At the weak 
end, the principle is limited to Fisher’s definition, i.e., it merely 
                                           
3 Cf. Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Hart 
2007) 24–26. 
4 Fisher, ‘Is the Precautionary Principle Justiciable?’ (2001) 13 JEL  
315, 316. 
5 Kysar, ‘It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution, and Opportunity Costs’ 
(2006) 22 JLUEL 1, 7; see also Stewart, ‘Environmental Regulatory 
Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty’ (2000) 20 Res.L.&Econ. 71, 79–80 
(collecting sources). 
6 Applegate, ‘The Taming of the Precautionary Principle’ (2002) 27 
Wm.&Mary.Envtl.L.&Pol’y.Rev. 13, 17–21. 
7 Stewart (n.5), 75–78. 
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authorises action. At the strong end are versions of the principle that 
would “reverse the burden of proof” and require regulatory controls on 
new technologies in the absence of convincing evidence of safety.8 
While it is difficult to find serious critics of weak versions of the 
precautionary principle, stronger versions have been sharply criticised by 
commentators on both sides of the Atlantic. In particular, Giandomenico 
Majone and Cass Sunstein have levelled detailed criticisms of strong 
versions of precaution.9 For both Professors Majone and Sunstein, the 
fundamental vice of strong precaution is that it ignores the fact that in 
many situations regulatory intervention will itself create risks.10 In these 
circumstances, particularly when the risks on both sides are uncertain, 
the precautionary principle fails to provide guidance.11 Both also point 
specifically to the opportunity costs associated with the strong version’s 
propensity to slow the introduction of new technology.12 
The criticisms advanced by Sunstein and Majone rest on the premise 
that the goal of regulation is to maximise social welfare, that all harms to 
social welfare should be treated equally, and that the totality of benefits 
and harms of a particular regulatory decision should be balanced against 
one another.13 On that premise, their analyses of strong precaution are 
compelling (although one should acknowledge that the strong version of 
the principle they critique does not reflect the way in which the principle 
is applied in practice, including in the EU). If, however, one were not to 
treat all threats to social welfare equally, but instead were to adopt a 
hierarchy of values associated with health and environmental risk, then 
the apparent rudderlessness of the principle disappears.14 One might for 
example prioritise the loss of an endangered species over threats to 
                                           
8 Ibid., 113–14. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary 
Principle (CUP 2005) 18–20. 
9 Majone, ‘What Price Safety? The Precautionary Principle and Its Policy 
Implications’ (2002) 40 JCMS 89; Sunstein, ‘Beyond the Precautionary 
Principle’ (2003) 151 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1003 (2003). 
10 Majone (n.9), 101–02; Sunstein (n.9), 1024–25. 
11 Sunstein (n.9), 1020–28. 
12 Majone (n.9), 105; Sunstein (n.9), 1023. 
13 Kysar (n.5), 6–8. 
14 Ibid. 
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human health. One might even adopt some system of lexical ordering in 
which certain risks must be eliminated or reduced to the greatest extent 
possible before other threats to welfare are considered.15 Feintuck, for 
example, has argued that the precautionary principle should be 
understood to demand a hierarchy of values in which “common interests” 
are prioritised over economic interests.16 Similarly, Kysar has argued 
against accepting the moral equivalence of prevented harms and foregone 
opportunities.17 
These differing perspectives on the precautionary principle are, at 
bottom, different approaches for defining and constituting the public 
interest. Sunstein and Majone take an essentially consequentialist view, 
in which the public interest is to a large extent equated with social 
welfare.18 Because it implicitly rejects choosing among competing visions 
of the public good, their approach is also essentially pluralistic. For 
Feintuck and Kysar, by contrast, the public interest is not the sum of 
individuals’ conceptions of the public good, but rather a purposeful 
construction of what constitutes a good society.19 This conception 
requires a process for evaluating and choosing among differing visions of 
the public interest. In Feintuck’s view that definitional process must have 
democratic sanction, but it is not merely a question of majority 
preference.20 Instead, formulation of the public interest also requires the 
application of moral reasoning, which leaves open a role for law—and by 
extension courts—in defining the public interest. 
                                           
15 Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances (OUP 1993) 168–75. 
16 Feintuck, ‘Precautionary Maybe, but What’s the Principle? The 
Precautionary Principle, the Regulation of Risk, and the Public Domain’ 
(2005) 32 JLS 371, 398. 
17 Kysar (n.5), 51–55. 
18 Stewart is more explicit in this regard. Stewart (n.5), 82. None of these 
writers appears to deny that considerations other than welfare may be 
important; their claim is instead that welfare will normally be the central 
concern in risk regulation. Cf. Adler and Posner, New Foundations of 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (Harvard 2006) 53–54. 
19 Feintuck (n.2), 40–41; Kysar (n.5), 48–52. 
20 Feintuck specifically rejects pluralist bargaining as a basis for 
formulating the public interest, arguing instead that certain public values 
are inherent in the concept of democracy. Feintuck (n.2), 54–56. 
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As I will develop in the following sections, these differing perspectives 
on the meaning of the public interest are reflected in the different 
approaches taken to precaution by European and American public law. 
US law tends to reflect a pluralistic account of the public interest and to 
treat precaution as a function of political preference or, put differently, as 
a matter of policy. EU law, by contrast, tends to conceive of the public 
interest as a normative question distinct from political preferences. 
Although politics have hardly been banished from the EU’s precautionary 
jurisprudence, the case law shows that the courts have employed their 
own understandings of the public interest, drawn from legal sources, in 
applying the precautionary principle. These different understandings of 
the public interest, I will argue, inform differences in the theories on 
which the two systems ground the constitutional legitimacy of regulation. 
B. The Precautionary Principle in the 
European Union 
The Treaty of Maastricht formally introduced the precautionary principle 
into EU law, by adding Article 130r to the EC Treaty, paragraph 2 of 
which provided: 
Community policy on the environment shall 
aim at a high level of protection taking into 
account the diversity of situations in the 
various regions of the Community. It shall be 
based on the precautionary principle and on 
the principles that preventive action should be 
taken, that environmental damage should as a 
priority be rectified at source and that the 
polluter should pay. 
This language has been retained unchanged, except for the 
substitution of “Union” for “Community”, in Article 191 TFEU. The roots 
of the precautionary principle in European law go back much farther 
than Maastricht, however. Its deepest origins lie in the constitutional 
obligations of many Member State governments to protect public health 
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and the environment.21 Similar duties can also be found in the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the European Social Charter, both of 
which are binding on all Member States.22 And at EU level, the Court of 
Justice has long recognised a duty on the part of the EU Institutions to 
take environmental and public health concerns into account when 
regulating.23 In addition to recognising an affirmative obligation to protect 
public health, pre-Maastricht case law affirmed the authority of Member 
State governments to take regulatory action when the evidence of harm is 
uncertain. For example in Sandoz, the Court of Justice held that Member 
States could regulate potentially harmful substances without waiting for 
definitive proof.24 The court reached a similar conclusions at EU level in 
Fedesa, in which it held that it was not necessary for the EU legislature 
to establish the existence of a risk scientifically before taking action.25 
Precautionary reasoning was thus an important aspect of EU law before 
the inclusion of the precautionary principle in the Treaties.26 Indeed, 
                                           
21 Vos, Institutional Frameworks of Community Health and Safety 
Legislation (Hart 1999) 15–17, 68; Koppen and Ladeur, ‘Environmental 
Rights’ in Cassese, Clapham, and Weiler (eds.), Human Rights and the 
European Community (Nomos 1991) 21–34; Micklitz, ‘Consumer Rights’ in 
ibid., 61–67; Boehmer-Christiansen, ‘The Precautionary Principle in 
Germany—Enabling Government’ in O’Riordan and Cameron (eds.), 
Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Earthscan 1994) 32. 
22 Desgagné, ‘Integrating Environmental Values into the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (1995) 89 AJIL 263, 265. 
23 Case 240/83, Procureur de la Republique v. Association de defense des 
Bruleurs d’huiles usagées [1985] ECR 531, para. 13; Case C-331/88, R. 
v. MAFF, ex p. Fedesa [1990] ECR I-4023, paras. 8–9; see also Case C-
221/10 P, Artegodan GmbH v. Commission, nyr, Opinion of A.G. Bot, 
para. 96 (deeming public health a “primordial” principle). 
24 Case 174/82, Criminal proceedings against Sandoz BV [1983] ECR 
2445, paras. 15–16; see also Case 247/84, Criminal proceedings against 
Motte [1985] ECR 3887 paras. 19–20; Case 54/85, Ministère Public v. 
Mirepoix [1986] ECR 1067, para. 14. 
25 Fedesa (n.23), paras. 16–17. 
26 Fisher (n.3), 209–10; Heyvaert, ‘Facing the Consequences of the 
Precautionary Principle in European Community Law’ (2006) 31 ELR 
185, 203. 
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even after Maastricht, the courts continued to uphold precautionary 
regulation without explicitly relying on the precautionary principle.27 
As a result of this deep constitutional history, the courts have 
extended the reach of the precautionary principle well beyond the 
confines of Article 191, so that its application is now mandatory 
whenever EU action touches on protection of health or the 
environment.28 Significantly, the courts have accomplished this 
expansion by elevating the precautionary principle to the status of a 
general principle of EU law.29 General principles are a foundational 
component of the EU legal system, with no direct parallel in US law. They 
are binding legal principles of a constitutional nature, derived by the EU 
courts from the legal traditions of the Member States. Because they have 
the status of primary law, “a measure, whether legislative or 
administrative, which infringes one of them is illegal and may be 
annulled by the Court”.30 Just as important, by designating it as a 
general principle, the courts have invested the precautionary principle 
with high normative status. General principles inhabit the realm of those 
foundational principles—human rights, proportionality, rights of the 
defence (natural justice)—that are constitutive of EU law’s character and 
identity. They have moral, not just legal, force.31 
In the last twenty years, the precautionary principle truly has become 
the leitmotif of European risk regulation.32 It is cited as part of the legal 
                                           
27 E.g., Case C-405/92, Etablissements Armand Mondiet SA v. Armement 
Islais SARL [1993] ECR I-6133, paras. 32–36; Case C-157/96, R. v. MAFF 
ex p. National Farmers’ Union [1998] ECR I-2211, para. 63. 
28 Case T-392/02, Solvay Pharmaceuticals BV v. Council [2003] ECR II-
4555, paras. 121–22. 
29 The General Court first recognised the precautionary principle as a 
general principle of law in Case T-74/00, Artegodan GmbH v. Commission 
[2002] ECR II-4945, para. 184. The Court of Justice has never explicitly 
referred to the precautionary principle as a general principle, but some 
recent decisions apparently treat it as such. E.g., Case C-269/13 P, Acino 
AG v. Commission, nyr, paras. 58–59. 
30 Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2d ed., OUP 2006) 6. 
31 Ibid., 1, 3–5. 
32 Fisher (n.4), 315. 
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basis of almost all environmental, health, and safety legislation.33 The 
Commission routinely alludes to it in official documents on various 
aspects of regulatory policy.34 It is the frequent subject of litigation. In 
many ways, interpretation and application of the precautionary principle 
has come to structure the EU’s framing of, and response to, problems of 
technological risk.35 As such, it has become perhaps the most important 
conceptual foundation of EU risk regulation. 
1. The precautionary principle as a source 
of regulatory authority 
Although it is easy to identify the precautionary principle as an aspect of 
EU constitutional law, it is harder to specify its function. It is sometimes 
said that that precautionary principle increases the EU’s power to take 
regulatory measures to address potential health and environmental risks 
by allowing it to act in advance of scientific certainty.36 But as we have 
seen, the EU courts upheld numerous regulatory measures despite 
scientific uncertainty well before the precautionary principle was 
                                           
33 E.g., Directive 2015/412 amending Directive 2001/18/EC as regards 
the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation 
of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in their territory [2015] O.J. 
L68/1, recital 2; Regulation 528/2012 concerning the making available 
on the market and use of biocidal products [2012] O.J. L167/1 (Biocides 
Regulation), art. 1(1); Regulation 1907/2006 concerning the Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) &c. 
[2006] O.J. L396/1, art. 1(3). Indeed, the principle is cited even when its 
relevance is not obvious, e.g., Regulation 66/2010 on the EU Ecolabel 
[2009] O.J. L27/1, recital 3. 
34 E.g., European Commission, Communication, ‘Renewable Energy: 
Progressing towards the 2020 Target’ COM(2011) 31 final, 4; European 
Commission, Communication, ‘Regulatory Aspects of Nanomaterials’ 
COM(2008) 366 final, 8. 
35 Fisher (n.3), 209–10; Joerges, ‘Law, Science and the Management of 
Risks to Health at the National, European and International Level—
Stories of Baby Dummies, Mad Cows and Hormones in Beef’ (2001) 7 
Colum.J.Eur.L. 1, 18–19. 
36 Heyvaert (n.26), 186; see also de Sadeleer (n.1), 165–66; Vos, 
‘Antibiotics, the Precautionary Principle, and the Court of First Instance’ 
(2004) 11 MJECL 187, 194. 
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introduced. Thus, there would seem to be no need for the precautionary 
principle to expand the EU’s regulatory powers in this regard. What the 
precautionary principle instead provides is a specific legal justification for 
those powers. As the EU’s powers in the field of risk regulation became 
more expansive—and, in particular, as an increasing share of EU-level 
risk regulation came to be adopted administratively by the Commission— 
such a justification became necessary to reconcile precautionary risk 
regulation with European concepts of administrative legality. 
To understand how the precautionary principle justifies EU risk 
regulation, it is necessary first to understand the limits on the EU’s 
regulatory authority inherent in the concept of legality.37 Historically, 
three general principles of law—fundamental economic rights,38 
proportionality, and equal treatment—have been used by the courts to 
place legal bounds on the EU’s regulatory powers. In different ways, each 
of these principles protects individual economic liberty by requiring that 
regulation be directed toward a legitimate public aim and have an 
“objective” basis.39 These principles have been used as the basis for 
arguments that the EU may not regulate without substantial scientific 
evidence of harm because to do so would be to act without an objective 
                                           
37 This discussion assumes that the EU has competence to act under the 
Treaties. Given the EU’s broad powers to harmonise the internal market, 
art. 114 TFEU, and its general competence to regulate for the protection 
of the environment, art. 192 TFEU, competence is usually not an issue in 
the area of risk regulation. The EU’s powers in this field are not 
unlimited, however. E.g., Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and 
Council [2000] ECR I-8419, paras. 83–84. 
38 “Fundamental economic rights” is short-hand for the right to property 
and other liberal economic rights recognised by the Court of Justice, e.g., 
the rights to pursue an occupation or to engage in economic activity. 
Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und 
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125, paras. 3–4; 
Tridimas (n.30), 298–319. 
39 Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council [2002] ECR II-3305, 
para. 478; Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law: A 
Comparative Study (Kluwer 1996) 6–8; Tridimas (n.30), 83–84. 
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basis.40 Proponents of that view argue that regulatory measures taken 
without such evidence arbitrarily restrict individual liberty and, as such, 
are contrary to the rule of law. 
The obstacles to precautionary regulation posed by economic rights, 
proportionality, and non-discrimination could be overcome in at least two 
ways. One approach would be simply to deny that “objectivity” requires a 
high degree of scientific evidence, thereby removing the most important 
legal barrier to precautionary regulation. As Heyvaert argues, that was 
apparently the approach taken by the EU courts in the many cases 
upholding precautionary regulation without relying on the precautionary 
principle.41 The effect of that approach would be to accord the 
Commission a wide discretion to determine the goals of EU risk 
regulation as well as the means necessary for achieving those goals. As 
we will see below, the US courts have taken such an approach to 
upholding precautionary regulation. 
According the Commission such a wide margin of discretion is 
problematic, however, for EU administrative law. For one thing, it is 
unclear that the Commission possesses sufficient democratic legitimacy 
to sustain such a large margin of discretion. Unlike the administrations 
of many Member States, which bear a high degree of responsibility to 
their national parliaments, the democratic credentials of the Commission 
are relatively weak.42 Whereas broad discretion may be appropriate when 
the EU acts legislatively, it is doubtful whether according the 
Commission a similar freedom of action would be acceptable to the 
Member States and the European public.43 A second problem is that 
                                           
40 Indeed, such arguments can be found even in recent literature. E.g., 
Bergkamp, ‘The Quiet Revolution in EU Administrative Procedure: 
Judicial Vetting of Precautionary Risk Assessment’ [2014] EJRR 102, 
107–08; de Vries and Francot-Timmermans, ‘As Good as It Gets: On 
Risk, Legality and the Precautionary Principle’ in Besselink, Pennings, 
and Prechal (eds.), The Eclipse of the Legality Principle in the European 
Union (Kluwer 2011) 25–30. 
41 Heyvaert (n.26), 200. 
42 Chapter 2, section II.B.1. 
43 Cf. Case C-343/09, Afton Chem. Ltd. v. Sec’y of State for Transp. [2010] 
ECR I-7027, Opinion of A.G. Kokott, paras. 33–34. 
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according the administration a wide margin of discretion runs counter to 
the idea of the rule of law in the public law systems of some Member 
States, notably Germany. In these systems, the administration’s exercise 
of discretion must be legally structured in ways that allow for effective 
judicial review.44 Without such structure, administrative discretion is 
literally lawless. 
Conceptualising the precautionary principle as a general principle of 
EU law, and not merely an aspect of the EU’s environmental policy (as 
provided in the Treaties), provides an alternative way to reconcile 
regulation under conditions of scientific uncertainty with the principle of 
legality. It does so by modifying the meaning and scope of the other 
general principles, but without overriding them.45 The precautionary 
principle in effect clarifies the meaning of objectivity by providing that 
neither scientific certainty nor even strong scientific evidence is required 
in cases in which the Commission is acting to protect health or the 
environment. It does not, however, simply leave the basis of regulation to 
administrative discretion. Instead, the courts have interpreted the 
precautionary principle to impose a limited hierarchy of values. Both the 
Court of Justice and the General Court have held that “protection of 
public health must unquestionably take precedence over economic 
considerations”.46 In other words, although the level of protection is a 
“political choice”, the Institutions’ freedom of choice is not unbounded 
                                           
44 Below, p.142. 
45 Case C-491/01, R. v. Secretary of State for Health, ex p. British 
American Tobacco [2002] ECR I-11453, Opinion of A.G. Geelhoed, paras. 
228–29; Case C-121/00, Criminal proceedings against Hahn [2002] ECR 
I-9193, para. 47. 
46 Artegodan (n.29), para. 173. The General Court has restated this 
principle on numerous occasions. E.g., Case T-483/11, Sepro Europe Ltd. 
v. Commission, nyr, para. 85; Case T-31/07, DuPont de Nemours (France) 
v. Commission, nyr, para. 132; Case T-475/07, Dow AgroSciences Ltd. v. 
Commission [2011] ECR II-5937, para. 143; Case T-158/03, Industrias 
Quimícas del Vallés, SA v. Commission [2005] ECR II-2425, para. 134; 
Solvay Pharmaceuticals (n.28), para. 121; Case T-70/99, Alpharma Inc. v. 
Council [2002] ECR II-3495, para. 356. This hierarchy of values was first 
announced by the Court of Justice in Case C-183/95, Affish BV v. 
Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees [1997] ECR I-4315, para. 42. 
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and is subject to scrutiny by the courts.47 At the same time, however, 
protection of economic rights and individual liberty is not simply set 
aside. Precautionary measures must still be proportionate and non-
discriminatory, requirements that are again subject to judicial control.48 
Thus, as interpreted by the courts, the precautionary principle 
elaborates a framework for assessing the compatibility of risk regulation 
with the general principles of EU law. The administration not only may, 
but arguably must, act to protect health and the environment and may 
do so on the basis of uncertain evidence. It must nonetheless respect 
individual liberty by not relying on purely hypothetical risks49 and by 
ensuring that regulatory measures are neither disproportionate nor 
discriminatory.50 Although it provides a fairly detailed rubric for decision, 
it should be obvious that this framework does not mechanically yield 
results when applied to particular facts. Rather, determining the 
compatibility of any particular measure with the general principles of law 
requires an act of judgment. Although the courts are the ultimate 
arbiters of whether the framework has been properly applied, they accord 
considerable deference to the Commission’s own assessment.51 
Relying on the precautionary principle to justify regulation under 
scientific uncertainty aligns EU law, to a degree, with the German 
approach to administrative discretion. Unlike American52 or French53 
administrative law, both of which tend to draw a strong distinction 
between law and policy or law and discretion (légalité ou opportunité), 
                                           
47 E.g., Case T-333/10, Animal Trading Company (ATC) BV v. 
Commission, nyr, para. 101. 
48 Case C-77/09, Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços Lda v. 
Ministero della Salute [2010] ECR I-13533, para. 76; Case C-6/99, 
Association Greenpeace France v. Ministère de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche 
[2000] ECR I-1651, Opinion of A.G. Mischo, paras. 71–72. 
49 Gowan (n.48), para. 78; The “no hypothetical risk rule” is discussed in 
chapter 4, section III.C.1. 
50 ATC (n.47), para. 101. 
51 Ibid., para. 82. 
52 Davis, Discretionary Justice (Louisiana State University 1969) 36–42. 
53 Brown and Bell, French Administrative Law (5th ed., Clarendon 1998) 
256–61. 
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German administrative law tends to conceive of the two concepts as 
interwoven.54 Indeed, in contemporary German administrative law, it is 
often asserted that legal rules allow for only one solution to regulatory 
problems and that the administration possesses no discretion.55 From a 
German perspective, simply creating a zone of discretion in which the 
administration is free to act (or not) poses a serious threat to the rule of 
law.56 It is therefore no surprise that the precautionary principle was 
initially developed in Germany in part as a means of creating a legal basis 
for overcoming obstacles to environmental regulation posed by 
proportionality and economic rights.57 Although the EU courts’ 
application of the precautionary principle is broadly aligned with this 
approach, it also shows the influence of other legal traditions by allowing 
the Commission a considerable margin of discretion in how the legal 
framework is applied.58 
Relying on the precautionary principle, rather than on an expansive 
notion of administrative discretion, has certain practical legal effects. 
Whereas simply expanding administrative discretion would leave the 
Commission free to regulate or not as it deemed appropriate, the 
precautionary principle operates in one direction only: in favour of 
greater protection. If the Commission declines to regulate when presented 
with evidence of potential but uncertain risk, its decision gains no 
                                           
54 Maurer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (17th ed., Verlag C.H. Beck 
2009) 135–43 (“Das Ermessen gibt der Verwaltung die Möglichkeit zur 
eigenverantwortlichen, wenn auch gesetzlich gelenkten Entscheidung.” 
(emphasis supplied)); Singh, German Administrative Law in Common Law 
Perspective (2d ed., Springer 2001) 151–56; Nolte, ‘General Principles of 
German and European Administrative Law—A Comparison in Historical 
Perspective’ (1994) 57 MLR 191, 196–97. 
55 Nolte (n.54), 196; Singh (n.54), 151–54. 
56 Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (University 
of Chicago 1995) 125–34; Schmidt-Aßmann, ‘Verwaltungslegitimation als 
Rechtsbegriff’ (1991) 116 Archiv.offen.Rechts 329, 384–87. 
57 Boehmer-Christiansen (n.21), 36–37; von Moltke, ‘The Vorsorgeprinzip 
in West German Environmental Policy’ in Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution, Twelfth Report: Best Practicable Environmental 
Option (HMSO 1988) 60–61. 
58 Cf. de Vries and Francot-Timmermans (n.40), 31–33. 
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protection from the precautionary principle.59 Additionally, the hierarchy 
of values created by the principle makes it possible to argue that 
regulatory measures should be annulled because they are insufficiently 
precautionary. Such challenges have had limited success thus far, but 
there have not been many cases and, as Heyvaert notes, most of the 
challenges have been weak on the facts.60 Finally, the hierarchy of values 
created by the courts’ precautionary jurisprudence should push the 
administration to frame risk regulation problems in terms of protection 
first and economic development second. It would, of course, be a heroic 
assumption that administrators always act in conformity with the letter 
and spirit of judicial decisions, but it would also be farfetched to assume 
that they have no influence.61 If nothing else, the court’s articulation of a 
legal requirement that protection be given priority strengthens the 
position of those actors within the administration who advocate for more 
protective approaches.62 
Nor should the normative force of the constitutionalisation of 
precaution be overlooked. A general principle, as Tridimas reminds us, 
“express[es] a core value of an area of law or the legal system as a 
whole”.63 Though their effect may be hard to pin down, there can be little 
doubt that such constitutional principles play an important role in 
setting the normative terms for legal and policy debate. Simply put, it is 
hard to argue that something is normatively desirable—that it furthers 
the public interest—if it is contrary to basic constitutional 
commitments.64 It would be difficult, for example, for the Commission to 
                                           
59 Case T-299/04, Sweden v. Commission [2007] ECR II-2437,  
paras. 172–86. 
60 Heyvaert (n.26), 194. At least one “insufficient precaution” challenge 
has been successful, Sweden (n.59), and another has been partly 
successful, Case C-3/00, Denmark v. Commission [2003] ECR I-2643. 
61 Consider in this regard, the Commission’s acknowledgement of the 
courts’ case law in its ‘Communication on the Precautionary Principle’ 
COM(2000) 1 final, 19. 
62 Cf. Pedersen, ‘Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking’ (1975) 85 YLJ 
38, 59–60. 
63 Tridimas (n.30), 1. 
64 Feintuck (n.2), 183–88. 
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argue that economic concerns, even concerns for public interests such as 
employment or poverty relief, should be pursued at the expense of health 
or environmental protection.65 This normative weight can be important in 
controversial areas. For example, REACH, which places heavy burdens 
on the large and powerful European chemicals industry, derived 
substantial rhetorical support from the precautionary principle.66 
2. The precautionary principle as a 
norm of legislative interpretation 
Although the bulk of scholarly work on the precautionary principle has 
focused on its meaning and application as an independently enforceable 
legal principle, the principle has perhaps had its greatest practical impact 
on EU law as a norm of legislative interpretation.67 Legislation is the 
primary means by which the legislature exercises control over the 
administration, by providing instructions and setting boundaries on the 
Commission’s scope of discretion. No matter how detailed, however, 
legislation, especially legislation setting up broad regulatory programmes, 
cannot definitively resolve the many varied questions that will arise in its 
application. For that reason, the interpretation of legislation is central to 
the definition of both the scope of a regulatory programme and the 
administration’s role in it. Theories of legislative interpretation abound, 
                                           
65 Of course, that difficulty may create an incentive for the EU 
administration to minimise its assessment of potential health and 
environmental risks or to overstate the protective capacities of regulation 
so that these goals do not come into conflict. 
66 European Commission, White Paper, ‘Strategy for a Future Chemicals 
Policy’ COM(2001) 88 final, 5, 20. While acknowledging the occasional 
rhetorical use of the precautionary principle, Heyvaert doubts that the 
content of REACH can be traced to an EU commitment to the principle. 
Heyvaert, ‘Guidance Without Constraint: Assessing the Impact of the 
Precautionary Principle on the European Community’s Chemicals Policy’ 
(2006) 6 YEEL 27, 57–58. 
67 An important exception is the work of Nicolas de Sadeleer. E.g., 
Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002) 
289–91; de Sadeleer (n.1), 145–46; ‘The Precautionary Principle as a 
Device for Greater Environmental Protection: Lessons from EC Courts’ 
(2009) 18 RECIEL 3, 7–8. 
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including approaches that focus on text, the intention of the legislature, 
or the underlying purpose of the legislation. None of these approaches, 
however, is capable of fully overcoming the indeterminacy of legislative 
language.68 As a result, interpretation necessarily takes place against a 
background of legal and normative principles that create the context in 
which the meaning of legislative terms can be fixed.69 The identification 
and interpretation of those background principles can thus have 
important consequences for the content of regulatory programmes and 
the administration’s role in implementing them. 
The elaboration of these interpretive norms by the judiciary is of 
particular consequence in the EU legal system. Unlike the US, where (as 
will be discussed below) agencies are given primary authority for 
interpreting the statutes they administer, legislative interpretation in the 
EU is emphatically a judicial function. In accordance with the civil law 
tradition on which EU administrative law is based,70 the EU courts 
accord no explicit deference to the views of the other Institutions.71 The 
EU courts’ approach to interpretation is eclectic, but a purposive or 
teleological approach, in which the court interprets legislation to further 
the legislation’s underlying goals rather than focusing on text or 
legislative intent, figures prominently.72 The Court of Justice has offered 
                                           
68 Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution (Harvard 1990) 117–23; Eskridge, 
‘Public Values in Statutory Interpretation’ (1989) 137 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1007, 
1019–33. 
69 Sunstein (n.68), 133–37, 144–47. 
70 Craig, ‘Judicial Review of Questions of Law: A Comparative Perspective’ 
in Rose-Ackerman and Lindseth (eds.), Comparative Administrative Law 
(Edward Elgar 2010) 461–62. Craig notes that substitution of judgment is 
also the norm for United Kingdom courts reviewing administrative action. 
71 In many cases, of course, an administrative body will have 
responsibility for interpreting legislation in the first instance, such as 
when adopting implementing acts or preparing guidance documents. 
Although the courts would accord no deference to those interpretations, 
obtaining judicial review may sometimes be difficult as a practical matter. 
Scott, ‘In Legal Limbo: Post-Legislative Guidance as a Challenge for 
European Administrative Law’ (2011) 48 C.M.L.Rev. 329. 
72 Arnull, The European Union and Its Court of Justice (2d ed., OUP 2006) 
607–08. 
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various justifications for its use of a teleological approach,73 but a 
particularly important consideration has been that much EU legislation 
is drafted in broad terms and that the resulting gaps and ambiguities 
often require the courts to go beyond the text to resolve specific cases.74 
In the absence of reliable legislative history, the teleological method 
provides a framework for this analysis.75 
Application of the teleological approach necessarily depends on the 
establishment, implicitly or explicitly, of principles for the identification of 
the legislative telos, and the EU courts look to the Treaties and the 
general principles of law as the primary sources of those norms.76 The 
elevation of the precautionary principle to a general principle of law 
means that all risk regulation legislation will be interpreted to the 
greatest extent possible to require a precautionary approach.77 Although 
the courts have not attempted to define precisely the content of the 
precautionary principle as an interpretive norm, they have generally 
applied it to construe legislation to require a high—sometimes a very 
high—level of environmental and health protection. In this regard, the 
courts often combine the precautionary principle with the principle that 
                                           
73 E.g., Case 283/81, CILFIT v. Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 3415, 
paras. 17–20. Arnull suggests that the teleological approach also has its 
roots in the civil law tradition. Arnull (n.72), 621; see also Koopmans, 
‘The Theory of Interpretation and the Court of Justice’ in O’Keeffe and 
Bavasso (eds.), Judicial Review in European Union Law (Kluwer 2000)  
47–51. 
74 E.g., Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95, France v. Commission [1998] 
ECR I-1375, para. 168; Arnull (n.72), 615–16. 
75 E.g., Case C-245/01, RTL Television GmbH v. Niedersächsische 
Landesmedienanstalt für privaten Rundfunk [2003] ECR I-12489, para. 
59; Arnull (n.72), 616–19. 
76 That said, the teleological approach is not the only interpretive 
approach taken by the courts and it would be wrong to suggest that the 
court does not pay close attention to text. Arnull (n.72), 612; Tridimas, 
‘The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism’ (1996) 21 ELR 199, 205. 
77 Tridimas (n.30), 29. Cf. Artegodan (n.29), para. 192 (“The precautionary 
principle requires the suspension or withdrawal of a marketing 
authorisation where new data give rise to serious doubts as to either the 
safety or the efficacy of the medicinal product . . . .”) (emphasis supplied). 
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the EU is to aim for a high level of protection,78 so that “a high level of 
protection” is understood to be one that is precautionary regarding 
uncertain risk.79 
One way in which the courts have applied precaution as an 
interpretive principle is to broaden the scope of EU regulation. An early 
example is ARCO Chemie Nederland,80 in which the Court explicitly 
applied the precautionary principle in a teleological manner to hold that 
the concept of “waste” in the Waste Directive81 should be interpreted 
broadly on the premise that greater environmental protection would be 
achieved by bringing more substances within the Directive’s coverage.82 
In a similar vein, the Court of Justice has relied on the precautionary 
principle to avoid literal interpretations of legislative language that might 
result in gaps in protection. For example, in Greenpeace France83 the 
Court relied on the principle to hold that Directive 90/220 on the release 
of GMOs permitted a Member State to withhold authorisation of a 
particular GMO on the basis of new information, even though the 
Directive did not explicitly provide for authorisation to be withheld in 
such circumstances.84 
Both the Court of Justice and the General Court have also applied the 
precautionary principle more aggressively, particularly in their 
                                           
78 This principle is also enshrined in the Treaties. Article 3(3) TEU; 
Articles 114(3), 168, 169, and 191(2) TFEU; Case C-284/95, Safety Hi-
Tech Srl v. S. & T. Srl [1998] ECR I-4301, paras. 47–49. 
79 E.g., Case C-106/14, Fédération des Entreprises du Commerce et de la 
Distribution v. Ministre de l’Écologie, du Développement Durable et de 
l’Énergie, Opinion of A.G. Kokott, nyr, para. 81; Case C-113/12, Brady v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, nyr, para. 39; Case T-368/11, 
Polyelectrolyte Producers Group v. Commission, nyr, para. 62. 
80 Case C-418/97, ARCO Chemie Nederland Ltd. v. Minister van 
Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer [2000] ECR  
I-4475. 
81 Directive 2008/98/EC on waste &c. [2008] O.J. L312/3. 
82 Arco Chemie (n.80), paras. 39–40; see also Case C-9/00, Palin Granit 
Oy [2002] ECR I-3533, para. 23. 
83 Above n.48. 
84 Ibid., paras. 44–47; see also Case C-236/01, Monsanto Agricoltura 
Italia SpA v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri [2003] ECR I-8105, 
paras. 110–12. 
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interpretation of the level of protection required by legislation. The two 
best examples of this phenomenon are Waddenzee85 and Sweden v. 
Commission.86 In Waddenzee, the Court of Justice interpreted Article 6(3) 
of the Habitats Directive87 in light of the precautionary principle to 
prohibit national authorities from authorising an activity in a special 
protection area if “doubt remains as to the absence of adverse effects on 
the integrity of the site”.88 In Sweden, the General Court interpreted the 
Plant Protection Products Directive,89 again in light of the precautionary 
principle, as prohibiting the authorisation of an active substance unless 
the Commission “establish[es] beyond a reasonable doubt” that the 
substance will not have any harmful effects on human or animal health 
or any unacceptable influence on the environment.90 These are both very 
strong interpretations of language that could easily have been construed 
to permit greater flexibility. Moreover, this use of the precautionary 
principle can have a decisive effect on the regulatory outcome. In 
Sweden, the court applied its interpretation of the required level of 
                                           
85 Case C-127/02, Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee v. 
Staatssecretaris van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij [2004] ECR  
I-7405. 
86 Above n.59. 
87 Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats &c. 
[1992] O.J. L206/7. 
88 Waddenzee (n.85), paras. 57–58. Article 6 of the Directive prohibits 
Member States from authorising projects in special areas of conservation 
unless they first assess their “implications for the site in view of the site’s 
conservation objectives” and determine on the basis of the assessment 
that they “will not adversely affect the integrity of the site concerned”. 
The Court of Justice interpreted “will not adversely affect” to require that 
“no reasonable scientific doubt remains as to the absence of such effects” 
and that, accordingly, projects may not be authorised “in the face of 
uncertainty”. Ibid., paras. 67–68. 
89 Directive 91/414/EEC concerning the placing of plant protection 
products on the market [1991] O.J. L230/1. 
90 Sweden (n.59), para. 170. Article 5 of the Directive provides that active 
substances may only be authorised if “it may be expected that . . . their 
use . . . does not have any harmful effects on human or animal health or 
any anacceptable [sic] influence on the environment”. It is not obvious 
that “may be expected” should be equated with “beyond a reasonable 
doubt”. 
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protection and found that the Commission had not made the necessary 
evidentiary showing to support the authorisation. Accordingly, the court 
annulled the authorisation, despite the fact that the relevant expert 
committee had recommended authorisation and the majority of Member 
States voting in the comitology committee had agreed.91 
Unlike the courts’ use of the precautionary principle to expand 
administrative authority by limiting other general principles, the use of 
precaution as an interpretive norm can be seen as increasing judicial 
authority at the expense of administrative, and to a lesser extent 
legislative, authority by framing the level of protection as an issue of law 
rather than as an issue of policy. By aggressively applying precaution as 
a strong interpretive norm, the courts make it more difficult for the 
legislature to enact policies calling for a lower level of protection.92 
Further, because the courts accord no special weight to the 
Commission’s views on legislative interpretation, framing the level of 
protection as a question of law acts as a powerful constraint on 
administrative discretion. 
The strong use of precaution as an interpretive norm demonstrates 
the importance of the recognition of the precautionary principle as a 
general principle of law, even though the courts have been reluctant to 
use the principle on its own to annul legislative or regulatory measures. 
While it is true that implementing the precautionary principle primarily 
through legislative interpretation leaves opportunities for the legislature 
to adopt less precautionary policies, the courts’ reliance on precaution as 
an interpretive norm has nonetheless resulted in consistently strong 
interpretations of legislative language.93 At the same time, by giving no 
                                           
91 Ibid., para. 42; this aspect of Sweden is discussed in chapter 4, 
section III.D. 
92 A great deal of political science literature has shown that it is more 
difficult to form legislative majorities to overcome legal default rules. 
Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve 
Public Law (Yale 1997) 96–105. 
93 That the courts rely on the principle to adopt strong interpretations of 
risk legislation does not mean that precaution is the only relevant value 
or that courts will always choose the most precautionary reading. For 
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special weight to the Commission’s views, the courts limit opportunities 
for the administration to adjust the level of protection downward through 
implementation. In this way, judicial interpretations of precaution, and of 
the public interest in risk regulation more broadly, act as meaningful 
legal constraints on administrators’ policy choices. 
C. Precaution in the United States 
Perhaps the most striking thing about the precautionary principle in US 
law is its near absence. The term “precautionary principle” does not 
appear in the United States Code or the Code of Federal Regulations, and 
it is rarely adverted to in documents prepared by US administrative 
agencies.94 Mentions of the principle are similarly rare in US case law, 
and to date no judicial decision has relied on it by name. Nor is there a 
history in US constitutional law, as there is in Europe, of recognising 
affirmative obligations on the part of the federal government to protect 
health or the environment.95 
The absence of an official embrace of the precautionary principle 
should not, however, be taken to imply that US law rejects precautionary 
                                                                                                                   
example, in Joined Cases C-58/10 and C-68/10, Monsanto SAS v. 
Ministre de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche [2011] ECR I-7763, the Court of 
Justice had to decide which of two legislative provisions governed the 
adoption of safeguard measures with respect to GMOs. The court rejected 
France’s argument that the precautionary principle required it to choose 
the provision that accorded the Member States greater freedom to adopt 
safeguard measures unilaterally. Instead, the court held that the clear 
language of the legislation controls. Ibid., para. 60. The court also held, 
however, that the standards would have to be applied in light of the 
precautionary principle. Ibid., para. 71. Indeed, the Advocate General’s 
opinion supports the analysis presented in this chapter, in that he 
argued that the precautionary principle required the Member States and 
the Institutions to apply a similarly high level of protection regardless of 
the precise legislative language. Ibid., Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi, para. 64. 
94 Wood, Wood, and Wood, ‘Whither the Precautionary Principle? An 
American Assessment from an Administrative Law Perspective’ (2006) 54 
AJCL 581, 583–85. 
95 Sax, ‘The Search for Environmental Rights’ (1990) 6 JLUEL 93, 94. 
Such constitutional obligations are recognised in some state 
constitutions, however. E.g., Michigan Const., Article IV, § 52. 
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regulation. Many US health, safety, and environmental statutes have 
been interpreted to require a precautionary approach, in the sense that 
they require regulatory intervention in response to less-than-certain 
evidence of harm, and American law is generally not anti-precautionary. 
Nonetheless, precaution as an independent legal principle plays very little 
role in contemporary US discourse on risk regulation. 
It was not always obvious that this would be the case. Although it 
predated widespread use of the term “precautionary principle”, early US 
case law on risk regulation was often infused with strongly precautionary 
reasoning. Since the mid-1980s, however, such reasoning has been in 
marked decline. This change is partly the result of shifting views on risk 
regulation policy,96 but the more important cause has been significant 
changes in US administrative law regarding the appropriate roles of 
courts and agencies in the regulatory process. 
1. 1970s environmentalism and precaution 
in American law 
Precautionary reasoning in US law had its heyday in the 1970s.97 This 
decade saw the explosion of risk regulation programmes, and with them 
a palpable reordering of social priorities. 1970s environmentalism 
stressed health and environmental protection as primary public goals 
and generally denied that these goals could or should be balanced 
against economic concerns.98 Several of the new risk statutes called on 
the newly created agencies to set health standards with “an adequate 
margin of safety”99 or to reduce risk to the greatest extent “feasible”.100 
                                           
96 See Kysar (n.5), 5–6. 
97 Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law (University of Chicago 
2004) 80–83; Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean 
Air Act (Brookings 1983) 1–11; Sunstein, Risk and Reason (CUP 2004) 
11–18. 
98 Sunstein (n.97), 17–18; Kysar (n.5), 6. 
99 E.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q. 
100 E.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–
678; American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 422 U.S. 
490, 530 (1981) (Cotton Dust). 
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Other statutes were interpreted to apply to potential as well as 
scientifically established risks.101 
The courts were not unaware of the public and congressional mood.102 
Thus, in a statement that could have been lifted from a judgment of the 
European Court of Justice, the D.C. Circuit declared, “fundamental 
personal interests in life, health, and liberty . . . have always had a 
special claim to judicial protection, in comparison with . . . economic 
interests . . .”.103 Relying on the special status of interests in health and 
environmental protection, courts construed early environmental statutes 
aggressively in an effort to maximise protection for those interests.104 In 
part, these decisions were motivated by an effort to give effect to what the 
courts perceived to be Congress’s intent.105 But it is also apparent that 
the courts viewed special solicitude for health and environmental 
protection as an independent and judicially enforceable legal principle.106 
Unlike in the EU, there has never been a serious argument in the US 
that precautionary regulation is unconstitutional. The US Constitution 
does not separately recognise economic rights,107 nor does it incorporate 
                                           
101 E.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387; Reserve Mining Co. v. 
EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 520 (8th.Cir.1975); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y; EDF v. EPA, 465 F.2d 
528, 535–36 (D.C.Cir.1972). 
102 Oakes, ‘The Judicial Role in Environmental Law’ (1977) 52 
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 498, 511–16. 
103 EDF v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C.Cir.1971); see also 
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 615 
(D.C.Cir.1973) (affirming “all humanity’s interest in life, health, and a 
harmonious relationship with the elements of nature”); Calvert Cliffs 
Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109, 
1109 (D.C.Cir.1971) (welcoming “a flood of new litigation . . . seeking 
judicial assistance in protecting our natural environment”). 
104 Lazarus (n.97), 80–82; Melnick (n.97), 69–70, 356–57; Sunstein (n.97), 
11–16; Glicksman and Schroeder, ‘EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of 
Law and Politics’ (Autumn, 1991) 54 LCP 249, 273–75. 
105 Calvert Cliffs (n.103), 1109; Melnick (n.81), 374–75. 
106 Melnick (n.97), 64–65, 357; Sunstein (n.68), 24–31; Glicksman and 
Schroeder (n.104), 271. 
107 Stewart and Sunstein, ‘Public Programs and Private Rights’ (1982) 95 
HLR 1193, 1250–51. 
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the proportionality principle.108 Instead, US law protects those interests 
through the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, which are understood to contain a substantive component 
prohibiting arbitrary infringements of liberty or property interests.109 
Since the 1930s, however, when it ended the Lochner110 era of aggressive 
substantive due process review, the Supreme Court has held that 
substantive due process requires only that legislation “have a reasonable 
relation to a proper legislative purpose”.111 The adoption of this “rational 
basis test” was a purposeful choice by the Supreme Court to limit 
constitutional constraints on economic and social regulation.112 In 
practice, the scrutiny applied under the rational basis standard is so 
weak that, according to Professor Tribe, the courts will uphold legislation 
“for virtually no substantive reason at all”.113 Because the 
constitutionality of risk regulation programmes is evaluated under this 
standard,114 it is simply implausible to argue that the Constitution 
prohibits precautionary regulation.115 
Although the constitutionality of precautionary regulation was never 
in doubt, some precautionary measures have been challenged as a 
matter of administrative law. Unlike EU law, US public law makes a clear 
distinction between constitutional and administrative judicial review, 
with the latter being grounded primarily in statutory and common law 
principles. Administrative regulation is generally reviewed under the 
APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard, which requires a stronger 
                                           
108 Sullivan and Frase, Proportionality Principles in American Law (OUP 
2009) 61–63. 
109 1 Tribe, American Constitutional Law (3d ed., Foundation Press 2000) 
1332–43. 
110 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also Hammer v. 
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
111 West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397–99 (1937). 
112 Sunstein, ‘Lochner’s Legacy’ (1987) 87 Colum.L.Rev. 873, 874 & nn.6–8.  
113 Tribe (n.109), 1362. 
114 E.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595–96 (1962). 
115 Stewart and Sunstein (n.107), 1255; Mashaw (n.92), 52–55. 
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demonstration of means-ends rationality than the rational basis test.116 
As such, arguments have been made (and sometimes still are made117) 
that administrative regulation without a reasonably certain scientific 
basis is arbitrary. There are some well-known, older cases in which 
courts accepted such arguments, but they have not been widely 
followed.118 By the end of the 1970s the majority view in the courts of 
appeals was that administrators could regulate on a precautionary basis, 
unless that approach was precluded by statute.119 Although the Supreme 
Court has never passed explicitly on the compatibility of precautionary 
reasoning with the arbitrary and capricious standard, it has held 
repeatedly that agencies are not required to support their decisions with 
“anything approaching scientific certainty” to meet that standard.120 
Thus, during the 1970s and early 1980s US administrative law saw a 
number of developments, both statutory and judicial, that firmly enabled 
American regulatory agencies to engage in precautionary risk regulation. 
Some courts went further and appeared to lay the jurisprudential 
foundation for an affirmative obligation on the administration to take 
precautionary approaches, at least in some cases.121 The latter trend 
would not last, however. In the 1980s the Supreme Court fundamentally 
recast the relationship between law and discretion in administrative law 
or, put differently, the relationship between courts and administrative 
agencies. These changes would not result in new legal barriers for 
                                           
116 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 & n.9 (1983). 
117 E.g., Mississippi v. EPA, 744 F.3d 1334, 1343–44 (D.C.Cir.2013). 
118 Chapter 4, section II.A. 
119 E.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 13–15 (D.C.Cir.1976); Society of 
the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1304 (2d.Cir.1974) 
(Clark, J.). 
120 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 520 (2009); 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007); Industrial Union 
Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 609 
(1980) (Benzene). 
121 Rabin, ‘Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective’ (1986) 38 
Stan.L.Rev. 1189, 1303. 
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precautionary regulation, but they would end any trend toward the 
development of a substantive precautionary principle in US law. 
2. The shift from precaution to policy 
The decline in the US courts’ reliance on precautionary reasoning may be 
traced to several factors. A series of economic downturns in the 1970s 
dampened public and congressional enthusiasm for aggressive health 
and environmental regulation.122 At the same time, a wave of scholarship 
emerged calling into question the success of regulatory programmes, 
particularly health and environmental programmes, at meeting their 
aims.123 Somewhat counterintuitively, much of this scholarship argued 
that the courts’ enthusiasm for health and environmental protection had 
actually hindered the achievement of its protective goals by too rigidly 
limiting the administration’s discretion to balance competing concerns.124 
This shift in attitudes was accompanied by a sharp decline in the use of 
precautionary rhetoric in US judicial decisions. Whereas courts had 
previously treated the goals of health and environmental legislation as 
legal questions, they now began to treat them as questions of policy. The 
results of this shift are perhaps best illustrated by the US courts’ 
changing approach to the interpretation of regulatory statutes. 
Before 1984, judicial review of administrative statutory interpretation 
was “erratic”.125 Although the Supreme Court had long held that courts 
should accord a degree of deference to agencies’ interpretations of the 
statutes they administer, there was another “equally impressive” line of 
cases that apparently accorded no deference to agency interpretations.126 
These lines of cases were “analytically in conflict” with the result that 
                                           
122 Lazarus (n.97), 94–97. 
123 E.g., Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substances Regulation (MIT 
1988); Wildavsky, Searching for Safety (Transaction 1988). 
124 E.g., Ackerman and Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air (Yale 1981) 111–15; 
Mashaw and Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety (Harvard 1990) 247–52; 
Melnick (n.97), 110–12; see also Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy 
(Brookings 1977) 284–93. 
125 Starr, ‘Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era’ (1986) 3 Yale.J.Reg. 
283, 283. 
126 Ibid., 292–93. 
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lower courts were left to choose between them as they thought 
appropriate.127 Throughout the 1970s, reviewing courts tended to show 
relatively little deference to administrative interpretations of 
environmental statutes. Instead, they applied the principle that health 
and the environment merited special legal protection to override 
interpretations they found insufficiently protective.128 
That approach to review was dramatically altered by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Chevron, which came down firmly on the side of 
deference to administrative interpretations. Henceforth, courts were to 
apply a two-part test: “First, always, is the question whether Congress 
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” If so, then “the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress”.129 If, however, the statute is ambiguous, 
then courts must defer to the agency’s interpretation, “unless [it is] 
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”.130 Following 
Chevron, courts became much less assertive in their use of background 
policy norms to interpret regulatory legislation.131 Rather than relying on 
their own understandings of legislative policy and the public interest, 
courts were increasingly prepared to accept the administration’s view as 
to whether a given statute should (or should not) be read to require 
precautionary action. As a result, whether US risk regulation would take 
a precautionary approach came to depend on the policy preferences of 
the incumbent president. 
That the shift away from precautionary reasoning in judicial review 
was driven primarily by changing understandings of the proper roles of 
the administration and the courts is indirectly confirmed by comparing 
cases in which courts review administrative decisions with cases in 
which the courts themselves apply risk statutes. For example, under 
                                           
127 Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 
(2d.Cir.1976) (Friendly, J.). 
128 Melnick (n.97), 11–13. 
129 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
130 Ibid., 844. 
131 Sunstein (n.68), 142–44; Glicksman and Schroeder (n.104), 286–97; 
Starr (n.125), 294–95. 
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sections 7002 and 7003 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 
the federal courts may order injunctive relief to address releases of 
hazardous waste that “may present an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to health or the environment”.132 Consistently with the 
judicial approach to precaution that prevailed in the 1970s, early cases 
interpreted this language broadly, holding that it empowered the courts 
to address “any risk”.133 Despite the decline in precautionary reasoning in 
administrative cases following Chevron, the courts have continued to 
apply these provisions in a highly precautionary manner.134 
The US courts’ tendency post-Chevron to treat precaution as a 
question of policy has also been reinforced by a trend toward markedly 
more lenient substantive review.135 During the 1970s, courts relied on a 
precautionary philosophy not only in their interpretation of regulatory 
statutes, but also in their substantive review of agency decisions, 
sometimes leading them to vacate those decisions as insufficiently 
precautionary.136 This trend too was to fall off in the 1980s, largely as the 
result of Supreme Court decisions reemphasising the importance of 
deference to agencies’ scientific and policy judgments.137 On one hand, 
renewed emphasis on restrained judicial review supported the pre-
existing trend toward recognising the legality of precautionary regulation, 
and recent case law is virtually uniform in accepting precautionary 
                                           
132 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972, 6973. 
133 United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 213–14 (3d.Cir.1982); see also 
Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1355–56 (2d.Cir.1991) (“An 
‘imminent hazard’ may be declared at any point in a chain of events 
which may ultimately result in harm to the public.” (quoting EDF (n.101), 
535)). 
134 E.g., Maine People’s Alliance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 286–
93 (1st.Cir.2006); Interfaith Community Organization v. Honeywell 
International Inc., 399 F.3d 248, 258–59 (3d.Cir.2005). 
135 Chapter 4, section II.D. 
136 E.g., NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 327–28 (2d.Cir.1976); EDF 
(n.103), 598. 
137 E.g., Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 
(1989); Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983). 
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approaches.138 On the other, however, courts have usually been just as 
willing to uphold regulation that rejects precaution.139 The principal 
exceptions are all found in statutory programmes that unambiguously 
require precautionary approaches.140 The result, as with statutory 
interpretation, is that the degree to which US risk regulation is 
precautionary is largely a function of the policy preferences of the 
incumbent administration.141 
D. European and American Approaches to 
Precaution Compared 
The foregoing analysis shows that, as a matter of public law, the EU and 
US take fundamentally different approaches to precautionary regulation 
and the precautionary principle. EU administrative law explicitly 
incorporates the precautionary principle, and the constitutional status of 
precaution within the EU legal order is now beyond question. US law, by 
contrast, neither requires nor rejects precaution. These different 
approaches are only partly attributable to the normative judgments that 
inform the principle itself. Much more significant are the two systems’ 
different understandings of the appropriate role for law in constituting 
and limiting regulatory objectives. In more practical terms, the divergence 
in approaches to precaution can be understood as a consequence of 
differences in the ways in which the two systems draw lines between law 
and policy or between law and discretion. In other words, it is a function 
of how the question of precaution is framed. In the EU, precaution is 
framed as a question of law, hence a matter for judicial resolution. In the 
                                           
138 E.g., American Farm Bureau Federation v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512 
(D.C.Cir.2008); see also Upper Blackstone Water Pollution Abatement 
District v. EPA, 690 F.3d 9, 23–24 (1st.Cir.2012); Miami-Dade County v. 
EPA, 529 F.3d 1049, 1065 (11th.Cir.2008). 
139 Marsh (n.137), 385; Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 997–99 
(9th.Cir.2008) (en banc). 
140 Most notably, the Clean Air Act: American Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 
388, 389 (D.C.Cir.1998). 
141 National Association of Home Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1043 
(D.C.Cir.2012). 
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US, it is framed as a question of policy on which the courts should take 
no position. 
The differing placement of the line between law and policy in the two 
systems is not merely a matter of historical accident. Rather, it is an 
outgrowth of underlying theories on which the legitimacy of 
administrative regulation is premised. The EU, as a supranational 
organisation with an uncertain constitutional status, has always relied 
heavily on law and legality to legitimate its actions.142 Because its 
democratic foundations are weak, the EU administration cannot rely on 
an electoral mandate to justify its exercise of regulatory power. Instead, it 
must rely on the authority it derives from the Treaties and EU legislation, 
as filtered through a shared European legal culture. For this approach to 
be credible, the Commission’s regulatory discretion must be legally 
cabined and subject to judicial control. The centrality of legality to 
regulatory legitimacy is not unique to the EU, but rather is shared by 
many of its Member States.143 Within this framework, the precautionary 
principle, as a legal principle, plays an important role by providing both 
an affirmative legal justification for regulatory action and by creating a 
basis for judicial review. By expanding the domain of legality, the EU 
approach, at least rhetorically, limits administrative discretion and 
thereby increases its legitimacy. 
The theories underlying the legitimacy of American administrative 
regulation have undergone substantial transformations in the last forty 
years. Legality as a basis for administrative legitimacy was at its zenith in 
the 1970s, and the case law of that period shows the courts attempting 
to work out the proper goals of risk regulation through legal analysis, 
including by adopting precautionary reasoning. Since Chevron, however, 
the courts have relied increasingly on the administration’s democratic 
accountability as a basis for regulatory legitimacy. At the same time, 
experience with strong judicial involvement in regulation and concerns 
about unintended consequences gave rise to considerable scepticism 
                                           
142 Everson, ‘Administering Europe?’ (1998) 36 JCMS 195, 203–04, 213. 
143 Schwarze, European Administrative Law (Sweet and Maxwell 1992) 
230–32. 
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regarding the ability of even the best intentioned courts to contribute to 
good regulatory policy. These developments resulted in a narrowing of the 
range of issues deemed appropriate for legal analysis, with a 
corresponding increase in the number of issues designated as matters of 
policy and hence beyond judicial competence. Just as a high degree of 
judicial control is necessary to make the EU approach to regulatory 
legitimacy credible, a high degree of democratic control is essential to the 
credibility of the US approach. For the theory to have any functional 
legitimating power, presidential elections must matter for administrative 
policy and, just as importantly, they must be seen to matter. As a 
consequence, administrative law must be sufficiently flexible to allow for 
relatively frequent policy change, and conceptualising precaution as an 
issue of policy facilitates that flexibility. In contrast to EU law, in which 
administrative discretion is seen as undermining regulatory legitimacy, 
US law takes the idea of administrative discretion and transforms it into 
a source of legitimacy, by leaving the administration free(er) to pursue 
democratically endorsed preferences. 
At an even broader level, the differences in the European and 
American approaches to the precautionary principle can be traced to 
different understandings of the role of law in constituting the public 
interest. In the EU, as well as in many of its Member States, law is 
understood as possessing its own normative authority. To say that an 
administrative act is “lawful” is not merely to say, as in American-style 
positivism, that the act does not transgress any legal boundary or 
prohibition,144 but also to say that it comports with ideas of the public 
good embedded within legal doctrine.145 Thus, an act that is lawful is also 
normatively commendable, and its legitimacy is thereby enhanced. In this 
way, law partially constitutes and limits the public interest by placing 
bounds on the field of good public values. The point should not be 
overstated; the EU is no jurocracy, and the EU political Institutions 
remain the primary sources of risk regulation policy. Nonetheless, there 
                                           
144 Cf. Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 HLR 457, 458–60. 
145 Verhoeven and Widdershoven, ‘National Legality and European 
Obligations’ in Besselink, et al. (n.40), 56–58. 
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is a discernible sense in which the law, particularly the general 
principles, have something to say about the ends of regulation, not just 
its means.146 Nor should the EU’s reliance on legality as a source of 
legitimacy be seen as a second-best approach, only adopted in default of 
more robust democratic processes. A core component of the European 
project has always been the building of a normative order that would, by 
virtue of its inherent merit, earn the loyalty of the European public and 
that would stand out as an example for the rest of the world.147 The EU 
courts’ approach to administrative legality contributes to this project, not 
least through application of the precautionary principle. 
The US legal system, by contrast, has a deeply rooted scepticism 
toward judicial declaration of the public interest, particularly in the areas 
of economic and social regulation. This scepticism has its origins in the 
Lochner era, in which constitutional adjudication was used to thwart 
highly popular regulatory initiatives. It was substantially reinforced 
during the 1970s when decisions on controversial social questions, 
particularly abortion, powerfully called into question the capacity of 
courts to arbitrate public values. The result of this scepticism is that in 
the US the public interest (outside of certain areas148) tends to be 
understood in pluralist terms, as the preference of the prevailing electoral 
majority. Again, the point should not be overstated. American 
constitutional law places numerous limits on majoritarian law making, 
and certain core constitutional values undoubtedly carry great normative 
weight. But those values are for the most part negative in the sense that 
they define limits on governmental power rather than attempting to 
advance their own coherent theory of the public interest. It is difficult to 
                                           
146 Tridimas (n.30), 14–17. 
147 Article 3 TEU; European Council, Copenhagen Declaration on 
European Identity (Dec. 1973) 12 Bulletin of the European Communities 
118; Lenaerts, ‘“In the Union We Trust”: Trust-Enhancing Principles of 
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‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ (2002) 40 JCMS 
235, 252. 
148 Especially the protection of minorities. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 
(Harvard 1980) 145–70. 
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find a place for the precautionary principle in such a system, but there is 
also less need for one. 
II. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Having addressed the understanding of the precautionary principle 
within the administrative law systems of the EU and the US, this section 
turns to the topic of cost-benefit analysis. Whereas there are considerable 
differences in the ways in which the EU and US legal systems 
conceptualise and employ ideas of precautionary regulation, I will argue 
in this section that the two legal systems treat the issue of cost-benefit 
analysis in broadly similar ways. In neither system is cost-benefit 
analysis an important legal principle, yet executive action in both 
systems has made cost-benefit analysis a central part of the regulatory 
process. Although cost-benefit analysis is currently more prominent in 
US regulation, there is reason to believe that the EU and US are 
converging in this respect. 
A. Defining Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Like the precautionary principle, cost-benefit analysis has no fixed 
definition, and (again like the precautionary principle) much debate over 
the appropriateness of cost-benefit analysis is obscured by definitional 
ambiguity.149 Cost-benefit analysis, at bottom, is a systematic 
comparison of the estimated costs with the estimated benefits of a 
proposed action. At one extreme, it can refer to nothing more than 
Franklin’s “moral algebra”, by which he meant the listing and reflective 
weighing of pros and cons.150 At the other extreme, cost-benefit analysis 
can involve elaborate mathematical models that attempt to quantify, 
monetise, and balance all aspects of a proposed action. And of course 
                                           
149 Posner, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment 
on Conference Papers’ (2000) 29 J.Legal.Studs. 1153, 1154–56; Sen, ‘The 
Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (2000) 29 J.Legal.Studs. 931, 935–39. 
150 Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Joseph Priestly (Sept. 19, 1772) in 
Mott and Jorgenson (eds.), Benjamin Franklin: Representative Selections 
(American Book Co. 1936) 348–49. 
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there are many intermediate approaches. The meaning of cost-benefit 
analysis also varies regarding the role of the analysis in 
decisionmaking.151 In some cases, cost-benefit analysis is merely one 
source of information, to be considered as part of a broader 
decisionmaking process. In others, cost-benefit analysis is a rule of 
decision, in which regulatory measures should be taken if, but only if, 
they result in a net increase in total welfare.152 As a consequence, the 
meaning of cost-benefit analysis is highly context-dependent. Because 
cost-benefit analysis is such a flexible concept, it can be used as a means 
of inscribing policy preferences into regulatory decisionmaking. By 
specifying which costs and benefits must be analysed and the 
methodology by which they are to be compared, political principals (e.g., 
the White House and the European Commission) can use cost-benefit 
analysis requirements to provide guidance on how administrators should 
evaluate various policy choices. 
Like the weak version of precaution, weak versions of cost-benefit 
analysis seems generally uncontroversial; few argue that regulatory 
decisionmaking should be blind to possible negative consequences.153 
Controversy arises as one moves toward greater quantification and 
rigidity in decisionmaking criteria. There are difficult economic and 
ethical issues regarding the quantification of certain goods (most 
prominently, human lives) and the comparison of incommensurable 
values (environmental integrity, economic wealth) along a single, uniform 
metric, and most critiques of cost-benefit analysis are directed at these 
                                           
151 Sinden, ‘Formality and Informality in Cost-Benefit Analysis’ [2015] 
Utah.L.Rev. 93, 107–20. 
152 Posner (n.149), 155–56. 
153 Richardson, ‘The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard’ (2000) 29 
J.Legal.Studs. 971, 973; Sen (n.149), 934. See also Whitman v. American 
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 496 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring). Some 
commentators go further and argue for the moral importance of 
accounting for the welfare effects of regulation. E.g., Adler and Posner 
(n.18), 52–56; Graham, ‘Saving Lives through Administrative Law and 
Economics’ (2008) 157 U.Pa.L.Rev. 395, 411–13. 
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concerns.154 Especially controversial are approaches to cost-benefit 
analysis that attempt to treat it as a rule of decision or that may preclude 
regulatory action when benefits are difficult or impossible to quantify. As 
discussed below, such strong forms of cost-benefit analysis are extremely 
rare in either US or EU regulation. Instead, cost-benefit analysis is more 
often used to guide decisionmaking while acknowledging that regulatory 
decisions must ultimately be based on policy (and political) judgment. 
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis in the US 
Given the frequent characterisations of US law as being based on cost-
benefit analysis, it is striking how rare such requirements are in 
constitutional, statutory, and judge-made law.155 Instead, these sources 
of law are ambivalent, and perhaps even somewhat antagonistic, toward 
the use of cost-benefit analysis in regulatory decisionmaking. 
1. Constitutional and statutory requirements 
The US Constitution imposes no requirement that the administration rely 
on cost-benefit analysis. As discussed above, risk regulation measures 
are subject to constitutional review only for minimum rationality. Just as 
that highly constrained review unquestionably allows for precautionary 
regulation, it cannot mandate cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, the defining 
aspect of modern substantive due process jurisprudence is the rejection 
of the Lochner era’s intensive judicial scrutiny of means-ends 
balancing.156 
Although the Constitution does not require it, Congress is free to 
specify the considerations the administration must take into account in 
setting standards and may impose cost-benefit analysis requirements by 
statute. Such requirements are not especially prominent in US risk 
legislation, however. Rather, risk statutes take widely varied approaches 
to the weighing of benefits and costs. A handful have been read to 
                                           
154 Richardson (n.153), 972–73; Ackerman and Heinzerling, Priceless 
(New Press 2004). For responses, see Adler and Posner (n.18), 154–84. 
155 Farber, ‘Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (2009) 74 U.Chi.L.Rev. 
1355, 1372–79. 
156 1 Tribe (n.109), 1346–48, 1361–62. 
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preclude the consideration of cost entirely.157 Many allow the 
consideration of costs, but only in determining whether regulatory 
standards are feasible.158 Others require the consideration costs, but do 
not specify how they are to be weighed against other considerations.159 
Some are completely silent on the issue.160 Only a tiny number explicitly 
require cost-benefit analysis,161 and just four statutes are commonly 
cited in the literature as mandating cost-benefit analysis.162 As far as my 
research shows, no US risk statute has been interpreted to impose a rigid 
requirement that benefits be shown to exceed costs before a regulation 
may be promulgated.163 
                                           
157 Most famously, section 109 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7409(b)(1); Whitman (n.153), 471. 
158 E.g., section 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5); Cotton Dust 
(n.100), 513. 
159 E.g., section 2 of FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136. 
160 E.g., section 316 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.SC. § 1326; Entergy 
Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 222 (2009). 
161 One analysis looked at thirty-one statutes and found that only two 
explicitly required cost-benefit analysis. Center for Progressive Reform, 
Comments Regarding Executive Order on OMB Regulatory Review (March 
16, 2009), http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/ 
CPR_Comments_New_EO_Reg_Rev.pdf. 
162 E.g., Adler, ‘Risk, Death, and Harm: The Normative Foundations of 
Risk Regulation’ (2003) 87 Minn.L.Rev. 1293, 1391–92; Coglianese and 
Marchant, ‘Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk 
Standards’ (2004) 152 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1255, 1337; Sunstein, ‘Cost-Benefit 
Default Principles’ (2001) 99 Mich.L.Rev. 1651, 1666–67. The statutes 
commonly cited are the Consumer Products Safety Act, FIFRA, the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA), and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). 
There is not even universal agreement that FIFRA, TSCA, and SDWA 
require cost-benefit analysis. Center for Progressive Reform (n.161). 
163 In Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (11th.Cir.1991), the 
Eleventh Circuit came close to interpreting TSCA as imposing such a 
requirement. Ibid., 1222–23. Even that decision, however, did not require 
strict use of cost-benefit analysis as a rule of decision. Ibid. Moreover, 
judicial interpretations of TSCA are not uniform. In National Association 
of Homebuilders v. EPA (n.141), the D.C. Circuit held that although TSCA 
“expressly requires the Administrator to consider the economic 
consequences of action taken under the Act, this does not mean that the 
regulation’s benefits must outweigh its costs”. Ibid., 1039. 
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2. Judge-made law 
Judicial decisions are also an important source of US administrative law, 
so it might reasonably be supposed that the courts have been active in 
creating requirements that the administration employ cost-benefit 
analysis. Courts could create such requirements either by applying 
principles of statutory construction to interpret ambiguous statutes as 
requiring cost-benefit analysis or by independently creating cost-benefit 
analysis requirements through their exercise of substantive review under 
the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard. Some commentators, 
notably Professor Sunstein, have argued that courts should use one or 
both of these methods to create a general presumption that agencies 
should regulate on the basis of cost-benefit analysis.164 Recent decisions 
in the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals, however, have declined 
to take up these suggestions. 
On the issue of statutory interpretation, the leading case is Entergy 
Corp. v. Riverkeeper Inc.,165 which addressed EPA’s authority to balance 
costs against benefits when selecting the “best technology available” 
under section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act. That provision is silent on 
whether costs may be considered, and the Court concluded that, under 
Chevron, EPA’s interpretation had to be upheld if reasonable.166 In doing 
so, the Court rejected the argument that statutory silence should 
normally be taken to prohibit the consideration of costs and instead held 
that the issue must be considered in light of the statute as a whole.167 
Entergy did not, however, create a general presumption in favour of cost-
benefit analysis. Instead, as in earlier cases,168 the Court’s analysis 
                                           
164 Sunstein, ‘Regulating Risks after “ATA”’ [2001] Sup.Ct.Rev. 1; 
Sunstein (n.162); Sunstein, ‘Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?’ 
(1999) 98 Mich.L.Rev. 303. 
165 Above n.160. 
166 Ibid., 218–19. 
167 Ibid., 222–23. 
168 In at least two earlier cases, the Supreme Court rejected arguments 
that statutory ambiguity should normally be construed to require cost-
benefit analysis: Whitman (n.153), 464–71 and Cotton Dust (n.100), 508–
12. Additionally, the Court declined to address the issue in Benzene 
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focused on specific statutory language, rather than on generalities about 
good regulatory policy. Indeed, although the court approved EPA’s 
specific interpretation—i.e., that the agency could consider whether the 
costs of a particular technology were “significantly greater than the 
benefits”—it also expressed scepticism that “a more rigorous form of cost-
benefit balancing” would be consistent with the Clean Water Act’s 
protective goals.169 
The Supreme Court clarified Entergy somewhat in its recent decision 
in Michigan v. EPA.170 First, the Court held that “expansive” terms, such 
as “appropriate and necessary”, should normally be interpreted to require 
the consideration of cost, though not necessarily cost-benefit analysis.171 
Second, the Court, relying on Whitman v. American Trucking 
Associations,172 held that when Congress instructs the agency to regulate 
on the basis of a factor that “on its face does not include cost, the Act 
normally should not be read as implicitly allowing the Agency to consider 
cost anyway”.173 These holdings suggest that the Supreme Court 
continues to view the question whether a statute requires cost-benefit 
analysis to be one that needs to be decided on a case-by-case basis. More 
importantly, it indicates that the Court considers the use of cost-benefit 
analysis vel non to be an issue of regulatory policy for which general legal 
presumptions are inappropriate. 
Regarding the requirements of the APA, the Court held unanimously 
in Michigan v. EPA that administrative decisions that failed to consider 
costs “at all” would normally be arbitrary and capricious, unless 
                                                                                                                   
(n.120), 609. Sunstein distinguished these cases on the ground that the 
statutes at issue all clearly precluded the consideration of costs. 
Sunstein (n.162), 1670–71, 1683–85. 
169 Entergy (n.160), 223. 
170 135 S.Ct. 2699 (2015). 
171 Ibid., 2709, 2711. 
172 Above n.153. 
173 Ibid., 2709. This aspect of Michigan calls into question the D.C. 
Circuit’s “settled law” that “only where there is clear congressional intent 
to preclude consideration of cost [will the court] find agencies barred from 
considering costs”. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 667 (D.C.Cir.2000). 
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Congress had precluded the consideration of cost.174 Notably, however, 
the Court also held that how costs are considered is a matter for the 
agency’s discretion, and it specifically declined to require cost-benefit 
analysis.175 That holding is consistent with the case law in the courts of 
appeals. While the lower courts have held that costs are normally a 
“relevant factor”176 that must be considered, they have also uniformly 
declined to interpret the APA to require cost-benefit analysis.177 As with 
the question whether statues should be interpreted in a precautionary 
manner, the courts have shown a distinct lack of appetite for wading into 
an area of regulatory practice they see as primarily dependent on policy 
considerations. 
In sum, the traditional sources of US law cannot be characterised 
being as based on or expressing a strong preference for cost-benefit 
analysis. At the same time, however, these sources of law invite, and 
sometimes require, administrative agencies to consider costs in a variety 
of ways. It is also true that in cases of ambiguity courts have usually 
allowed agencies to consider costs (though not necessarily to engage in 
strict cost-benefit balancing). But courts have not created horizontal legal 
requirements that agencies use cost-benefit analysis. Rather, like the 
precautionary principle, the use of cost-benefit analysis is understood as 
a question of policy on which the judiciary should take no position. One 
consequence of treating cost-benefit analysis as a matter of policy is that 
the role of costs in US regulation will depend heavily on current political 
preferences. Indeed, as will be explained in the next section, those 
preferences have pushed US risk regulation toward greater use of cost-
benefit analysis. 
                                           
174 Michigan (n.170), 2706; ibid., 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (agreeing 
with the majority that agencies must normally consider cost). 
175 Michigan (n.170), 2711. 
176 State Farm (n.116), 43. 
177 E.g., National Association of Home Builders (n.141), 1039–40; Village of 
Barrington v. Surface Transportation Board, 636 F.3d 650, 670–71 
(D.C.Cir.2011); ConocoPhillips Co. v. EPA, 612 F.3d 822, 838–42 
(5th.Cir.2010). 
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3. Executive Orders mandating cost-benefit analysis 
Although statute and judge-made law rarely require cost-benefit analysis, 
every president, Democrat and Republican, since Richard Nixon has used 
Executive Orders (EOs) to require the administration to engage in cost-
benefit analysis in some situations.178 Since 1981, those policies have 
been generalised to apply to most regulatory activities.179 The most 
important of the orders, EO 12,866 issued by President Clinton in 1993, 
contains a “Statement of Regulatory Philosophy and Principles” that all 
agencies should follow to the extent permitted by law. That Statement 
covers a wide range of principles of good regulation, including public 
participation, transparency, and federalism. Perhaps most prominent, 
however, is cost-benefit analysis. 
It is important at the outset to understand the legal status of EOs. 
They are instructions from the president, as chief executive, to 
subordinate government officials. Practically, if not legally, they are 
binding on the officers and agencies to whom they are addressed,180 but 
they cannot bind the public or organs of the government that do not fall 
under the president’s authority. Unless they clearly provide to the 
                                           
178 This history and development of executive direction of regulatory 
policy is reviewed in McGarity, Reinventing Rationality (CUP 1991) 17–25 
and Copeland, ‘The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs in Federal Rulemaking’ (2006) 33 Ford.Urb.L.J. 1257. 
179 The dynamic nature of the OIRA process is illustrated by the history of 
revisions to the EOs creating general cost-benefit analysis requirements. 
The first such order was EO 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981), 
issued by President Reagan. President Clinton repealed and replaced that 
order with EO 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). President 
Bush made minor procedural changes in EO 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9,385 
(Feb. 26, 2002) and issued further substantive amendments in EO 
13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2,763 (Jan. 18, 2007). President Obama revoked the 
Bush amendments in EO 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6,113 (Jan. 30, 2009), so 
that EO 12,866 is currently effective in its original form. In 2011, 
President Obama issued EO 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011), 
which supplements EO 12,866. 
180 The extent to which EOs legally bind officials in agencies other than 
the Executive Office of the President is an unresolved question. Strauss, 
‘Overseer or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law’ (2007) 
75 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 696, 716–17. 
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contrary, EOs do not create legal rights and normally cannot be enforced 
judicially.181 They are internal executive branch directives and, as such, 
they are interpreted, applied, and enforced by the executive branch.182 
EO 12,866 should thus be understood as a set of instructions from 
the president to federal agencies regarding how they should go about 
exercising their regulatory authority. Regarding cost-benefit analysis, 
section 1(b)(6) provides:  
Each agency shall assess both the costs and 
the benefits of the intended regulation and, 
recognizing that some costs and benefits are 
difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a 
regulation only upon a reasoned determination 
that the benefits of the intended regulation 
justify its costs. 
That provision unambiguously requires agencies to use cost-benefit 
analysis, but to understand what that means, one must delve further. 
Several points are important: 
First, the requirements of EO 12,866 apply only “to the extent 
permitted by law”.183 Executive orders cannot amend or override higher 
sources of law, and judicial review may be invoked to set aside agency 
action that follows an EO but violates a statute.184 EO 12,866 therefore 
does not override statutory provisions that either prohibit the use of cost-
benefit analysis or constrain the way in which it is used. Second, the 
order does not mandate fully quantitative cost-benefit analysis. Section 1 
provides that “[c]osts and benefits shall be understood to include both 
quantifiable measures (to the fullest extent that these can be usefully 
estimated) and qualitative measures of costs and benefits that are 
difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider”.185 President 
Obama’s EO 13,563 reinforced this point by stating that “each agency 
                                           
181 Helicopter Association International, Inc. v. FAA, 722 F.3d 430, 439 
(D.C.Cir.2013). 
182 On the legal status of executive orders, see Stack, ‘The Statutory 
President’ (2005) 90 Iowa.L.Rev. 539, 585–99. 
183 EO 12,866, section 1(b). 
184 Whitman (n.157), 471 n.4. 
185 EO 12,866, section 1(a). 
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may consider (and discuss qualitatively) values that are difficult or 
impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and 
distributive impacts”.186 Third, EO 12,866 does not require agencies to 
make decisions solely on the basis of cost-benefit analysis. Instead, it 
requires them to make a “reasoned determination” that the benefits of 
regulation “justify its costs”. The use of the term “justify” was a 
purposeful change from President Reagan’s EO 12,291, which on its face 
required a showing that benefits exceed costs.187 Additionally, EO 13,563 
emphasises that when comparing costs and benefits, agencies must 
consider “potential economic, environmental, public health and safety, 
and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity”.188 Thus, the 
orders by their terms require only a fairly weak form of cost-benefit 
analysis and are unspecific regarding when benefits will “justify” costs. 
Above all, the terms used in the EOs are ambiguous, so that their 
practical meaning depends on how they are applied by the current 
administration. 
EO 12,866 is enforced through a regulatory review process run by the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). OIRA is a division of 
the Office of Management and Budget, which is itself a component of the 
Executive Office of the President. OIRA applies and enforces the EOs by 
reviewing agencies’ regulatory measures before they are published. The 
OIRA review process covers the entire substance of the proposed action, 
and OIRA will frequently use the review process to solicit input on the 
proposal from other parts of the executive branch.189 According to three 
recent OIRA Administrators, cost-benefit analysis is often not the central 
                                           
186 EO 13,563, section 1(c). 
187 EO 12,291, section 2(b); DeMuth and Ginsburg, ‘White House Review 
of Agency Rulemaking’ (1986) 99 HLR 1075, 1075; Pildes and Sunstein, 
‘Reinventing the Regulatory State’ (1995) 62 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1, 43–45. 
188 EO 13,563, section 1(b)(4). 
189 Sunstein, ‘The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and 
Realities’ (2013) 126 HLR 1838, 1844–68. 
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concern of OIRA reviews.190 That said, cost-benefit analysis of the 
proposed action is an important aspect of the process. OIRA checks that 
the agency’s analysis has been prepared in accordance with the EOs and 
OIRA guidance documents. It also assesses the adequacy of the agency’s 
conclusion that benefits justify costs, and may ask the agency to 
undertake further analysis in that regard. According to most accounts, 
the majority of OIRA’s analysis is focused on technical concerns, but 
political considerations, i.e., the alignment of the proposed action with 
the president’s policy preferences, are important as well. At the 
conclusion of its review, OIRA may clear an action as proposed or may 
suggest changes to the originating agency.191 If agreement on changes is 
not reached, the agency may withdraw the action, or OIRA may “return” 
it for reconsideration. Normally, when an action is withdrawn or 
returned, the agency will not proceed without making substantial 
changes and reinitiating OIRA review. There are examples, however, of 
agencies going ahead with returned actions, despite failing to secure 
OIRA clearance.192 
The ambiguous language of the EOs allows OIRA to apply the review 
process differently depending on the policy views and regulatory priorities 
of the current president. Whereas OIRA under Presidents Reagan and 
George H.W. Bush tended to emphasise quantification and to demand a 
showing that regulatory benefits exceeded costs, the Clinton 
Administration OIRA tended to apply cost-benefit analysis more 
holistically and to put greater stress on distributive concerns.193 Similar 
changes in emphasis can be observed in the George W. Bush and Obama 
administrations.194 In other words, EO 12,866’s cost-benefit analysis 
mandate is flexible enough to accommodate different presidents’ policy 
priorities, and OIRA review is one means by which the White House 
                                           
190 Ibid., 1868–69; Graham (n.153), 458–59, 465–66; Katzen, ‘OIRA at 
Thirty: Reflections and Recommendations’ (2011) 63 Admin.L.Rev. 103, 
105–08. 
191 Sunstein (n.189), 1854–59. 
192 Copeland (n.178), 1278. 
193 Katzen (n.190), 104. 
194 Compare Graham (n.153), 456–59, with Sunstein (n.189), 1864–66. 
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exercises control over policymaking throughout the administration.195 
The EOs are designed to facilitate this process of policy transfer; they are 
couched in such general terms that changes in the application of cost-
benefit analysis can occur without any formal legal action (such as a new 
EO) or even any public acknowledgement that a change has been made. 
Recall that President Bush retained President Clinton’s EO 12,866 with 
only minor changes, yet the practice of review differed considerably in the 
two administrations.196  
Cost-benefit analysis in US administrative law should therefore be 
understood primarily as a managerial tool that facilitates the 
transmission of presidential policy preferences across a large 
bureaucracy, rather than as a well-defined regulatory philosophy. That is 
not to say that the substantive commitments to cost-benefit analysis set 
forth in the EOs are not genuine. Ronald Reagan and his advisors 
believed that regulation could only be justified if it increased net social 
welfare,197 just as Barak Obama and his advisors believe that the 
systematic assessment of regulatory benefits and costs will result in 
better public policy.198 But although the substantive commitment to cost-
benefit methodology should not be gainsayed, it should not be allowed to 
obscure the more important control and coordination functions served by 
the OIRA process. 
Although the US courts have not mandated the use of cost-benefit 
analysis, they have facilitated its rise to prominence. By drawing a sharp 
distinction between questions of law and questions of policy, US 
administrative law has allowed successive administrations to pursue 
their preferred regulatory philosophies with minimal judicial interference. 
The courts’ jurisprudence has also promoted a pluralist conception of the 
public interest, which tends to focus on maximising social welfare rather 
                                           
195 Kagan, ‘Presidential Administration’ (2001) 114 HLR 2245,  
2284–2309. 
196 General Accounting Office, Rulemaking: OMB’s Role in Reviews of 
Agencies’ Draft Rules and the Transparency of Those Reviews  
(GPO 2003) 5. 
197 DeMuth and Ginsburg (n.187), 1080–82. 
198 Sunstein (n.97), 19–27. 
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than on prioritising particular public values. US administrators may 
trade-off values like environmental protection to advance other public 
goals such as full employment without transgressing legal conceptions of 
the public good. Further, by increasingly focusing on the president’s 
democratic mandate as a source of administrative legitimacy, US 
administrative law has encouraged presidents to be more assertive in 
enforcing their policy views throughout the administration.199 If 
administrative policymaking is legitimated by presidential leadership, 
then a fortiori it is appropriate for presidents to insist that their policy 
preferences are followed. 
C. Cost-Benefit Analysis in the EU 
In general, the use of cost-benefit analysis has a lower profile in the EU 
than in the US. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to assume that cost-
benefit analysis plays no role in EU risk regulation. As in the US, there 
are few legal mandates that regulators use cost-benefit analysis. Since 
the announcement of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000, however, the 
Commission has increased its reliance on cost-benefit analysis as a 
component of regulatory impact analysis. As with the EO 12,866 process, 
the Commission’s use of impact analysis appears to be directed, at least 
in part, towards reinforcing the Commission’s policy priorities throughout 
the regulatory process. 
1. Treaty and legislative provisions 
In general, the Treaties have little to say regarding the use of cost-benefit 
analysis. An important exception, however, is Article 191(3) TFEU which 
provides that “[i]n preparing its policy on the environment, the Union 
shall take account of . . . the potential benefits and costs of action or lack 
of action”. This provision is applicable to the EU’s environmental policy 
and any legislation adopted in accordance with that policy.200 There is 
                                           
199 Kagan (n.195), 2372–83. 
200 Case T-370/11, Poland v. Commission, nyr, paras. 108–09. 
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almost no case law interpreting Article 191(3).201 On its face, however, it 
only requires that the EU consider costs when regulating and does not 
mandate strict cost-benefit analysis. 
As in the US, EU risk legislation takes a variety of approaches to the 
consideration of costs. Much legislation, especially older legislation, is 
silent on the issue.202 While such silence does not necessarily preclude 
the consideration of costs,203 the administration may not rely on cost 
considerations to undermine legislative objectives.204 The trend in more 
recent legislation is to require consideration of costs in some form. For 
example, the Industrial Emissions Directive defines “best available 
techniques” for pollution control to mean (in relevant part) “those 
developed on a scale which allows implementation in the relevant 
industrial sector, under economically and technically viable conditions, 
taking into consideration the costs and advantages”.205 Other legislation 
qualifies regulatory requirements by providing that they should not 
require “disproportionate costs”206 or “significant economic or practical 
disadvantage”.207 Somewhat more obliquely, REACH embeds a 
requirement to consider costs within a requirement for a broader 
                                           
201 The Court of Justice has occasionally mentioned the provision without 
analysing it in detail. E.g., ibid., paras. 110–11. 
202 E.g., Directive 67/548/EEC on the approximation of laws &c. relating 
to the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous substances 
[1967] O.J. Spec. Ed. 234; Directive 76/160/EEC concerning the quality 
of bathing water [1976] O.J. L31/1; Regulation (EEC) 793/93 on the 
evaluation and control of the risks of existing substances [1993] 
O.J  L84/1. 
203 Case T-257/07, France v. Commission [2011] ECR II-5827, para. 221. 
204 Joined Cases C-14/06 and C-295/06, Parliament v. Commission 
[2008] ECR I-1649, paras. 74–76. 
205 Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions (integrated pollution 
prevention and control) (Recast) [2010] O.J. L334/17, art. 3(10)(b). The 
same definition is used for purposes of the Waste Directive (n.81), 
art. (3)(20). 
206 E.g., Directive 2008/50/EC on ambient air quality and cleaner air for 
Europe [2008] O.J. L152/1, arts. 15(1), 16(1), 17(1). 
207 E.g., Biocides Regulation (n.33), art. 23(3)(a); a similar formulation is 
used in Regulation (EC) 1107/2009 concerning the placing of plant 
protection products on the market &c. [2009] O.J. L291/1, art. 50(1)(b). 
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socioeconomic analysis.208 Still other legislation requires the Commission 
to study the costs of regulation without specifying how they should factor 
into subsequent regulatory decisions.209 As far as my research shows, no 
EU risk legislation requires decisions to be made on the basis of cost-
benefit analysis.210 
In recent legislation, it seems that costs are most frequently used as a 
basis for making exceptions to risk standards, rather than as the basis 
for setting the standards themselves. For example, the Biocides 
Regulation generally requires substitution of less risky products for more 
risky products, unless such substitution would result in “significant 
economic or practical disadvantages”.211 These provisions can be 
interpreted as relying on cost as a safety valve: standards should in 
principle be set without regard to cost. If, however, the cost in a 
particular case would be disproportionate, the requirement can be 
relaxed if the risk is otherwise acceptable. Understood in that way, these 
provisions are expressions of both Article 191(3) TFEU and the 
proportionality principle. It also suggests the EU Legislature believes 
costs are relevant to risk regulation but should be secondary 
considerations, an attitude that is consistent with the courts’ holding 
that the “protection of public health must unquestionably take 
precedence over economic considerations”.212 
2. Judicial requirements 
In addition to the Treaties and legislation, the EU courts have addressed 
the consideration of costs in risk regulation. Most importantly, all EU 
acts must be in conformity with the principle of proportionality, which is 
                                           
208 REACH (n.33), art. 68(1) (restrictions process). 
209 E.g., Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release into the 
environment of genetically modified organisms &c. [2001] O.J. L106/1, 
art. 31(7)(d). 
210 Wiener, ‘Better Regulation in Europe’ (2006) 59 CLP 447, 467. 
211 Biocides Regulation (n.33), art. 23(3)(a). For a similar approach, see 
REACH (n.33), art. 60(4). 
212 See cases cited n.46. 
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perhaps the most fundamental general principle of EU law.213 As 
summarised by Advocate General Poiares Maduro, “the principle of 
proportionality entails a consideration of the costs and benefits of a 
measure . . . in the light of the different interests which Community rules 
deem worthy of protection”.214 Proportionality in EU law is generally 
described as a three-part inquiry. First, the measure in question must be 
appropriate for achieving a legitimate public purpose. Second, it must be 
the least restrictive alternative available. Finally, the restrictions imposed 
must not be disproportionate to the aims to be achieved.215 
Interpreted rigidly, proportionality might result in a fairly rigorous 
form of cost-benefit balancing. As applied by the EU courts, however, 
proportionality is much more flexible. For one thing, proportionality is 
not concerned with costs and benefits as such, but with those “interests 
which Community rules deem worthy of protection”.216 The “costs” to 
which proportionality is principally addressed are not economic costs, 
but rather restrictions on protected interests, including economic 
liberty.217 The two are of course related, but it seems that the monetary 
costs need not be considered independently of a measure’s impact on 
protected interests. For example, although the Court of Justice has never 
decided the issue, two Advocates General have suggested that 
proportionality does not preclude risk regulation measures based solely 
on an assessment of health effects.218 The courts also show flexibility by 
                                           
213 Tridimas (n.30), 136–39; see also Case C-120/94, Commission v. 
Greece [1996] ECR I-1513, Opinion of A.G. Jacobs, para. 70 (“As for the 
principle of proportionality, there are few areas of Community law, if any 
at all, where that is not relevant.”). 
214 Case C-434/04, Criminal proceedings against Ahokainen [2006] ECR I-
9171, Opinion of A.G. Poiares Maduro, para. 23. 
215 Craig, EU Administrative Law (2d ed., OUP 2012) 591–92; de Búrca, 
‘The Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law’ (1993) 13 
YEL 105, 113–14. Note that the third step of the analysis is frequently 
omitted in the EU case law. Tridimas (n.30), 139. 
216 Ahokainen (n.214), Opinion of A.G. Poiares Maduro, paras. 23–26; de 
Búrca (n.215), 106–07. 
217 Ibid.; Tridimas (n.30), 139. 
218 Case C-127/05, Commission v. United Kingdom [2007] ECR I-4619, 
Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi, para. 140; Case C-434/02, Arnold André 
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according the other Institutions a great deal of leeway in their 
assessment of the second and third prongs of the analysis.219 In the risk 
regulation context, the courts have gone so far as to indicate that a 
measure will not be held to be disproportionate unless the Institutions 
have made a manifest error of assessment.220 
The link between proportionality and cost-benefit analysis was 
explored to some extent in Pfizer and Alpharma. The General Court raised 
eyebrows in those cases when it stated that it “considers that a 
cost/benefit analysis is a particular expression of the principle of 
proportionality in cases involving risk management”.221 Further, the 
Council’s apparent concession that “the Community institutions were 
obliged to carry out such an analysis”, suggested agreement that an 
obligation existed to conduct cost-benefit analysis.222 Despite these 
indications, however, no robust cost-benefit analysis requirement has 
emerged in the case law. 
In hindsight, the General Court’s focus in Pfizer and Alpharma on 
cost-benefit analysis appears to have been more a product of how the 
litigants framed their arguments than the articulation of a legal rule.223 
To begin with, the court at no point suggested that it understood 
“cost/benefit analysis” to mean formal cost-benefit analysis, much less 
quantitative cost-benefit analysis. Instead, the court seemed to find 
sufficient the general weighing of the advantages and disadvantages 
contained in various international reports on antibiotics as livestock 
growth promoters.224 Additionally, the court seemed less concerned with 
the economic effects of the ban and more with unintended adverse 
consequences or “risk-risk trade-offs”. That point came across more 
                                                                                                                   
GmbH & Co. KG v. Landrat des Kreises Herford [2004] ECR I-11825, 
Opinion of A.G. Geelhoed, para. 63. 
219 Craig (n.215), 593–99; Tridimas (n.30), 142–49. 
220 E.g., Gowan (n. 48), para. 82; Pfizer (n.39), para. 412. 
221 Alpharma (n.46), para. 323; Pfizer (n.39), para. 410. 
222 Alpharma (n.46), para. 322; Pfizer (n.39), para. 409. See also 
Communication on the Precautionary Principle (n.61), 18–19. 
223 Alpharma (n.46), para. 321; Pfizer (n.39), para. 408. 
224 Alpharma (n.46), para. 263; Pfizer (n.39), para. 469. 
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clearly in Alpharma, in which the applicant alleged that banning 
antibiotics as growth promoters would lead to increased cases of 
salmonella poisoning.225 Finally, in the dozen years since Alpharma and 
Pfizer were decided, the courts have done nothing to develop the 
suggestion that proportionality requires cost-benefit analysis, and very 
few risk cases even mention cost-benefit analysis.226 As the case law 
currently stands, proportionality cannot be said to require cost-benefit 
analysis in any strict sense. 
3. Better Regulation and Commission initiatives on 
impact assessment 
As in the US, the main impetus for the increased use of cost-benefit 
analysis in EU regulation has come not from the courts or the legislature, 
but from the executive. As part of its Better Regulation initiative, the 
Commission has imposed on itself a requirement to conduct impact 
analyses as part of its development of regulatory proposals.227 Although 
the Commission tends to avoid the term cost-benefit analysis,228 
quantitative assessment of costs and benefits is often a significant 
component of impact assessment. 
Greater use of impact assessment is a central component of the 
Commission’s efforts to implement the Lisbon Strategy, under which the 
EU aims to be “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more 
                                           
225 Alpharma (n.46), paras. 327–39. On risk-risk trade-offs, see Graham 
and Wiener, Risk Versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the 
Environment (Harvard 1995). 
226 My research found no risk regulation case since Alpharma and Pfizer 
in which cost-benefit analysis was significantly discussed. One case 
currently pending before the General Court appears to raise the issue. 
Case T-429/13, Bayer CropScience AG v. Commission [2013] O.J. 
C325/37. 
227 European Commission, Communication, ‘Better Regulation for Better 
Results—An EU Agenda’ COM(2015) 215 final; see also Meuwese, Impact 
Assessment in EU Lawmaking (Kluwer 2008) 20–22. 
228 Lee, ‘Experts and Publics in EU Environmental Law’ in Arnull and 
Chalmers (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of EU Law (OUP 2015) 1001. 
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and better jobs and greater social cohesion”.229 Both the Lisbon Strategy 
and Better Regulation are responses to perceived economic weakness in 
the EU, particularly sluggish growth and high unemployment. As in the 
US at the end of the 1970s, overregulation has often been identified 
(rightly or wrongly) as a prime contributor to this stagnation. The move 
toward greater use of impact analysis has also been driven, in part, by 
the experience of some Member States, particularly the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom, as well as by the OIRA process.230 
The Commission first outlined its approach to impact assessment in 
its 2002 Communication on Impact Assessment.231 Following a pilot 
programme, the Commission issued Impact Assessment Guidelines in 
2005,232 and updated these in 2006 and 2009. In May 2015, the 
Commission replaced these with new Better Regulation Guidelines.233 
Under the new Guidelines, an impact assessment “is required for 
Commission initiatives that are likely to have significant economic, 
environmental or social impacts”.234 The form of the action is immaterial, 
“impact assessments should be carried out for both legislative and non-
legislative initiatives as well as delegated acts and implementing 
measures, taking into account the principle of proportionate analysis”.235 
The 2015 Guidelines’ extension of the impact assessment process to 
delegated acts is an important change from previous practice, in which 
the focus of the impact assessment process was on the preparation of 
                                           
229 Presidency conclusions, Lisbon European Council (March 23–24, 
2000), para. 5, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm. 
230 Rowe, ‘Tools for the Control of Political and Administrative Agents: 
Impact Assessment and Administrative Governance in the European 
Union’ in Hofmann and Türk (eds.), EU Administrative Governance 
(Edward Elgar 2006), 451–52; Wiener (n.210), 469–71. 
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233 SWD(2015) 111 final. 
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legislation, and its use for implementing measures was optional and 
inconsistent.236 
Each Directorate General is responsible for preparing the impact 
assessment for its own proposals.237 All impact assessments are reviewed 
by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board,238 which is composed of the Chair, 
three Commission officials, and three independent members, all of whom 
are appointed by the College of Commissioners on the recommendation of 
the Commission President.239 The Regulatory Scrutiny Board performs 
“its tasks independently and prepare[s] its opinions autonomously from 
any national or European institution, body, office or agency”.240 The 
Board issues opinions on the quality of impact assessments and may 
make suggestions for revision or improvement. A positive opinion of the 
Board is necessary before an interservice consultation can proceed, thus 
giving the Board significant power to hold up proposals.241 The impact 
assessments are also reviewed by the other DGs as part of the 
interservice consultation, and some DGs have issued negative opinions 
on proposals based on the results of an impact assessment or on the 
basis that the impact assessment is inadequate.242 
An impact assessment will often, but not always, include a cost-
benefit analysis. The 2015 Guidelines and accompanying “Toolbox” 
provide extensive guidance regarding how impacts, both positive and 
negative, are to be identified, assessed, and weighed.243 Although the 
Guidelines require that “[a]ll relevant impacts should be assessed 
                                           
236 Alemanno and Meuwese, ‘Impact Assessment of EU Non-Legislative 
Rulemaking: The Missing Link in “New Comitology”’ (2013) 19 ELJ 76, 
79–81. 
237 Better Regulation Guidelines (n.233), 17. 
238 Ibid., 18. 
239 Decision of the President of the European Commission on the 
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240 Ibid., recital 4, art. 4. 
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quantitatively, if possible”,244 they also recognise that quantitative cost-
benefit analysis is not always suitable.245 Additionally, the Guidelines 
stress the importance of including unquantified impacts in the evaluation 
of proposals.246 Despite these caveats, the Better Regulation Guidelines 
place noticeably greater emphasis on quantification than did the 2009 
Impact Assessment Guidelines.247 The 2015 Guidelines also provide 
greater detail on the classes of impacts that must be assessed, helping to 
align the impact assessment process with the political priorities set forth 
in the Commission’s 2015 Communication on Better Regulation, 
including subsidiarity, regulatory simplification, and a preference for 
market-based regulation. The political nature of the Better Regulation 
programme is also underscored by the Guidelines’ clear statement that 
impact assessments are informational only and that regulatory decisions 
are ultimately a matter of political judgment.248 
The Commission’s choice to rely on soft law instruments to give 
substantive content to the impact assessment process is significant for 
two reasons: First, it arguably (see below) cuts the EU courts out of the 
process of interpreting the Better Regulation requirements, leaving their 
content and application solely in the hands of the Commission. Second, 
the use of soft law instruments gives the Commission significant 
flexibility to withdraw or amend those instruments to reflect changing 
political priorities without needing to engage in lengthy procedures. This 
malleability enhances the usefulness of the impact assessment process 
as a means of transmitting political priorities, suggesting a parallel 
between the Commission’s use of impact assessment and OIRA’s use of 
cost-benefit analysis. 
The new Better Regulation programme raises a number of legal 
questions, including the extent to which the Commission’s compliance 
with the Better Regulation Guidelines may be subject to judicial review. 
                                           
244 Better Regulation Guidelines (n.233), 27. 
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Historically, the Commission has taken the position that the procedural 
commitments it makes in soft law instruments like the Guidelines do not 
create rights in individuals and are not judicially enforceable.249 
Alemanno nonetheless argues that by purporting to impose procedural 
requirements on itself, the Commission has opened itself up to review of 
its compliance with those requirements. He notes that in the past the 
courts have enforced procedural rules contained in soft law instruments 
in cases brought under the Staff Regulations and in competition 
enforcement proceedings. Relying on those precedents, Alemanno argues 
that various general principles of law, including equal treatment and 
legitimate expectations, create a legal basis for the courts to enforce 
compliance with purportedly nonbinding guidelines.250 
To date, the question of reviewability has not been answered by the 
EU courts. A few points seem important, however. First, as Alemanno 
acknowledges, it would be one thing for the courts to enforce the 
Guidelines procedurally and another for them to review the substance of 
an impact assessment. For reasons discussed in the next chapter, the 
courts are much more likely to undertake the former than the latter. 
Second, the precedents on which Alemanno relies all address 
circumstances in which individuals were asserting a right to certain 
procedural protections. Many regulatory measures are of general 
applicability, however, and it is less clear that soft law guidelines can be 
considered binding in that context.251 Finally, if the courts determine that 
the Guidelines are judicially enforceable it could, depending on the 
nature of review, limit their usefulness as a means for transmitting policy 
preferences. The greater the courts’ willingness to review compliance with 
the Guidelines, the more restricted will be the Commission’s flexibility to 
modify them in response to current political priorities. Judicial review 
                                           
249 Alemanno, ‘The Better Regulation Initiative at the Judicial Gate: A 
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15 ELJ 382, 392. 
250 Ibid., 392–94. 
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could thus result in the impact assessment process taking on a more 
legalistic and entrenched character than the OIRA process. 
D. American and European Approaches Compared 
Unlike the two systems’ approaches to the precautionary principle, which 
rest on fundamentally different premises, the approaches taken by US 
and EU administrative law to cost-benefit analysis are broadly similar. In 
neither system is cost-benefit analysis legally required, although both 
systems generally allow the administration to rely on the technique when 
doing so would not run contrary to legislative mandates. 
Despite its minor significance as a legal principle, cost-benefit 
analysis has become an important part of regulatory practice on both 
sides of the Atlantic as a result of executive action. As such, the use of 
the technique tends to respond to executive interests. Both 
administrations use cost-benefit analysis as means of policy coordination 
and harmonisation across large bureaucracies. By issuing detailed 
guidance and instituting centralised review processes, executives in both 
jurisdictions are able to reinforce their political priorities by controlling 
the process of regulatory analysis. Both administrations have also used 
the technique to respond to criticisms that regulatory programmes are 
either poorly designed or serve special interests at the expense of the 
commonweal.252 Finally, the increased prominence of cost-benefit 
analysis in both systems can be seen as a reaction to the rise of an 
accountability culture that increasingly demands extensive, analytical, 
and preferably numerical justification for regulatory action.253 
Although there are strong parallels in the use of cost-benefit analysis 
in the US and the EU, it is important to underscore that those parallels 
are mostly procedural. Because both administrations use cost-benefit 
analysis as a tool for transferring political priorities, the way in which 
cost-benefit analysis is applied in the two jurisdictions will vary to reflect 
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different policy preferences and political pressures. It is by no means 
clear that a cost-benefit analysis approved by OIRA and one approved by 
the Regulatory Scrutiny Board would reach the same conclusions. 
Consequently, any comparison of the technique in the two jurisdictions 
must look beyond labels to the details of administrative practice. 
III. Conclusion 
The precautionary principle and cost-benefit analysis are important in 
both EU and US risk regulation, but contrasting US and EU law on risk 
regulation solely in terms of those concepts can be seriously misleading. 
Numerous examples of both precautionary and cost-benefit approaches 
can be found in both systems, and attempts to understand differences 
between the two solely in terms of those concepts will inevitably be 
inconclusive.254 
Viewed from the perspective of administrative law, we can see that 
instead of defining different substantive approaches to risk regulation, 
the differences between the EU and US legal systems with respect to the 
roles of precaution and cost-benefit analysis lie in the ways in which 
those concepts are used to justify and legitimate the exercise of 
regulatory power. Stated broadly, EU administrative law places 
significant emphasis on the principle of legality as a source of 
administrative legitimacy. Within this framework, the precautionary 
principle performs an important function by authorising regulatory 
intervention in cases of uncertainty and by providing justiciable guidance 
for the exercise of administrative discretion. US administrative law, by 
contrast, is relatively sceptical about the ability of law to guide regulatory 
aims. Instead, it relies more heavily on the democratic mandate the 
administration derives from its oversight by the elected president. One 
consequence of this theory of administrative legitimacy is that issues of 
precaution tend to be treated as questions of policy rather than law, 
leaving little room for precaution as a legal principle. Although these 
                                           
254 Compare, e.g., Wiener, Rogers, Hammitt, and Sand (eds.), The Reality 
of Precaution: Comparing Risk Regulation in the United States and Europe 
(RFF 2011), with Vogel, The Politics of Precaution (Princeton 2012). 
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characterisations do much to explain the different approaches to 
precaution taken in EU and US administrative law, it is important to bear 
in mind that these are only tendencies and not stark contrasts. Both 
jurisdictions care about law and about democracy. 
Cost-benefit analysis, by contrast, illustrates an area in which the EU 
and US administrations have faced broadly similar problems and 
pursued similar solutions. Administrative law in both jurisdictions has 
facilitated greater use of cost-benefit analysis without appreciably 
shaping how it is applied. Rather than responding to legal requirements, 
the use of cost-benefit analysis on both sides of the Atlantic has largely 
been a response to criticisms of the quality of regulatory policymaking as 
well as demands for greater accountability. Executives in both 
jurisdictions have also used the inherent flexibility of cost-benefit 
analysis methodology to transmit policy preferences throughout the 
administration. As long as administrators continue to see them as useful 
tools for meeting their political and policy objectives, cost-benefit analysis 
and impact assessment are likely to remain prominent features of both 
EU and US regulatory practice. 
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4 
Administrative Rationality and 
Risk Regulation 
In this chapter, the focus of the analysis turns from substantive legal 
principles applicable to administrative risk regulation to the process of 
administrative decisionmaking. In both the US and the EU, 
administrative decisionmaking, to be lawful, must be “rational”, or 
“reasonable”, or “non-arbitrary”.1 That obligation, which derives from the 
rule of law, can be understood to require that administrative action be 
explainable as a process of rational decisionmaking.2 Some 
commentators have gone further and linked the requirement of 
administrative rationality to fundamental rights by describing it as a 
right to a certain type of administrative decisionmaking process.3 
Although the requirement of rational administrative decisionmaking is 
well-established, its content is hard to pin down. Taken in the abstract, 
the term “rational” connotes a decision grounded in reasons and logic, 
and indeed, for an administrative decision to be rational it must be 
backed by reasons and those reasons must logically support the 
regulatory outcome. But the administrative law demand for rationality 
goes deeper. It is not sufficient that the administration give reasons; they 
                                           
1 Craig, EU Administrative Law (2d ed., OUP 2012) 408–15; II Pierce, 
Administrative Law Treatise (4th ed., Aspen 2002) 767–814. 
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must also be the right kinds of reasons.4 Some of these requirements are 
uncontroversial. For example, for a decision to be rational in the 
administrative law sense, the reasons given for it must show that it was 
plausibly in the public interest.5 They must also show that the action was 
consistent with the administrator’s legal mandate as specified in 
applicable legislation.6 Courts reviewing an administrative decision for 
rationality sometimes go further, however, and consider whether the 
evidence relied on was sufficient or whether the administration’s 
scientific or economic reasoning was sound.7 In some cases, courts may 
even demand that administrators apply particular analytical 
methodologies or prioritise particular values in their reasoning.8 As 
courts become more intensive in their demands for particular forms of 
rationality, they can come to exercise considerable legal control over both 
the process and content of administrative decisionmaking.9 
In both the US and the EU, courts are empowered to answer these 
difficult questions through their exercise of substantive review. In the US, 
such review is usually taken under the Administrative Procedure Act’s 
arbitrary and capricious standard10 and is therefore often referred to as 
“arbitrariness review”. In the EU, rationality review is generally 
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ex rel. Alliance for Natural Health v. Secretary of State for Health [2005] 
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2437, paras. 172–81. 
8 E.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1218–19 
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conducted under the rubrics of manifest error of assessment and 
proportionality.11 Terminology aside, this form of review in both 
jurisdictions is directed at essentially the same questions: Do the reasons 
offered by the administration support the decision taken? Are they 
sufficient to sustain the action? Has the administration dealt adequately 
with any contrary reasons offered by objectors? The focus of this chapter 
is on understanding how courts in the two jurisdictions address the 
substance of these questions in the context of risk regulation. 
Rationality review is a fascinating topic for study because the law in 
this area is almost entirely judge-made. Although legislation often 
provides guidance on how administrators must approach specific 
regulatory problems, general principles of administrative decisionmaking, 
applicable across a range of substantive areas, are far less often specified 
in legislative or constitutional provisions. Instead, these principles take 
shape over time as courts decide individual cases by applying their own 
general suppositions about the public interest, how the administration 
should further it, and what legal controls on administrative 
decisionmaking are necessary or appropriate. Because rationality review 
is the product of judicial decisionmaking, it presents a particularly legal 
view of good administration, in that the values that motivate decisions in 
this area are drawn from legal sources rather than public policy 
discourse. Further, judicial understandings of administrative rationality 
are powerfully shaped by constitutional theories regarding the legitimacy 
both of regulation and of the administration itself. Rationality review can 
thus be understood as a prominent, and particularly complex, 
manifestation of administrative constitutionalism.12 
In both jurisdictions, understandings of what it means to regulate 
risk rationally have been highly controversial. In particular, rationality 
review has been one of the main battlegrounds on which disputes about 
the proper roles of scientific and policy considerations in risk regulation 
have been contested, with proponents of various positions hoping to have 
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their vision engrafted into the legal definition of rational risk regulation. 
These disputes are in part epistemological debates about the capacity of 
risk science to provide answers to regulatory problems. To a much 
greater extent, however, these are normative debates about the 
circumstances in which administrative power may legitimately be 
exercised to restrict or prohibit activities in which individuals wish to 
engage. Because these debates take place in the language of rationality, 
however, their connection to normative commitments about the exercise 
of state power is not always apparent. One of the objectives of this 
chapter is to expose those connections. 
To make these connections more apparent, this chapter adopts a 
historical approach. Starting with the US, I show how conflicts over 
rational risk regulation have evolved in tandem with theories about the 
legitimacy of the administrative state. I conclude that in contemporary 
American jurisprudence, risk regulation is understood to require the 
exercise of both scientific and policy judgment and that administrative 
rationality requires the coherent exercise of both. Moving to the EU, I 
again show that understandings of rational risk regulation have evolved 
alongside changes in the identity and role of the EU administration. 
Unlike the US courts, however, current EU jurisprudence understands 
risk regulation as a policymaking activity, although it also requires the 
administration to seek scientific advice both as a means of informing the 
administration’s policy judgment and as a basis for holding the exercise 
of that judgment to account. I then compare the consequences of these 
differing conceptions of administrative rationality. 
I. Framing the Problem of Risk Regulation 
Before analysing courts’ attempts to develop principles of rational risk 
regulation, it is necessary to address the prior question of framing. As 
discussed in chapter 1, framing concerns the way in which questions for 
regulatory analysis, deliberation, and decision are presented and 
structured.13 Framing is thus central to ideas about administrative 
                                           
13 Chapter 1, section I.B. 
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rationality because it will determine in large part what constitutes a 
rational response to a particular regulatory problem.14 Framing is a way 
of determining what kinds of reasons are or are not germane to a 
regulatory decision, as well as to the ways in which those reasons should 
be weighed. 
Although the problem of risk regulation can be framed in many 
ways,15 both US and EU administrative law consistently frame risk 
regulation in terms of safety, which is to say the protection of humans or 
the environment from physical harm that may be caused by a product. 
Harm in this framing is defined in terms of empirically observable 
physical changes and, as such, is understood to be an appropriate 
subject for scientific analysis. Put differently, both the US and EU courts 
have framed risk in terms of a specific type of concern about technology, 
i.e., scientifically backed concerns that a product or process may be 
detrimental to the physical well-being of humans or the environment.16 
Although they have reached similar conclusions about the framing of 
risk, the US and EU courts have done so for somewhat different reasons. 
In the US, the framing of risk in terms of safety has its basis in 
legislation. US risk regulation legislation frequently requires 
administrators to regulate on the basis of “the best available science” or 
similar formulations, and courts have understood such requirements to 
indicate a legislative intention that regulatory efforts should be focused 
on scientifically analysable concerns.17 More broadly, US courts have 
interpreted regulatory legislation that speaks in terms of “public health” 
or “safety” (the Clean Air Act, for example), to require administrators to 
set regulatory standards on the basis of health effects, which in turn are 
                                           
14 Edley, Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy 
(Yale 1990) 98–105; Fisher (n.12), 90–93. 
15 Chapter 1, section I.B. 
16 Hilson, ‘Beyond Rationality—Judicial Review and Public Concern in the 
EU and the WTO’ (2005) 56 N.Ire.L.Q. 320, 332. 
17 E.g., Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286, 1290 
(D.C.Cir.2000). 
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understood as medically observable effects.18 The US courts have tended 
to reach these conclusions either on the basis of their perception of the 
plain meaning of the statue19 or the legislative history.20 For the most 
part, US courts have not engaged with other possible framings of risk, 
possibly because US risk regulators have rarely attempt to justify their 
actions on grounds other than the physical protection of health or the 
environment. Because the issue has received so little attention from the 
courts, it is unclear what, if any, limits there are on the extent to which 
administrative agencies may regulate technological risks on the basis of 
concerns other than safety.21 
For a long time, the EU courts equivocated on the framing of risk 
regulation.22 In Fedesa, the Court of Justice held that the EU’s ban on 
the use of hormones for fattening beef cattle could be upheld as a 
response to public anxiety without the need to show a scientifically 
backed health concern,23 and the BSE Cases seemed to reaffirm that 
position.24 By contrast, cases like Angelopharm25 and Bergaderm26 
required the administration to demonstrate evidence of potential risks to 
health. The issue seems to have been settled, however, by Pfizer27 and 
                                           
18 E.g., American Trucking Associations v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1052 
(D.C.Cir.1999); NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C.Cir.1987)  
(en banc). 
19 Chlorine Chemistry Council (n.17), 1290. 
20 NRDC (n.18), 1160–63. 
21 Although US administrative law frames risk in terms of safety, that 
does not mean that agencies may not consider non-safety factors when 
regulating. E.g., NRDC (n.19), 1163; Executive Order 12,898, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 11, 1994) (requiring all federal agencies to take account 
of environmental justice concerns when issuing regulations). 
22 Hilson (n.16), 330–32. 
23 Case C-331/88, R. v. MAFF, ex p. Fedesa [1990] ECR I-4023, paras. 7–9. 
24 Case C-180/96, United Kingdom v. Commission [1998] ECR I-2265, 
paras. 120–21. 
25 Case C-212/91, Angelopharm GmbH v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg 
[1994] ECR I-171, para. 38. 
26 Case T-199/96, Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA v. 
Commission [1998] ECR II-2805, paras. 63–65. 
27 Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council [2002] ECR II-3305, 
paras. 135–44. 
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Artegodan,28 in which the General Court came down firmly in favour of 
framing risk in terms of safety. 
The General Court’s decision to frame risk in terms of safety was 
rooted in concerns about the powers of the Commission.29 The court 
recognised that the precautionary principle had the potential to expand 
greatly the scope of the Commission’s regulatory discretion. In response, 
the court attempted to place bounds on that authority by narrowing the 
range of concerns to which the principle is applicable.30 Concerns about 
the scope of administrative discretion were even more evident in Alliance 
for Natural Health, in which the court interpreted the relevant directive as 
conferring on the Commission regulatory authority only for the purpose 
of protecting public health.31 As discussed in chapter 2,32 the Court of 
Justice was explicit that delegations of regulatory authority to the 
Commission required clear bounds.33 That constitutional requirement 
prompted the court to conclude that authority to regulate a potentially 
risky product should be limited to the protection of health—which in turn 
is defined in terms of scientifically backed concerns— and not expanded 
to include other considerations unless the inclusion of such 
considerations is clearly authorised by the delegating legislation. 
Arguably, Alliance for Natural Health went further than Pfizer and 
Artegodan by suggesting that limiting risk regulation to issues of safety 
was constitutionally necessary when regulatory decisions are made 
administratively, rather than by the EU legislature. 
Framing risk regulation in terms of safety has important implications 
for rationality review. Most importantly, the requirement that the 
administration base its actions on scientifically backed concerns means 
that administrators will have to offer scientific reasons to support their 
                                           
28 Case T-74/00, Artegodan GmbH v. Commission [2002] ECR II-4945, 
paras. 183–86. 
29 Heyvaert, ‘Facing the Consequences of the Precautionary Principle in 
European Community Law’ (2006) 31 ELR 185, 201–03. 
30 Pfizer (n.27), paras. 170–72; Artegodan (n.28), paras. 184–85. 
31 Alliance for Natural Health (n.6), paras. 83–86. 
32 Below section III.B. 
33 Alliance for Natural Health (n.6), paras. 90–92. 
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actions. It does not necessarily preclude administrators from also relying 
on other types of reasons, such as distributional concerns or public 
anxiety regarding certain technologies, but it does mean that non-science 
reasons will be limited to justifying particular responses to scientifically 
backed concerns, rather than constituting independently sufficient bases 
for regulatory action. The effect of this framing, therefore, will inevitably 
be to marginalise non-scientific concerns to some degree and to focus 
both administrative and judicial attention first on the validity of the 
asserted scientifically backed concern and second on the effectiveness of 
the administration’s chosen response, which will itself be analysed 
primarily in scientific terms.34 
Given the limits of risk science,35 however, rational administrative 
decisionmaking in this area can never be simply about getting the facts 
right. Instead, models of rational risk regulation must also account for 
how scientific conclusions are drawn, by whom, and on what basis. They 
must also be able to accommodate the fact that such judgments will very 
often be disputed. In the usual case, reaching scientific conclusions 
about risk will not be a matter of right or wrong but of choosing from 
among multiple plausible interpretations of incomplete and ambiguous 
data. As a result, the line between scientific conclusions and policy 
judgments begins to blur. Models of administrative rationality must also 
be able to deal with this overlap. 
II. Rationality Review in the United States 
The early US case law on risk regulation is notoriously difficult to 
reconcile. To understand the source of this confusion, it is necessary to 
understand the ways in which the explosion of risk regulation agencies 
and regulatory programmes in the 1970s fundamentally challenged the 
then-prevailing administrative law settlement in the US. In particular, 
three aspects of the new risk regulation programmes required courts to 
reassess their approach to judicial review. First, the new risk regulation 
                                           
34 Cf. Lee, ‘Beyond Safety? The Broadening Scope of Risk Regulation’ 
(2009) 62 CLP 242, 258. 
35 Chapter 1, section I.C. 
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programmes contemplated that most regulatory activity would take the 
form of administrative rulemaking. Although rulemaking had always 
been a part of US administrative practice, the primary mode of regulation 
before 1970 was adjudication. Administrative agencies adjudicated 
various types of licencing proceedings and enforcement actions, and 
made policy incrementally through their decisions in individual cases. 
Much of the theory underlying American administrative law at this time 
implicitly relied on this court-like approach to regulation.36 Regulation by 
rulemaking upset those premises by requiring administrators to make 
broad policy choices that in their effects were indistinguishable from 
legislation. As a result, courts were put in the position of reviewing 
administrative actions that looked like the work of legislatures without 
any clear guidance on what the courts’ role in that process should be.37 
The second challenge posed by risk regulation was the need for 
specialised scientific expertise in standard setting. Although expertise 
had historically been an important justification for administrative 
delegation, the kind of expertise being called upon in risk regulation 
programmes was qualitatively different. The New Deal agencies’ expertise 
was what might be called managerial expertise, i.e., the kind of expertise 
that is acquired from long experience with a particular industry.38 
Expertise of this kind does not typically yield definitive solutions, but 
rather informs the judgment of administrators.39 The scientific expertise 
called for by the new risk regulation programmes, by contrast, seemed 
like it should be capable of providing objective answers to questions such 
as whether a substance causes cancer. Yet in practice, the scientific 
analysis relied on by agencies failed to offer clear conclusions. Judges 
                                           
36 Mashaw and Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety (Harvard 1990) 21–27; 
Scalia, ‘Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme 
Court’ [1978] Sup.Ct.Rev. 345, 376–82. 
37 Fisher (n.12), 110–12; Leventhal, ‘Environmental Decisionmaking and 
the Role of the Courts’ (1974) 122 U.Pa.L.Rev. 509, 510; Pedersen, 
‘Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking’ (1975) 85 YLJ 38, 46–50. 
38 Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies (Harvard 1962) 74–78; 
Landis, The Administrative Process (Yale 1938) 22–26. 
39 Cf. Landis (n.38), 142–45; Scalia (n.36), 380–81. 
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unversed in risk science had difficulty discerning the significance of this 
uncertainty, especially the extent to which it might be attributable to 
failings in the agency’s analysis. 
The third challenge is more impressionistic. The powers being granted 
to administrative agencies in the risk regulation era represented a step-
change in the scope of administrative power.40 Whereas the New Deal 
agencies typically focused on a single industry and regulated 
incrementally, the new risk agencies, most notably the EPA, had the 
power to issue regulations that would, at a stroke, impose significant 
costs on every sector of the economy.41 The obvious example is the Clean 
Air Act, which directly or indirectly imposes compliance costs on virtually 
anyone who uses energy, including both businesses and consumers. 
These massive stakes—for both the economy and public health—caused 
disquiet among the courts. The crucial constitutional questions were the 
extent to which such significant policy choices could be made by 
administrative agencies and the forms of legal control that would be 
necessary to render them constitutionally legitimate. 
These three challenges completely upended the administrative law 
settlement that prevailed at the beginning of the 1970s. It should be no 
surprise, therefore, that the era of risk regulation also introduced a 
period of controversy and convulsion in rationality review. Indeed, it 
would take more than two decades for the Supreme Court and the courts 
of appeals to work out a new settlement. The development of this new 
settlement would result in a revised understanding of the place of the 
administration within the US system of government. To understand this 
development, it is necessary first to examine the lines of the debate that 
animated the 1970s case law. 
                                           
40 Cf. American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 502 
(5th.Cir.1978); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 
640–41 (D.C.Cir.1973). 
41 Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute¸ 
448 U.S. 607, 674–75 (1980) (Benzene) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
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A. Early Approaches in the Courts of Appeals 
Given the magnitude of these challenges, it should be unsurprising that 
the courts of appeals initially took divergent approaches to rationality 
review in the risk regulation context, and the case law of the 1970s can 
be said to have given birth to the perception that US judicial review is 
hopelessly unpredictable.42 Despite this enormous variation, however, 
decisions from the 1970s and into the early 1980s generally followed one 
of two models of judicial review, which Professors Stewart and Sunstein 
have dubbed the “private law” and “public law” models.43 The 
distinguishing features of the two models were the purposes of judicial 
review and the role of the administration in setting regulatory policy. 
Under the private law model, the reviewing court’s primary duty was 
to ensure that individual liberty was not unlawfully constrained by 
administrative action. As a consequence, the focus of review was on the 
rights of the regulated party and not on potential regulatory 
beneficiaries.44 The key legal premise of the private law model was that 
restrictions on individual liberty are only lawful when authorised by the 
legislature.45 Accordingly, regulatory legislation had to be interpreted so 
that all important policy decisions were made by Congress, leaving the 
administration only a narrow discretion to fill “interstitial” gaps.46 
Because the focus was on protecting the rights of regulated entities, 
courts adjudicating within the private law model tended to review 
administrative rulemakings as they would enforcement actions, i.e., by 
asking whether the administration had proved that its action was 
authorised by statute. That focus in turn led courts to dwell on 
determining the administration’s burden of proof and on assessing 
                                           
42 Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies (Lawyers Co-operative Press 
1976) 377–85. 
43 Stewart and Sunstein, ‘Public Programs and Private Rights’ (1982) 
95 HLR 1193, 1232–33; Sunstein, ‘Deregulation and the Hard-Look 
Doctrine’ [1983] Sup.Ct.Rev. 177, 179–89. 
44 Sunstein (n.43), 179. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Cf. Monaghan, ‘“Marbury” and the Administrative State’ (1983) 83 
Colum.L.Rev. 1, 6. 
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whether the evidence presented by the agency sufficed to meet that 
burden.47 In the private law model, the agency’s job was not to set risk 
regulation policy, but to gather evidence and determine—on that basis—
whether the relevant statute required the imposition of regulatory 
controls. Accordingly, administrative rationality in the private law model 
was essentially limited to instrumental rationality, and the courts 
assessed administrative decisionmaking accordingly. 
The private law model was particularly associated with the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which applied that model in several well-
known (and much criticised)48 decisions, including Aqua Slide ‘N’ Dive, 
American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, and Gulf South Insulation. In each 
of these cases, the agency had adduced evidence of possible, but 
uncertain harm, and had chosen to regulate. The courts reviewing those 
regulations focused on whether the agency had met a burden of proof. 
For example, in American Petroleum Institute, the agency had ample 
evidence that benzene could cause leukaemia at concentrations greater 
than 10 ppm, but little or no direct evidence of its effects below that 
level.49 Due to this uncertainty, which is a pervasive feature of risk 
science, the court set aside the challenged regulation. An important 
feature of cases following the private law model is that the scope of 
agencies’ discretion did not extend to determining when uncertain 
evidence of risk was sufficient to justify the imposition of regulatory 
controls.50 That question had to be reserved to Congress, which in effect 
                                           
47 Sunstein (n.43), 179; Aqua Slide ‘N’ Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831, 
839–40 (5th.Cir.1978). 
48 The literature criticising these cases is enormous. A few prominent 
examples include: Ashford, Ryan, and Caldart, ‘A Hard Look at Federal 
Regulation of Formaldehyde: A Departure from Reasoned 
Decisionmaking’ (1983) 7 Harv.Envtl.L.Rev. 297, 363–68 (1983), 
McGarity, ‘Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process’ 
(1992) 41 Duke.L.J. 1385, 1423; Pierce, ‘Seven Ways to Deossify Agency 
Rulemaking’ (1995) 47 Admin.L.Rev. 59, 61–62; and Wagner, ‘The 
Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation’ (1995) 95 Colum.L.Rev. 1613, 
1662–63. 
49 American Petroleum Institute (n.40), 501. 
50 Aqua Slide ‘N’ Dive (n.47), 841–42; Gulf South (n.7), 1145. 
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turned it into a question of law for the reviewing court to decide when 
interpreting the statute. 
Although the Fifth Circuit (and later the Eleventh) long adhered to the 
private law model, by the end of the 1970s other courts of appeals, led by 
the DC Circuit, had begun applying what Stewart and Sunstein call the 
public law model.51 Instead of focusing on protecting the rights of 
regulated entities, the role of the court in the public law model is to 
ensure that the administrative agency is adequately implementing 
regulatory legislation. That obligation includes ensuring not only that the 
agency is not unjustifiably infringing individual liberty, but also that the 
agency is protecting the interests of regulatory beneficiaries.52 The basic 
premise of the public law model is that by enacting risk regulation 
legislation, Congress intended to protect the public and the environment 
from the covered risks, an objective that could just as easily be 
threatened by under-regulation as by over-regulation. In the public law 
model, scientific uncertainty is not treated as a barrier to regulation, but 
as a policy problem for the agency to address. Recognising the inherent 
uncertainty of risk science and the need to weigh competing social 
policies in determining when to regulate, several reviewing courts held 
that administrators must make “an essentially legislative policy 
judgment, rather than a factual determination, concerning the relative 
risks of underprotection as compared to overprotection”.53 The public law 
model thus posited a very different role for the administration from the 
                                           
51 Some prominent examples of the public law model include Ethyl Corp. 
v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir.1976) (en banc); Society of the Plastics 
Industry, Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d.Cir.1975) (Clark, J.); Industrial 
Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C.Cir.1974). 
52 Sunstein (n.43), 187. 
53 Hodgson (n.51), 475. Hodgson’s approach to scientific uncertainty was 
adopted by several other circuit courts. E.g., BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. 
Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 647–48 (1st.Cir.1979); Society of the Plastics 
Industry (n.51), 1304; American Iron and Steel Institute v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 
825, 833–34 (3d.Cir.1978); Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. v. 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 529 F.2d 649, 653–
54 (8th.Cir.1976); ASARCO, Inc. v. OSHA, 746 F.2d 483, 490–91 
(9th.Cir.1984). 
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private law model. Instead of being confined to the narrowly instrumental 
task of collecting and assessing evidence, the administration in the 
public law model has an essentially constitutive role in elaborating 
regulatory policy. Although the administration’s policymaking authority 
remains subordinate to that of Congress, the public law model recognises 
that a great deal of discretion and judgment is required to concretise the 
broad policy goals set out in risk legislation and to apply them on the 
basis of uncertain and ambiguous scientific evidence. By entrusting the 
administration with responsibility for this elaboration, courts in the 
public law model narrowed the scope for judicial policymaking through 
judicial review. At the same time, however, courts in this model claimed 
an important judicial power—largely absent from the private law model—
to ensure that the agency was living up to the responsibilities assigned to 
it by Congress.54 
The differences between the private law and public law models of 
judicial review can be understood as differences in the role of the 
administration in setting risk regulation policy. In keeping with 
traditional delegation theory, the private law model placed policy 
decisions with Congress and sharply limited the administration’s 
discretion outside of technical issues. In this model, science is viewed as 
a largely objective and determinate method for selecting the appropriate 
regulatory action to implement fixed legislative instructions. That 
approach had the virtues of being consistent with then-prevailing 
administrative and judicial practice, as well as being easily reconcilable 
with separation of powers theory.55 But those virtues came at the cost of 
potentially crippling the effectiveness of risk regulation programmes. 
The public law model, by contrast, proceeded from a much more 
realistic understanding of the complexities inherent in the regulation of 
emerging and scientifically uncertain risks.56 It appreciated that 
administrative decisionmaking could not be captured in the adjudicative 
                                           
54 Stewart and Sunstein (n.43), 1216–18. 
55 Cf. Scalia (n.36), 375–77. 
56 Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (Harvard 
1990); Wagner, ‘Ethyl: Bridging the Science-Law Divide’ (1995) 74 
Tex.L.Rev. 1291, 1293–95. 
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metaphor of burdens of proof, but instead required the weighing of 
competing social priorities in light of the agency’s regulatory mandate.57 
In this model, science is understood as a source of information that 
guides administrative policymaking, but does not dictate outcomes.58 To 
allow the administration to deal with the complexity inherent in setting 
risk standards, courts applying the public law model were prepared to 
accord the administration an essentially constitutive role in setting risk 
policy. The problem, however, was that the then-dominant technocratic 
theories of administrative law were insufficient to legitimate that 
policymaking authority. If scientific expertise was necessarily an 
insufficient basis for risk regulation, then a technocratic model of 
administration was also insufficient to justify vesting regulatory power in 
administrative agencies.59 Some courts attempted to fill the gap by 
crafting a “surrogate political process”, but that effort was short-lived 
(and largely unsatisfactory).60 Others courts simply skirted the issue.61 
Until a cogent theory could be found to legitimate the extent of 
administrative policymaking that modern risk regulation programmes 
seemed to require, the debate between the private law and public law 
models could not be resolved. 
B. Risk Regulation in the Supreme Court 
Risk regulation first reached the Supreme Court in the Benzene case,62 
which was an appeal from the Fifth Circuit’s private law model decision 
in American Petroleum Institute. Although the Benzene decision was 
much-anticipated, the Court failed to reach a majority in support of any 
                                           
57 Cf. Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’ (1978) 92 HLR 353, 
370–72. 
58 Society of the Plastics Industry (n.51), 1308 (“[T]hough the factual 
finger points, it does not conclude.”). 
59 Stewart, ‘The Reformation of American Administrative Law’ (1975) 
88 HLR 1667, 1681–88. 
60 Ibid., 1760–62. 
61 E.g., Ethyl (n.51), 20. 
62 Above n.41. 
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opinion, depriving the judgment of precedential authority.63 As Justice 
Scalia (then a law professor) put it, the Benzene decision “literally 
provides no conclusive answer to any legal question more general than 
whether the benzene exposure regulation . . . is valid.”64 Despite that 
important limitation, the case is worth careful examination because it 
shows the Supreme Court actively working through some of the 
challenges posed by risk regulation. 
Writing for a four-justice plurality, Justice Stevens’s central concern 
was OSHA’s Cancer Policy, under which the agency asserted that once a 
substance was determined to be a carcinogen, the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act required it to impose the most stringent controls 
technically and economically feasible because no level of exposure to a 
carcinogenic substance could be considered safe. The plurality was 
transparent in its uneasiness with the scope of authority that the Cancer 
Policy seemed to claim for the agency and with the regulatory costs that 
it potentially entailed.65 In that regard, the mood of the plurality opinion 
was of a piece with the more generalised anxiety regarding the marked 
increase in administrative power brought about by the new risk 
regulation programmes. The plurality’s solution was to cabin that 
power.66 Relying on a convoluted construction of statutory language, 
Justice Stevens held that the Act only gave the agency power to regulate 
risks that rendered a workplace “unsafe”, a term he equated with 
“significant risk”.67 The agency was therefore required to make a finding 
that a substance posed a significant risk before regulating; such risk 
could not be presumed from the presence of a hazardous property as 
under the Cancer Policy. The plurality hastened to add in the very next 
sentence, however, that the agency was “not required to support its 
                                           
63 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
64 Scalia, ‘A Note on the Benzene Case’ (1980) 4 Regulation 25, 25. 
65 Benzene (n.41), 639–40. That uneasiness was even more pronounced 
in Justice Powell’s and Justice Rehnquist’s concurrences. Ibid., 668–69 
(Powell, J, concurring in part), 672 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
66 Chapter 2, section III.A. 
67 Benzene (n.41), 655. 
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finding that a significant risk exists with anything approaching scientific 
certainty”.68 Because OSHA had not made the necessary finding, its rule 
was invalid. The plurality never resolved the question whether there was 
adequate evidence in the record to support a finding of significant risk. 
Indeed, it explicitly noted that it was declining to resolve that question.69 
Although it did not definitively determine what reasons OSHA would 
need to give to support a finding of substantial risk, the plurality did offer 
some clues. Unfortunately, those clues point in different directions. On 
one hand, the plurality held that the agency bore a burden of proof to 
show that “it is at least more likely than not” that a substance poses a 
significant risk.70 To that extent, the plurality seemed to conceive of the 
question of significance as an evidentiary threshold, echoing the private 
law model employed by the court below. On the other hand, however, the 
plurality clearly did not understand the question of significance in purely 
scientific terms. Drawing heavily on cases applying the public law 
model,71 the plurality stated, “while the Agency must support its finding 
that a certain level of risk exists by substantial evidence, we recognise 
that its determination that a particular level of risk is ‘significant’ will be 
based largely on policy considerations.”72 Importantly, the plurality noted 
its agreement on this point with Justice Marshall’s dissent for four 
justices. Thus, at least seven justices in the Benzene case agreed that a 
finding of significant risk would have to be based on a combination of 
scientific and policy considerations. 
It is also important to note what the Benzene plurality did not hold. As 
noted above, it did not hold that the evidence in the administrative record 
was insufficient to support a finding of significant risk. Instead, it 
remanded the rule to the agency to consider that question in the first 
instance. It most certainly did not, despite certain ill-advised dictum, 
                                           
68 Ibid., 656. 
69 Ibid., 660. 
70 Ibid., 653. 
71 In fact, the only precedents cited in this part of the plurality opinion 
are two public law model cases. Ibid., 656 (citing Hodgson (n.51) and 
Society of the Plastics Industry (n.51)). 
72 Ibid., 655 (quoting ibid., 706 (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
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hold that OSHA could only regulate on the basis of a quantitative risk 
assessment.73 To the contrary, both the plurality and the dissent 
explicitly recognised that significance could not be determined with 
mathematical precision.74 
Because of its opacity, Benzene did little to clarify how agencies 
should approach the problem of risk regulation. The Supreme Court next 
returned to the problems of risk regulation in Baltimore Gas and Electric 
Co. v. NRDC,75 which concerned a rule promulgated by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission providing that, for purposes of considering 
licensing applications, long term storage of nuclear waste would be 
deemed to have no environmental impact. Baltimore Gas was the second 
time that rule had been to the Court. The first was Vermont Yankee,76 in 
which the court famously declared that courts could not impose 
procedural requirements on agencies beyond those specified in 
legislation. Following remand, the DC Circuit had once again vacated the 
rules but this time of the basis that they were substantively irrational. 
The crux of the circuit court’s ruling was that it found the challengers’ 
view of the evidence to be more credible than the Commission’s.77 As in 
Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed. 
                                           
73 Puzzlingly, several commentators have nonetheless claimed that 
Benzene does require quantitative risk assessment, at least as a practical 
matter. E.g., Bergkamp, ‘The Quiet Revolution in Administrative 
Procedure: Judicial Vetting of Precautionary Risk Assessment’ [2014] 
EJRR 102, 107; Charnley and Elliott, ‘Risk Versus Precaution: 
Environmental Law and Public Health Protection’ (2002) 32 Env.L.Rptr. 
10363; Latin, ‘Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment’ 
(1988) 5 Yale.J.Reg. 89, 93. That interpretation has been consistently 
rejected by the courts of appeals, however. E.g., National Maritime Safety 
Association v. OSHA, 649 F.3d 743, 751 (D.C.Cir.2011); Miami-Dade 
County v. EPA, 529 F.3d 1049, 1069 (11th.Cir.2008); Cactus Corner, LLC 
v. Department of Agriculture, 450 F.3d 428, 433 (9th.Cir.2008); American 
Dental Association v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 827 (7th.Cir.1993) (Posner, J.). 
74 Benzene (n.41), 655. 
75 462 U.S. 87 (1983). 
76 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
77 NRDC v. NRC, 685 F.2d 459, 484 & n.129 (D.C.Cir.1982). 
 Administrative Rationality 209 
  
Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor held that “a reviewing court 
must remember that the Commission is making predictions, within its 
area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science. When examining this 
kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a 
reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential.”78 This holding, 
which draws on language first used by the D.C. Circuit in Hodgson,79 
came to be known as the “frontiers of science doctrine”.80 How to 
interpret that doctrine, however, continues to be a matter of dispute. 
Some take it to mean that when agencies are regulating on the basis of 
highly technical scientific conclusions, courts must be especially 
deferential. On this interpretation, agencies’ scientific determinations are 
entitled to greater deference, even “super-deference,” because of the 
agency’s relatively greater competence to evaluate sophisticated scientific 
issues. 81 Proponents of the super-deference interpretation therefore 
argue that Baltimore Gas creates an incentive for agencies to couch the 
justification for their rules in complex scientific terms, even when 
decisions are actually being made for other reasons.82 
Careful analysis of Justice O’Connor’s opinion, however suggests that 
the super-deference interpretation is incomplete. The Court in Baltimore 
Gas was particularly concerned that courts not set aside agency action 
merely because it is based on science that is uncertain, or even 
substantially uncertain.83 The crucial issue was how the agency should 
                                           
78 Baltimore Gas (n.75), 103. 
79 Hodgson (n.51), 474. 
80 Shapiro, ‘The Frontiers of Science Doctrine: American Experiences with 
the Judicial Control of Science-Based Decision-Making’ in Joerges, 
Ladeur, and Vos (eds.), Integrating Scientific Expertise into Regulatory 
Decision-Making (Nomos 1997) 331. 
81 Meazell, ‘Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review 
as Translation of Agency Science’ (2011) 109 Mich.L.Rev. 733, 763–64 
(collecting sources). 
82 Ibid., 781–82; Wagner (n.48), 1640. 
83 In support of this point, the Court cited to passages in both the 
plurality and dissenting opinions in Benzene emphasising that agencies 
cannot be expected to eliminate uncertainty from their scientific 
conclusions. Baltimore Gas (n.75), 105. 
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address that uncertainty.84 Although it required the NRC to bring its 
technical expertise to bear on the issue, the Court openly acknowledged 
that the final decision depended on an exercise of judgment. Indeed, 
what sets an issue “on the frontiers of scientific knowledge” apart from “a 
simple finding of fact” is that the issue cannot be resolved by scientific 
methods alone but instead requires the agency to exercise its “policy 
judgment”.85 Deference is owed at least as much because of the policy-
laden nature of the agency’s conclusion, as because of the complexity of 
the science.86 In effect, the Court held that when scientific information is 
uncertain, the agency’s exercise of its expert judgment and its policy 
judgment are inseparable.87 
The unanimous opinion in Baltimore Gas, along with the plurality and 
dissenting opinions in Benzene, show a strong majority of the Supreme 
Court endorsing a public law model of judicial review and administrative 
rationality, along the lines elaborated by the D.C. Circuit. What 
continued to be missing, however, was a cogent theory of how conferring 
such broad policymaking discretion on administrative agencies could be 
reconciled with democratic values and the separation of powers. That 
issue would be resolved by the Supreme Court in a series of cases that 
fundamentally reshaped US administrative law. 
C. The True Reformation of American 
Administrative Law 
That the challenges posed by the explosion of risk regulation programmes 
(among other causes) had thrown American administrative law into a 
state of turmoil was obvious even to contemporary observers. In his justly 
                                           
84 Baltimore Gas (n.75), 105; Shapiro (n.80), 332. 
85 Baltimore Gas (n.75), 105. 
86 Ibid., 105–06. This reading is further supported by the Court’s reliance 
on Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 
419 U.S. 281 (1974), a case which turned on the reasonableness of the 
agency’s policy judgment and involved no scientific or technical issues. 
87 Shapiro (n.80), 334; see also NRDC. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 971 
(D.C.Cir.1990). 
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famous 1975 article ‘The Reformation of American Administrative Law’,88 
Richard Stewart analysed judicial responses to this upheaval and 
concluded that the courts were responding by replacing the traditional, 
Weberian theory of administrative legitimacy with a pluralist interest 
representation model, in which administrative procedure would create a 
“surrogate political process” that would in turn legitimate administrative 
decisionmaking.89 Opening the administrative process to a wide range of 
interests was thought both to compensate for administrators’ limited 
democratic mandate and to create safeguards against capture of 
regulatory agencies by regulated interests.90 
At the time he wrote, Stewart’s prognostication seemed like a good 
bet, based as it was on decisions by influential circuit court judges. In a 
trio of landmark decisions, however, the Supreme Court would reject the 
interest group representation approach to administrative law and instead 
formulate a much different response to the challenges posed by 
administrative risk regulation. This new theory would attempt to 
reconcile the exercise of administrative power with the tripartite 
framework of government by reaffirming the technocratic nature of 
administration, while at the same time linking administrative 
policymaking to the elected president. It would also fully endorse the 
public law model of judicial review, in which courts are tasked with 
ensuring that agencies live up to their regulatory obligations. 
The decision that started the reformation was Vermont Yankee,91 in 
which the Court held that judges may not impose additional procedural 
                                           
88 Above n.59. 
89 Ibid., 1670. 
90 Following George Stigler’s publication of ‘The Economic Theory of 
Regulation’ (1971) 2 Bell.J.Econ.Mgmt.Sci. 3, capture theory came for a 
time to dominate US public administration scholarship. Capture theory 
basically asserts that, for structural reasons, regulated entities will often 
be able to dominate regulators’ decisionmaking processes thereby 
allowing those entities to use regulation to extract benefits at the expense 
of the public. Ibid., 17–18; see also Carpenter and Moss (eds.), Preventing 
Regulatory Capture (CUP 2013). Stewart believed that many judges had 
read and accepted the literature on capture. Stewart (n.59), 1685. 
91 Above n.76. 
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requirements on agencies beyond those required by statute. The court of 
appeals had remanded an NRC rule and required the agency to provide 
public interest intervenors with greater opportunities to “ventilate” 
certain scientific issues. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. In 
language that dripped with disdain for the DC Circuit’s approach, the 
Court held that, absent highly unusual circumstances, courts could not 
use rationality review to impose procedural requirements on agencies 
beyond those specified in the APA or other applicable legislation.92 The 
decision had the immediate effect of terminating any attempt by the lower 
courts to foster a surrogate political process through administrative law. 
It also had additional significance for the interest group theory of 
administrative legitimacy. By rejecting interest group pluralism, the 
Court reaffirmed that the legitimacy of administrative policymaking is not 
dependent on the participation of interested parties.93 The Court also 
implicitly rejected the partnership model of administration advanced by 
some judges, in which the agencies and the courts would act in 
partnership in setting regulatory policy.94 For the Vermont Yankee Court, 
regulatory policy was a matter for the administration itself, and courts 
were not to interfere except to police constitutional and statutory bounds. 
The next step in the reformation was State Farm,95 which concerned 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s decision to rescind a 
safety standard requiring passive restraint systems in new automobiles.96 
Affirming the court of appeals, the Supreme Court vacated the rescission 
on the ground that it was arbitrary and capricious in light of the evidence 
before the agency. State Farm’s significance for the new legal settlement 
was threefold: First, it affirmed the “hard look” approach to arbitrariness 
                                           
92 Ibid., 547–48. 
93 Ibid., 545. 
94 E.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 848–49 
(D.C.Cir.1972); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 
851–52 (D.C.Cir.1970); cf. Byse, ‘Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of 
Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat Different View’ (1978) 91 HLR 
1823, 1828. 
95 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
96 Ibid., 36–38. 
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review, thereby ensuring that courts would continue to engage in 
searching substantive review.97 Second, it rejected a legal preference for 
non-regulation or deregulation, in effect rejecting the common law regime 
as the baseline for social ordering.98 Third, it rejected a conception of 
judicial review in which the task of courts is primarily to protect private 
interests from government overreach. Instead, it forwarded a conception 
of judicial review as protection of “a right to a process of decision 
designed to ensure that the relevant public values will be properly 
identified and implemented.”99 
By embracing hard look review, State Farm also reaffirmed the 
centrality of technocratic rationality to judicial understandings of good 
administrative decisionmaking. In vacating the agency’s decision, the 
Court closely examined the evidence before the agency and required it to 
produce a justification for its decision grounded in consideration of that 
evidence.100 This approach to review reinforced the notion that it is the 
administration’s job to gather and analyse information and to make 
decisions on the basis of that analysis rather than on the basis of 
political prejudgment.101 The opinion should not, however, be read as 
denying a legitimate role for administrative policy judgment.102 The Court 
recognised that often “the available data does not settle a regulatory issue 
and the agency must then exercise its judgment in moving from the facts 
. . . to a policy conclusion”.103 Writing for four justices, Justice Rehnquist 
went further and recognised that an agency’s policy conclusions will be 
influenced by the political views of the incumbent president.104 In this 
way, Justice Rehnquist, apparently for the first time in the Supreme 
                                           
97 Ibid., 43; Garland, ‘Deregulation and Judicial Review’ (1985) 98 HLR 
505, 526; Sunstein (n.43), 196. 
98 Sunstein (n.43), 213. 
99 Ibid., 212. 
100 State Farm (n.95), 47–49. 
101 Garland (n.97), 556; Sunstein (n.43), 209. 
102 Contra Watts, ‘Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and 
Capricious Review’ (2009) 119 YLJ 2, 5. 
103 State Farm (n.95), 52. 
104 Ibid., 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Court’s case law, identified this connection to the president as a basis for 
the legitimacy of administrative policymaking.105 
The final piece of the reformation was the unanimous decision in 
Chevron,106 which in retrospect can fairly be said to have revolutionised 
American administrative law. The importance of Chevron for the 
interpretation of regulatory statutes and the allocation of authority 
between agencies and courts was explored in chapter 3.107 Chevron’s 
significance extends beyond statutory interpretation, however, because 
the case dealt at some length with the theoretical basis for the legitimacy 
of administrative decisionmaking. At the outset of the opinion, the Court 
emphasised the agency’s expertise as the source of its superior 
competence for setting regulatory policy, particularly in technical 
areas.108 That justification was consistent with the traditional 
technocratic understanding of administration as an alternative to politics 
for certain types of decisionmaking. Later in the opinion, however, the 
Court articulated a second basis for the legitimacy of administrative 
policymaking, grounded in the agency’s democratic mandate derived from 
its oversight by the president: 
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated 
policy-making responsibilities may, within the 
limits of that delegation, properly rely upon 
the incumbent administration’s views of wise 
policy to inform its judgments. While agencies 
are not directly accountable to the people, the 
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appro-
priate for this political branch of the Govern-
ment to make such policy choices . . . .109 
This rationale picked up on Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in State 
Farm, but in this case it was embraced by a unanimous Court. It was by 
far the Court’s strongest endorsement to that point of the democratic 
legitimacy of administrative agencies. 
                                           
105 Ibid. 
106 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
107 Chapter 3, section I.C.2. 
108 Ibid., 865. 
109 Ibid. 
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Chevron is a powerful statement on the nature of the administration 
in two ways: First, it openly acknowledges the indeterminacy inherent in 
most regulatory statutes.110 In doing so, it undermines the notion, crucial 
to the private law model, that administrative rationality could be purely 
instrumental in nature. Second, the Court made a self-conscious 
decision to place primary responsibility for the elaboration of regulatory 
policy the administration. By empowering the administration in this way, 
the Court affirmed an important constitutive role for the administration. 
To be sure, the administration’s constitutive role is a subordinate one; 
plenary power to issue regulatory commands remains the monopoly of 
Congress. But the size and complexity of the modern regulatory state 
ensures that the administration will have significant power to shape 
regulatory policy. Crucially, Chevron reconciles the exercise of that 
constitutive power with the tripartite constitutional structure by tying 
administrative authority to the president’s electoral mandate.111 
Taken together, the frontiers of science doctrine elaborated in 
Baltimore Gas and the Vermont Yankee-State Farm-Chevron trilogy 
present a coherent picture of administrative rationality when making 
decisions on risk regulation. State Farm requires that the agency 
undertake a thorough scientific investigation of the potential risk in 
question.112 This requirement is consistent with the longstanding 
American view that administrative regulation is legitimate, in part, 
because it is capable of bringing expertise to policymaking that other 
government actors (Congress, the courts) do not possess.113 Baltimore 
Gas recognises, however, that scientific analysis will be an insufficient 
basis for many, perhaps most, risk regulation decisions and that when 
                                           
110 Chapter 3, section I.C.2. 
111 Farina, ‘The “Chief Executive” and the Quiet Constitutional 
Revolution’ (1997) 49 Admin.L.Rev. 179, 182–83. 
112 Gas Appliance Manufacturers Association v. Department of Energy, 998 
F.2d 1041, 1046 (D.C.Cir.1993). 
113 Mashaw, ‘Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and 
Legitimacy in the Administrative State’ (2001) 70 Ford.L.Rev. 17, 23; 
Rabin, ‘Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective’ (1986) 38 Stan.L.Rev. 
1189, 1219–20, 1263. 
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science runs out, the agency must exercise its policy judgment. Courts 
owe such policy judgments no less—and perhaps more114— deference 
than the agency’s technical determinations. Finally, Chevron supplies the 
theoretical foundation for the legitimacy of administrative policymaking 
by stressing the president’s democratic mandate. 
In the model of administrative rationality described by these cases, 
scientific evaluation and policy judgment are essentially inseparable. 
Because of this inseparability, the focus of judicial review is less on the 
truth or falsity of the agency’s scientific conclusions and more on 
whether the agency has offered evidence and reasons to show that its 
decisionmaking process has been directed at furthering the purposes of 
the underlying statute. In effect, the Supreme Court accepted the public 
law model as the correct approach to administrative rationality and 
judicial review. 
D. Judicial Review After the Reformation 
The Supreme Court’s landmark decisions of the early 1980s did not 
change the lower courts’ approach to risk regulation overnight. Initially, 
there was considerable debate in the courts of appeals regarding the 
application of these cases, and it would be several years before they fully 
worked out the implications of the Supreme Court’s reasoning. 
Eventually, however, two trends emerged in the case law. First, following 
the logic of Baltimore Gas, courts increasingly came to see questions of 
risk science and questions of risk policy as inextricably intertwined, 
thereby rejecting the notion that such issues could be definitively settled 
on an objective basis. As a result, courts increasingly expressed the view 
that the interpretation of scientific evidence was inevitably a matter of 
judgment that invoked the agency’s policymaking authority, as well as its 
scientific expertise. 
The second trend was the forging of a link between agencies’ 
judgment on disputed scientific questions and the rationale of Chevron, 
which held that statutory ambiguity should normally be interpreted as a 
                                           
114 Competitive Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA, 956 F.2d 321, 323–24 
(D.C.Cir.1992); Edley (n.14), 29–30. 
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delegation of policymaking authority to the administration. Following this 
logic, some courts have treated statutory silence (hence, ambiguity) 
regarding scientific issues as an implicit delegation of authority to 
agencies to rely on policy considerations in their interpretation of 
scientific evidence. The significance of the courts’ reliance on Chevron is 
that it grounds deference to administrative science-policy judgments not 
only in the agencies’ technical expertise, but also in their putative 
democratic legitimacy. 
A prominent early case that touches on both these themes is the D.C. 
Circuit’s unanimous en banc judgment in Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. EPA.115 The case is interesting because while the court 
recognised that regulatory decisions about risk “depend to a greater 
extent upon policy judgments”, it nonetheless interpreted the Clean Air 
Act,116 to require the agency to exercise its expertise and “determine an 
acceptable risk to health”.117 The case underlines the tension at the heart 
of the Supreme Court’s case law: a recognition that science does not 
provide a politically neutral basis for decisionmaking coupled with a 
continued commitment to a Weberian conception of administration in 
which expertise is central to the legitimacy of administrative 
policymaking. What the court of appeals essentially required EPA to do 
was to make a policy judgment, but to do so on the basis of its best 
assessment of the available scientific evidence.118 The case is also 
important because it is one of the earliest examples of the court explicitly 
linking administrative evaluation of risk to the Chevron framework.119 
The D.C. Circuit further developed the application of Chevron to 
review of risk regulation in Edison Electric Institute v. EPA.120 The issue in 
                                           
115 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C.Cir.1987) (en banc). 
116 Specifically, section 112 regarding controls on hazardous air 
pollutants. 42 U.S.C. § 7412. 
117 NRDC (n.115), 1163. 
118 EPA had attempted to avoid the issue by substituting a feasibility 
analysis for risk assessment. The court ruled that approach unlawful. 
Ibid., 1164–65. 
119 Ibid. 
120 2 F.3d 438 (D.C.Cir.1993). 
218 Administrative Legitimacy and Risk Regulation 
  
that case was whether EPA had permissibly adopted a “generic 
mismanagement scenario” for determining whether wastes are 
hazardous, instead of assessing the management of each waste 
separately.121 The court held that statutory silence regarding risk 
assessment methodology should be interpreted as a delegation of 
policymaking authority and that, accordingly, EPA’s choice of 
methodology was entitled to deference.122 Because EPA’s preferred 
approach was consistent with the underlying goals of RCRA, the court 
upheld the agency’s decision. The relationship between Chevron and 
agencies’ scientific judgment was raised again in Chemical Manufacturers 
Association v. EPA.123 In that case, the court held that because the Clean 
Air Act was silent on the matter, Chevron deference extended to EPA’s 
development of an air dispersion model for estimating pollutant 
concentrations.124 In doing so, the Court stressed that the choice of 
modelling parameters was not a narrow technical issue but a question of 
policy, and that such policy judgments could not be overcome with 
technical arguments.125 Both Edison Electric and Chemical Manufacturers 
are examples of courts reviewing issues that might be regarded as largely 
scientific—how to estimate risk from hazardous waste disposal, how to 
model dispersal of an air pollutant—using the Chevron framework. In 
both cases, the court acknowledged that the determinations the agency 
was required to make were not simple matters of empirically 
determinable fact, but instead required the agency to make a judgment 
about the significance of the available evidence. The court then framed 
those judgments as matters of policy and relied on Chevron to hold that it 
must defer to such judgments. 
Since the 1980s, cases acknowledging the importance of policy 
judgment in reaching scientific conclusions have become common, and 
                                           
121 Ibid., 443. 
122 Ibid., 445. 
123 28 F.3d 1259 (D.C.Cir.1994). 
124 Ibid., 1264 (holding that Chevron requires courts to defer to agencies’ 
risk assessment methodologies if the statute “can reasonably be read to 
authorize the agency’s choice”). 
125 Ibid., 1264–65. 
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explicit discussions of the role of policy in formulating scientific 
conclusions can be found in virtually every circuit.126 In addition, courts 
have been increasingly ready to re-characterise challenges to agency 
science as challenges to agency policy choices.127 The sheer ubiquity of 
these statements suggests that the courts have rejected the 
instrumentalist premises of the classical account, and that they have 
accepted that (in many circumstances) an agency’s scientific conclusions 
will also embody policy judgments about how scientific evidence should 
be interpreted. The courts have been less consistent in linking deference 
to agency science with the Chevron framework, although many examples 
can be found.128 But even when they do not rely upon it expressly, 
Chevron’s influence can be felt throughout the case law. As several 
commentators have observed, Chevron is part of a major theoretical shift 
in American administrative law away from a technocratic theory of 
administrative legitimacy and toward a president-centred democratic 
                                           
126 That said, it is important to acknowledge that the case law is not 
perfectly uniform, and it is possible to find relatively recent examples of 
courts seeming to treat scientific conclusions as matters of objective of 
fact. E.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 671 F.3d 955 (9th.Cir.2012); Bluewater 
Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1 (D.C.Cir.2004); Dithiocarbamate Task Force v. 
EPA, 98 F.3d 1394 (D.C.Cir.1996). The existence of counter examples 
does not, however, undermine the broader point that cases treating 
issues of risk science in this manner have become rare. 
127 E.g., Mississippi v. EPA, 744 F.3d 1334, 1343 (D.C.Cir.2013). 
128 E.g., Catawba County v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20, 35 (D.C.Cir.2009); Miami-
Dade County (n.73), 1063 (linking Chevron to the approach to review 
outlined in Ethyl); American Coke and Coal Chemicals Institute v. EPA, 
452 F.3d 930, 945 (D.C.Cir.2006); BCCA Appeal Group v. EPA, 355 F.3d 
817, 841 (5th.Cir.2003); National Wildlife Federation v. EPA, 286 F.3d 
554, 560 (D.C.Cir.2002) (linking the rationales of Chevron and Baltimore 
Gas); Allied Local and Regional Manufacturers Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 
61, 70 (D.C.Cir.2000); Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 204 
F.3d 229, 234 (D.C.Cir.2000); Maier v. EPA, 114 F.3d 1032, 1043 
(10th.Cir.1997); Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C.Cir.1997); 
Schering Corp. v. FDA, 51 F.3d 390, 397–98 (3d.Cir.1995); Alliance for 
Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 930 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C.Cir.1991). 
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theory.129 When courts invoke the greater legitimacy of administrative 
agencies as policymakers, they are drawing on that trend. 
This evolution in the US case law has been accompanied by an 
important shift in US legal culture. Three decades of experience has 
made the phenomenon of administrative risk regulation familiar and, to 
that extent at least, less threatening. When the controversial cases of the 
1970s and early 1980s were decided, administrative regulation on the 
scale, and with the economic consequences, of modern risk regulation 
was new and seemed to unsettle established understandings of the 
proper role of administration. As we have seen, that anxiety animated 
many of the problematic cases of the 1970s, as well as the Supreme 
Court’s Benzene decision. Today, though specific regulatory actions are 
often controversial, the idea that they should be undertaken by 
administrative agencies is not. That increased level of comfort with 
administrative risk regulation likely results in a less sceptical attitude on 
the part of courts towards agencies’ judgments.130 At the same time, 
decades of scholarship and policy analysis, not least of all several 
important reports by the National Academy of Sciences,131 have made 
conventional the understanding that science cannot eliminate the need 
for judgment in risk regulation. Judges who accept this proposition are 
unlikely to find irrational agency action taken on that basis. Today, it is 
not unusual to find passages like this excerpt from the D.C. Circuit’s 
recent decision in Mississippi v. EPA: 
The force of Mississippi’s position . . . assumes 
only one standard . . . can be “requisite” . . . . 
But of course, this idea presupposes scientific 
certainty in an area actually governed by 
policy-driven approaches to uncertain science. 
                                           
129 Farina (n.111), 180–83; Kagan, ‘Presidential Administration’ (2001) 
114 HLR 2245, 2272–74; Strauss, ‘From Expertise to Politics: The 
Transformation of American Rulemaking’ (1996) 31 Wake.Forest.L.Rev. 
745, 766–67. 
130 Cf. Rabin (n.113), 1319–21. 
131 E.g., National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal 
Government: Managing the Process (1983); National Research Council, 
Science and Decisions: Advancing Risk Assessment (2009). 
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. . . Mississippi’s position—though perhaps an 
arguable thesis—collapses under the weight of 
reality.132 
This is a very different reality indeed than the one inhabited by earlier 
courts following the private law model. 
E. Rationality Review in the US Today 
The trend in the case law toward understanding risk regulation as 
requiring the exercise of policy judgment has caused the US courts to 
become substantially less interventionist in their review of administrative 
risk regulation. They have not, however, abandoned substantive review. 
To the contrary, US courts continue to require that agencies present 
scientific support for their risk standards and to give sustained attention 
to agencies’ technical justifications. These requirements are in accord 
with an understanding of administrative rationality that requires 
agencies’ policy judgments to be based on their assessment of the 
available evidence. In keeping with this understanding, courts continue 
to vacate risk standards on scientific grounds in three situations. 
First, courts will invalidate an agency standard if a petitioner can 
show that it is based on a demonstrably incorrect scientific conclusion. 
The classic example is Chemical Manufacturers Association v. EPA, in 
which the court vacated an EPA rule that assumed a substance behaved 
as a gas at a temperature at which that substance is solid.133 It is 
important, however, to emphasise the narrowness of the circumstances 
in which a court will overturn an agency’s scientific findings. The rule in 
Chemical Manufacturers was vacated because EPA’s assumption bore “no 
rational relationship” to the physical properties of the substance in 
question.134 In other words, there must be no room for disagreement that 
the agency was in error. It is not enough to show that there is scientific 
disagreement, or even that there is a “better” scientific view.135 When 
                                           
132 Mississippi (n.127), 1342–43. 
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scientific disagreement exists, the courts are uniform in holding that the 
agency’s position on that issue is a question of policy to which the courts 
must normally defer.136 
The second circumstance in which courts will vacate risk standards 
on scientific grounds is when the agency’s regulatory decision is 
apparently at odds with its own scientific conclusions. Although courts 
accord agencies wide discretion in reaching their scientific conclusions, 
once an agency has made scientific findings, it must accept their 
implications for its policy analysis. The bite in this requirement comes 
from the fact that agencies frequently engage in scientific analysis either 
during the early stages of rulemaking or in separate administrative 
proceedings.137 In subsequently formulating its regulatory proposals, the 
agency’s action must be consistent with those earlier scientific analyses 
or the agency must explain the reason for the inconsistency. 
A good example is American Lung Association v. EPA,138 in which the 
court remanded EPA’s rule setting air quality standards for sulphur 
dioxide. In the course of revising the standards, EPA had conducted a 
number of analyses of the health effects of sulphur dioxide in the 
ambient air. One EPA analysis concluded that between 180,000 and 
395,000 “exposure events,” in which asthmatics suffer heavy breathing 
and discomfort could be expected to occur annually under the existing 
standard.139 Nonetheless, EPA declined to tighten the standard. Without 
even considering the petitioners’ challenges to the agency’s scientific 
analysis, the court remanded because EPA had not explained how failing 
to act in the face of its own prediction of several hundred thousand 
annual exposure events was consistent with the statutory requirement 
                                           
136 Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989); 
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that standards be set at a level “requisite to protect the public interest 
with an adequate margin of safety.”140 
Similarly, in Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA,141 the court vacated 
an EPA standard under the Safe Drinking Water Act that had been based 
on the assumption that the carcinogenic risk of chloroform had no 
threshold. In a separate administrative proceeding, however, EPA had 
concluded that such a threshold exists.142 Nonetheless, EPA adhered to 
the nonthreshold assumption in its SDWA rulemaking on the grounds 
that it was longstanding EPA policy and that EPA’s Science Advisory 
Board had not yet completed its review of the threshold conclusion.143 
The court of appeals remanded the action, holding that EPA could not 
rely on scientific conclusions that the agency itself had determined were 
no longer accurate. 
Requiring consistency between an agency’s scientific conclusions and 
its policy choices can be seen as an application of State Farm’s 
requirement that agencies demonstrate “a rational connection between 
the facts found and the choice made.”144 The significance for risk 
regulation is that the “facts found” will not be facts in the sense of 
adjudicative facts, but rather complex judgments that involve both 
“factual” scientific analysis and the application of science-policy 
judgments. By holding agencies to their scientific conclusions, judicial 
review should cause agencies to consider their science-policy judgments 
carefully, knowing that they will restrict the range of possible regulatory 
outcomes. And by requiring agencies to make a connection between their 
scientific conclusions and their regulatory outcomes, courts also 
underscore that although scientific judgments often entail a large 
measure of policy choice, agencies may not make decisions without 
consideration of what scientific evidence is available. 
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The third circumstance in which a court will set aside agency action 
on the basis of scientific consideration is when agencies are inconsistent 
in their approach to scientific issues. The key recent case for this 
principle is American Farm Bureau Federation v. EPA,145 in which the DC 
Circuit partially vacated a rulemaking under the Clean Air Act because 
the agency had treated data from short-term epidemiological studies 
differently than it had in earlier rulemakings.146 The court acknowledged 
that the agency was entitled to change its approach, but only if it 
provided a cogent explanation for doing so.147 The rationale for requiring 
agencies to behave consistently over time is to guard against 
opportunistic decisionmaking.148 If agencies must provide adequate 
reasons to justify departure from past practice, it will be more difficult for 
them to act out of political expediency.149 Also, it is at least plausible that 
if agencies are required to be consistent they will tend to act with an eye 
toward long-term policy, which should promote better decisionmaking 
over time.150 Indeed, in some recent cases, it appears that the courts 
applied this principle to test for undue political influence over agency 
decisionmaking.151 
What ties all of these strands of case law together is an understanding 
of administrative agencies as unitary, expert decisionmakers. Because 
the agency is conceived of as a single mind, rational decisions must be 
consistent across all aspects of the analysis.152 Courts take apparent 
disconnects between scientific analysis and policy judgments or 
unexplained changes in agencies’ approach to science as evidence that 
the agency is not acting on the basis of its evaluation of the evidence but 
rather on the basis of some other, undisclosed, motive. The concern is 
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that the agency is serving purely political interests, “naked preferences” 
in Sunstein’s terminology,153 rather than furthering the goals of the 
statute. Pursuit of such interests is not only contrary to the principle that 
agencies must exercise power on the basis of knowledge, but also runs 
afoul of the principle that agencies only enjoy the powers delegated to 
them by Congress. Accordingly, rationality review continues to discharge 
an important function by keeping the administration within its 
constitutionally permissible role.  
F. A Coda: Massachusetts v. EPA 
The prevailing view of the US courts that issues of science and policy are 
inseparable and that administrators’ are entitled to exercise their 
judgment on both, came under strain during the George W. Bush 
administration, during which certain White House officials—relying 
broadly on the contingent and subjective nature of science—used various 
forms of influence in an effort, sometimes successful, to cause 
administrative agencies to produce scientific findings that would support 
predetermined policies. The cause célèbre, of course, is climate change, 
for which the Bush administration confidently asserted there was little 
scientific evidence, but other examples have been documented.154 
The Bush administration in some ways upturned conventional 
positions on science and policy. Whereas regulated interests have often 
tried to impose “good science” requirements in an effort to limit 
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regulatory intervention,155 environmental groups now found themselves 
advocating for an emphasis on science over politics in decisionmaking.156 
The Bush administration’s practices challenged the traditional view of 
science and policy issues at a much deeper level, however. Although US 
courts had long recognised that policy and science could not be 
separated, they had continued to insist that administrative regulation be 
based substantially on expert analysis. In this way, the scope of political 
discretion was limited to the range of options that could be justified 
scientifically. The Bush administration’s assertion that it could act 
without regard to science or, worse, that it could use political means to 
dictate scientific outcomes threatened that understanding and with it the 
theory on which the legitimacy of administrative regulation rests. 
The most high-profile case challenging the Bush administration’s 
approach to science was brought by Massachusetts against EPA’s denial 
of a rulemaking petition seeking limits on greenhouse gas emissions from 
mobile sources.157 In denying the petition, EPA had refused to decide 
whether greenhouse gases “endanger public health”.158 Instead, the 
agency declined to regulate on the grounds that it preferred other 
strategies for addressing possible climate change. At first instance, Judge 
Randolph, writing the lead opinion for the DC Circuit, held that by citing 
numerous policy reasons weighing against greenhouse gas regulation 
EPA had offered a supportable rationale for denying the petition. Notably, 
Judge Randolph’s opinion relied heavily on Ethyl.159 
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for a five justice majority, 
Justice Stevens held that EPA’s proffered reasons for declining to 
regulate were arbitrary. First, the Court held that it was incumbent upon 
the agency to make an endangerment finding. If the agency thought the 
evidence too inconclusive to justify action it was required to make a 
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finding of no endangerment and to support that finding with reference to 
the uncertainty of the evidence.160 Second, the statute limited the 
considerations EPA could take into account when deciding whether to 
regulate. In the Court’s view, EPA had to make its decision solely by 
reference to whether public health was endangered.161 The other 
considerations EPA had offered for declining to regulate, whatever their 
merit, were irrelevant and reliance on them was therefore arbitrary.162 
The Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA engaged in a more 
assertive form of judicial review than has been typical in recent cases. 
Part of the explanation for that scrutiny was the Court’s apparent, if 
implicit, scepticism that EPA was treating the scientific issues openly and 
honestly. It is also possible, however, that the Court was reasserting the 
primacy of scientific considerations over policy in setting risk standards. 
Indeed, at least two scholars have argued that the Court’s message was 
that politics needed to take a back seat to expertise in administrative 
decisionmaking.163 
The court’s opinion unquestionably sets limits on the role of policy 
considerations in this area. Most importantly, it reaffirms that only policy 
considerations germane to goals of the governing statute may be taken 
into account in administrative decisionmaking.164 In effect, it is a 
reminder that Chevron’s recognition of administrative power to elaborate 
statutory goals is not a license to rewrite legislation, no matter how 
reasonable the administration’s approach may be.165 It reaffirmed, in 
other words, that the administration is only a subordinate law maker. It 
also suggested that the integrity of the agency’s scientific findings 
matters and that courts need not always assume an agency’s conclusions 
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were reached in good faith.166 The Court did not, however, clearly 
sanction judicial second-guessing of administrative science-policy 
judgments absent some indication of undue political influence. Of course, 
the Court left to the lower courts the task of deciding what constitutes 
undue political influence and how best to ferret it out. 
All-in-all, it seems doubtful that the Massachusetts Court was 
advocating a significant retreat from the prevailing judicial understanding 
of risk regulation as requiring a large measure of policy judgment. 
Indeed, its discussion of EPA’s refusal to make an endangerment finding 
suggested that the Court understood that when science is uncertain an 
agency will have to look to policy considerations to reach the necessary 
conclusions.167 The Court’s opinion instead seems to be a reminder that 
the exercise of administrative policy discretion must also be based on the 
agency’s expert evaluation. By upholding a decision based on policy 
considerations with no grounding in scientific analysis and no discernible 
relationship to the goals of the Clean Air Act, the D.C. Circuit had tipped 
the balance too heavily in favour of indulging the agency’s policy 
preferences. The Supreme Court’s opinion should not, however, be read 
to fundamentally question the relevance or legitimacy of administrative 
policy judgment in risk regulation. Thus far, the lower courts appear to 
have interpreted the decision in this way, and recent cases do not show a 
trend away from the understanding that risk regulation demands the 
exercise of both scientific and policy judgment.168 
G. US Summary 
The story of the evolution of arbitrariness review of administrative risk 
regulation has been the story of evolving theories of administrative 
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legitimacy. When the explosion of risk regulation programmes occurred 
in the early 1970s, administrative legitimacy was theorised in highly 
instrumental terms.169 Agencies were to be Congress’s faithful servants 
and were to base their decision on a rigorous technical analysis of how 
best to achieve Congress’s ends. Although the need for administrative 
discretion was recognised, that discretion was limited to exercises of 
professional judgment.170 What is more, the overriding focus of courts 
was on the protection of individual liberty from administrative overreach, 
with little consideration given to the effectiveness of risk regulation 
programmes or the interests of regulatory beneficiaries.171 This judicial 
mind-set was doomed to failure in the era of risk regulation. Strong 
political forces, not least of all Congress itself, demanded regulatory 
action that could not be accommodated by common law categories.172 
Moreover, the context-specific nature of so many risk issues, combined 
with the need to make assessments “on the frontiers of science”, required 
administrators to elaborate regulatory policy in ways that could not be 
based solely on analysis of legislative text. The old “private law” model of 
judicial review simply could not keep pace with these developments. 
In the 1970s, courts and judges offered a number of new theories to 
reconcile the broad administrative discretion that risk regulation seemed 
to require with constitutional structure and rule of law values.173 Some of 
these, such as interest group pluralism, had a moment of prominence 
and then were discarded. The only theory that proved to have the 
necessary staying power accorded broad constitutive authority to the 
administration while grounding the legitimacy of that authority in the 
administration’s connection to the democratically elected president. A 
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theory that Justice Kagan has dubbed “Presidential Administration”.174 
The rise of Presidential Administration among the courts as the dominant 
theory of administrative legitimacy saw a concomitant decrease in the 
intensity of judicial review. The more courts conceived of risk regulation 
as demanding the exercise of policy judgment, the less they felt capable 
of second-guessing administrative decisions. Whereas commentators 
have widely decried the intrusive and meddling courts of appeals of the 
1970s, by the end of the century the question could fairly be asked 
whether the courts had become too lax. Were the rights of both regulated 
entities and regulatory beneficiaries being infringed by a politicised 
administration that made decisions first and asked questions later? 
Judicial review in the last twenty years or so has thus tried to strike a 
difficult balance between enabling the broad administrative risk 
regulation programmes the public has demanded, while maintaining rule 
of law constraints on executive power. In part, the courts have threaded 
this needle by holding to the original premises of the American 
administrative state that administrative power could be legitimate only if 
exercised on the basis of knowledge. Thus, even as they have recognised 
that policy cannot be separate from science in risk regulation, the courts 
have attempted to reinforce science’s role by requiring the administration 
to demonstrate a connection between its scientific analysis and its policy 
judgment. Whether the current approach can keep pace with the steady 
expansion of executive power remains to be seen. 
III. Rationality Review in the EU 
As in the US, judicial review of risk regulation in the EU has evolved 
significantly over time. This evolution, too, is traceable to substantial 
changes in the nature of the EU administration. Specifically, the 
evolution of EU understandings of administrative rationality is an 
outgrowth of the greatly expanded range of EU regulatory competences 
and obligations following the Single European Act and the Treaty of 
Maastricht, and the emergence of a distinct identity for the EU 
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administration. This evolution has required the EU courts to adopt 
theories of administrative rationality that balance the interests of 
individuals in fair administrative proceedings with the inevitably political 
nature of risk regulation, including the Commission’s need to be 
responsive to the concerns of Member States. Also as in the US, 
competing models of rational risk regulation can be found in the case 
law. The dominant approach, exemplified by Pfizer and its progeny, has 
strong resonances with the American public law model, though it differs 
in several particulars. A competing approach, represented by the General 
Court’s judgment in Sweden v. Commission, has parallels with the private 
law model seen in older US cases in that it focuses on the 
administration’s burden of proof. 
A. Early Case Law 
Traditionally, EU courts exercised their substantive review powers with a 
light touch, setting aside acts only if the court found a glaring error on 
the face of the measure. Proportionality review was largely limited to 
assessing whether the reasons provided showed that the measure was an 
appropriate means for achieving its stated goal.175 Proportionality strictu 
sensu was rarely addressed and review of the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting the measure was virtually non-existent.176 The Court of 
Justice justified this weak approach to review largely on the ground that 
the weighing of competing considerations, i.e., the making of “complex 
assessments”, was a political exercise unsuitable for judicial 
intervention.177 
The classic example of the traditional approach is Fedesa.178 In 
reviewing the decision to ban the use of hormones as growth promoters 
in livestock, the Court of Justice was content to accept the Council’s 
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statement that the available scientific information was conflicting and 
held that it was within the Council’s discretion to determine how best to 
respond to that information to achieve its goal of harmonising the 
internal market.179 The court never reviewed the evidence on which the 
Council’s conclusions were based, nor did it distinguish clearly between 
the objectives of protecting public health and of restoring confidence in 
the market for beef, both of which it viewed as legitimate.180 The Fedesa 
approach imposed virtually no limits on the EU Legislature’s freedom of 
assessment beyond a minimal check that the measure in question fell 
within the EU’s competence and that there was a discernible connection 
between the reasons stated and the measures taken.181 Many other 
examples of this type of review can be found in the case law.182 
Fedesa concerned measures adopted by the EU legislature (at the 
time, the Council acting on a proposal from the Commission). As such, it 
is tempting to explain the court’s deference as grounded in respect for 
legislative judgments. Cases contemporary with the Fedesa judgment, 
however, show that the Court of Justice did not at that time draw a clear 
distinction between legislative and administrative rulemaking and that 
the court was prepared to adopted a similarly deferential approach when 
reviewing administrative decisions. The clearest examples can be found 
in the cases reviewing Commission competition decisions. In cases such 
as Remia183 and British-American Tobacco,184 the court again invoked the 
rhetoric of “complex assessments” and deferred to the Commission’s 
judgments.185 These cases suggest that during this period the court was 
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just as unwilling to scrutinise administrative decisionmaking as it was to 
second-guess legislative judgments. 
Although it avoids judicial interference with the other Institutions’ 
policy choices, the Fedesa approach provides at best minimal judicial 
protection for individuals who may be adversely affected by regulatory 
measures.186 While this hands-off approach may be defensible in the 
context of broad legislative measures of general applicability, it legitimacy 
in the context of measures affecting specific individuals—in which the 
right to effective judicial protection takes on greater importance—is 
harder to justify.187 That distinction between legislative and 
individualised measures became increasingly important following 
adoption of the Single European Act, as an increasing number of EU 
regulatory programmes required the Commission to determine individual 
applicants’ right to various regulatory benefits, such as product 
authorisations or tax exemptions. 
In this new environment, the courts’ approach to judicial review came 
to be questioned, particularly from the perspective of legal traditions in 
which a strong form of judicial review is seen as essential to the rule of 
law.188 That controversy came to a head in Technische Universität 
München (TU München),189 which concerned the denial of a customs duty 
exemption on the basis of a technical evaluation of equivalence. The 
national court not only referred the question of the decision’s validity, but 
also pointedly suggested that if the decision could not be reviewed 
substantively then the legislative scheme itself might be unlawful as 
violating the right to judicial protection.190 
In his opinion, Advocate General Jacobs agreed with the national 
court that the Court of Justice’s then-standard approach to manifest 
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error was deficient.191 He denied, however, that the court had the 
capacity to engage in its own detailed review of questions in a “technical 
domain”.192 Instead, he viewed the court’s role as ensuring that the 
administration undertook a careful evaluation of the relevant technical 
issues. If the court were satisfied that the administration met the 
requisite level of care, it could limit its review to manifest error without 
undermining the right to judicial protection.193 
The court’s judgment did not embrace the entirety of the Advocate 
General’s reasoning. Most importantly, it dodged the question of the 
compatibility of its deferential approach to review with the right to 
judicial protection. It did, however, hold that when the administration 
was called upon to make “complex technical appraisals,” the competent 
Institutions would be required “to examine carefully and impartially all 
the relevant aspects of the individual case” and to respect “the right of 
the person concerned to make his views known and to have an 
adequately reasoned decision.”194 In effect, the court imposed upon the 
Commission an administrative duty of care when regulating in the field of 
risk.195 TU München thus marked an important shift in the courts’ 
approach towards greater judicial scrutiny. That scrutiny would not, 
however, be focused on the substance of the administrative decision, but 
rather on decisionmaking procedure.196 
The TU München decision had tremendous significance for the new 
generation of EU risk regulation programmes, many of which required 
the Commission to make decisions regarding the compatibility of 
individual products with broad legislative standards. Examples in the 
field of risk regulation include the Plant Protection Products Directive,197 
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the Cosmetics Directive,198 and the GMO Deliberate Release Directive,199 
among others. Thus, in cases like Angelopharm and Bergaderm, both of 
which concerned the authorisation of cosmetic products, the court took 
an approach similar to TU München (although neither judgment actually 
relied on it), and carefully reviewed the adequacy of the Commission’s 
evaluation process. In both cases, input from qualified experts was held 
to be necessary for adequate regulatory consideration.200 Indeed, in 
Angelopharm, the court went so far as to state that expert advice was 
necessary “in the nature of things”.201 These cases show the courts 
looking to science and scientific assessment as a means of disciplining 
administrative decisionmaking, as well as a mechanism for judicial 
control through imposition of procedural requirements. 
It is also notable that in these cases the courts’ focus was on 
protecting the rights of applicants from unlawful (or unwarranted) 
regulation. The introduction of an administrative duty of care and the 
recognition of the applicant’s right to be heard can thus be seen as 
related to the courts’ broader jurisprudence on the rights of defence, 
which was also undergoing substantial development at this time.202 In 
this respect, these decisions can be seen as akin to early US decisions 
following the private law model in that their focus is on ensuring that the 
administration’s reasons are adequate to justify the imposition of 
regulatory burdens on private parties. In similar fashion, these decisions 
give a great deal of attention to the adequacy of the administration’s 
evidence, suggesting that the administration bears a burden of proof 
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when regulating.203 Despite these similarities, however, the EU courts did 
not engage in anything like the intense factual review undertaken by US 
courts applying the private law model. That difference suggests that 
although they harboured similar concerns regarding the lawfulness of 
administrative regulation, the EU courts were prepared to recognise a 
role for administrative discretion in determining when scientific evidence 
was sufficient to justify regulation. 
B. The Importance of the BSE Crisis 
Had circumstances been different, EU judicial review of risk assessment 
might have remained focused on the protection of regulated entities, with 
the corresponding implications for administrative rationality. History 
intervened, however, in the form of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy. 
BSE was a crisis not only for public health, but also for public confidence 
in EU regulation, which in turn threatened commitment to the single 
market.204 In the wake of such a significant regulatory failure, the EU’s 
entire approach to risk regulation had to be reassessed. For its part, the 
Commission issued a series of communications and policy papers vowing 
to increase the rigour and transparency of EU regulation and to improve 
the quality of the scientific advice on which it relied.205 The courts, too, 
would have to respond to the changed circumstances brought about by 
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the BSE crisis. In particular, they would have to address how, if at all, 
administrative law would contribute to ensuring that the EU 
administration would meet its responsibility to protect public health.206 
When BSE finally reached the courts, the Court of Justice seemed to 
revert to the Fedesa approach. In the BSE Cases,207 the court’s focus 
palpably shifted away from safeguarding the rights of regulated entities 
and toward affirming that the EU Institutions possessed sufficient 
discretion to deal with public health problems as they arose. In contrast 
to cases like Bergaderm, which had reviewed the Commission’s scientific 
analysis in some detail, the court only briefly addressed the evidence on 
which the measures were based.208 For the court, it was sufficient that 
there was some evidence of serious health risks. Its analysis instead 
focused on the importance of policy considerations—and of the regulatory 
objectives to be achieved (i.e., the protection of public health)—in 
assessing the lawfulness of measures taken in response to concerns 
about safety.209 The court’s language suggests that it was not simply 
deferring to the Commission’s scientific analysis, but that, in light of the 
undisputed potential seriousness of the threat, further scientific analysis 
was largely beside the point.210 Additionally, as in Fedesa, the court 
upheld the Commission’s reliance on a mix of concerns regarding risk to 
consumer health and the need to restore consumer confidence in the 
market, thus reinforcing the characterisation of the regulatory problem 
as one of agricultural policy, rather than scientific risk evaluation.211 
This approach to review is similar to the public law line of cases in the 
US and, indeed, both the Advocate General’s opinion and the Court of 
Justice’s judgments have strong resonances with the DC Circuit’s 
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decision in Ethyl. The focus is on whether the Commission is regulating 
appropriately to protect public health. Although the interests of regulated 
entities are not irrelevant, protection of those interests must give way to 
the interests of the public at large. Striking the appropriate balance is a 
question of regulatory policy for the Commission. Although rational 
administrative decisionmaking must have due regard for the available 
facts, rationality vel non is determined by the reasonableness of the 
Commission’s policy analysis and not by the quality of its scientific 
reasoning. The court’s role is to confirm that the Commission’s decision 
conforms to its regulatory mandate and that is consistent with the 
regulatory policies enshrined in the Treaties and the General Principles, 
including the principle that the EU must pursue a high level of 
protection.212 
The BSE Cases were also notable for their reliance on the logic of the 
precautionary principle, even if the principle itself was not named. In its 
judgment, the court recognised that “[a]t the time when the contested 
decision was adopted, there was great uncertainty as to the risks 
posed”.213 That uncertainty did not, however, vitiate the lawfulness of the 
measures: “Where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of 
risks to human health, the institutions may take protective measures 
without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks 
become fully apparent”.214 By reaffirming that scientific uncertainty is no 
bar to regulation, the court seemed to expand the scope of the 
Institutions’ policy discretion while simultaneously limiting the role of 
judicial review.215 It also repudiated an approach to judicial review 
structured in terms of burdens of proof in favour of a more context-
sensitive approach to administrative rationality. 
The BSE Cases were, in part, a product of their circumstances, and 
the court’s lack of attention to the rule of law concerns raised in TU 
München is understandable in light of the dramatic context. It was 
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inevitable, however, that in less politically charged circumstances the 
tension between the need for judicial control and the discretion-
enhancing effects of the precautionary principle would resurface. The 
legal problem for the courts was to find a means of extending adequate 
judicial control over administrative decisionmaking without undermining 
the flexibility introduced by the precautionary principle. The General 
Court would finally confront these challenges in its landmark judgments 
in Pfizer and Alpharma. 
C. Pfizer and Its Aftermath 
Pfizer and Alpharma216 both concerned challenges to the validity of 
directives withdrawing authorisation for the use of certain antibiotics as 
feed additives. These directives had been adopted by the Council under 
authority delegated by an earlier directive (following the failure of the 
comitology committee to adopt an opinion).217 The scientific evidence 
relied on by the Commission was admittedly thin. Although there was 
some evidence that the use of antibiotics as growth promoters could 
promote antibiotic resistance in humans, that evidence was far from 
conclusive and the relevant expert committee issued an opinion finding 
no immediate need for action.218 Nonetheless, concerned about the 
potentially grave threat to health, the Council pressed ahead with a ban. 
In mounting its challenge, Pfizer relied heavily on cases like Angelopharm 
and Bergaderm, as well as the courts’ Article 30 jurisprudence, which 
emphasised the importance of scientific analysis and the protection of 
individuals from unjustified regulatory burdens. The Council, 
unsurprisingly, focused on the holdings in Fedesa and the BSE cases, 
which had upheld broad discretion to address potential threats to public 
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health. The court was thus required to re-assess the boundaries of the 
domain of risk regulation, as well as to consider what qualified as a 
rational administrative decision within those bounds, particularly in light 
of the precautionary principle. 
1. Does Pfizer impose a burden of proof? 
Pfizer argued, in effect, that the courts’ case law imposed on the 
Commission a burden of proof. While it did not go so far as to demand 
scientific certainty, it argued that withdrawal of the authorisation could 
only be lawful if the administration could “demonstrate that . . . the use 
of the additive in question is a hazard to human health and to show the 
level of risk associated with it.”219 The court’s response to this argument 
was ambiguous. Although it made clear that certainty would not be 
required—which would be inconsistent with the precautionary principle—
it also suggested that regulatory measures needed “to be adequately 
backed up by the scientific data available at the time”.220 Perhaps more 
importantly, the court prohibited regulatory measures based solely on “a 
purely hypothetical approach to the risk, founded on mere conjecture 
which has not been scientifically verified”.221 Interpretation of the no 
hypothetical risk rule has proved to be difficult and controversial. The 
court’s phrasing could be interpreted as creating a burden of proof, 
requiring the administration to produce a certain type and quantum of 
evidence as a precondition for taking regulatory measures.222 Other 
cases, such as Solvay Pharmaceuticals,223 which focus on whether the 
administration has produced “solid evidence” of risk, seem to support the 
burden of proof interpretation, as do some of the courts’ 
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contemporaneous Article 36 (ex Article 30) TFEU cases, such as 
Commission v. Netherlands.224 
Subsequent judgments cast doubt on the burden of proof 
interpretation, however. First, if the rule imposes a burden of proof, the 
hurdle is exceedingly low.225 In Pfizer itself, it appeared that a risk would 
not be deemed hypothetical if the administration could produce any 
plausible scientific basis to support a concern, even if there were also 
substantial evidence suggesting the absence of risk.226 Subsequent cases 
have also clarified that empirical evidence is not necessary to support 
risk concerns; a grounding in scientific theory is enough.227 Finally, later 
cases have upheld regulatory measures based on an absence of evidence 
of safety, rather than a positive showing of risk. In the context of plant 
protection products, for example, the courts have upheld a positive 
authorisation procedure that forbids the Commission from granting 
authorisation unless the applicant can produce sufficient evidence to 
show that an active substance does not pose specified risks.228 
These cases suggest that the no hypothetical risk rule is better 
understood not as a burden of proof, but as a limitation on the types of 
reasons on which the administration may rely. Specifically, the no 
hypothetical risk rule requires the administration to justify regulatory 
measures on the basis of specifically identified concerns that are at least 
theoretically capable of scientific verification. In this way, the no 
hypothetical risk rule reinforces the courts’ framing of risk in terms of 
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scientifically backed concerns regarding health or the environment.229 
Thus interpreted, the primary role of the no hypothetical risk rule is to 
define the framing of rational decisionmaking on risk. It does not, 
however, address the further question of the kind of reasoning that must 
link the identification of a scientifically backed concern and the decision 
on whether and how to regulate. 
2. Pfizer’s reconciliation of scientific and 
political judgment 
Like TU München, Pfizer addressed review of administrative risk 
regulation largely through the lens of procedure. Fundamental to the 
court’s analysis was its acceptance of the separation of risk assessment 
from risk management along the lines described by the Commission in its 
Communication on the Precautionary Principle.230 As formulated by the 
Commission, risk assessment is an analytical scientific process that 
must be committed to experts and insulated from political influence. Risk 
management, by contrast, is a decisionmaking process for which political 
methods are appropriate.231 In this way, the court was able to address 
the technical and policy aspects of risk regulation separately and to 
require the administration to apply distinct modes of reasoning to each. 
The court discussed risk assessment in terms of building an 
information base for decisionmaking on risk management. Before 
regulating, the Institutions must first undertake “as thorough a scientific 
risk assessment as possible”.232 Absent “exceptional circumstances”,233 
the Institutions must entrust the risk assessment to experts, whose work 
must be undertaken on the basis of “excellence, independence, and 
transparency”.234 The Institutions are not bound by the experts’ opinion, 
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but if they depart from it, they must provide reasons for doing so, which 
“must be of a scientific level at least commensurate with that of the 
opinion in question”.235 Although it addressed risk assessment largely as 
an objective inquiry, the court was careful to add that when “a 
Community authority is required to make complex assessments in the 
performance of its duties, its discretion also applies, to some extent, to 
the establishment of the factual basis of its action.”236 In formulating 
these requirements, the court relied heavily on the TU München judgment 
and the administrative duty of due care.237 
By contrast to its focus on the need for expert evaluation in risk 
assessment, the court was absolutely clear that it viewed risk 
management—and by extension the ultimate regulatory outcome—as 
primarily a question of politics.238 Risk management is informed by risk 
assessment, but is not controlled by it. Importantly, decisionmaking on 
risk management is not limited to scientific concerns, but extends to the 
full range of issues that affect public acceptability of risk, as well as 
practical considerations that inform the choice among various potential 
regulatory measures.239 Because questions of risk management are 
ultimately political, they must be decided by politically legitimate means. 
As such, they may not be delegated to expert bodies, but must be 
undertaken by institutions with political responsibilities.240 Furthermore, 
the courts may not second-guess the substance of those decisions but 
must confine their review to assuring that the chosen measures fall 
within the scope of the decisionmaker’s authority and are not vitiated by 
manifest error.241 
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Pfizer thus suggests that rational risk regulation calls for two separate 
modes of reasoning. Scientific reasoning is applied to risk assessment, 
which is understood as an empirical and analytical exercise that informs 
regulatory decisionmaking.242 The final regulatory decision, by contrast, 
is framed as a question of policy, which the Commission not only may, 
but must, decide through the application of political (including 
normative) reasoning.243 By its nature, such political reasoning is 
susceptible of only limited judicial review.244 Instead of reviewing the 
administration’s risk management choices directly, the court attempts to 
bolster their legitimacy by ensuring that they are taken “in full knowledge 
of the facts”,245 rather than on the basis of misinformation or 
prejudgment.246 The requirement of a risk assessment may be seen as a 
logical outgrowth of TU München, in that the legal determination of 
whether a measure is arbitrary depends not on the substance of the 
decision but on the thoroughness of the administration’s consideration of 
the problem. In this way, the right to judicial protection from arbitrary 
administrative decisionmaking is upheld while minimising the need for 
the court to arbitrate the weighing of competing concerns.247 
Passages in the Pfizer opinion suggest that the court also saw risk 
assessment as reinforcing the legitimacy of political decisionmaking in a 
subtler way, by reinforcing political accountability. In this regard, the 
court required not only that the administration complete a risk 
assessment, but also that the assessment be independent and 
transparent.248 Independence requires that the risk assessment be 
conducted without regard to political considerations, so that the risk 
assessment does not end up being nothing more than a post-hoc 
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justification.249 And, when coupled with transparency, independence 
reinforces political accountability.250 A risk assessment that is prepared 
independently of the political decisionmaking process provides a 
benchmark against which the public can evaluate the administration’s 
risk management choices. It also provides courts with a basis for review. 
For risk assessment to fulfil that role, it is not necessary to assume 
scientific analysis is objective in some neutral sense; it is sufficient that it 
provides an analysis of the problem that is not wholly dependent on 
political preferences, so the significance of the Commission’s policy 
choices is made more apparent. The Commission itself has suggest that 
independence and transparency of risk assessment can contribute to 
accountability in these ways.251 The viability of this solution, however, 
depends on the framing of risk in terms of scientifically backed concerns. 
If risk regulation were not limited to such concerns, the ability of the risk 
assessment to act as a sufficient procedural constraint on administrative 
decisionmaking would be undermined. Similarly, it would become 
difficult to argue that the courts’ procedural approach adequately 
implements the right to judicial protection. 
Pfizer represents an effort by the EU courts to reconcile an essentially 
public law vision of administrative risk regulation—in which rational 
decisionmaking depends on the administration’s ability to link its 
evaluation of the evidence to public-regarding regulatory goals—with the 
protection of individual rights, including the right to judicial protection. It 
affirms the centrality of scientifically backed concerns, but at the same 
time it seems to open up decisionmaking to nonscience reasons. It aims 
to protect regulated entities by insisting on a thorough and impartial 
investigation of the relevant facts, but it does not carve out a regulatory 
no-go area by imposing a rigid burden of proof. The central insight of 
Pfizer is the recognition that scientific and political legitimacy are not 
independent values, but that scientific legitimacy can buttress political 
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legitimacy, both by guarding against the excesses of politics and by 
enhancing the accountability of political actors. 
The General Court’s approach to rationality review in Pfizer was 
echoed by the Court of Justice in its judgment in Gowan,252 in which the 
applicant challenged restrictions on the use of the active substance 
fenarimol imposed by the Commission as part of its reauthorisation 
under the Plant Protection Products Directive. During the authorisation 
procedure, the rapporteur Member State, upon completing the risk 
assessment, recommended reauthorisation without restrictions and that 
recommendation had been confirmed by the Evaluation Working Group 
of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health. 
Initially, the Commission had accepted that recommendation, but after 
hearing concerns from several Member States regarding fenarimol’s 
possible endocrine disrupting properties and seeking additional advice 
from the Scientific Committee on Plants, the Commission proposed a 
more restricted authorisation for a shorter time period. When the 
comitology committee failed to deliver an opinion on that proposal, the 
Commission re-evaluated its position and proposed a much more limited 
authorisation to the Council. After the Council failed to act, the 
Commission adopted its revised proposal.253 
The Court of Justice’s opinion was much more cursory than the 
General Court’s in Pfizer and for that reason is open to competing 
interpretations. On one hand, it can be seen as a retreat from Pfizer in 
that the Court of Justice seemed less willing than the General Court to 
examine closely the procedure that had yielded the risk assessment.254 
On the other, several aspects of the judgment are consistent with the 
General Court’s decision. First, the Court of Justice relied on TU 
München as the basis for its analysis.255 In doing so, it reinforced the link 
between administrative rationality and the administrative duty of care. 
Second, the Gowan court reaffirmed the regulatory measures could not 
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be based on “purely hypothetical considerations”, but it did not treat that 
prohibition as imposing a burden of proof.256 For the court, it was 
sufficient that certain Member States had put forward scientific evidence 
suggesting a possible concern.257 Finally, the court reaffirmed that the 
scope of the necessary risk management measures is a question for 
political resolution. The risk assessment was only a starting point. How 
the Commission responded to that assessment, in conjunction with the 
Member States through comitology, was a matter of policy judgment, the 
legality of which “can be affected only if the measure is manifestly 
inappropriate”.258 
Gowan is also important because it shows that in the EU, 
administrative risk regulation is not just a political choice, but also a 
negotiated one. Initially, the Commission was prepared to propose and 
unrestricted authorisation. It was only through the comitology process 
that the Commission’s position evolved as it sought to secure a qualified 
majority.259 The court shows itself entirely comfortable with that 
evolution, indicating that it does not understand administrative 
rationality in purely instrumental terms, but rather as (at least partially) 
a constitutive process. In other words, rational administrative 
decisionmaking must be able to account for the process of negotiating a 
European position out of potentially divergent views of various actors in 
the regulatory process. One consequence of the negotiated character of 
EU decisionmaking is that administrative rationality does not (cannot) 
require the Commission to demonstrate that its decision is a logical 
outgrowth of the risk assessment, but merely that the risk assessment 
was completed and considered in the decisionmaking process. That 
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understanding of the relationship between the risk assessment and the 
regulatory decision marks an important contrast to the US approach to 
administrative rationality, in which the administration, conceived as a 
unitary actor, is required to show consistency across all aspects of the 
decisionmaking process. 
Another important recent case in the Pfizer mould is France v. 
Commission,260 which concerned a challenge to a Commission regulation 
relaxing certain safeguards concerning transmissible spongiform 
encephalopathies (TSEs). The case is important because it shows both 
the General Court and the Court of Justice applying the Pfizer framework 
in a case in which the applicant, a Member State, argued that the 
Commission’s decision was insufficiently protective of public health. In 
this case, France argued that the Commission violated the precautionary 
principle by relaxing the safeguards despite opinions from EFSA and a 
French expert body concluding that doing so would increase the risk of 
transmission of TSEs to humans.261 
In upholding the Commission’s decision, the General Court focused 
on the fact that the Commission was aware of the expert opinions as well 
as of the uncertainties regarding the risk assessment.262 Having 
demonstrated that it possessed “full knowledge of the facts”, it was up to 
the Commission to make a political determination regarding the level of 
risk acceptable to society, giving due regard to the Treaties’ mandate that 
the EU pursue a high level of protection.263 The fact that the expert 
evaluation indicated that the measure could increase risk was not 
dispositive.264 Addressing the substance of the Commission’s risk 
management decision, the court found that France had not shown the 
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Commission’s evaluation of the risk’s acceptability was unreasonable, 
and thus it had to be upheld.265 
France v. Commission reinforces the conclusion that the role of 
scientific analysis in the EU courts’ model of administrative rationality is 
essentially procedural and focused on the compilation of an adequate 
information base for political decisionmaking. By undertaking a risk 
assessment and examining the evidence submitted by France, the 
Commission discharged its obligation to consider the scientific issues. 
Absent a showing that its scientific conclusions were implausible, the 
Commission was entitled to act on the basis of that evaluation, and its 
decision could be subject to only highly circumscribed review by the 
court. As discussed in the next section, however, this model is not the 
only one to be found in the EU courts’ case law. 
D. An Alternative Approach: Sweden v. Commission 
Although Pfizer has come to dominate judicial review of EU risk 
regulation, it has not fully settled doctrine in this area. In Sweden v. 
Commission,266 the General Court annulled the Commission’s 
authorisation of the active substance paraquat under the Plant 
Protection Products Directive,267 relying in part on its own evaluation of 
the scientific evidence. The approach taken in Sweden relies on a 
different model of administrative rationality from the one advanced in 
Pfizer with regard to both the role of science in administrative rationality 
and the place of the Commission in the overall regulatory process. 
Sweden challenged the Commission’s authorisation of paraquat on 
both procedural and substantive grounds. On the procedural claims, the 
court ruled, in essence, that the authorisation had to be annulled 
because the scientific committee had failed to document its evaluation of 
all of the relevant issues.268 That ruling was fully consistent with 
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Pfizer.269 If anything, by focusing on the transparency of the 
Commission’s analysis, this aspect of the judgement reinforces the idea 
that a central purpose of risk assessment is to enhance the 
administration’s accountability, rather than to dictate outcomes. 
In its substantive challenge, Sweden argued that the authorisation of 
paraquat was contrary to the principle of integration, the principle of a 
high level of protection, and the precautionary principle.270 Sweden’s 
argument was not merely that the Commission had breached these 
principles by giving inadequate consideration to potential safety 
concerns, but rather that the existence of evidence indicating possible 
adverse effects required the Commission—as a matter of law—to deny the 
authorisation. Specifically, Sweden argued that, under the terms of 
Directive 91/414, as interpreted in light of the precautionary principle, 
the Commission could not authorise a substance unless “it has been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a product containing that active 
substance can be used with complete safety in at least one representative 
type of use.”271 In Sweden’s view, the existence of studies showing 
adverse effects from paraquat exposure meant that the Commission 
could not meet that standard. 
The court largely accepted Sweden’s argument. First, it construed 
Directive 91/414 to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that use of 
a substance will cause no harm to health or the environment.272 Rather 
than expanding the administration’s discretion in matters of risk 
regulation, the Sweden court applied the principle as a restraint, all but 
eliminating the Commission’s flexibility “to determine the level of 
protection which [it] deem[s] appropriate for society.”273 The most 
interesting aspect of the Sweden judgment, however, is not its 
interpretation of the directive, but that the court went on to evaluate the 
available evidence and to determine—with little apparent regard for the 
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Commission’s (or the comitology committee’s) views—whether that 
standard was met. Relying on its own reading of a single study,274 the 
court explicitly rejected the scientific committee’s weight of evidence 
evaluation and instead determined that the study constituted “solid 
evidence which may reasonably raise doubts as to the safety of paraquat 
for operators” and on that basis held that the authorisation violated the 
directive.275 In a subsequent section of the judgment, the court engaged 
in a similar evaluation of the evidence with respect to ecological risks.276 
The Sweden court’s evaluation of the evidence marks a substantial 
departure from the Pfizer approach. Rather than evaluating whether the 
administration had undertaken an adequate scientific evaluation, the 
court evaluated whether the Commission had met a judicially determined 
burden of proof. In effect, the court treated the risk assessment as a 
question of basic fact rather than as a complex evaluative judgment. 
Nowhere to be found in the Sweden judgment is the principle, central to 
the Pfizer approach, that when “a Community authority is required to 
make complex assessments in the performance of its duties, its 
discretion also applies, to some extent, to the establishment of the factual 
basis of its action.”277 Yet the Sweden judgment seems to assume that 
such determinations can be made unproblematically by the court on the 
basis of its review of the submitted studies. What is more, the Sweden 
court effectively transformed the question of the appropriate level of 
protection into a question of law for judicial resolution. 
The judgment in Sweden thus demonstrates an understanding of the 
administration’s role in risk regulation very different from Pfizer’s. 
Instead of a process of political decisionmaking about the implications of 
scientific evidence, the Sweden court seemed to view the administration’s 
task as a largely mechanical one of verifying whether a substance meets 
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legally prescribed criteria. In this approach to risk regulation, scientific 
evidence is the overriding basis for administrative decisionmaking. There 
is little need for discretionary evaluation and, consequently, a much 
larger role for the court in determining risk acceptability through its 
interpretation of legislative thresholds and application of the 
precautionary principle. The Sweden approach can be seen as essentially 
the inverse of the private law model in the US. Like the private law model, 
administrative rationality is structured in terms of burdens of proof, and 
the lawfulness of the administration’s regulatory decision depends 
primarily on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting it. It is the inverse 
of the private law model because rather than using these burdens to 
protect the interests of regulated entities, the Sweden court applied them 
to prohibit the Commission from authorising a potentially risk product. 
Although some might approve of this use of burdens of proof, inasmuch 
as it would seem to promote greater protection of public health, there is 
also good reason to be cautious. As we saw in chapter 1, judgments 
about risk are inherently contextual, and it will often be impossible to 
capture that complexity in terms of a burden of proof. Were the Sweden 
approach to become dominant, it could greatly impoverish EU discourse 
on risk regulation and exacerbate conflicts among the various 
stakeholders. The result might be greater regulatory controls on 
potentially risky technologies, but it is far from clear that it would foster 
greater functional legitimacy of EU risk regulation. 
E. EU Summary 
The foregoing analysis has illustrated the relationship between the EU 
courts’ jurisprudence on risk and their understanding of the role of the 
administration within the EU’s institutional structure. Stepping back 
from the facts of the cases, it becomes possible to draw connections 
between the EU courts’ evolving conceptions of rational risk regulation 
and concerns about the constitutional legitimacy of administrative power. 
Recognising these connections helps to clarify the bases for the 
competing models of administrative rationality and judicial review found 
in the case law. 
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The first observation to make is that the EU courts have begun to 
treat legislation and administrative standard setting differently, and to 
apply greater scrutiny to the latter. This heightened scrutiny is rooted, in 
part, in the courts’ understanding of the administration as a subordinate 
policymaker.278 Additionally, the increasingly individualised nature of 
much EU risk regulation, exemplified in the granting or withholding of 
authorisations for particular products, has led to the imposition of 
procedural obligations to protect the fairness of proceedings. Judicial 
control of these procedures is linked to the right to judicial protection, 
which is recognised as a general principle of EU law.279 The resort to 
procedure appears to be motivated by a desire to vindicate rule of law 
values while maintaining a large measure of flexibility for administrative 
decisionmaking. The effect is to create a distinctively administrative 
process of regulatory decisionmaking on risk. 
Less clear is the extent to which the courts are prepared to endorse a 
role for the EU administration in making policy judgments on risk. In the 
dominant approach represented by Pfizer, risk regulation is understood 
as an inherently policy-laden process. Although the identification, and to 
some extent the characterisation, of the risk depends on science, the 
content of the regulatory response is understood primarily as a question 
of policy.280 On this view, the administration is a legitimate, albeit 
subordinate, policymaker, and the legality of administrative risk 
regulation is grounded in a combination of political authority and 
procedural mandates meant to ensure that the Commission’s discretion 
is exercised in an informed manner.281 
In the Pfizer approach, science contributes to the legitimacy of risk 
regulation in two ways. First, it attempts to promote high quality 
decisionmaking by ensuring that the Commission exercises its discretion 
on the basis of adequate information. This aspect of Pfizer is directed 
                                           
278 Case C-343/09, Afton Chemical Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Transport 
[2010] ECR I-7027, Opinion of A.G. Kokott, paras. 66–67. 
279 TU München (n.189), para. 14; Tridimas, The General Principles of EU 
Law (2d ed., OUP 2006) 6. 
280 Pfizer (n.27), paras. 288, 443. 
281 Ibid., para. 201. 
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both at the substantive quality of the decision and at the fairness of the 
administrative proceeding vis-à-vis the individual affected.282 Second, 
science enhances the administration’s accountability by providing a 
reference against which the administration’s decisions may be judged.283 
To a limited extent, this accountability takes place in the courts, but 
other fora, such as the Parliament, the Council, and national 
parliaments—as well as the public at large—are likely to be more 
important.284 On the whole, science plays an integral, but fairly weak, 
role in legitimating risk regulation. The role of law as a source of 
legitimation is also weak in the Pfizer approach. Because the regulatory 
decision is understood as a political choice, the room for judicial review of 
the substance of the decision is narrow. The court’s role is confined to 
policing the bounds of delegations, enforcing procedures, and protecting 
specific rights. In this way, judicial review ensures compliance of 
administrative risk regulation with the rule of law,285 but it does not 
provide a robust basis for the regulation’s functional legitimacy. The 
administration may, for example, comply with the letter of the courts’ 
procedural prescriptions while ignoring their spirit, with only a small 
chance of being rumbled by a reviewing court.286 
The legitimacy of risk regulation in the Pfizer model must therefore 
rest primarily on the Commission’s exercise of its policy judgment. It is at 
this point that the Pfizer approach is least satisfying because the sources 
of the EU administration’s democratic legitimacy are weak.287 The Pfizer 
                                           
282 Ibid., paras. 171–72; see also TU München (n.189), para. 14. 
283 Pfizer (n.27), paras. 203–04. 
284 On the role of fora in holding actors to account, see Bovens, ‘Analysing 
and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework’ (2007) 13 ELJ 
447, 450–52. 
285 TU München (n.189), Opinion of A.G. Jacobs, paras. 13–16. 
286 Hilson (n.16), 332. 
287 A separate, but equally important question, is the extent to which the 
Commission is prepared to exercise its political judgment. See Weimer 
and Pisani, ‘Expertise as Justification—The Contested Legitimation of the 
EU “Risk Administration”’ in Weimer and de Ruijter (eds.), Regulating 
Risks in the European Union—The Co-production of Expert and Executive 
Power (Hart 2016) (forthcoming). 
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court relied primarily on the legitimacy the Commission derives from 
oversight by the Parliament288 and, to a lesser extent, oversight through 
the comitology process.289 Though both of those sources are real, neither 
is overwhelming, and the political legitimacy of the Commission remains 
very much contestable. In any event, the court does not question the 
reality of the Commission’s legitimacy (perhaps it feels itself 
constitutionally barred from doing so). In stark contrast to their 
treatment of the scientific aspects of risk regulation, the courts have not 
attempted to bolster the Commission’s political legitimacy through 
procedural requirements or other means.290 Of course, the nature of 
political legitimacy is itself open to dispute, and it need not be limited to 
a majoritarian form of democratic legitimacy.291 For example, the 
Commission might also derive a measure of legitimacy from its own 
constitutional role as guardian of the Union interest.292 The court never 
discusses these questions, however. 
Sweden adopts a much narrower vision of the administration’s role in 
risk regulation. In this approach, the administration is merely a tool of 
the legislature, tasked with collecting and evaluating the scientific 
evidence. It is accorded little, if any, role in formulating the regulatory 
                                           
288 Pfizer (n.27), para. 201. 
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290 Scott and Vos, ‘The Juridification of Uncertainty: Observations on the 
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response to that evidence, in particular with regard to judgments about 
the acceptability of risk. In Sweden, there is no explicit discussion of 
political legitimacy, but by relying on the directive to define risk 
acceptability, the Sweden judgment implicitly locates political legitimacy 
in the legislative, not the administrative, process. As in Pfizer, the reality 
of that legitimacy is not considered. Instead of viewing risk regulation as 
a complex, contextual judgment, Sweden seems to view the process as 
the straightforward application of facts to a fixed legal standard. The 
primary source of regulatory legitimacy thus becomes neither science nor 
politics, but law. As such, like the private law model in the US, it tends to 
increase the role of the courts setting risk policy. 
The case law of the EU courts shows them grappling with the same 
problems as their American counterparts in their effort to define what it 
means for administrators to make rational decisions about risk. The EU 
courts’ approach to these issues has also changed over time in response 
to the growth and changing institutional structure of EU risk regulation. 
Although the Pfizer approach has become the dominant approach to 
these questions, cases like Sweden suggest that jurisprudence in this 
area may not yet be fully settled, and quiescence may have to await a 
broadly accepted and explicit theory of the democratic legitimacy of EU 
administration. 
IV. Comparing Rational Risk Regulation in the 
US and the EU 
The foregoing analysis shows courts in both jurisdictions grappling with 
the problem of reconciling the need for administrators to make highly 
technical and politically laden administrative judgments with rule of law 
values, particularly judicial control of bureaucracy. Though the basic 
problems are the same—how to account for both the scientific and policy 
aspects of risk regulation and how to reconcile the exercise of 
bureaucratic power with liberal democracy—the solutions developed by 
the US and EU courts differ in important ways. Those differences reflect 
the history and institutional characteristics of the two administrations. 
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Before considering the differences, however, it is important to stress 
the substantial similarities. Foremost, the common framing of risk 
regulation in terms of safety means that courts in both jurisdictions 
understand the regulatory problem in essentially the same way. In 
particular, by limiting administrators to acting on the basis of 
scientifically backed concerns, both jurisdictions require the 
administration to incorporate scientific evidence into regulatory 
decisionmaking, and in both jurisdictions the demand for scientific 
reasons fundamentally shapes what it means for an administrative 
decision to be rational.293 Courts in both jurisdictions also acknowledge, 
however, that science is always uncertain and that the appropriate 
regulatory response is a normative, not an empirical, question.294 
Accordingly, both recognise that science alone is an insufficient base for 
decisionmaking and that regulatory decisions inevitably depend on 
administrators’ policy choices. The result of this shared understanding of 
administrative risk regulation is that while both jurisdictions demand 
that the administration demonstrate careful consideration of relative 
scientific evidence, their approaches to administrative rationality are 
shaped more by their understanding of the appropriate scope of 
administrative policymaking than by concerns for scientific analysis. As a 
result, the jurisdictions’ different models of administrative rationality 
reflect different understandings of the administration’s institutional role 
within the broader constitutional framework. They are, at bottom, 
traceable to different theories of how the exercise of bureaucratic power 
can be rendered constitutionally and democratically legitimate. 
Although the idea that expertise is a sufficient basis for administrative 
legitimacy has long since been consigned to history, the US courts 
remain faithful to the Weberian premise that bureaucratic power, to be 
legitimate, must be exercised on the basis of knowledge.295 The ideal US 
administrator is therefore a subject matter expert, and the courts require 
her to demonstrate that she exercised her judgment on the basis of her 
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expertise.296 At the same time, contemporary US administrative law sees 
administrators as democratically legitimate decisionmakers, who are 
directly accountable to the electorate through their responsibility to the 
president and indirectly through their oversight by Congress.297 Because 
US courts understand administrators to possess both these qualities and 
because they view questions of science and policy judgment as essentially 
inseparable in the setting of risk standards, the case law often does not 
make a clear distinction between questions of science and questions of 
policy. As a result, the hallmark of administrative rationality in US 
administrative law is consistency of reasoning, including consistency 
between scientific findings and policy judgments. 
The requirement that US agency’s risk decisions be consistent with 
their scientific conclusions makes science a more important constraint 
on administrative decisionmaking than it is in the EU. The important 
thing to note, however, is that the source of constraint is the agency’s 
scientific conclusions, rather than science in the abstract.298 Because US 
doctrine allows agencies to take policy considerations into account when 
making scientific judgments, agencies are being constrained by their 
earlier science-policy decisions, not by some ostensibly value-free body of 
scientific knowledge. The focus on the agency’s own scientific conclusions 
does not exclude the possibility that a court will set aside an agency’s 
action on the basis of scientific error, but examples of courts acting on 
that basis are rare. Since the reformation of the early 1980s, the trend in 
the case law has been toward greater emphasis on the policy dimension 
of risk regulation. The administration’s legitimate policymaking authority 
is not of a plenary, legislative kind, however. Whereas Congress may act 
on the basis of will alone, administrators must act on the basis of 
reason.299 Distinguishing between reasoned policy judgments and lightly 
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clothed, but otherwise naked, preferences continues to be a challenge for 
the courts, however. 
The EU courts, by contrast, have established a model that separates 
scientific analysis from policy judgment. The model EU administrator is a 
policymaker, not a technocrat, a characterisation that emphasises the 
essentially political nature of risk regulation. As in the US, however, the 
EU administration does not enjoy the same freedom to set policy as the 
legislature. Although it is accorded great discretion, the EU 
administration is under a legal obligation—derived from the amorphous 
but constitutionally important EU concept of good administration300—to 
exercise its discretion responsibly. Discharge of that responsibility 
requires administrators to undertake an adequate investigation of the 
facts relevant to the decision at hand and to treat all affected interests 
fairly.301 In this model, administrative policymakers are required to 
consult scientific experts, but they remain free to disagree with their 
conclusions as long as they are able to provide reasons for doing so. 
Because the courts do not require a close connection between the results 
of the scientific evaluation and the substance of the regulatory decision, 
administrative rationality in the EU is defined mainly in terms of 
process.302 Science can therefore be seen as a weaker source of 
legitimation for administrative decisionmaking in the EU than it is in the 
US. The authority of the administrative decisionmaker is not derived from 
its qualification as an expert (real or fictional), but instead derives from 
its status as the constitutionally appropriate decisionmaker. 
Although science plays only a supporting role in the EU courts’ theory 
of administrative legitimacy, it is nonetheless essential for three reasons. 
First, it ensures that the Commission’s political decision is made by 
reference to an adequate information base. This aspect of the EU model 
of rationality promotes the quality of risk decisions. Second, it provides a 
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means for judicial control of administrative decisionmaking and a degree 
of procedural protection for affected interests. This use of science 
promotes ideas of procedural fairness. Finally, science provides one 
benchmark (though, it should be emphasised, not the only benchmark) 
for evaluating the reasons given by the Commission in support of its 
decision. In this way, science enhances administrative legitimacy by 
enhancing administrative accountability. 
The EU separation of scientific analysis from policymaking also 
responds to the plural and networked nature of EU governance, in which 
outcomes must be negotiated not only among the Institutions but also 
frequently with the Member States. Regardless whether such negotiations 
are seen in positive terms as a manifestation of deliberative 
supranationalism303 or negatively as deals transacted among elites, the 
courts cannot ignore their necessity to EU decisionmaking. The 
inherently negotiated nature of EU regulation, including administrative 
regulation, tends to reinforce the understanding of regulatory decisions 
as political rather than as the result of a unitary, rationalised process. 
Perhaps for this reason, the EU courts have focused less on the internal 
consistency of administrative reasoning and more on its compatibility 
with broad constitutional values such as the precautionary principle and 
proportionality. As we saw in the last chapter, the courts have relied on 
constitutional values such as precaution to construct a legal framework 
to guide the administrative policymaking in this area.304 
The US and EU models could perhaps be contrasted in this way: US 
law seeks the judgment of a politically accountable expert, whereas the 
EU prefers the judgment of a scientifically informed policymaker. The 
difference is subtle, and it is not at all clear that it will lead to different 
results in the mine run of cases. It does however mean that regulatory 
decisionmaking will follow different paths in the two jurisdictions and 
that the influences of science and law will operate in different ways. What 
the foregoing analysis has attempted to show is that those different 
models of rational administrative risk regulation reflect not just different 
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solutions to the problem of incorporating both scientific expertise and 
political judgment, but also different understandings of how 
administrative power can be legitimated within a liberal democracy. In 
other words, the differences between the US and EU models of rational 
administrative risk regulation can be traced to differences in the US and 
EU administrative-constitutional frameworks. 
V. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to show two things. First, through a 
close reading of the case law, I have tried to come to grips with the idea of 
rational administrative risk regulation in US and EU jurisprudence. 
Courts rarely talk explicitly about their models of rationality, but their 
decisions inevitably rest on premises about what rational administrative 
decisionmaking entails. By uncovering those premises, I have attempted 
to reconstruct the models of rationality implicit in the case law so that 
they can then be subjected to comparative analysis. I have also tried to 
show how those models have evolved over time. The purpose of the 
historical analysis is to make clear the connections between judicial 
conceptions of administrative rationality and broader concerns about the 
legitimacy of administration within the US and EU constitutional orders. 
Second, in my comparative analysis, I have tried to show that the 
significant differences between the US and EU models of rational 
administrative risk regulation are attributable primarily to different 
theories of how administrative regulation can be made constitutionally 
legitimate, and not to different views about the substance of risk 
regulation policy. In particular, I have attempted to show that both 
jurisdictions frame the problem of risk regulation in similar ways and 
that they have similar understandings of the capacities and limits of risk 
science for addressing those problems. The two jurisdictions do differ, 
however, with regard to their institutional structures and their 
constitutional theories of how the exercise of bureaucratic power can be 
reconciled with a commitment to liberal democracy. Perhaps most 
importantly, the two jurisdictions differ in their understandings of what 
the administration is and what it is meant to be doing when it sets risk 
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standards. Those understandings are rooted in history and legal culture 
and, as with their approaches to precautionary regulation, are not 
primarily the product of substantive views on risk. 
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5 
Retelling the Legitimacy Narratives 
The last three chapters have looked in detail at some central doctrines of 
European and American administrative law. In each of these chapters, we 
saw that various aspects of EU and US law on risk regulation developed 
in response to concerns about the constitutional legitimacy of 
administrative regulation. In this chapter, I endeavour to pull together 
those distinct threads and restate them into coherent legitimacy 
narratives that reconcile administrative risk regulation with each 
jurisdiction’s administrative-constitutional framework. I then attempt to 
explain some of the factors that have caused the EU and US narratives to 
develop different features. 
I. Putting the Doctrine Together 
In this section, the analysis steps back from doctrinal specifics and 
consider the broader legitimacy narratives implied by the courts’ case 
law. Though the EU and US narratives differ in many particulars, both 
are similar in that they are built out of three basic themes or legitimacy 
vectors:1 democracy, expertise, and law.2 A further commonality is that 
no single vector is sufficient to sustain the constitutional legitimacy of 
the administration. Instead, the three vectors mutually reinforce one 
another to create a complete account of administrative legitimacy. 
Accordingly, all three are essential to each legitimacy narrative, and 
modifications in any one vector would require corresponding 
modifications in the others for the narrative to remain coherent. 
                                           
1 Lord and Magnette, ‘E Pluribus Unum? Creative Disagreement about 
Legitimacy in the EU’ (2004) 42 JCMS 183, 184. 
2 Edley, Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy 
(Yale 1990) 29–36. 
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Before proceeding, it is important to recall that the construction of 
legitimacy narratives is a process of interpretation and reconstruction. 
Legitimacy narratives are theoretical tools, not restatements of the law. 
The following narratives should thus be understood as an effort to 
produce coherent understandings of the two bodies of case law as a 
whole. Beyond making sense of legal doctrine, I will argue that these 
narratives provide a means for explaining certain aspects of EU and US 
risk regulation. 
A. Democracy 
Democracy is the fundamental basis of the constitutional and functional 
legitimacy of government in both the EU and the US.3 As such, a 
narrative that failed to reconcile the exercise of bureaucratic power with 
democratic government would fail by definition. The difficulty for both 
jurisdictions is that, as a matter of history, culture, and public 
perception, the administration is generally deemed to be undemocratic or 
at best weakly democratic. In particular, the democratic credentials of 
the administration, which is staffed by unelected officials, are contrasted 
with those of the popularly elected legislature, which is understood to be 
the principal repository of democratic authority.4 It is therefore necessary 
to construct a narrative that convincingly explains how the 
administration either possesses sufficient democratic legitimacy in its 
own right, via means other than direct election, to justify its exercise of 
                                           
3 Arts. 2 and 10 TEU; U.S. Const. Amend. XV; Lincoln, Gettysburg 
Address (November 19, 1863), http://www.ourdocuments.gov/ 
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Liberalism (2d ed., Norton 1979) 272–74; von Bogdandy and Bast (eds.), 
Principles of European Constitutional Law (2d ed., Hart 2010) 267–73; 
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governmental power or is made democratically legitimate through its 
control by other actors. Reconciling bureaucratic power with democracy 
is the essential problem that haunts both systems of administrative law, 
and it is one that neither system has been able to solve fully. It may even 
be a problem that, by its nature, is unsolvable.5 
It is important to bear in mind the distinction between democratic 
legitimacy and legal or constitutional legitimacy. An exercise of 
government power enjoys democratic legitimacy if it receives the 
necessary democratic sanction within a particular political theory of 
democracy. An exercise of government power is constitutionally legitimate 
when it is consistent with the requirements of primary law.6 The two 
concepts are related, but they are not coextensive. The focus in this 
section is on the ways in which the two narratives use democracy to 
support the constitutional legitimacy of administrative regulation. As we 
will see, that constitutional analysis frequently relies on disputable 
jurisprudential premises about democratic legitimacy. 
Despite persistent doubts about the administration’s democratic 
legitimacy, both the EU and the US narratives rely heavily on the 
presumed existence of democratic controls on administration to sustain 
the constitutional legitimacy of the exercise of bureaucratic power. Just 
as important, having posited that the administration possesses a degree 
of democratic legitimacy, both narratives use the existence of that—
suspect—legitimacy as the primary reason for limiting judicial power to 
review the content of administrative decisions.7 Democracy thus has a 
Janus-like character in both narratives. On one hand, the 
administration’s questionable democratic legitimacy poses the most basic 
challenge to its constitutional legitimacy and justifies the imposition of 
various legal controls on administrative power. On the other, both 
narratives posit democratic control of the administration as a 
fundamental, perhaps the fundamental, basis for the legitimacy of 
                                           
5 Farina (n.4), 1037; Frug, ‘The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law’ 
(1984) 97 HLR 1276, 1295–96. 
6 Chapter 1, section II.B.1. 
7 Chapter 4, sections II.E and III.E. 
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bureaucratic policymaking, which, to be effective, requires the courts to 
accord great deference to administrative policy judgments. It is this core 
tension that makes administrative law so contentious. 
1. EU 
What is most striking about the European approach to reconciling 
administrative regulation with democracy is how little the EU courts have 
explicitly addressed the problem. Although the case law is filled with 
statements that risk standards are ultimately political decisions for the 
Institutions,8 there is almost no discussion as to why the Institution that 
makes most of those decisions—the Commission—is competent to decide 
weighty matters of policy. In most instances, the courts simply ignore the 
problem of the Commission’s democratic legitimacy.9 In the few cases in 
which the courts have considered the basis for this legitimacy, they have 
grounded it primarily in the Commission’s accountability to Parliament.10 
It seems clear that the courts’ first approach—simply assuming the 
Commission’s democratic legitimacy—is insufficient. An institution 
cannot be made democratic, either as a matter of political theory or as a 
matter of public perception, merely by declaring it to be so. As a matter of 
constitutional law, however, it is not so absurd. The Treaties themselves 
announce that “[t]he functioning of the Union shall be founded on 
representative democracy”,11 and the Treaties were agreed and ratified 
                                           
8 Case C-77/09, Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços Lda. v. 
Ministero della Salute, nyr, para. 82; Case C-154/04, R. ex p. Alliance for 
Natural Health v. Secretary of State for Health [2005] ECR I-6451, para. 
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10 Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council [2002] ECR II-3305, 
para. 201; Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council, 
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voluntarily by democratic states on the basis of democratic processes. 
The Treaties also explicitly provide that the Commission, in conjunction 
with the larger EU administration, shall adopt delegated and 
implementing measures when such measures are authorised by EU 
legislation. The democratic legitimacy of the Commission can therefore be 
seen as a constitutional premise engrafted in the Treaties. On that view, 
the Court’s role is not to concern itself with the democratic legitimacy of 
the Commission, as such, but rather to ensure that the Commission does 
not overreach the limits of its constitutionally sanctioned powers.12 
The courts’ other approach to the Commission’s democratic 
legitimacy—basing it on the Commission’s responsibility to the 
Parliament—is even less satisfying. Whereas the former approach has the 
virtue of absolving the courts from any obligation to justify Commission 
policymaking in terms of democracy, the latter approach seems to require 
them to make an unconvincing argument. As explored in chapter 2, the 
Parliament’s, and for that matter the Council’s, means of overseeing the 
Commission and holding it to account are far from illusory.13 Before the 
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Treaty of Lisbon, however, those means were considerably weaker than 
the corresponding powers possessed by political principals in the Member 
States. To say that it was appropriate for the Commission to make 
admittedly delicate policy decisions on the basis of that level of 
democratic control strains credulity. Things may now be different. The 
Lisbon reforms, particularly as implemented in the selection of the 
Junker Commission, have brought the EU considerably closer to a 
parliamentary model in which the Commission bears real responsibility 
to the Parliament.14 In light of these reforms, it is no longer as far-fetched 
to argue that the Commission is subject to real democratic 
accountability. Nonetheless, the sufficiency of that accountability 
remains controversial and is insufficient in itself to sustain the 
Commission’s authority.15 
The Commission might also derive a measure of democratic legitimacy 
from the fact that it only adopts implementing acts in conjunction with 
review by a comitology committee and that its decisions on delegated acts 
are subject to Parliament and Council oversight.16 Surprisingly, however, 
the courts have largely ignored this possibility.17 Although comitology 
committees are not without their own accountability problems, the 
participation of Member State representatives in decisionmaking would 
seem to reinforce the democratic quality of Commission decisionmaking. 
That potential is all the greater with oversight of delegated acts, although 
much depends on how the Parliament and Council use their new 
powers.18 For now, however, the EU narrative does not rely on these 
                                           
14 Ibid.; Craig, The Lisbon Treaty (rev. ed., OUP 2013) 115–21. 
15 Cf. Curtin, Executive Power in the European Union (OUP 2009) 275–76. 
16 Chapter 2, section II.B.4. 
17 The Court of Justice did rely in part on the possibility of committee 
oversight in upholding delegations to the Commission in Case C-25/70, 
Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v. Köster and 
Berodt & Co. [1970] ECR 1161, para. 9, but it has not followed up on that 
suggestion. 
18 Stack, ‘The Irony of Oversight: Delegated Acts and the Political 
Economy of the European Union’s Legislative Veto Under the Treaty of 
Lisbon’ (2014) 2 Theory.Pract.Legis. 61. 
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mechanisms to reinforce the democratic quality of administrative 
decisionmaking. 
Despite lacking a robust account of the Commission’s democratic 
legitimacy, the EU courts nonetheless rely on the administration’s 
putative democratic mandate as the starting point for their approach to 
the constitutional legitimacy of administrative risk regulation. That 
reliance is shown most clearly in the courts’ application of the manifest 
error standard to the administration’s policy choices, which the courts 
justify on the ground that the Commission is the appropriate body to 
make political decisions.19 That degree of deference is especially notable 
because many Member State courts exercise much more intensive review 
over their national administrations.20 Without a strong theory to support 
the presumption that the administration’s policy choices are 
democratically legitimate, such a deferential stance would seem to 
require substantial procedural or legal safeguards,21 and the EU courts 
have responded by developing a number of mechanisms to control the 
Commission’s exercise of discretion. 
There is some indication that the courts’ traditional reluctance to 
engage in substantive review is changing, and some recent decisions have 
been more intensive in their examination of the Commission’s policy 
choices.22 These recent decisions may indicate doubts on the part of the 
courts that the Commission’s democratic legitimacy (whatever it may be) 
is sufficient to sustain the constitutional legitimacy of administrative 
                                           
19 Corkin, ‘Science, Legitimacy and the Law: Regulating Risk Regulation 
Judiciously in the European Community’ (2008) 33 ELR 359, 365; 
Fritzsche, ‘Discretion, Scope of Judicial Review and Institutional Balance 
in European Law’ (2010) 47 C.M.L.Rev. 361, 367–71. 
20 Schwarze, European Administrative Law (Sweet and Maxwell 1992) 
212–32. 
21 Azoulay, ‘The Judge and the Community’s Administrative Governance’ 
in Joerges and DeHousse (eds.), Good Governance in the European Union 
(OUP 2002) 112–19. 
22 Craig (n.4), 415–29; chapter 4, section III.C.2. Examples include Joined 
Cases C-14/06 and C-295/06, Parliament v. Commission [2008] ECR I-
1649, paras. 50–79; Case T-446/10, Dow AgroSciences Ltd. v. 
Commission, nyr, paras. 61–76; Case T-333/10, Animal Trading Company 
(ATC) BV v. Commission, nyr, paras. 70–94. 
270 Administrative Legitimacy and Risk Regulation 
  
regulation and that complementary sources of legitimacy need to be 
reinforced. Nonetheless, the courts have mostly adhered to their highly 
deferential approach, and the strong presumption that the Commission is 
a constitutionally appropriate policymaking body remains the backbone 
of the broader legitimacy narrative. Perhaps more importantly, the courts 
have not attempted to force the Commission or the other Institutions to 
take steps, such as procedural reforms, that would reinforce the 
Commission’s democratic accountability. The courts’ reluctance in this 
regard may suggest that they see such reforms as outside judicial 
competence. Until a strong theory of the Commission’s democratic 
legitimacy emerges, however, this will remain the least satisfying and 
most disputed aspect of the EU narrative. 
2. US 
Unlike the EU, in which the Commission’s authority to make regulatory 
decisions is provided for in the Treaties, the US courts could never take 
the constitutionality or the democratic legitimacy of the administration 
for granted. Indeed, the constitutionality of administrative government—
particularly the power of administrative agencies to issue generally 
applicable rules (including risk regulation standards)—is still not 
universally accepted.23 As a consequence, American courts have had to 
grapple directly with the apparent disconnect between the practice of 
administrative regulation and the Constitution’s vision of representative 
government and the separation of powers. 
The courts’ earliest approach to the democratic legitimacy of 
administrative regulation was to deny that it mattered. Administration 
                                           
23 E.g., Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses 
the People Through Delegation (Yale 1993) 155–64; Lawson, ‘The Rise and 
Rise of the Administrative State’ (1994) 107 HLR 1231, 1233–41. During 
the past Supreme Court term, Justice Thomas twice questioned the 
fidelity of the Court’s administrative law jurisprudence to constitutional 
principles. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S.Ct. 1199, 1215–
21 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Department of 
Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 135 S.Ct. 1225, 
1240–52 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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was understood to be the more-or-less mechanical implementation of 
legislative instructions, and the residual discretion possessed by 
administrators was understood to fall comfortably within the concept of 
executing the law.24 This “transition belt” approach to administration was 
reformulated by the Progressive movement into a commitment to 
professionalized administration. Epitomised by the New Deal agencies, 
this approach sought to take certain policy problems out of the political 
process entirely and to place them instead in the hands of expert 
administrators.25 The Progressives were motivated in part by a desire to 
remove administrative decisions from routine politics, which were seen as 
corrupting, and in part by a faith in the ability of experts to formulate 
efficient policies that would redress widely recognised social problems.26 
On this theory, the only democratic sanction needed was Congress’s 
decision to delegate matters to the administration. More extensive 
democratic control was actually undesirable due to its tendency to 
promote irrational results.27 
The notion that experts could be trusted to determine good policy 
without further democratic input came into widespread disrepute in the 
1970s. In fact, it was to a large extent the rise of risk regulation 
programmes that laid bare the disputed value judgments inherent in 
much administrative regulation. That recognition, accompanied by the 
doubt cast on the administrative process by capture theory, required the 
courts to develop a new approach for reconciling the exercise of 
                                           
24 Rabin, ‘Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective’ (1986) 38 
Stan.L.Rev. 1189, 1240; Landis, The Administrative Process (Yale 1947) 
50–54. 
25 Cook, Bureaucracy and Self-Government (Johns Hopkins 1996) 82–86; 
Stewart, ‘The Reformation of American Administrative Law’ (1975) 88 
HLR 1667, 1677–78. 
26 Cook (n.25), 86–94; Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 
1870–1960 (OUP 1992) 222–25. 
27 Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies (Harvard 1962) 165–67 
(describing the positions of New Deal-era commentators); Landis (n.24), 
62–72; see generally Nelson, ‘The Quest for Scientific Morality’ in The 
Roots of American Bureaucracy (Harvard 1982). 
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bureaucratic power with democratic government.28 The first, short-lived, 
effort was expansion of administrative procedure to create a “surrogate 
political process”, in which the lack of electoral control over 
administrative agencies would be remedied by encouraging broad 
participation of affected interests in the administrative process.29 In 
practice, however, the surrogate political process approach seemed to 
create paralyzing procedural delay without addressing the constitutional 
tension between administrative policymaking and electoral democracy. A 
sceptical Supreme Court stamped it out in Vermont Yankee.30 
The courts’ theory shifted again in the early 1980s, as they began to 
rely quite heavily on the president as the source of the administration’s 
democratic legitimacy.31 The Presidential Administration theory is 
elegant: the president is the sole federal actor to enjoy a truly national 
constituency. By virtue of the Take Care Clause,32 the president has both 
the responsibility and the constitutional authority to oversee the work of 
the federal administration.33 That being the case, the policy choices made 
by agencies are presumptively democratic, hence legitimate, and courts 
have no warrant to second-guess them.34 Since 1984, when the Court 
decided Chevron,35 some version of this theory has dominated American 
administrative law. 
As elegant as it is, the Presidential Administration model is both 
problematic and incomplete. It is problematic, above all, because the 
picture of presidential control it posits is a highly imperfect reflection of 
                                           
28 Reich, ‘The Law of the Planned Society’ (1966) 75 YLJ 1227, 1243–47; 
Stewart (n.25), 1684–88. 
29 Stewart (n.25), 1670. 
30 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
31 Farina, ‘The “Chief Executive” and the Quiet Constitutional Revolution’ 
(1997) 49 Admin.L.Rev. 179, 182–85; Kagan, ‘Presidential Administration’ 
(2001) 114 HLR 2245, 2272–76. 
32 US Const. Art. II, § 3, cl. 3. 
33 Lessig and Sunstein, ‘The President and the Administration’ (1994) 94 
Colum.L.Rev. 1, 97–103. 
34 Calabresi and Prakash, ‘The President’s Power to Execute the Laws’ 
(1994) 104 YLJ 541, 661–62. 
35 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984). 
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reality. Although the president may be the only federal official elected by 
the nation as a whole, the strength of the president’s electoral mandate is 
far from clear.36 Moreover, given the vast scope of the federal 
bureaucracy, the idea that a single individual, or even the entire White 
House organisation, could actively supervise more than a small minority 
of agency actions is fanciful.37 While it may be true that politically or 
economically significant issues will receive attention at the highest levels 
of the White House,38 there remains a huge number of more mundane 
actions—including much risk regulation—that goes unreviewed. And 
while it is true that the president selects the agency’s leadership, 
management by presidential appointees is a very indirect form of political 
accountability.39 When these realities are considered, most administrative 
risk standards can be said to reflect the president’s democratic choices 
only in an attenuated way. 
The second weakness of the Presidential Administration theory is that 
it rests on a controversial interpretation of the Constitution.40 Because 
the debate is as much about questions of political and constitutional 
theory as it is about historical evidence and judicial precedent, it is 
doubtful that it can ever be resolved. This inherent contestability limits 
the legitimating force of the Presidential Administration theory because 
there will always be some who view the theory as not merely insufficient 
or incomplete, but as unfaithful to basic constitutional principles.41 
Because democracy has become the dominant theme of the US legitimacy 
                                           
36 Farina (n.4), 992–1002; Farina (n.31), 185–86. 
37 The OIRA process helps to make presidential management of 
administrative rulemaking effective, but even this process only extends to 
a limited sample of regulatory actions. Chapter 3, section II.B.3. 
38 Kagan (n.31), 2307; Sunstein, ‘The Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities’ (2013) 126 HLR 1838, 1850–53. 
39 Chapter 2, section II.A.1. 
40 For some of the main literature in this debate see chapter 2, n.17. 
41 E.g., Farina (n.4), 1007–18; Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and 
Ideas in the Making of the Constitution (Knopf 1996) 209–14. 
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narrative, the inherent weaknesses of the Presidential Administration 
theory threaten to destabilise the entire narrative.42 
Despite these doubts, the Presidential Administration has had 
impressive staying power. More than thirty years after Chevron, it has if 
anything grown stronger.43 While it is true that some recent cases, such 
as Massachusetts v. EPA,44 have confirmed that there are limits to 
presidential control of administrative decisionmaking, there is no 
indication that the Supreme Court is prepared to retreat significantly 
from the model.45 Presidential Administration now frames the overall US 
legitimacy narrative, including the roles of law and expertise. 
With respect to law, Presidential Administration, most notably as 
manifested in Chevron and its progeny, has greatly limited the courts’ 
ability to rely on legal analysis to constrain administrative 
policymaking.46 Whereas courts once took the lead in interpreting the 
content of regulatory legislation, including the goals of the legislation, 
primary responsibility for concretising legislation now falls to the 
administration.47 This shift has confirmed an important constitutive role 
                                           
42 Consider the continued resistance to Chevron in some quarters. E.g., 
Beermann, ‘End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has 
Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled’ (2010) 42 Conn.L.Rev. 
779; Garry, ‘Accommodating the Administrative State: The 
Interrelationship Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines’ 
(2006) 38 Az.St.L.J. 921; Molot, ‘Reexamining Marbury in the 
Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial 
Power over Statutory Interpretation’ (2002) 96 Nw.U.L.Rev. 1239. 
43 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S.Ct. 1863, 1872–73 (2013); Barnhart v. 
Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221–22 (2002); Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota) 
N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739–43 (1996). 
44 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
45 Recent cases, e.g., Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S.Ct. 2427 
(2014) and EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S.Ct. 1584 
(2014), have shown that justices from across the ideological spectrum 
accept the Presidential Administration model. Only Justice Thomas 
appears to have serious reservations about Presidential Administration 
(above n.23). 
46 Breyer, ‘Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy’ (1986) 38 
Admin.L.Rev. 363, 376–79. 
47 Chapter 3, section I.C.2. 
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for the administration in elaborating regulatory policy by effectively 
conferring on it the power to define the ends of legislation, not just the 
means for their achievement.48 To be sure, US courts have not wholly 
abdicated their power to review administrative interpretations of 
legislation,49 but the importance of the shift in interpretive authority 
should not be understated. 
Presidential Administration has also brought about a substantial 
change in the role of expertise in the US legitimacy narrative by replacing 
it as the primary basis for judicial deference to administrative decisions. 
Once the US courts openly recognised that expert analysis entails a large 
degree of judgment, often including important value judgments, the 
administration’s expertise became insufficient to justify judicial deference 
to its scientific conclusions.50 Presidential Administration filled this gap 
by shifting the theory of deference from one based on comparative 
institutional competence, to one based on comparative institutional 
legitimacy. By making this shift, Presidential Administration—and hence 
democracy—has come to underwrite the legitimacy of both the 
administration’s policy and its expert judgments.  
*   *   *   *   * 
This section began by observing that democratic legitimacy is the 
central problem for both EU and US administrative law, and so it is 
unsurprising that both narratives conclude that bureaucratic regulation 
is consistent with democratic government. It is important to observe, 
however, that neither narrative is able to conclude that administrative 
decisionmaking is democratic in itself. Instead, both narratives posit a 
view of the administration as incompletely democratic. Both narratives 
must therefore find ways of closing the remaining legitimacy gap. The 
primary sources of supplemental legitimacy drawn on by both narratives 
are expertise (science) and law. The centrality of democracy to the two 
                                           
48 Chapter 4, section II.G. 
49 E.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S.Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015); UARG (n.45), 
2442–44. 
50 This is the constitutional problem opened up by Ethyl Corp. and its 
progeny. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 20 (D.C.Cir.1976) (en banc); 
chapter 4, section II.A. 
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legitimacy narratives lies in the fact that the roles of these supplemental 
sources of legitimacy in the overall narratives are, in large part, dictated 
by the role of democracy, or more precisely by its shortcomings. 
B. Expertise 
It is probably inevitable that in a field so shot through with complex 
questions of technical fact and scientific prediction, that administrative 
law would turn to expertise as a mechanism of reinforcing the legitimacy 
of risk regulation.51 Indeed, to the extent that risk regulation is framed in 
terms of safety and relies on essentially factual predictions of the effect of 
products on human health or the environment, it is difficult to conceive 
of how risk standards could be functionally legitimate without being able 
to claim a defensible scientific basis.52 
Unsurprisingly then, both the EU and US legitimacy narratives are 
premised on the view that scientific expertise can contribute to the 
standard setting process in ways that other legitimacy vectors 
(democracy, law) cannot. In particular, both narratives rely on scientific 
expertise as a basis for distinguishing arbitrary from non-arbitrary 
decisionmaking, i.e., decisionmaking based on insufficient or improper 
reasons. The role of expertise in the two narratives differs in important 
ways, however. In the EU, requirements that the Commission obtain 
scientific advice developed as a procedural protection for regulated 
entities. As such, expertise is primarily directed at ensuring the fairness 
of administrative processes.53 And although the role of expertise has been 
                                           
51 For the time being, I put to one side the complexities of risk science. 
See chapter 1, section I.C. I return to these issues and their implications 
for the two legitimacy narratives in the next chapter, section I.A. 
52 Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (Harvard 
1990) 16–17, 239–40; Jasanoff, Designs on Nature (Princeton 2005) 287–
89; Joerges, ‘The Law’s Problems with the Governance of the European 
Market’ in Joerges and Dehousse (eds.), Good Governance in Europe’s 
Integrated Market (OUP 2002) 22–24. 
53 Azoulay (n.21), 118–23; Joerges, ‘Scientific Expertise in Social 
Regulation and the European Court of Justice: Legal Frameworks for 
Denationalized Governance Structures’ in Joerges, Ladeur and Vos (eds.), 
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expanded somewhat in more recent case law,54 the EU courts continue to 
analyse it mainly in procedural terms.55 In the US, expertise is a 
definitional aspect of “administrative”, as opposed to political or legal, 
decisionmaking.56 The US narrative posits that this form of 
decisionmaking, in which science and politics are combined, will—in 
appropriate settings—produce regulatory standards that are superior to 
standards that could be produced on the basis of political 
decisionmaking alone. Accordingly, expertise in the US narrative is 
directed values of efficiency and effectiveness. 
1. EU 
The consistent framing by the EU courts of risk standard setting as “a 
political choice”57 necessarily limits science to a supporting role in the EU 
legitimacy narrative. That does not, however, mean that expertise is not 
essential. To the contrary, the Court of Justice’s case law makes clear 
that expert investigation is necessary to guarantee the fairness of 
administrative proceedings, as well as to ensure that policy decisions are 
made on the basis of adequate information. 
As we saw in chapter 4, the EU courts first began to demand that the 
Commission seek expert advice in the context of granting or denying 
authorisations for the marketing of certain products.58 These decisions 
                                                                                                                   
Integrating Scientific Expertise into Regulatory Decision-Making (Nomos 
1997) 315–19. 
54 Gowan (n.8), paras. 52–67; Case T-257/07 R, France v. Commission 
(Interim Measures) [2007] ECR II-4153, paras. 69–86. 
55 Case C-269/13, Acino AG v. Commission, nyr, paras. 83–87; Case T-
71/10, Xeda International SA v. Commission, nyr, paras. 64–71. 
56 Landis (n.24), 22–24; Mashaw and Harfst, ‘Regulation and Legal 
Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety’ (1986) 4 Yale.J.Reg. 257, 313–
15; Short, ‘The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, 
Rationality, and Reasons’ (2012) 61 Duke.L.J. 1811, 1819–20. 
57 E.g., Pfizer (n.10), para. 468; Case T-257/07, France v. Commission, 
nyr, para. 78. 
58 Chapter 4, section III.A. E.g., Case C-212/91, Angelopharm GmbH v. 
Freie Hansestadt Hamburg [1994] ECR I-171, paras. 37–38; Case T-
199/96, Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA v. Commission 
[1998] ECR II-2805, para. 60. 
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could be distinguished from legislative measures, like those at issue in 
Fedesa,59 both because they were being made by the Commission 
through an administrative process and because they directly concerned 
the interests of specific individuals or entities. That latter aspect also 
implicated those entities’ individual rights, spurring the courts to 
demand procedural guarantees to protect rule of law values.60 Perhaps 
the most significant development in this regard was the imposition of an 
administrative duty of care, which included the obligation to consult 
qualified and impartial experts.61 Because its origins are in the protection 
of regulated entities, the administrative duty of care can be seen as akin 
to the rights of the defence. That connection was made explicit in Pfizer 
and Alpharma, in which the General Court characterised the risk 
assessment requirement as one of the “guarantees conferred by the 
Community legal order in administrative proceedings”.62 Thus, one way 
expertise contributes to the EU legitimacy narrative is by promoting the 
fairness of decisions regarding individual circumstances.63 It may be that 
the courts see this procedural guarantee as all the more important in 
that EU law makes clear that economic rights must give way to 
protection of health and the environment, which can justify imposing 
“even substantial adverse consequences” on individual traders.64 
                                           
59 Case C-331/88, R. v. MAFF, ex p. Fedesa [1990] ECR I-4023. 
60 Case C-269/90, Hauptzollamt München-Mitte v. Technische Universität 
München [1991] ECR I-5469, Opinion of A.G. Jacobs, paras. 11–13. 
61 Chapter 4, section III.A; Nehl, Principles of Administrative Procedure in 
EC Law (Hart 1999) 132–35. 
62 Pfizer (n.10), para. 171. 
63 TU München (n.60), Opinion of A.G. Jacobs, paras. 42–43. 
64 Case C-183/95, Affish BV v. Rijksdienst voor de Keuring van Vee en 
Vlees [1997] ECR I-4315, para. 42; Dow AgroSciences (n.22), para. 66. A 
connection between procedural protections and burdens on economic 
rights was also made in Case C-59/11, Association Kokopelli v. Graines 
Baumaux SAS, nyr, para. 40 and in Case C-504/04, Agrarproduktion 
Staebelow GmbH v. Landrat des Landkreises Bad Doberan [2006] ECR I-
679, paras. 37–40. The consequences for affected individuals can be 
serious indeed; recall that the directive challenged in Bergaderm led to 
the applicant’s bankruptcy. Bergaderm (n.58), para. 27. 
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Expertise in the EU narrative is not limited to the protection of 
individuals, however, but also extends to ensuring the quality of 
administrative risk regulation. Following the BSE crisis, the Commission, 
in a bid to reinforce public trust in EU-level regulation, strengthened its 
commitment to science as a means of ensuring that EU regulation would 
deliver a high level of protection.65 Specifically, the Commission resolved 
that in the future, EU food regulation would be grounded in scientific 
advice conforming to the principles of “independence, excellence, and 
transparency”.66 Not only is this use of science directed at the quality of 
regulation, it also tends to focus on protecting the interests of regulatory 
beneficiaries, rather than regulated entities. To this day, a focus on high-
quality scientific advice as a protective measure continues to be a 
frequent theme in Commission publications on risk regulation.67 
The General Court picked up on the principles of independence, 
excellence, and transparency in Pfizer and Alpharma. Ironically, however, 
it did so in the context of evaluating whether the authorisations for the 
applicants’ products had been wrongly revoked, and science was once 
again invoked for the protection of regulated entities.68 The courts’ 
rhetoric, however, shifted somewhat away from the protection of 
economic rights and towards an understanding of science as a public 
health safeguard, and a couple of subsequent cases have indicated that 
adequate scientific analysis is necessary to ensure that the Commission 
is meeting its obligation to provide a high level of protection.69 Like the 
                                           
65 Van Zwanenberg and Millstone, BSE: Risk, Science, and Governance 
(OUP 2005) 219–22. 
66 European Commission, ‘White Paper on Food Safety’ COM(1999) 719 
final, 16–20. 
67 European Commission, Communication, ‘Innovating for Sustainable 
Growth: A Bioeconomy for Europe’ COM(2012) 60 final, 40; European 
Commission, Communication, ‘Towards a European Strategy for 
Nanotechnology’ COM(2004) 338, at 5–6; European Commission, 
Communication, ‘Community Strategy for Endocrine Disruptors’ 
COM(1999) 706 final, 12. 
68 Pfizer (n.10), paras. 171–72. 
69 Case C-15/10, Etimine SA v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
[2011] ECR I-6681, Opinion of A.G. Bot, para. 148; Case C-446/08, 
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earlier cases, expertise in these decisions is directed at accurate fact 
finding. But rather than securing fairness to regulated entities, accuracy 
in these cases protects the public interest in ensuring that regulatory 
measures are adequately protective. 
Although science is understood as a procedural safeguard—whether 
of rights or of public health—the EU courts have not treated it as a 
burden of proof, which would more tightly constrain political 
decisionmaking.70 Instead, the EU case law suggests that expert analysis 
protects the relevant interests in a softer way, by ensuring that the 
Commission’s decision is adequately informed.71 The judgments in 
France v. Commission make that point clear. So long as the Commission 
acts “in full knowledge of the facts”, it is entitled to make its decision on 
the basis of its views as to wise policy.72 
The EU case law on expertise in risk regulation demonstrates that, 
although risk standards are always questions of policy, political will alone 
is insufficient to render administrative risk regulation constitutionally 
legitimate.73 Instead, the EU narrative requires the Commission to treat 
the important interests at stake in risk regulation, of both regulated 
entities and the public, with care. While there is an obvious connection 
between careful consideration and good decisionmaking, the emphasis is 
on respect for the interests themselves, a concern which sounds in 
fairness rather than substantive quality. Perhaps because of this focus 
on science as a procedural protection, the large majority of science-based 
                                                                                                                   
Solgar Vitamins France v. Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de 
l’Emploi [2010] ECR I-3973. Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen, para. 84; Smoke 
Flavourings (n.9), para. 46; Case T-296/12, Health Food Manufacturers’ 
Association v. Commission, nyr, paras. 64, 126–30; France (n.57), paras. 
211–13; Case T-75/06, Bayer CropScience AG v. Commission [2008] ECR 
II-2081, para. 208; Case T-229/04, Sweden v. Commission [2007] ECR II-
2437, paras. 167–70. 
70 Chapter 4, section III.C.1. If anything, recent decisions have reinforced 
the Commission’s burden is only to identify a non-hypothetical possibility 
of harm. Acino (n.55), paras. 58–60. 
71 Scott and Sturm, ‘Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in 
New Governance’ (2006) 13 Colum.J.Eur.L. 565, 583–84. 
72 France (n.57), para. 77. 
73 Cf. Case T-240/10, Hungary v. Commission, nyr, para. 110. 
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challenges focus on whether regulatory restrictions are adequately 
justified rather than whether standards are adequately protective.74 
Although challenges by regulated entities are rarely successful, this skew 
in the character of the cases brought inevitably colours the way in which 
the role of science is analysed by the courts and may contribute to a 
perception that the role of science in EU administrative law tends to be 
anti-regulatory. 
2. US 
Unlike the EU narrative, the US narrative does not clearly subordinate 
expertise to politics. Instead, they are nearly co-equal. One of the most 
urgent problems for the US narrative is the reconciliation of 
administrative regulation with the tripartite separation of powers, 
especially the exercise of rulemaking power by administrative agencies.75 
Historically, a key aspect of the US narrative’s solution to this problem 
has been the conceptualisation of administration as a process of 
decisionmaking distinct from the process of legislation.76 Whereas 
legislation is the pure exercise of political will, administration combines 
both political judgment and scientific analysis; i.e., administration 
“exercise[s] power on the basis of knowledge”.77 Thus understood, 
administrative regulation does not displace legislation by Congress, but 
instead complements it.78 On this theory, however, administrative 
decisions cannot be purely political. To be constitutionally legitimate 
                                           
74 This tilt may also be the result of the courts’ restrictive rules on 
standing. Chapter 2, section I.B.2. Standing cannot be the whole 
explanation, however, because public interest groups have had success 
with the preliminary reference procedure despite its shortcomings. E.g., 
Case C-6/99, Association Greenpeace France v. Ministère de l’Agriculture 
et de la Pêche [2000] ECR I-1651. 
75 Edley (n.2), 17–18. 
76 Horwitz (n.26), 222–25; chapter 4, section II.G. 
77 Mashaw, ‘Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and 
Legitimacy in the Administrative State’ (2001) 70 Ford.L.Rev. 17, 23. 
78 This is one of the oldest ideas in US administrative law. Goodnow, The 
Principles of the Administrative Law of the United States (Lawbook 
Exchange 2012) (1905), 66–68. 
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within the US narrative, administrative decisions must also incorporate 
expert judgment.79 
In the US narrative, expertise bolsters the legitimacy of administrative 
regulation in both positive and negative ways. On the positive side, the 
demand for expertise is based on a conviction that scientific analysis can 
improve government’s ability to address social problems, however they 
may be defined. As Mashaw puts it: “The promise of the administrative 
state was to bring competence to politics. It is the institutional 
embodiment of the Enlightenment project to substitute reason for the 
dark forces of culture, tradition, and myth.”80 Expertise legitimises 
administration because it promises better social policies than democracy 
can deliver on its own.81 On the negative side, expertise constrains 
politics by limiting the range of decisions that may be viewed as plausibly 
within the public interest.82 Requiring administrators to exercise expert 
judgment is thought to limit the ability of the administration to cater to 
the self-interested preferences of private groups or, to use Sunstein’s 
phrase, to pursue “naked preferences”.83  
Although the US legitimacy narrative puts great trust in expertise, it 
does not rely on a naïve view of expertise as neutrally objective or 
independently capable of generating policy solutions. As we have seen, 
belief in the neutrality of expertise was deeply shaken in the 1970s, 
resulting in a general upheaval in administrative law.84 This doctrinal 
                                           
79 Massachusetts (n.44), 533; Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983); see 
also Bressman, ‘Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in 
the Administrative State’ (2003) 78 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 461, 527–29; Freeman 
and Vermeule, ‘Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise’ [2007] 
Sup.Ct.Rev. 51, 82–83; Metzger, ‘Ordinary Administrative Law as 
Constitutional Common Law’ (2010) 110 Colum.L.Rev. 479, 490–93. 
80 Mashaw (n.77), 23. 
81 Ibid.; Landis (n.24), 57–59. 
82 State Farm (n.79), 47–51; American Farm Bureau Federation v. EPA, 
559 F.3d 512, 518–20 (D.C.Cir.2009). 
83 Sunstein, ‘Naked Preferences and the Constitution’ (1984) 84 
Colum.L.Rev. 1689, 1691; see also Seidenfeld, ‘A Civic Republican 
Justification for the Bureaucratic State’ (1992) 105 HLR 1511, 1554–58. 
84 Stewart (n.25), 1681–88. 
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crisis was ultimately solved not be reasserting the objectivity of expertise 
(as some advocated85), but by relying on agencies’ democratic credentials 
to give authoritative effect to their disputable expert judgments.86 The 
roles of expertise and democracy in the US legitimacy narrative thus 
became intertwined and mutually reinforcing. Democratic legitimacy is a 
prerequisite for the legitimacy of expert judgment, which in turn supports 
the legitimacy of administrative power, in part, by guarding against 
democratic abuses. 
The US legitimacy narrative combines these demands by requiring 
administrative agencies to engage in a particular kind of decisionmaking, 
one in which a high level of expert analysis and a high level of political 
authority are embodied a single decisionmaker.87 The relative roles of 
democracy and expertise will of course vary from decision to decision, but 
administrators are expected to give due regard to both aspects of an 
issue. It is for this reason that US courts, unlike EU courts, generally 
demand that administrative decisionmakers reach scientific conclusions 
and that they abide by the conclusions they adopt.88 It also explains why 
courts remain willing to set aside agency actions on the basis that they 
are inadequately supported by technical analysis, despite the courts’ 
enthusiasm for Presidential Administration as the cornerstone of 
administrative legitimacy.89 An agency that fails to exercise its expert 
judgment fails to live up to its administrative role. 
Because it is focused on improving the administration’s fulfilment of 
legislative policy objectives, expertise does not have the same emphasis 
on protection of individual rights that it does in the EU narrative.90 It is 
                                           
85 E.g., Raul and Dwyer, ‘“Regulatory Daubert”: A Proposal to Enhance 
Judicial Review of Agency Science by Incorporating Daubert Principles 
into Administrative Law’ (Autumn, 2003) 66 LCP 7, 8–12. 
86 Chapter 4, section II.D. 
87 Chapter 4, section II.G; Chevron (n.35), 865–66. 
88 American Farm Bureau Federation (n.82), 17; chapter 4, section II.E. 
89 Alpharma, Inc. v. Leavitt, 460 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C.Cir.2006); NRDC v. EPA, 
824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C.Cir.1987) (en banc); see also Bowen v. 
American Hospital Association, 476 U.S. 610, 626–27 (1986). 
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section II.A. 
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true, of course, that the US narrative permits regulated entities to rely on 
science to argue that an administrative decision is flawed,91 but it also 
provides the same opportunity to proponents of tighter standards and—
in contrast to the EU—US courts routinely set aside administrative 
decisions because the scientific record suggested that a standard was 
insufficiently protective.92 Expertise thus not only constrains discretion, 
but also helps to ensure that the administration meets its regulatory 
responsibilities.93 Application of expertise in the US narrative is thus 
both a normative and a procedural obligation. 
C. Law 
As with expertise, law plays very different roles in the EU and US 
legitimacy narratives. In the EU, administrative compliance with the rule 
of law entails both compliance with positive legal requirements (e.g., 
procedural requirements, the limits of delegated authority), as well as 
conformity with legally embedded values (e.g., proportionality, the 
precautionary principle).94 The latter, normative, aspect of the rule of law 
analysis is central to the idea of legally constrained government in 
European constitutional theory.95 This understanding of the rule of law, 
                                           
91 Chemical Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1265 
(D.C.Cir.1994). 
92 State Farm (n.79), 51; NRDC v. EPA, 735 F.3d 873, 881–84 
(9th.Cir.2013); American Farm Bureau Federation (n.82), 519; Bluewater 
Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1, 21–22 (D.C.Cir.2004); National Lime Assoc-
iation v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625, 634–35 (D.C.Cir.2000); American Lung 
Association v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 329–93 (D.C.Cir.1998). But see Center 
for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 749 F.3d 1079, 1090 (D.C.Cir.2014) 
(upholding a standard that EPA acknowledged to be insufficiently 
protective because the agency adequately explained that the available 
data was too uncertain to allow for a reasoned decision and the agency 
was actively working on the issue). 
93 Sunstein, ‘Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine’ [1983] 
Sup.Ct.Rev. 177, 187–88. 
94 Von Bogdandy and Bast (n.4), 20–28. 
95 Ibid., 33–35; Stone Sweet, ‘Why Europe Rejected American Judicial 
Review and Why It May Not Matter’ (2003) 101 Mich.L.Rev. 2744, 2766–69. 
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related to the German concept of Rechtsstaatlichkeit,96 has provided 
occasion for the EU courts to develop legal principles that guide and 
constrain the policy content of EU risk regulation. In this way, law 
supports the EU legitimacy narrative by conferring the law’s normative 
authority on administrative decisionmaking. 
The American understanding of the rule of law shares the European 
commitment to the observance of positive legal requirements. It does not, 
however, entail a similar commitment to particular normative values. To 
the contrary, US legal theory favours the neutrality of legal principles as 
regards most matters of regulatory policy.97 Rather than focus on 
substantive norms, US administrative law focuses on the allocation of 
decisionmaking authority and the maintenance of institutional roles.98 
The duty of the courts in this system is to police the process, while 
leaving matters of substance to governmental actors—including the 
administration—that can claim some democratic mandate. 
1. EU 
In the EU narrative, law supports the legitimacy of administrative 
regulation both procedurally and substantively. Procedurally, it 
safeguards ideas of fairness and due process, which are essential to the 
constitutional legitimacy of actions impinging on the rights of individuals. 
Substantively, it is concerned with giving content to the idea of the public 
interest by supplying essential norms of good regulation that provide a 
basis for justifying (and critiquing) administrative regulation 
independently of democratic preferences.99 
                                           
96 On Rechtsstaatlichkeit, see Currie, The Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (University Of Chicago 1995) 18–20. 
97 Stewart, ‘Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity 
Values’ (1983) 92 YLJ 1537, 1540–43 see also Ely, Democracy and 
Distrust (Harvard 1980) 88–104; Wechsler, ‘Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law’ (1959) 73 HLR 1, 10–20. 
98 Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process (Eskridge and Frickey eds., 
Foundation Press 2006) 158–67; Fallon, ‘Reflections on the Hart and 
Wechsler Paradigm’ (1994) 47 Vand.L.Rev. 953, 962–64. 
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The most visible procedural influence has been the courts’ 
jurisprudence on rights of defence, which has extended a number of 
procedural protections to regulated entities and has influenced the 
design of some risk regulation programmes.100 These decisions vindicate 
those broadly shared principles, embodied in the British conception of 
natural justice, that have come to define the circumstances in which an 
adverse decision may be made against an individual.101 More important 
for European risk regulation, however, has been the courts’ elaboration of 
an administrative duty of care, which has been the primary doctrinal 
vehicle for defining the necessary role of expert advice in risk 
regulation.102 Like the rights of defence, the EU courts have developed the 
duty of care as a means of ensuring the fairness of administrative 
proceedings.103 
The importance of fairness to the legitimacy narrative should not be 
underestimated. One of the core constitutional concerns of both EU and 
US administrative law is that individuals should be treated justly and 
with dignity by administrative bodies,104 and it should come as no 
surprise that courts have occupied themselves intensely with procedural 
matters. Fairness is equally essential to functional legitimacy. No matter 
                                           
100 Joerges, ‘“Good Governance” Through Comitology?’ in Joerges and Vos 
(eds.), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics (Hart 1999) 
332–38; Nehl (n.61), 8–12; Scott, ‘REACH: Combining Harmonization and 
Dynamism in the Regulation of Chemicals’ in Scott (ed.), Environmental 
Protection: European Law and Governance (OUP 2009) 73–75; Vos, 
Institutional Frameworks of Community Health and Safety Regulation 
(Hart 1999) 181, 239–40. 
101 Bignami, ‘Creating European Rights: National Values and 
Supranational Interests’ (2005) 11 Colum.J.Eur.L. 241, 278–93; Bignami, 
‘Three Generations of Participation Rights before the European 
Commission’ (Winter, 2004) 68 LCP 61, 63–67. 
102 Chapter 4, section III.E. 
103 Nehl (n.61), 116–17; see also Pfizer (n.10), para. 171. 
104 Harlow and Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU Administration 
(Hart 2014) 74–75; Mashaw, ‘Reasoned Administration: The European 
Union, the United States, and the Project of Democratic Governance’ 
(2007) 76 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 99, 117–19; Nehl, ‘Good Administration as a 
Procedural Right and/or General Principle?’ in Hofmann and Türk (eds.), 
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what its substantive merits, an administrative policy is unlikely to be 
accepted if it is imposed in ways that fail to respect the moral autonomy 
of those subject to it.105 Just as any adequate legitimacy narrative must 
be able to reconcile administrative regulation with democracy, so too it 
must offer an explanation for the fairness of administration. Notably, in 
both narratives, this explanation is offered almost entirely in legal terms: 
administration is fair because it conforms to legal ideals of justice. 
Substantively, the EU courts have influenced the process of 
administrative risk regulation by developing constitutional principles to 
give content to the idea of the public interest in risk regulation and by 
requiring the EU administration to demonstrate that its actions are 
consistent with those principles.106 To a large extent, the courts have 
developed those principles from the Treaties, particularly the 
precautionary principle and the principle that the Union must pursue a 
high level of protection of human health and the environment.107 But the 
courts have also gone beyond the Treaties and developed normative 
principles of good administration, including good risk regulation, based 
on general principles of law. In particular, the proportionality principle 
has figured prominently in many decisions on risk regulation.108 Whether 
derived from the Treaties or other sources, these normative principles are 
largely the creation of courts and have been developed through 
jurisprudential methods.109 They reinforce administrative legitimacy by 
insisting that there is more to good administration than political 
preference or even political preference tempered by scientific analysis. In 
this way, law attempts to make up (to some extent) for the democratic 
weakness of bureaucratic policymaking by supplying values that require 
                                           
105 Mashaw, ‘Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary 
Theory’ (1981) 61 B.U.L.Rev. 885, 887–88. 
106 Chapter 3, section I.B.1; Case T-74/00, Artegodan GmbH v. 
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107 Art. 191 TFEU. 
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no democratic sanction.110 Put differently, by validating particular 
regulatory decisions, law confers some of its own moral authority on the 
practice of administrative risk regulation. 
This role for law in legitimising EU risk regulation is consistent with 
one understanding of the role of law in the overall European project. 
Throughout its history, the Court of Justice has used normative 
argument to buttress the legitimacy of the EU legal order.111 Its project 
seems to have been not just the implementation of Treaty rules, but also 
the construction of a normative vision of the EU, the inherent merit of 
which would win the allegiance of Member States and European citizens. 
In its early days, that vision focused on the free movement of goods and 
people, the elimination of cross-national discrimination, and the 
integration of European law into the Member States’ legal orders.112 More 
recently, the court has focused on developing a European vision in the 
areas of individual rights and social policy, including in the field of risk 
regulation.113 Lenaerts, for example, has referred to the “trust-enhancing” 
aspects of EU law in these areas.114 By building a positive vision of the 
EU as a guarantor of (presumably) widely held public values, EU public 
law can be understood as attempting to create an additional basis for the 
legitimacy of EU regulation to supplement the EU’s contested democratic 
legitimacy.115 
                                           
110 Cf. Smismans, ‘The European Union’s Fundamental Rights Myth’ 
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The judicial elaboration of the normative foundations of European 
risk regulation is an important part of the EU legitimacy narrative. The 
EU narrative posits that administrative risk regulation is legitimate in 
part because EU law ensures that it furthers values that are (or should 
be) universally shared.116 That idea may seem naïve in a world in which 
the ends and means of risk regulation are the subject of intense 
disagreement by people of good faith. It would be sad, however, to reject 
it out of hand for that reason. That there is a public institution open to 
discourse on the public good, independently of transient political 
preferences, is admirable. So too is the commitment to the idea that—at 
least within a given cultural and historical context— it is possible to 
identify shared public values.117 The idea that the EU is a normative 
project, and not just an economic project, provides an important 
counterweight to the liberalising nature of the internal market. It also 
helps to reconcile the essentially liberal EU project with the European 
tradition of social democracy.118 It supplies values that the European 
public can believe in and feel allegiance towards.119 It makes the EU 
admirable, not just efficient. 
Although the role for law in legitimating administration is potentially 
powerful, it is important to be realistic about its operation in practice. 
Despite occasionally strong rhetoric, the EU courts have for the most part 
been timid, and there is little evidence that they are prepared to 
scrutinise rigorously the political choices made by the Commission for 
compliance with public values.120 There is also a serious question as to 
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how successful the EU courts have been in articulating public values to 
guide risk regulation. The courts’ decisions in this area have been 
critiqued from all sides. Many argue, for example, that the courts’ 
precautionary jurisprudence is insufficiently respectful of individual 
autonomy and the social value of technology.121 Others have argued that 
the courts have been too concerned about European uniformity and free 
movement, and have been insufficiently solicitous of national preferences 
regarding technological risk.122 Thus, however admirable the project may 
be, it is not clear that it is actually winning much allegiance that could 
supplement the EU’s contested democratic legitimacy. Indeed, given the 
current strains on European ideals brought about by the financial crisis 
and the effects of austerity,123 there is all the more reason to be sceptical 
that law offers an efficacious forum for defining the public interest. 
2. US 
As in the EU, the role of law in the US legitimacy narrative has both 
procedural and substantive components. Procedurally, the US narrative 
parallels the EU narrative in many respects. Substantively, however, law 
plays a very different role in the US narrative. Rather than using law to 
develop a normative vision of good regulatory policy, the US narrative 
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focuses on ensuring that the administration engages in a distinctive form 
of administrative decisionmaking and stays within its constitutionally 
sanctioned role. 
The procedural aspect of law in the US narrative can be addressed 
briefly. As in the EU, the US courts enforce a number of due process 
rights meant to ensure that individuals, particularly regulated entities, 
are treated fairly.124 Also as in the EU, procedure in the US is concerned 
with ensuring an adequate information base, in addition to fairness. In 
particular, the US courts have elaborately embroidered the APA’s notice-
and-comment rulemaking process to ensure both that agencies receive 
information from a wide range of sources and that agencies’ provisional 
conclusions are available for public evaluation and criticism.125 Because 
they emphasise improving the information base for regulation, US 
procedural requirements are somewhat less focused on the interests of 
regulated entities than are their EU counterparts. Rather, they can be 
seen as reinforcing analytical quality in administrative decisionmaking. 
If the procedural aspects of the role of law are broadly similar in the 
EU and US narratives, the substantive aspects could not be more 
different. As we saw in chapter 3, the Supreme Court’s Chevron judgment 
marked a decisive turning point for the role of law in the US narrative, 
prompting courts to take a much narrower view of law’s role in defining 
administrative aims.126 The courts have not only accorded agencies 
primary authority for construing their own legislative mandates, but also 
framed the choice among regulatory ends primarily in terms of policy 
rather than law. Whereas the EU courts have relied on general principles 
of law to guide the substantive content of EU risk regulation, the US 
courts have rejected any such role. Perhaps the best example of this is 
the US courts’ steadfast refusal to mandate (or even encourage) cost-
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benefit analysis, despite repeated calls to do so.127 More broadly, several 
American commenters have urged the courts to engage with substantive 
policy in part as a means of counterbalancing the short-term bias of 
politics.128 These suggestions have not been taken up, however. Instead, 
the notion that courts should not involve themselves in questions of good 
policy has become ever more entrenched in the decades following 
Chevron.129 Far from legitimating administrative regulation, intensive 
judicial review of administrative policymaking has come to be seen as 
conflicting with democratic principles.130 
Judicial withdrawal from questions of regulatory policy has not 
caused the US courts to abandon substantive judicial review, however. 
Instead, the focus on substantive review has shifted from the content of 
administrative decisions to the process of administrative decisionmaking 
and, in particular, to ensuring that agencies live up to their assigned 
role, i.e., that they faithfully pursue their legislative mandate and that 
they make decisions on the basis of expert analysis as well as political 
judgment.131 In particular, courts have developed rationality review as a 
means for testing whether agencies have engaged in “administrative” 
decisionmaking by exercising both expert and policy judgment.132 In most 
cases, when courts set aside agency action on substantive grounds their 
apparent concern, though often unstated, is that the action under review 
was made on the basis of political expediency rather than reflective 
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analysis.133 Such “naked” policymaking, as we have seen, is inconsistent 
with other aspects of the US narrative.134 
The substantive aspect of law in the US narrative can thus be 
understood as defining the administration’s institutional identity and its 
place within the larger framework of government. This “legal process” 
approach to substantive review is consistent with the peculiar emphasis 
of American public law on the allocation of decisionmaking authority 
among various government actors, which itself is rooted in the US 
Constitution’s commitment to separation of powers and checks-and-
balances.135 On this understanding, the principal task of judicial review 
is to ensure that the administration stays within its assigned role, 
including by adopting a discernibly administrative approach to regulatory 
problems. In exercising this function, the courts cannot of course wholly 
avoid substantive questions, and deciding whether the agency has 
undertaken an appropriate analysis will have its own substantive 
overtones.136 Nonetheless, by refraining from the development of general 
substantive principles, the US courts have carved out a very different role 
for legal analysis in legitimating administrative regulation. 
D. Summary 
As the foregoing reconstructions show, the EU and US legitimacy 
narratives are complex and resist straightforward comparison. One 
useful way of summarising and distinguishing the two narratives is to 
focus on the distinct ways in which they conceptualise the administration 
and administrative regulation. In the EU narrative, administrative 
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standard setting is understood as an extension of the legislative 
process.137 The various strands of the EU narrative can be read as 
portraying administrative standard setting as a form of idealised 
legislation, in which the administration apprises itself of all relevant 
information and considers the interests of affected parties fairly and 
impartially. Because it lacks the full democratic accountability of the 
legislature, the administration must meet higher standards of rationality 
and fairness in its decisionmaking.138 The EU narrative also recognises 
that the administrator-legislator exercises political discretion, but 
requires that it do so by reference to impersonal regulatory values that 
are enshrined in law and sufficiently concrete to allow for objective 
judicial review.139 In this way, the administration’s discretion is 
sufficiently cabined that its limited democratic legitimacy is 
constitutionally adequate.140 
By contrast, the US narrative posits a conception of administration 
that is discontinuous from the legislative process.141 Administrators in 
the US narrative make decisions on the basis of rigorous technical 
analysis and judgments as to which course of action will best effectuate 
legislative goals.142 This commitment to the exercise of power on the basis 
of knowledge distinguishes the administration from the legislature143 and 
justifies its otherwise anomalous presence within a system based on the 
                                           
137 Bieber and Salomé, ‘Hierarchy of Norms in European Law’ (1996) 33 
C.M.L.Rev. 909, 912; see also European Commission, Communication, 
‘Implementation of Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union’ COM(2009) 673 final, 3. 
138 Azoulay (n.12), 439; TU München (n.60), para. 14; cf. Afton Chemical 
(n.108), Opinion of A.G. Kokott, paras. 53–54. 
139 Gowan (n.8), para. 76; Case C-333/08, Commission v. France [2010] 
ECR I-757, paras. 91–95; ATC (n.22), paras. 98–101. 
140 Cf. Neyer (n.110), 917–19. 
141 Shapiro, Who Guards the Guardians? (University of Georgia 1988)  
42–44. 
142 Landis (n.24), 22–24; Mashaw, ‘Prodelegation: Why Administrators 
Should Make Political Decisions’ (1985) 1 J.L.Econ&Org. 81, 94–95; see 
also State Farm (n.79), 48–50. 
143 Indeed, there is a strand of American legal thought that tends to see 
legislation as deeply irrational. Horwitz (n.26), 27–31. 
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tripartite separation of powers.144 At the same time, the US narrative 
recognises that science alone is insufficient for decisionmaking.145 Like 
EU administrators, US administrators are therefore accorded substantial 
policy discretion.146 Rather than constraining this discretion through law, 
however, the US narrative finds legitimacy for administrative 
policymaking in the president’s democratic mandate.  
Although the two narratives differ in many respects, an important 
commonality is that they both rely on multiple legitimacy vectors to 
provide a complete account of administrative legitimacy. Both narratives 
place great weight on democracy as the touchstone for the legitimate 
exercise of governmental power, but in neither is democracy sufficient. 
Risk regulation must be democratic, but it must also be scientifically 
defensible and it must be consonant with values of justice and fairness. 
Each of these legitimacy vectors responds to specific legal and 
constitutional concerns, but none acts in isolation. Rather, they are 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Thus, the function of each 
vector within the overall legitimacy narrative is defined by reference to 
the other two. Consequently, as the role of any one vector in the narrative 
evolves, it simultaneously brings about changes in the roles of the other 
two. That interdependence is amply demonstrated by the evolution of the 
legitimacy narratives in both jurisdictions in recent decades. 
Analysis of the two narratives confirms Fisher’s argument that 
differences between systems of risk regulation cannot be reduced to 
preferences for democracy versus science.147 Instead, the key differences 
lie in the ways in which scientific analysis and democratic processes 
interact in the production of regulation. In addition, one has to consider 
                                           
144 Goodnow (n.78), 68–69; Shapiro and Levy, ‘Heightened Scrutiny of the 
Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate 
Reasons for Agency Decisions’ [1987] Duke.L.J. 387, 425–28.  
145 Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 105–06 (1983); 
Shapiro, ‘The Frontiers of Science Doctrine: American Experiences with 
the Judicial Control of Science-Based Decision-Making’ in Joerges, et al. 
(eds.) (n.53), 327–29. 
146 Ethyl (n.50), 20. 
147 Fisher (n.122), 14–18. 
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the role of law, both with regard to its role in structuring the relationship 
between democracy and science and as a source of normative 
frameworks and values in its own right. 
Because the roles of democracy, science, and law are complex and 
interdependent, regulatory systems cannot be compared linearly. Instead, 
comparisons must consider how the separate vectors interact in the 
context of particular aspects of the regulatory process. Analysis of the EU 
and US legitimacy narratives also demonstrates the law’s essential role in 
constituting bureaucratic legitimacy. Law structures the interaction of 
the three legitimacy vectors, and law provides the discourse in which 
they combine into a coherent narrative. Legal values and legal reasoning 
thus define what it means for administrative risk regulation to be 
legitimate within each constitutional system. 
II. Explaining the Differences 
Thus far, I have endeavoured to recount the EU and US legitimacy 
narratives and to identify some of the key differences. In this section, I 
suggest some of the reasons for those differences. I say some; I do not 
make any claim that the following discussion exhausts the universe of 
possible causes for the divergence in the two narratives. Instead, my 
analysis is limited to a few possible causes that to me seem highly 
significant. In keeping with the focus of the thesis on legal doctrine, the 
explanations discussed in this section focus on aspects of the two 
jurisdictions’ administrative law frameworks. Other possible causes, such 
as political dynamics and cultural attitudes toward certain technologies, 
are excluded, although I would readily acknowledge their importance in 
comparing EU and US risk regulation programmes overall.148 
                                           
148 The importance of these factors is well-documented by two of the most 
serious observers of EU and US risk regulation. Jasanoff, Designs on 
Nature (n.52), 273–87; Vogel, The Politics of Precaution (Princeton 2012) 
34–42. 
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A. Institutions 
The differences in the EU and US legitimacy narratives can be explained 
in important ways by differences in the two jurisdictions’ institutional 
frameworks. It is well accepted in the literature that institutional 
structures can have profound effects on the ways in which administrative 
bodies make decisions and on the way in which administrative regulation 
develops.149 Less noticed is the effect that institutional structures have 
on the way in which administration is conceptualised within legal 
doctrine. Because courts have limited control over institutional 
arrangements, they have little choice but to formulate their theories of 
administrative legitimacy in ways that justify existing administrative 
institutions. In some cases, of course, the courts have the option of 
declaring institutional arrangements incompatible with primary law,150 
but that option is exceedingly costly both for society and for the courts’ 
own authority.151 Further, some institutional arrangements will be set in 
primary law, making them insusceptible to judicial invalidation. In the 
usual case, therefore, courts must formulate their legitimacy narratives 
to reflect institutional arrangements as they find them. 
In chapter 2, we saw how the EU administration is characterised by 
networked institutions with responsibility and authority for 
administrative decisionmaking spread across multiple bodies. US 
administration, by contrast, is characterised primarily by fully integrated 
and autonomous administrative agencies.152 To some extent, these 
                                           
149 Krapohl, Risk Regulation in the Single Market (Palgrave Macmillan 
2008) 2–5; Lindner and Rittberger, ‘The Creation, Interpretation, and 
Contestation of Institutions: Revisiting Historical Institutionalism’ (2003) 
41 JCMS 445, 451–52. 
150 E.g., Case 9/56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v. High 
Authority [1958] ECR 133, 154; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,  
733–34 (1986). 
151 Consider the (entirely justified) backlash to the Court of Justice’s 
Opinion 2/13, nyr. Eekhout, ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the 
ECHR and Judicial Dialogue—Autonomy or Autarky?’ (2015) JMWP 
01/15, at 39. 
152 Chapter 2, section II.A.1. 
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characterisations oversimplify institutional reality,153 but they are the 
models around which the two legitimacy narratives are built. Looking 
specifically at risk regulation, several differences in the two legitimacy 
narratives can be explained in terms of these differing institutional 
structures. In chapter 4, for example, I argued that the principal 
difference in the two jurisdictions’ models of rational administrative risk 
regulation is the division in the EU between risk assessment and risk 
management and the integration of the two processes in the US.154 
Perhaps the most straightforward explanation for why the EU and US 
have taken divergent approaches on this issue is that a separated 
framework is easier to reconcile with the EU’s networked institutional 
arrangements, whereas an integrated framework better fits the US’s 
consolidated agencies.155 
Under existing EU law, the Commission is responsible for making 
most decisions regarding regulatory standards, at least formally. The 
Commission, however, is a generalist policy-making body with limited 
expert resources. It must, therefore, seek expert advice from other bodies. 
At the same time, the ECJ’s Meroni jurisprudence has, at least until 
recently, seemed to preclude the establishment of agencies possessing 
both significant expert capacity and policymaking power.156 Given these 
constraints, the separation of risk assessment from risk management is 
unsurprising. So long as it is accepted that functionally legitimate risk 
standard setting requires both expert input and politically responsible 
decisionmaking, and so long as the EU’s institutional structure prevents 
those two decisionmaking inputs from being integrated in the same body, 
the expert and political aspects of risk regulation must remain divided. 
Institutions also help to explain the nature of scientific advice in the 
EU. Because EU agencies are themselves networked bodies, rather than 
monolithic institutions, they are more disposed to formulating scientific 
                                           
153 Chapter 2, section II.C. 
154 Chapter 4, section IV. 
155 On the comparison between the EU’s networked administrative 
structure and the US’s preference for consolidated agencies, see chapter 
2, section II.C. 
156 Chapter 2, section II.B.2. 
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opinions in ways that make the influence of multiple perspectives 
explicit. For example, EU agencies allow for the inclusion of minority 
views in scientific opinions.157 The presence of national diversity, as well 
as expert diversity, reinforces this tendency. Comitology in particular 
creates opportunities for Member States to voice differing interpretations 
of scientific evidence, which themselves are likely to reflect national 
values and policy preferences in addition to more narrowly scientific 
considerations.158 By contrast, the integrated structure of US agencies 
tends to submerge divergent expert views within internal agency 
processes so that the agency can be seen as speaking with one voice.159 
Institutional arrangements help to explain not just the process and 
content of scientific advice giving, but also the relative roles of politics 
and science in the two narratives. One consequence of placing scientific 
analysis and political decisionmaking into separate, non-hierarchically 
related institutions is to separate responsibility for those aspects of 
standard setting. The expert body, be it an agency or a committee, is 
responsible only for providing scientific advice. The Commission is 
responsible only for the political decision leading to the final standard. 
Indeed, the principle of independence would seem to preclude the 
Commission from taking responsibility for, and thus inevitably 
influencing, the content of scientific advice.160 This separation of 
responsibility tends to reinforce the framing of administrative standard 
setting as a question for political resolution because it makes clear that 
expert opinion cannot bind the Commission as the final decisionmaker. 
Although the Commission is free to accept the recommendations of 
                                           
157 EFSA, ‘Scientific Opinion on Bisphenol A’ (2010) 8 EFSA Journal 1829; 
EFSA, ‘Joint Scientific Opinion of the GMO and BIOHAZ Panels on the 
“Use of Antibiotic Resistance Genes as Marker Genes in Genetically 
Modified Plants”’ (2009) 7 EFSA Journal 1108; Smith, Terry, and Detken, 
‘10 Years of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the EU Food 
Safety System’ (2012) 7 EFFL 111, 114. 
158 E.g., Short Report of the Meeting of the Standing Committee on the 
Food Chain and Animal Health (Phytopharmaceuticals Section) Held on 3 
October 2003, SCFA 4/2003. 
159 Wagner, Science in Regulation (2013) 132–34. 
160 White Paper on Food Safety (n.66), 17. 
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experts—and most often does—it has less room to claim, as American 
agencies sometimes have done,161 that scientific analysis left it with no 
choice in the matter. 
Institutional arrangements have had very nearly the opposite effect on 
the US legitimacy narrative. In part because the administration is treated 
as a single entity and often personified in a single person, agencies are 
treated in American law as individual minds.162 This conceptualisation of 
the administration has led the US courts to hold that agencies’ scientific 
and political conclusions must be consistent.163 Just as it would be 
nonsensical for a single person to conclude simultaneously that a 
substance is highly dangerous and that the substance should not be 
regulated under a statute that requires regulation of dangerous 
substances, so too it would be irrational for an agency to reach a 
scientific conclusion and then to make a regulatory decision that is 
inconsistent with that conclusion.164 
The structure of American agencies also tends to reinforce a 
particular way of looking at science. Because agencies are unitary 
entities, they are generally assumed to reach unitary conclusions on 
scientific issues. That is not to say that either agencies or the courts do 
not realise that scientific conclusions are virtually always uncertain or 
that other supportable views exist.165 Rather, it means that agencies 
generally take a single position based on their evaluation of the evidence, 
even if that position is that the evidence is too uncertain to draw firm 
conclusions.166 Additionally, US agencies do not have the built-in 
                                           
161 Coglianese and Marchant, ‘Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in 
Setting Risk Standards’ (2004) 152 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1255, 1268–69. 
162 E.g., American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA, 283 F.3d 255, 373 
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(2011) 120 YLJ 1032, 1036–38. 
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diversity of viewpoints exhibited by EU advisory committees and, 
especially, comitology committees. Agencies’ scientific staff tend to be 
career civil servants who have worked at the agency (and together) for a 
number of years, and who therefore come to share a common 
professional outlook.167 Outside review by expert advisory committees, 
when it occurs, tends to focus on whether the agency’s position is 
supportable, rather than on reviewing the full range of plausible 
opinions.168 This disposition toward the agency adopting “a” view tends to 
lessen the need for US administrative law to accommodate diverse 
scientific opinions. It is enough if the agency’s view is supportable and 
consistent with its own prior pronouncements; the fact that there are 
other views, perhaps even better views, is largely irrelevant.169 
A further aspect of the institutional structures of the two systems that 
affects the legitimacy narratives is the relationship of the administration 
to other government institutions. As we have seen, EU administration is 
largely continuous with other aspects of EU governance, and even as 
certain forms of risk standard setting have taken on a distinctively 
administrative character, significant continuity and overlap with the 
legislative process remains.170 In the US, by contrast, a fairly sharp 
distinction is made between the administration and the constitutional 
branches of government.171 
In many ways, the continuity of administration and legislation in the 
EU reflects the EU’s multilevel, networked character, in which 
decisionmaking almost always involves a process of negotiation among 
multiple institutions and between the EU and the Member States 
through comitology committees and the Council. In particular, the need 
                                           
167 Landy, Roberts, and Thomas, The Environmental Protection Agency: 
Asking the Wrong Questions (OUP 1990) 34; McGarity and Shapiro, 
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to ensure the broad acceptability of both process and outcomes to all 
Member States tends to make negotiation and deliberation the preferred 
form of decisionmaking, whether the particular forum is legislative or 
administrative.172 In the US, by contrast, the distinctiveness of the 
administrative process is the basis of most theories of administrative 
legitimacy. The delegation of standard setting authority to bodies outside 
the constitutional branches is permissible, in part, because the 
administration has the capability to address problems in a way that the 
legislature cannot. On that theory, however, administrative agencies may 
not simply act like legislatures; they must apply a distinctive form of 
administrative rationality, including expert analysis, to the resolution of 
regulatory problems.173 
This difference in the relationship between the administration and 
other institutions helps to explain the relative prominence of political 
decisionmaking in the EU legitimacy narrative versus the prominence of 
expertise in the US because it explains what the courts think the 
administration should be doing. The EU administration’s goal is to find 
regulatory solutions that, while respecting the available scientific 
evidence, are acceptable to the broadest possible constituency of 
Institutions and Member States.174 Hence, the EU legitimacy narrative 
emphasises the political and negotiated nature of decisionmaking, and 
only focuses on science when restrictions on individual liberty—i.e., 
considerations that are not thought proper for political resolution—are at 
issue.175 The purpose of American administration is to provide expert 
analysis to produce better policy solutions; purely political questions can 
be decided by Congress or the president within their respective spheres. 
Expertise must therefore be an integral component of all administrative 
decisionmaking.176 
                                           
172 Harlow and Rawlings (n.104), 78; Joerges and Neyer, ‘From 
Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The 
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173 Rabin (n.24), 1267; Shapiro (n.141), 74–75. 
174 Cf. Poiares Maduro (n.111), 164–66. 
175 E.g., Bergaderm (n.58), paras. 58–59. 
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Legitimacy narratives reconcile government practices with 
constitutional values. For the most part, institutional structures are 
given premises around which those narratives must be constructed, and 
those premises affect the shape of the subsequent narratives. What is 
particularly worth noting is that the institutional arrangements that have 
had such a profound effect on the ways in which the EU and the US 
regulate risk were initially created without regard to the particular 
problems or needs of risk regulation. American administrative agencies 
are the product of nineteenth century government reform movements, 
working long before risk regulation was an important administrative 
task.177 The EU’s networked administration initially developed to 
implement market regulation, particularly in the agricultural sector.178 
Yet in both jurisdictions these early institutional arrangements have 
become the default pattern for administration generally and have 
produced many of the assumptions about what administration is and 
how it works.179 Institutional arrangements are thus prime examples of 
how the broader administrative-constitutional framework shapes the 
practice of risk regulation independently of concerns specific to risk 
regulation itself. 
B. Legal Culture 
A second partial explanation for the divergence between the EU and US 
legitimacy narratives is legal culture. As discussed in chapter 1, 
legitimacy narratives are necessarily intertwined with legal culture 
because it is legal culture that, to a large extent, determines the 
plausibility of legitimacy narratives. Legal culture is also complex and 
many-layered. That is especially the case with EU legal culture, which is 
only slowly emerging from the mingling of many European legal cultures. 
Accordingly, it would not be possible in this space to attempt to address 
all of the aspects of legal culture that contribute to differences between 
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the EU and US legitimacy narratives. Instead, this section will focus on 
just two aspects of legal culture that I believe are particularly relevant to 
the differences observed in the two narratives. The first concerns styles of 
legal reasoning and, in particular, the rejection of categorical legal 
reasoning in American legal culture. The second, which is closely related 
to the first, concerns the proper roles of courts and agencies within a 
democratic system of government. 
1. Categorical legal reasoning and 
legal realism 
“Categorical legal reasoning”, also sometimes known as “formalist 
reasoning”, is an approach to legal analysis that attempts to resolve legal 
questions by deductive reasoning from basic legal concepts or 
categories.180 This type of reasoning prevailed in the nineteenth century 
in both common law and civil law systems and continues to be common 
in civil law systems today.181 In the US, however, categorical legal 
reasoning came under sustained intellectual assault in the early 
twentieth century by the legal realists. As a result, categorical legal 
reasoning is much less accepted as a valid mode of legal argument in 
contemporary American legal culture.182 
Legal realism was a multifaceted movement in American 
jurisprudence that extended from the late nineteenth century to 
approximately the 1940s. The central insight of legal realism was the 
recognition of the logical impossibility of deciding most cases by 
deductive reasoning from abstract legal concepts.183 Thus, any legal 
decision ultimately required a disputable act of judgment, and realism 
sought to lay bare this value-laden aspect of judging. As a result of this 
                                           
180 Horwitz (n.26), 17–19; Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo, The Civil Law 
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critique, American lawyers, both academic and practicing, broadly accept 
that judicial decisions are a kind of law making.184 One consequence of 
this critique was that legal rules could only be evaluated by their social 
effects, a task for which the intellectual tools of categorical legal 
reasoning were unsuited. Instead, these effects had to be studied using 
the tools of sociology, economics, and political science.185 The realists’ 
commitment to social science as the basis for law reform provided much 
of the intellectual foundation of the New Deal administrative state. 
Agencies could regulate more effectively than common law courts 
because they had the capacity to engage in empirical analysis, and this 
capacity was vital to the legitimacy of the new agencies.186 
European lawyers might respond—with some force—that the realist 
critique is overdrawn and that categorical legal reasoning within the civil 
law tradition is much more sophisticated than the nineteenth century 
American version against which the realists were reacting.187 However 
one resolves that debate, the persistence of categorical legal reasoning in 
Europe and its rejection in the US has resulted in real differences in the 
ways in which questions of administrative law are framed and analysed, 
and it has contributed to the differences in which the two legitimacy 
narratives are formulated. 
Several aspects of the US narrative are related to the pervasive 
influence of legal realism on American legal culture. First, the rejection of 
conceptual legal analysis explains the lack of reliance on legal concepts—
e.g., the precautionary principle, proportionality, legitimate 
expectations—as mechanisms for judicial control of administration. 
Because these concepts are indeterminate, they cannot, on the realist 
view, guide judicial decisions. Second, the realist focus on empiricism 
helps to explain the prominent role of expertise in the US narrative. From 
a realist perspective, it is the practical effects of regulation that most 
matter, and these can only be assessed empirically. Agencies are capable 
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of this type of analysis, whereas other government bodies are not. Finally, 
the emphasis on the importance of administrative discretion reflects the 
realist belief that effective regulation depends more on careful attention 
to the specific facts of each problem, than on the consistent application 
of general rules.188 
Although the realists’ work is not unknown to European lawyers, it 
has not had nearly so great an influence on European legal culture. More 
so than even nineteenth century common law, traditional civil law 
analysis relies heavily on categorical reasoning. And much more so than 
in contemporary American law, that mode of analysis continues to persist 
in civil law systems.189 EU law is largely based on civil law and, probably 
more importantly, almost all EU judges, as well as the majority of the 
lawyers working in the Institutions, have been trained in the civil law 
tradition. The result is that judgments of the EU courts continue to 
employ categorical legal reasoning to an extent that can be striking to an 
American reader.190 The most obvious example in the area of risk 
regulation is the EU courts’ jurisprudence on the precautionary principle, 
but similar differences can be found in other doctrinal areas, such as EU 
delegation doctrine’s focus on the essential elements of policy choices191 
or the focus on the core nature of economic rights in determining the 
limits of the EU’s regulatory powers.192 
Just as the influence of realism helps to explain various aspects of the 
American narrative, the continued reliance on categorical reasoning helps 
to explain various aspects of the European narrative. Of particular 
importance, the continued acceptance of categorical legal reasoning 
provides important support for the normative aspects of EU law on risk 
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regulation. Whereas realism renders concepts like precaution or the 
public interest hopelessly vague, categorical legal reasoning reaffirms the 
possibility of a conceptual, idealistic approach to questions of public 
policy.193 Put differently, it allows the EU courts to avoid distinguishing 
sharply between legal and normative questions, a distinction that has 
arguably hindered the development of a robust normative discourse on 
risk regulation in US law.194 
2. The role of courts and the 
“countermajoritarian difficulty” 
The broad acceptance of legal realism reinforced another aspect of 
American legal culture that has profoundly affected the US narrative: 
anxiety over the legitimacy of judicial review or what Alexander Bickel 
famously dubbed the “countermajoritarian difficulty”.195 Put simply, the 
countermajoritarian difficulty accepts that judicial decisions are a type of 
law making and then demands to know why judicial law making is 
legitimate in a democratic society, particularly when it involves setting 
aside the contrary judgments of democratic institutions.196 Since Bickel 
published his famously limited defence of judicial review, doubts 
regarding its legitimacy have been a key feature of American public law. 
Those doubts were reinforced by some of the Supreme Court’s 
controversial decisions of the 1970s, particularly Roe v. Wade,197 which 
found a constitutional right to elective abortion in certain 
circumstances.198 By wading into areas in which moral opinion was 
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sharply divided, the Court helped to fuel a strong backlash against 
“government by judges”.199 This scepticism toward judicial review creates 
strong pressure for American judges to avoid passing on policy questions 
(or, on a more cynical view, to conceal that they are doing so). 
Although concerns with the countermajoritarian difficulty originally 
focused on policymaking by courts, those concerns were soon extended 
to administrative policymaking. Critics began to ask why it should be 
acceptable for “unelected bureaucrats”, any more than unelected judges, 
to make policy decisions of enormous significance.200 An early, but 
extremely powerful, example of that anxiety can be seen in the various 
opinions in the Benzene case, most prominently that of Justice 
Rehnquist who argued that vesting such policymaking discretion in 
agencies was flatly unconstitutional.201 As Lisa Bressman shows, 
countermajoritarian concerns strongly influenced both academic and 
judicial writing on administrative law and contributed to the rise of 
political accountability as the primary concern of administrative law and 
the shift toward Presidential Administration.202 At the same time, concern 
over the countermajoritarian difficulty helps to explain the increasing 
reticence of courts to set aside agency actions on substantive grounds. 
That is particularly so as the current generation of judges were trained in 
an era in which academic concern over the countermajoritarian difficulty 
was at its height. 
As Craig and Stone Sweet, among others, have observed, continental 
legal cultures exhibit much less anxiety over the countermajoritarian 
difficulty in judicial review.203 Quite the contrary, the prevailing attitude 
                                           
199 Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood (University of  
California 1985). 
200 Bressman (n.79), 481–82. 
201 Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 
448 U.S. 607, 686–87 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Justice Thomas has recently revisited these concerns, above n.23. 
202 Bressman (n.79), 480–85. 
203 Craig (n.4), 494–95; Stone Sweet (n.95), 2779. The 
countermajoritarian difficulty is a concern in British legal culture, 
although to a lesser extent than in the US. In particular, several British 
commentators have criticised the “activist” approach of the Court of 
 Retelling the Legitimacy Narratives 309 
  
is that robust judicial review is an important check on democratic 
decisionmaking.204 Acceptance of substantive judicial review is related to 
the tendency of European legal cultures to draw sharper distinctions 
between legal and political questions, which is itself made possible by the 
persistence of categorical legal reasoning. If anything, that tendency is 
magnified in the EU context, in which the attenuated nature of 
democratic control would seem to justify a more robust judicial role.205 
Comparatively lesser concern regarding judicial policymaking, especially 
as regards rights and general principles of law, facilitates greater 
involvement by the EU courts in developing a normative framework 
around risk regulation. More broadly, it has allowed the emergence of a 
prominent role for law and legal analysis in contributing to the legitimacy 
of EU risk regulation. 
Just as different idealised conceptions of the administration have 
shaped the two narratives, so too have different ideal understandings of 
the judiciary. In particular, differences in European and American 
attitudes toward the involvement of courts in policymaking have 
contributed to different understandings of the relative roles of courts, 
administrators, and other government institutions in the administrative 
process, and have resulted in different allocations of authority for various 
aspects of decisionmaking on risk. Because different government actors 
rely on different discourses of justification for their actions, these 
allocations of authority also contribute to the ways in which the two 
legitimacy narratives combine law, expertise, and policy to legitimate 
administrative standard setting. 
                                                                                                                   
Justice. Tridimas, ‘The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism’ (1996) 21 
ELR 199, 207 (defending the European Court of Justice against charges 
of activism); see also Hartley, ‘The European Court, Judicial Objectivity 
and the Constitution of the European Union’ (1996) 112 LQR 95. 
204 Van Bogdandy and Bast (n.4), 345–47. 
205 Everson (n.111), 213–14; Poiares Maduro (n.111), 70–72, 166–68; cf 
Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (CUP 1999) 107–16.  
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III. Conclusion 
The narratives the EU and US courts tell to explain the legitimacy of 
administrative risk regulation are textured and complex. Though they are 
built of the same basic elements, they depict very different visions of the 
administration, its capacities, and its relationships to law, expertise, and 
politics. These differing visions of administration, in turn, help to explain 
the different ways in which courts in the two jurisdictions approach the 
legal problems of risk regulation. In particular, they help to define the 
role of law in constituting the legitimacy of administrative risk regulation. 
In doing so, they demonstrate that the solutions adopted by each 
jurisdiction would face serious problems if adopted by the other. They 
also show the connections in both jurisdictions between the law of risk 
regulation and basic normative commitments regarding good 
government. In the next and final chapter, I dig deeper into these 
normative commitments and explore whether they have produced 
coherent models of risk regulation and what implications they might have 
for reform of the regulatory process. 
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6 
Conclusion— 
The Legitimacy Narratives as 
Responses to the Social Problem of Risk 
In the last chapter, I pulled together various elements of EU and US 
administrative law doctrine and restated them as narratives that explain 
the constitutional legitimacy of administrative risk regulation in each 
system. I also showed how those narratives related to each system’s basic 
commitments regarding constitutional government and the 
administration’s place within it. Taken on their own terms, from the 
internal perspective of the two legal systems, both narratives tell coherent 
stories about why aspects of risk regulation are entrusted to the 
administration and why doing so is consistent with basic constitutional 
commitments to democracy, rights, and fairness. That is not to say that 
either narrative is impervious to internal attack, and both narratives 
remain controversial within their own legal systems. Both narratives 
should, however, be seen as organic expressions of each jurisdiction’s 
constitutional culture and as capable of making sense of risk regulation 
within their respective public law traditions. 
In this final chapter, I turn the analysis around and examine the two 
legitimacy narratives as legal responses to the social problem of 
technological risk. In particular, I look at two aspects of risk regulation 
that have often proved controversial: the incorporation of scientific 
expertise and the consideration of socio-political concerns. In some ways, 
of course, science and socio-political concerns are two sides of the same 
coin. Making an analytical distinction between them, however, helps to 
illuminate different aspects of the narratives. I first consider whether the 
two narratives incorporate realistic understandings of risk science and its 
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limitations. I argue that both narratives take a reasonable approach to 
science and that current doctrine is flexible enough to allow 
administrators to rely on science in a variety of appropriate ways. 
Second, I look at how well the two narratives respond to the range of 
social concerns posed by technology. I argue that when the problem of 
risk regulation is framed in terms of safety, both narratives are adequate 
legal responses to the social problem of risk. I also argue, however, that 
both narratives are resistant to a broader framing of risk in terms of 
technology choice, and that as a result neither system of administrative 
risk regulation is well-suited to addressing the full range of social 
concerns posed by technology. As a consequence, the prevailing 
narratives will likely prove unsatisfactory whenever non-safety concerns 
regarding technology come to the fore. In a brief conclusion, I reflect on 
the implications of this thesis for future comparative research on EU and 
US risk regulation. 
I. The Legitimacy Narratives as Responses to the Problem of 
Technological Risk 
A. Science 
Systems of risk regulation that rely on science to inform the standard 
setting process must incorporate a realistic understanding of the types of 
information that science can (and cannot) provide. From time to time, 
both the EU and the US systems of risk regulation have been criticised 
for failing in this regard, particularly for assuming that science can 
provide a neutral basis for setting risk standards.1 If those criticisms are 
correct, they raise serious doubts about the adequacy of the narratives 
because, as we have seen, in both jurisdictions the incorporation of 
                                           
1 Wagner, ‘The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation’ (1995) 95 
Colum.L.Rev. 1613, 1661–67; Coglianese and Marchant, ‘Shifting Sands: 
The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards’ (2004) 152 U.Pa.L.Rev. 
1255, 1274–82; van Asselt and Vos, ‘The Precautionary Principle and the 
Uncertainty Paradox’ (2006) 9 JRR 313, 324–29; van Zwanenberg and 
Stirling, ‘Risk and Precaution in the US and Europe: A Response to Vogel’ 
(2003) 3 YEEL 43, 44–49. 
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scientific expertise into the regulatory process is necessary to provide a 
complete account of the constitutional legitimacy of administrative risk 
regulation. In reviewing these objections, there are two aspects to 
consider. First, how realistic is the courts’ understanding of science in 
the case law, and second, how does the role of science in the narratives 
interact with the larger administrative process. 
1. Science in the courts’ case law 
The complexities of risk science were discussed extensively in chapter 1 
and can be reviewed briefly.2 For a number of reasons, scientific 
knowledge on most risk regulation questions is uncertain to highly 
uncertain, which means that regulators will have to make decisions on 
the basis of incomplete information.3 Moreover, because scientific 
evidence on risk issues it typically incomplete and ambiguous, that 
evidence will often be open to competing interpretations.4 Finally, issues 
of complexity and ignorance mean that even when very reliable scientific 
information is available, knowledge of risk will never be complete.5 For 
these reasons, risk science will almost always be contestable. This 
contestability is particularly salient for risk assessment, in which the 
results will often depend heavily on how the assessment is framed.6 
Scientific conclusions on risk are thus always the product of judgment, 
although the expert judgment applied in reaching those conclusions may 
                                           
2 Chapter 1, section I.C. 
3 McGarity, ‘Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative 
Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA 
and OSHA’ (1979) 67 Geo.L.J. 729, 736. 
4 Renn, Risk Governance (Earthscan 2008) 74–79. 
5 Stirling, ‘Risk, Uncertainty and Precaution: Some Instrumental 
Implications from the Social Sciences’ in Berkhout, Leach, and Scoones 
(eds.), Negotiating Environmental Change (Edward Elgar 2003) 45–47. 
6 Fisher, ‘Risk and Environmental Law: A Beginner’s Guide’ in 
Richardson and Wood (eds.), Environmental Law for Sustainability (Hart 
2006) 100. 
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be distinguished from other types of judgment necessary to the 
regulatory process.7 
Bearing these characteristics in mind, analysis of the case law shows 
that neither narrative rests on fundamentally mistaken understandings 
of science or its capabilities. To the contrary, courts in both jurisdictions 
have grappled in various ways with scientific indeterminacy. While the 
case law is not sufficiently detailed to show that judges have a deep 
theoretical understanding of risk science, it does show that they have 
grasped the nub of the problem. And although cases can be found in 
both jurisdictions that seem to portray science as a neutral, objective, 
and determinate source of knowledge, it is much more common to find 
examples of courts recognising the need for judgment in interpreting and 
applying scientific advice. 
First, both the EU or the US courts have acknowledged that science is 
an insufficient basis for risk standard setting in most circumstances. 
That recognition is most explicit in the EU, in which the political nature 
of risk regulation is a steady refrain,8 but there are also numerous 
examples of US courts holding that standard setting calls for a 
“legislative policy judgment”.9 At a minimum, these cases show that both 
EU and US courts understand that risk standards must be based on 
policy considerations, in addition to science. There is also ample evidence 
that courts understand the inherent uncertainty of risk science and the 
need for judgment in drawing conclusions from scientific evidence. In the 
EU, this understanding is best exemplified by the courts’ recognition of 
the legitimacy of minority scientific positions as a basis for standard 
                                           
7 National Research Council, Science and Decisions: Advancing Risk 
Assessment (NAP 2009) 31; see also Kitcher, The Advancement of Science 
(OUP 1993) 182–88; Longino, Science as Social Knowledge (Princeton 
1990) 76–82. 
8 Case C-77/09, Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços Lda. v. 
Ministero della Salute [2010] ECR I-13533, para. 82; Case T-13/99, Pfizer 
Animal Health SA v. Council [2002] ECR II-3305, para. 201. 
9 Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 
(D.C.Cir.1974); accord Mississippi v. EPA, 744 F.3d 1344, 1355 
(D.C.Cir.2013). 
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setting,10 and by their frequent holding that when the administration is 
making complex assessments, its “discretion also applies, to some extent, 
to the establishment of the factual basis of its action.”11 Some American 
courts have gone further, frankly acknowledging that scientific 
conclusions are matters of expert and policy judgment and that 
conflicting views among experts often cannot be settled definitively.12 
Finally, courts in both jurisdictions have held that drawing conclusions 
from inevitably uncertain science is the prerogative of the administration, 
subject to only narrow judicial review.13 In this regard, courts have 
implicitly viewed matters of scientific judgment as implicating questions 
of policy and have assigned responsibility for those policy choices to the 
administration.14 
Although courts in both jurisdictions recognise that risk science is 
inherently uncertain and indeterminate, they both also appear to view 
science as a discourse independent from politics and the normative 
evaluation of technology.15 That view assumes the existence of at least 
some ascertainable facts and the possibility of evaluating the reliability of 
various methodological approaches for ascertaining those facts. This 
understanding of science is integral to the role of science in the 
legitimacy narratives as a basis for informing and constraining 
administrative decisionmaking because it creates an independent 
                                           
10 Gowan (n.8), para. 77. 
11 Case T-75/06, Bayer CropScience AG v. Commission [2008] ECR II-
2081, para. 141; Pfizer (n.8), para. 168. 
12 Marsh v. Oregon Department of Natural Resources, 490 U.S. 360, 378 
(1989); Cellular Phone Task Force v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82, 90–92 
(2d.Cir.2000). 
13 Case C-601/11 P, France v. Commission, para. 142; Case T-475/07, 
Dow AgroSciences Ltd. v. Commission [2011] ECR II-5937, para. 280; 
Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983). 
14 Pfizer (n.8), para. 201; Baltimore Gas (n.13), 105; cf. Edley, 
Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy (Yale 
1990) 112. 
15 Chapter 4, section IV. 
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benchmark by which the conformity of administrative decisions with 
legislative goals and the public interest may be judged.16 
This understanding of science is also controversial. As discussed in 
chapter 1, the social constructivist view of science denies that scientific 
knowledge is independent from the social structures that produce it. On 
this account, scientific conclusions are inherently socio-political, such 
that reliance on science as a benchmark by which to assess 
administrative policymaking is circular.17 There is no easy answer to this 
objection inasmuch as one’s position depends ultimately on one’s view of 
basic epistemological questions.18 When thinking about how courts 
approach science, however, it may be useful to consider the interaction 
between understandings of science and other aspects of legal doctrine. As 
discussed more fully below, both systems rely on an essentially liberal 
view of the legitimacy of the exercise of coercive government power.19 
That view, in turn, relies on the ability of the government to provide 
objective reasons for restricting individual liberty.20 Frequently, such 
reasons are grounded in understandings of the functioning of the 
external world, and that is particularly the case with risk regulation. The 
difficulties a constructivist view poses for normative evaluation of 
technology would greatly complicate the administration’s ability to offer 
adequate reasons to justify risk regulation within a liberal theory of 
government.21 For this reason, the rejection of constructivist approaches 
                                           
16 Seidenfeld, ‘Hard Look Review in a World of Techno-Bureaucratic 
Decisionmaking: A Reply to Professor McGarity’ (1997) 75 Tex.L.Rev. 559, 
562–65; Everson and Vos, ‘European Risk Governance in a Global 
Context’ in Vos (ed.), European Risk Governance (Connex 2008) 25–29. 
17 Thorpe, ‘Political Theory in Science and Technology Studies’ in 
Hackett, Amsterdamska, Lynch, and Wajcman (eds.), The Handbook of 
Science and Technology Studies (3d ed., MIT 2007) 64–66. 
18 Chakravartty, A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism (CUP 2007) 16–26. 
19 Section B.2. 
20 1 Tribe, American Constitutional Law (3d ed., Foundation Press 2000) 
1332–43; Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd ed., OUP 2006) 
311–13. 
21 Chapter 1, section I.C.3; Radder, ‘Normative Reflexions on 
Constructivist Approaches to Science and Technology’ (1992) 22 
Soc.Stud.Sci. 141, 156–57. 
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to science can be seen as not just an epistemological assumption, but 
also a normative commitment of both legal systems. That commitment 
may seem misplaced to adherents of the social constructivist position, 
but its existence underscores the point that these debates cannot be 
resolved solely by reference to the nature of concepts like science or risk, 
but must be extended to include basic questions about the necessary 
conditions for the legitimate exercise of government power. 
2. Science in the administrative process 
We can reject, therefore, any conclusion that courts are simply operating 
on the basis of erroneous understandings of science. But the fact that 
courts have a reasonable grasp of the limits of risk science does not 
mean that their jurisprudence reflects the realities of the administrative 
process. Recognising the judgment-laden nature of scientific advice, both 
jurisdictions’ legitimacy narratives attempt, in different ways, to subject 
scientific advice to democratic control.22 Yet at the same time, both 
narratives rely to some extent on science and expertise to constrain 
political decisionmaking.23 These goals are in obvious tension, and the 
two jurisdictions manage that tension in markedly different ways. 
As we saw in chapter 4, the EU courts approach the tension rather 
straightforwardly by bifurcating the standard setting process into a 
scientific and a political component.24 In this way, regulatory 
decisionmaking stays firmly in political hands, while scientific advice 
giving remains independent from politics, thereby providing a basis for 
the evaluation of political judgment.25 The virtues of this approach are 
that it is easy for courts to administer and that it unambiguously places 
responsibility for standard setting on political decisionmakers. The main 
                                           
22 Christoforou, ‘The Precautionary Principle and Democratizing 
Expertise: A European Legal Perspective’ (2003) 30 Sci.Pub.Pol’y 205, 
209–10; Doremus, ‘Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental 
Policy’ (2007) 86 Tex.L.Rev. 1601, 1639–41. 
23 Chapter 5, section I.B. 
24 European Commission, ‘Communication on the Precautionary 
Principle’ COM(2000) 1 final, 12. 
25 Everson and Vos (n.16), 25. 
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drawback is that it tends to disregard the normative judgments that 
must take place in the formulation of scientific advice. Excluding overt 
consideration of policy from the scientific advice-giving process, creates a 
lacuna in which important political choices may be made without the 
processes necessary to render them legitimate. What is more, it tends to 
obfuscate important aspects of the decisionmaking process, thereby 
impeding accountability.26 
In evaluating these objections, we should first note that the 
separation of risk assessment from risk management is not as sharp as 
the courts’ language might suggest. For example, political actors play an 
important role in framing the questions posed to expert bodies. Often the 
salient issues are specified by the EU legislature in primary law,27 and in 
most cases expert opinions are rendered in response to requests from the 
Commission, which gives the Commission considerable influence over 
how the assessment is framed. In some cases, the Treaties themselves 
frame the risk in important ways.28 Additionally, the Commission has the 
power to respond to expert opinions by requesting clarifications or 
additional advice, a power that has been employed in response to issues 
that have arisen during the comitology process.29 This practice helps to 
ensure that the advice being given responds to the concerns of the 
relevant political actors. 
In addition to the Commission’s ability to influence the risk 
assessment process, there are good reasons to believe that regulatory 
decisionmakers are well-equipped to review expert recommendations 
critically. First, although the Commission lacks deep expert resources, it 
cannot be considered an uninformed consumer of scientific information, 
and Commission staff generally have deep familiarity with the issues they 
work on, including the key scientific issues.30 The staff’s knowledge can 
also be supplemented by the Commission’s own, albeit limited, expert 
                                           
26 Lee, EU Environmental Law (2d ed., Hart 2014) 52–56. 
27 E.g., Regulation (EC) 1107/2009 concerning the placing of plant 
protection products on the market &c. [2009] OJ L309/1, Annex II. 
28 E.g., Case C-1/00, Commission v. France [2001] ECR I-9989, para. 24. 
29 E.g., Gowan (n.8), paras. 30–44. 
30 Nugent, The European Commission (Palgrave 2001) 179. 
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resources.31 Second, EU administrative procedure builds-in many 
opportunities for scrutiny of expert advice. One forum for that scrutiny is 
the expert committee itself, which is meant to bring together a number of 
experts with diverse backgrounds and institutional affiliations.32 Expert 
advice is also scrutinised by the Member States in the comitology 
process. Even more so than the Commission, the Member States are well-
placed to evaluate expert advice critically, and there are several examples 
of Member States challenging the scientific conclusions of EU bodies.33 
Finally, expert advice is at times actively scrutinised by other actors 
including the European Parliament and both environmental and business 
NGOs.34 Although scrutiny from these bodies is more ad hoc, it can be 
especially effective in broadening the range of perspectives brought to 
bear on scientific issues. 
There is thus good reason to believe that the EU’s approach can work, 
but there are also reasons for caution. The EU system has failed in the 
past, most notably during the BSE crisis.35 That episode changed 
attitudes in the EU toward risk regulation, however, resulting in a much 
                                           
31 Chapter 2, section II.B.1. 
32 Chapter 2, section II.B.2. The reality of this diversity is questionable, 
however; see below. 
33 Consider, for example, the circumstances recounted in Gowan (n.8); 
Case T-240/10, Hungary v. Commission, nyr, paras. 23–41; Case T-
229/04, Sweden v. Commission [2007] ECR II-2437, paras. 32–41; 
Weimer and Pisani, ‘Expertise as Justification—The Contested 
Legitimation of the EU “Risk Administration”’ in Weimer and de Ruijter 
(eds.), Regulating Risks in the European Union—The Co-production of 
Expert and Executive Power (Hart 2016) (forthcoming). 
34 Greenpeace, The EU GMO Environmental Risk Assessment Needs 
Reforming (September 2008), http://www.greenpeace.org/eu-
unit/en/Publications/2009-and-earlier/Reform-of-EU-GMO-risk-
assessment; American Chemistry Council and Cefic, Joint Statement on 
WHO-UNEP 2012 report on Endocrine Disruptors (March 2014), 
http://www.cefic.org/Policy-Centre/Environment--health/Endocrine-
Disruption-Modulators. 
35 European Parliament, ‘Report on alleged contraventions or 
maladministration in the implementation of Community law in relation to 
BSE &c.’, A4-0020/97 (1997); van Zwanenberg and Millstone, BSE: Risk, 
Science, and Governance (OUP 2005) 181–95. 
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stronger culture of vigilance.36 Europe’s experience with BSE may, 
therefore, actually be a reason for increased confidence. More recently, 
concerns have been raised—most prominently by the Parliament—about 
diversity and balance on expert committees, with the charge being that 
they are tilted in favour of industrial perspectives.37 The European 
Ombudsman also conducted an Own Initiative Inquiry into the 
composition of expert committees and concluded that the Commission 
could make several improvements in its selection process.38 Those 
concerns must be taken seriously, as biased committees could 
undermine one of the most important safeguards in the EU system. At 
the same time, however, the fact that this issue has been pressed and is 
receiving attention at the highest political levels suggests that there are 
sufficient overlapping sources of critical oversight to make a system-wide 
failure unlikely. 
Although there have been many calls in the US to adopt a bifurcated 
approach similar to the EU’s,39 those calls have not been heeded, and US 
administrative law has generally refused to draw a sharp distinction 
between the political and scientific aspects of standard setting.40 Instead, 
                                           
36 Vogel, The Politics of Precaution (Princeton 2012) 76; Vos, ‘EU Food 
Safety Regulation in the Aftermath of the BSE Crisis’ (2000) 23 
J.Consumer.Pol’y 227, 233–36. 
37 Nielsen, ‘MEPs Withhold Millions from EU Commission over 
Transparency’ (October 22, 2014) EU Observer, https://euobserver.com/ 
justice/126194. 
38 European Ombudsman, Own-initiative inquiry OI/6/2014 concerning 
the composition of Commission expert groups; see also Lee, 
‘Accountability and Co-Production Beyond Courts: The Role of the 
European Ombudsman’ in Weimer and de Ruijter (n.33). 
39 Such calls prompted the analysis that resulted in the 1983 Redbook, 
although the authors of that report declined to endorse a rigid 
separation. National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal 
Government: Managing the Process (NAP 1983) 140–43. More recent calls 
for partial separation include Bagley and Revesz, ‘Centralized Oversight 
of the Regulatory State’ (2006) 106 Colum.L.Rev. 1260, 1323–24 and 
Graham, ‘Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics’ 
(2008) 157 U.Pa.L.Rev. 395, 464–65. 
40 This is another area in which it is important to note that 
administrative practice varies, and some programmes are more separated 
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the US manages the tension by placing politically responsible 
administrators in charge of the provision of scientific advice.41 Involving 
political decisionmakers in the production of scientific advice decreases 
the risk that the perspectives of experts will dominate the political 
debate, but it increases the risk that political actors will apply pressure 
to skew scientific advice-giving.42 The result may be that decisions made 
on purely political grounds can be cloaked in scientific conclusions and 
to some extent immunised from political scrutiny.43 
Just as the EU approach requires robust political scrutiny of expert 
advice, the reliability of the US approach depends upon the existence of 
mechanisms for evaluating the process of expert advice-giving to ensure 
that political influence is kept in check. To an extent, that function is 
performed by independent advisory committees, but resort to such 
committees in the US is inconsistent and not always well-publicised.44 
Judicial review is a more important source of scrutiny, and as discussed 
in chapter 4, one focus of contemporary US judicial review is on ferreting 
out possible illegitimate political influence on scientific analysis.45 
Finally, many of the procedural aspects of US administrative law are 
directed at facilitating scrutiny of administrative decisions, not only by 
courts, but also by interested parties,46 and both industry and pro-
regulatory groups make frequent use of these mechanisms to interrogate 
agency science. The system is thus not without safeguards.47 At the same 
time, however, scrutiny of regulatory science is less institutionalised in 
                                                                                                                   
than others. US administrative law has never imposed a separation 
requirement similar to the EU principle of independence, however. 
41 Chapter 2, section II.A.1. 
42 Chapter 4, section II.F. 
43 Wagner (n.1), 1651–54. 
44 Wagner, Science in Regulation (2013) 152–54. 
45 Section II.E. 
46 American Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 237–38 
(D.C.Cir.2008); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 
F.2d 240, 251 (2d.Cir.1977); Leventhal, ‘Environmental Decisionmaking 
and the Role of the Courts’ (1974) 122 U.Pa.L.Rev. 509, 540–41. 
47 Wagner, Barnes and Peters, ‘Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical 
Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards’ (2011) 63 Admin.L.Rev. 99, 
136–42. 
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the US than in the EU. There is no guarantee, for example, that every 
regulatory decision will be scrutinised by a capable NGO or that courts 
will successfully detect inappropriate political influence. There may, 
therefore, be greater possibilities for “science bending” to go uncorrected. 
In sum, there is reason to conclude that both the EU and the US 
administrations possess sufficient freedom to make appropriate use of 
scientific advice. Whether they actually do so is a much more difficult 
question that would require extensive empirical investigation that cannot 
be pursued in this thesis. Mostly likely, the answer varies, perhaps 
considerably, among regulatory programmes and regulatory bodies. We 
may conclude on the basis of doctrinal analysis, however, that when 
administrators fall short in their use of science, blame for that failure lies 
with the administrators themselves. Though the EU and US narratives 
channel the role of scientific expertise in the administrative process in 
various ways, neither materially impedes a range of sensitive and 
appropriate uses of science in the regulatory process. 
But is it enough not to impede? Should the courts go further and 
push administrators in the direction of better uses of science? On the 
whole, such efforts seem unadvisable, at least so long as other fora 
remain available for proposing reforms. In the first place, it is not clear 
that courts are especially competent to engage with these issues in detail. 
Although I have argued that courts grasp the basic problems of risk 
science, it seems unlikely that many judges have studied them closely, 
much less devoted substantial thought to how administrators can best 
manage the limits of risk science. These issues are not simple, and there 
is substantial risk courts would worsen existing practice rather than 
improve it.48 In particular, courts have a tendency to push administrators 
in the direction of trial-like procedures, but in many circumstances such 
procedures are likely to be poorly suited to addressing the role of science 
in regulation. 
                                           
48 Certainly, the US experience with judicial innovation in administrative 
procedure has been much-criticised. E.g., Pierce, ‘Seven Ways to Deossify 
Agency Rulemaking’ (1995) 47 Admin.L.Rev. 59, 60–66. 
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An additional reason to reject greater judicial intervention is that 
procedures for incorporating science into regulatory decisionmaking are 
controversial. Although there may be general agreement on the limits of 
risk science, there is legitimate—and I would argue fruitful—
disagreement about how to respond to those limits. There are also 
difficult questions about trade-offs between more elaborate procedures, 
including greater or more intensive public participation, and other 
considerations, such as cost and regulatory delay. Legal analysis simply 
does not provide the necessary tools for resolving these questions, which 
are better suited to democratic debate and regulatory experimentation. 
The latter is particularly important, as problems of risk regulation 
continue to arise in new contexts. One feature of adjudication is that it 
tends strongly toward path-dependency and ossification.49 Although it is 
not inevitable, there is a real danger that greater judicial involvement in 
deciding how risk science is produced and used will lead to a loss of 
flexibility, dampening political discourse and making it more difficult for 
administrators to respond as knowledge and circumstances evolve. 
None of this is to say that courts have no contribution to make, and 
many general administrative law doctrines tend to improve the use of 
science by administrators. Judicial decisions that promote transparency, 
that require administrators to articulate reasons, and that guard against 
inappropriate political influence all create tools for holding 
administrators to account for their use of science. One of the virtues of 
these doctrines is that they derive from essentially legal values and apply 
to administrative decisionmaking generally.50 When courts attempt to go 
beyond these basic norms of good administration, however, they are less 
likely to make a positive contribution. 
Viewed as a whole, then, I conclude that that both legitimacy 
narratives appropriately incorporate realistic understandings of risk 
science. That is not to say that either jurisdiction’s doctrine or practice 
                                           
49 Shapiro and Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics, and Judicialization (OUP 
2002) 112–17. 
50 Scott and Sturm, ‘Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in 
New Governance’ (2006) 13 Colum.J.Eur.L. 565, 572. 
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could not be improved, and recent case law shows courts in both 
jurisdictions making marginal, if important, advances.51 Rather than 
focusing on courts or legal doctrine, however, efforts to reform the use of 
science would be better directed at administrators or legislators. In some 
ways, those paths are more difficult, and resistance from opposed 
interests should be expected. But the legal process poses its own 
obstacles, and focusing on more overtly political avenues has the virtue 
of allowing the role of science in risk regulation to be addressed frankly 
as a matter of social policy and political choice. 
B. Socio-political concerns 
Although I would argue that both legitimacy narratives are premised on 
realistic understandings of risk science and its limitations, an adequate 
approach to science is only half the problem. As discussed in chapter 1, 
regulatory responses to technological risk implicate a broad range of 
socio-political concerns. At the most basic level, risk regulation involves 
choices about the role of technology in society and about the distribution 
of harms and benefits associated with that technology. The legitimacy 
narratives must therefore also be evaluated in terms of how well they 
accommodate those social considerations. In particular, a successful risk 
regulation programme must allow space at some point in the process for 
normative evaluation of the risk in question and must do so in ways that 
are consistent with constitutional commitments. 
Evaluating the narratives as responses to the socio-political aspects of 
risk regulation is made difficult, in part, because the nature of the 
evaluation depends on how the problem of risk regulation is framed and 
thus the range of socio-political concerns that are relevant. In chapter 4, 
I argued that administrative law in both jurisdictions tends to frame risk 
in terms of safety, i.e., the propensity of a product to cause physical 
harm to humans or the environment.52 Equating risk with safety is a 
narrow way to frame risk regulation, however, and in chapter 1 I 
                                           
51 Ibid., 582–92; Fisher, Pascual, and Wagner, ‘Rethinking Judicial 
Review of Expert Agencies’ (2015) 93 Tex.L.Rev. 1681, 1715–21. 
52 Chapter 4, section I. 
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described a broader framing of risk that includes the social implications 
of technology, which I termed “technology choice”.53 In this section, I first 
consider whether the two narratives allow adequate scope for response to 
socio-political concerns within the dominant risk-as-safety frame. I then 
consider whether they are adequate to sustain regulation on the basis of 
concerns beyond safety. 
1. Risk regulation within the safety frame 
Both EU and US administrative law allow administrators to take account 
of a number of considerations beyond science in setting risk standards. 
Courts have been quite explicit in this regard with respect to the question 
of risk acceptability.54 They have also generally recognised that 
administrators must take into consideration non-science factors in 
determining when scientific evidence is sufficient to justify regulation.55 
Other considerations that courts have recognised as legitimate include 
distributional concerns and (to an extent) public anxiety.56 Courts are 
therefore clear that risk standard-setting must be a normative, as well as 
a technical, exercise. Indeed, it is the courts’ recognition of the 
importance of non-science concerns that has led the legitimacy 
narratives to rely foremost on democracy, not science, as the basis for the 
legitimacy of administrative risk regulation.57 
Despite the recognition that risk regulation is an inherently normative 
question, however, both narratives place limits on administrators’ ability 
                                           
53 Chapter 1, section I.B. 
54 Gowan (n.8), paras. 78–79; Case T-257/07, France v. Commission 
[2011] ECR II-5827, paras. 78–80; Whitman v. American Trucking 
Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 475–76 (2001); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 
1, 29 (D.C.Cir.1976) (en banc). 
55 Pfizer (n.8), paras. 200–01; Case C-269/13, Acino AG v. Commission, 
nyr, paras. 63–64; BP Exploration & Oil, Inc. v. EPA, 66 F.3d 784 
(6th.Cir.1995); Ethyl (n.54), 20–21. 
56 Case 331/88, R. v. MAFF ex p. Fedesa [1990] ECR I-4023, paras. 13–
14; Case C-121/00, Criminal proceedings against Hahn [2002] ECR I-
9193, paras. 44–46; EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, LP, 134 S.Ct. 
1584, 1606–07 (2014); Hoosier Environmental Council v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, 722 F.3d 1053, 1063 (7th.Cir.2013). 
57 Chapter 5, section I.D. 
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to consider broader socio-political concerns. The main doctrinal source of 
these limits is delegation theory, which provides that administrators may 
only take into account those concerns that fall within the scope of the 
relevant delegation.58 Both the EU and US courts have generally framed 
the delegations narrowly in terms of safety due to concerns about 
according broad policymaking discretion to the administration.59 As a 
consequence, both the EU and US administrations are generally 
prohibited from acting on the basis of considerations that do not relate in 
some way to the safety of a product, and both the EU and US courts have 
set aside administrative actions that appear to be motivated by other 
concerns.60 That said, the courts have tended to interpret the concept of 
safety flexibly, so that both EU and US administrative law have been able 
to accommodate many non-science concerns regarding technological risk 
even within a safety framework. 
It still could be argued, however that although courts allow 
administrators to consider socio-political concerns related to safety, 
aspects of legal doctrine encourage administrators to focus on scientific 
issues at the expense of other considerations. It has been argued, for 
example, that science-focused decisions are easier to defend on judicial 
review, and that administrators will therefore give other considerations 
short shrift.61 It is certainly true that both legitimacy narratives require 
the administration to demonstrate that it has incorporated scientific 
                                           
58 Chapter 2, section III. 
59 Chapter 4, section I. This is an area in which statutory language 
matters a great deal. Cf. Scott, ‘European Regulation of GMOs: Thinking 
About Judicial Review in the WTO’ (2004) 57 CLP 117. Nonetheless, as I 
argued in chapter 2, general delegation concerns influence the ways in 
which legislation is interpreted and constrain the administration’s ability 
to account for broad socio-economic factors. Chapter 2, section III. 
60 Case T-74/00, Artegodan GmbH v. Commission [2002] ECR II-4945, 
para. 175–77; Case T-333/10, Animal Trading Company (ATC) BV v. 
Commission, nyr, paras. 86–88; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 
534–35 (2007); Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F.Supp.2d 162, 170–71 
(E.D.N.Y.2013). 
61 Coglianese and Marchant (n.1), 1292–98; Meazell, ‘Super Deference, 
the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of Agency 
Science’ (2011) 109 Mich.L.Rev. 733, 772–78; Wagner (n.1), 1661–67. 
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expertise into its decisionmaking process, while leaving administrators’ 
obligations with regard to socio-political concerns largely undefined. To 
that extent, it is fair to say that the case law in both jurisdictions tends 
to give greater prominence to the scientific aspects of risk regulation. 
There is not a lot of evidence, however, that courts are more likely to 
uphold science-heavy, versus policy-heavy, decisions. In the US, the 
opposite may be true, as some US courts have held that greater deference 
is owed to an agency’s policy choices than to its scientific conclusions.62 
In the EU, the limited evidence from the case law suggests that because 
of the operation of the precautionary principle, courts are more likely to 
defer to highly protective standards than to less protective standards, 
regardless whether the reasons underlying the standard are science- or 
policy-based.63 Scientific reasons can, of course, be highly compelling—
particularly when they provide evidence of potentially serious harm to 
public health—and for that reason administrators may frequently focus 
on scientific issues as a means of persuading not just the courts, but 
also the public, of the appropriateness of their decision. Science also 
provides a vocabulary for explaining why evidence motivated a specific 
outcome, which administrators, who are often required by legislation to 
set numerical risk standards, may find particularly congenial.64 It is far 
from clear, however, that administrative law encourages administrators 
to emphasise science at the expense of policy considerations. 
Another way in which both regulatory systems may unduly constrain 
the scope of the regulatory inquiry is through reliance on analytical 
techniques such as cost-benefit analysis and impact assessment. Many 
have argued that a focus on this type of analysis results in 
                                           
62 Competitive Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA, 956 F.2d 321, 323–24 
(D.C.Cir.1992); Edley (n.14), 33–34; Williams, ‘The Roots of Deference’ 
(1991) 100 YLJ 1103, 1106–08. 
63 Chapter 3, section I.B.1. I would stress that the evidence from the case 
law is very limited and any conclusions in this regard must be treated as 
tentative. E.g., France (n.54), para. 214. 
64 Coglianese and Marchant (n.1), 1264–66; Fisher, ‘Drowning by 
Numbers: Standard Setting in Risk Regulation and the Pursuit of 
Accountable Public Administration’ (2000) 20 OJLS 109, 128. 
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administrators taking an artificially narrow view of risk, mostly at the 
expense of socio-political considerations.65 Although I argued in 
chapter 3 that both administrations apply those frameworks flexibly, it is 
unquestionably true that impact assessment and cost-benefit analysis 
reinforce the prominence of certain values and perspectives in the 
regulatory process. In itself, however, that is no criticism, as there is 
simply no way to design a process for regulatory decisionmaking that is 
free of normative commitments or that does not privilege certain values.66 
What is important to recognise for present purposes, is that in neither 
jurisdiction has the choice to rely on impact assessment and cost-benefit 
analysis been made by the courts. Although administrative law permits, 
and in some ways facilitates, the use of those methodologies, reliance on 
them is not a part of either the EU or the US legitimacy narrative, and 
there is nothing in the Court of Justice’s or the Supreme Court’s case law 
that suggests that the constitutional legitimacy of administrative risk 
regulation would be in question if those methodologies were abandoned. 
Instead, the choice to rely on cost-benefit analysis and impact 
assessment has been made by administrators themselves, often with 
explicit backing at the highest political levels.67 Nor can it reasonably be 
maintained, in light of the extensive policy literature addressing these 
issues, that the administrators who endorse those methodologies are 
ignorant of the value choices implicit in them. The decision to employ 
those methodologies should therefore be understood as a political choice 
to embrace the normative vision of risk regulation they imply.68 There are 
                                           
65 See sources cited chapter 3, section II.A. 
66 Craig, Public Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America (Clarendon 1990) 5. This is true even of deliberative 
approaches to policymaking. Epstein, ‘Modern Republicanism, or the 
Flight from Substance’ (1988) 97 YLJ 1633; Sullivan, ‘Rainbow 
Republicanism’ (1988) 97 YLJ 1713. 
67 E.g., European Commission, Communication, ‘Better Regulation for 
Better Results—An EU Agenda’ COM(2015) 215 final; EO 12,866, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
68 E.g., Adler and Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
(Harvard 2006) 25–61; Graham (n.39), 404–11. 
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also, of course, many reasons to reject that vision,69 and the debate 
between these positions cannot be resolved here. I would argue, however, 
that regardless of one’s position on the use of cost-benefit analysis and 
impact assessment, the existence of intense controversy among 
thoughtful people of good faith suggests that any resolution is likely to 
have greater functional legitimacy if adopted through political processes 
than if adopted by the judiciary, if only because political processes are 
better adapted to the continual adjustment of whatever settlement is 
reached. For that reason, the courts should be applauded for refusing to 
take sides on the issue.70 
Thus, taken as a whole, both legitimacy narratives accord 
administrators sufficient flexibility to take account of an appropriate 
range of socio-political considerations that bear on the regulation of 
technological risk within the confines of a risk-as-safety frame. In 
particular, both jurisdictions allow the administration to consider the 
public acceptability of safety risks, as well as their empirical probability. 
Whether administrators adequately address socio-political concerns in 
practice is a separate question beyond the scope of this thesis, but it 
seems safe to say that the records of both administrations are mixed in 
this regard. It must also be stressed, however, that there are important 
limits to the risk-as-safety frame, and that this finding of adequacy is 
similarly limited. Accommodation of concerns other than safety within 
the existing narratives is a much more difficult problem. 
2. Beyond safety? 
As discussed in chapter 1, safety, though perhaps most prominent, does 
not begin to exhaust the range of social concerns posed by technology. 
New technologies, especially biotechnologies, have the potential to bring 
about significant changes in the social order and to redefine humanity’s 
relationship with the environment.71 Many of these issues touch on deep 
                                           
69 E.g., Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere (Yale 2010) 46–67. 
70 Cf. Byse, ‘Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative 
Procedure: A Somewhat Different View’ (1978) 91 HLR 1823, 1831–32. 
71 Jasanoff, Designs on Nature (Princeton 2005) 94–118. 
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questions of value, and many calls for regulation of new technologies are 
grounded at least as much in concerns for those values as they are in 
concerns for physical safety.72 Indeed, many of the most controversial 
and divisive technologies implicate just these concerns. 
Are the EU and US systems of administrative risk regulation well-
suited for addressing concerns beyond safety? The short answer is no. 
Both legitimacy narratives incorporate certain premises about the scope 
and nature of administrative decisionmaking that are incompatible, or at 
least in tension, with regulation on the basis of non-safety concerns. As a 
consequence, the EU and US legitimacy narratives are powerful barriers 
to expanding administrative risk regulation from questions of safety to 
larger questions of the role of technology in society. 
The central challenge for both EU and US constitutionalism posed by 
administrative regulation on the basis of non-safety concerns lies with 
one of the core premises of both systems regarding the legitimate exercise 
of government power: that restrictions on individual autonomy are only 
justified when they are adopted through democratic means and further a 
legitimate public purpose.73 As such, not all restrictions on individual 
liberty, even if backed by a democratic majority, are constitutionally 
legitimate.74 Restrictions must also be imposed for acceptable reasons.75 
The roots of this premise lie in liberal political theory and the protection 
of individual autonomy from majoritarian restriction.76 In European and 
American constitutional law, it is uncontroversial that preventing 
physical harm to people or the environment is a legitimate pubic purpose 
                                           
72 Lee, ‘Beyond Safety? The Broadening Scope of Risk Regulation’ [2010] 
CLP 242, 244–49. 
73 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und 
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125, paras. 3–4; 
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937). 
74 E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003). 
75 Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard 1980) 14–20; Rawls, Political 
Liberalism (expanded ed., Columbia 2005) (1993) 98. 
76 Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution (Harvard 1993) 36–37. 
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and thus an appropriate reason for restricting autonomy.77 By contrast, 
other asserted grounds for regulating technology—such as respect for 
traditional ways of life, some types of distributional concerns, and ethical 
or religious theories regarding alteration of nature—are constitutionally 
controversial. In particular, much liberal constitutional theory is 
sceptical of regulation on moral grounds, which in the context of risk 
regulation includes ideas about what is (or is not) “natural”.78 Many 
concerns regarding technology go to just such issues, however,79 
meaning that attempts to regulate on those bases are prone to raise 
constitutional concerns. That is not to say that regulation on such 
grounds is necessarily illegitimate, as a matter of either constitutional 
law or political theory. It is only to say that the legitimacy of regulation 
for these reasons is disputed, and it is the very existence of these 
controversies about the use of governmental power that poses problems 
for administrative regulation beyond the realm of safety. Because 
administrative regulation in both jurisdictions is seen as democratically 
suspect, both legitimacy narratives tend to restrain administrative power 
to enter into constitutionally controversial areas. 
Perhaps the most important obstacle to expansion of risk regulation 
beyond safety lies is the administration’s status, in both jurisdictions, as 
a subordinate law maker. The theories of delegation that form the 
backbone of both legitimacy narratives reconcile administrative 
regulation with democratic government by requiring that the most 
important value judgments be made by the legislature.80 This 
requirement comes across more clearly in the European case law, which 
explicitly reserves to the legislature basic value choices about 
                                           
77 Ibid.; see also Mill, On Liberty (Rapaport ed., Hackett 1978) (1859); 
Nagel, Equality and Partiality (OUP 1991) 155; Schroeder, ‘Rights Against 
Risks’ (1986) 86 Colum.L.Rev. 495, 501–02. 
78 Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (OUP 1963); see also Rawls (n.75), 
174–76; Schroeder (n.77), 512–13. 
79 Kysar (n.69), 191–94; Lee (n.72), 247–48; cf. Jasanoff (n.71) 146–48. 
80 Chapter 2, section III; Lindseth, ‘Delegation Is Dead, Long Live 
Delegation: Managing the Democratic Disconnect in the European 
Market-Polity’ in Joerges and Dehousse (eds.), Good Governance in 
Europe’s Integrated Market (OUP 2002) 146–50. 
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regulation,81 but it is also evident in Supreme Court decisions that adopt 
narrow constructions of delegating legislation so as not to empower the 
administration to make fundamental social choices.82 In both 
jurisdictions, the question whether a product or process is sufficiently 
safe—understood in terms of effects on human health or the physical 
environment—falls well within the range of questions that are 
appropriate for administrative resolution. But other questions, such as 
whether particular biotechnologies are innately immoral or whether a 
technology should be prohibited because it threatens certain interests, do 
not. The case law is far too sparse to draw any clear lines, but it is 
apparent that the more the reasons underlying regulation appear to turn 
on basic value choices regarding social relations, the more likely the 
courts are to redirect the decision back to the legislature.83 
A second reason why questions beyond safety are difficult to 
accommodate within the EU or US legitimacy narratives is that resolution 
of these questions requires processes of decisionmaking that do not fit 
the models of administration posited by the narratives. The US narrative, 
in particular, relies on a model of the administrative process that 
includes expert analysis to justify delegation to extra-constitutional 
institutions; expertise is constitutive of legitimate administration. 
Although expertise does not serve the same role in the EU, it is still 
essential to the EU legitimacy narrative as a core aspect of the duty of 
care. Questions of safety, which are answered in part by reference to 
scientific analysis, are well-suited to these models of administration. 
Other kinds of concerns, particularly ethical concerns, are less amenable 
to expert analysis and are therefore more difficult to fit within these 
                                           
81 Case C-355/10, Parliament v. Council, nyr, paras. 66–67; Case C-
403/05, Parliament v. Commission [2007] ECR I-9045, Opinion of A.G. 
Kokott, para. 79; Chamon, ‘How the Concept of Essential Elements of a 
Legislative Act Continues to Elude the Court: Parliament v. Council’ 
(2013) 50 C.M.L.Rev. 849, 856–58. 
82 Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267–68 (2006); Industrial Union 
Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 646 
(1980) (Benzene). 
83 Chamon (n.81), 859; cf. Lowi, The End of Liberalism (2d ed., Norton 
1979) 94–97. 
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models of administration.84 Instead, many non-safety concerns demand 
robust democratic engagement, yet in both systems the administrative 
process is understood—even presumed—to be the wrong forum for 
democratic debate.85 As a consequence, the existing legitimacy narratives 
are incapable of validating administrative regulation on these grounds. 
Various ways of democratising the administrative process have been 
suggested in both jurisdictions, particularly through greater use of 
participative administrative procedures. As yet, however, no approach 
has managed to successfully bridge the gap between participative 
administrative processes and the constitutional designation of the 
legislature as the forum for deciding basic questions of value.86 The 
challenge of rewriting the legitimacy narratives to accommodate value 
choices about technology thus requires not only revising the role of 
expertise but also reassessing the relationship between administrative 
regulation and democratic government. 
Finally, regulation on the basis of non-safety concerns is difficult to fit 
within the legitimacy narratives because it will often require controversial 
decisions regarding the scope of fundamental rights. Many non-safety 
concerns touch on vaguely defined, but highly valued rights, such as 
human dignity, privacy, intellectual freedom, religious liberty, and free 
development of personality. Neither legitimacy narrative understands 
administrative regulation as the proper forum for defining the boundaries 
of these rights, at least in the first instance. Although the EU courts have 
not reached a definitive position on the subject, one strand of European 
constitutional thinking would put such questions beyond administrative 
                                           
84 Ironically, the EU has tried to address this problem to some extent by 
turning ethical analysis into an expert discourse. E.g., Busby, Hervey 
and Mohr, ‘Ethical EU Law? The Influence of the European Group on 
Ethics in Science and New Technologies’ (2008) 33 ELR 803. 
85 Cf. Ehnert, ‘The Legitimacy of New Risk Governance—A Critical View in 
Light of the EU’s Approach to Nanotechnologies in Food’ (2015) 21 ELJ 
44, 65–66. 
86 Schmidt-Aßmann, ‘Verwaltungslegitimation als Rechtsbegriff’ (1991) 
116 Archiv.offen.Rechts 329, 371–76; Stewart, ‘The Reformation of 
American Administrative Law’ (1975) 88 HLR 1667, 1802–05. 
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power entirely.87 For their part, US courts have consistently interpreted 
regulatory statutes to avoid difficult constitutional questions, and in 
particular to constrain administrators’ power to limit non-economic 
rights.88 Again, for this reason, non-safety concerns would seem to 
require legislative, rather than administrative, resolution. 
In arguing that the current legitimacy narratives tend to exclude 
conceptions of risk regulation that extend beyond safety, I do not intend 
to endorse the status quo.89 Whether the tendency of the legitimacy 
narratives to exclude questions beyond safety is a virtue or a fault, 
depends on one’s view of the proper reach and limits of government and 
of the administration’s role in it. Once again, we are back to political 
theory.90 What can be said is that limiting administrative risk regulation 
to questions of safety is strongly appealing from a classically liberal 
perspective, and that appeal likely accounts for its dominance in EU and 
US law. For a liberal, limiting the grounds on which administrators can 
regulate tends to protect individual freedom91 by directing difficult value 
questions to “the governmental body best suited and most obligated to 
make the choice”.92 If disputable decisions about what constitutes a good 
society are to be made, they should only be made after the fullest political 
process constitutionally available.93 Because liberal ideas underlie much 
of the public law theory and doctrine in the EU and the US, 
administrative law has evolved to reflect these views and as a result has 
                                           
87 Von Bogdandy and Bast (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional 
Law (2d ed., Hart 2010) 390–94. The Court of Justice has expressed 
scepticism that such questions are appropriate for the administration. 
Parliament v. Council (n.81), paras. 76–78. 
88 Gonzalez (n.82), 267–68; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958). 
89 These are difficult questions of moral and political theory, an adequate 
treatment of which would require far more space than is available in a 
thesis about analysing existing judicial doctrine. It seems better to leave 
the question for another day than to make a jejune case here. 
90 Craig (n.66), 4–7; see also Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative 
Constitutionalism (Hart 2007) 250–54. 
91 Hart (n.78); Mill (n.77); Schroeder (n.77), 520. 
92 Benzene (n.82), 671 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment); see 
also Ely (n.75), 131–34. 
93 Lowi (n.83), 305–09. 
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created a number of barriers that prevent administrators from straying 
too far from the relatively noncontroversial grounds of safety. 
Liberalism can, of course, be criticised on many grounds,94 and its 
historical dominance in public law should not preclude us from 
considering whether that dominance is merited. Indeed, a strong 
argument can be made that the exclusion of administrators from difficult 
constitutional questions is simply unsustainable in modern “regulatory 
democracies”. After all, “bureaucrats” routinely make decisions that 
greatly affect individuals’ material circumstances—they can literally make 
or break people’s lives.95 Why should the question whether genetic 
modification is inherently immoral be any more sacrosanct? When the 
practical realities of contemporary regulation are considered, defining 
administrative risk regulation narrowly in terms of safety seems to ignore 
the fact that administrators cannot help but make far-reaching social 
choices. By excluding a range of valid and salient, if difficult, issues from 
regulatory consideration, it can be argued that the existing legitimacy 
narratives unjustifiably exclude one segment of interests from the 
regulatory process and thus undermine the broader, functional 
legitimacy of administrative risk regulation even as they preserve an 
outdated, legalistic form of legitimacy. The exclusion of non-safety 
concerns from administrative consideration is particularly problematic in 
the EU, which continues to struggle with its own democratic legitimacy. 
When the democratic validity of measures adopted by the EU legislature 
is itself in doubt, there would seem to be less reason for preferring 
legislative processes on democratic grounds. 
Regardless of one’s view of the proper role of the administration, it is 
apparent that the exclusion of non-safety concerns has created practical 
problems for both European and American risk regulation. By limiting 
the range of concerns that may be taken into account, administrative law 
sometimes requires administrators to formulate regulatory problems in 
ways that artificially exclude important aspects of public concern and 
                                           
94 Thorpe (n.17), 69–73; see also generally Mulhall and Swift, Liberals 
and Communitarians (2d ed., Wiley-Blackwell 1996). 
95 Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice (Yale 1985). 
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encourage regulatory advocates to shoe-horn normative objections into 
doubts about safety.96 Indeed, it is when non-safety concerns become 
highly salient that the weaknesses of the current legitimacy narratives 
become exposed. When the primary issue of public concern is safety, 
administrative risk regulation, though inevitably controversial, seems to 
function reasonably well. But when non-safety concerns come to the fore, 
as for example with GMOs in the EU or with emergency contraception in 
the US, the administrative process breaks down.97 Arguably at least, the 
root cause of these breakdowns is the inability of the administrative 
process to deal with the real issues in controversy. Although Europeans 
have genuine concerns about the safety of GMOs and the adequacy of 
EFSA risk assessment procedures,98 the high degree of controversy 
surrounding this particular technology has much more to do with the 
social ramifications of biotechnology.99 It should be unsurprising, 
therefore, that an administrative process that can only discuss safety has 
been unsatisfactory. A similar analysis applies to the longstanding 
American controversy regarding over-the-counter sales of emergency 
contraceptives, in which the drug approval process has proved to be a 
totally inadequate forum for airing concerns about teenage sexuality.100 
So long as the issues animating public anxiety about technologies are 
excluded from the regulatory debate, the functional legitimacy of 
administrative risk regulation in both jurisdictions will be in doubt. 
Given these experiences, one might reasonably argue that the scope of 
administrative risk regulation should be expanded to take account of 
concerns beyond safety. In either jurisdiction, however, such an 
                                           
96 Lee (n.72), 276–77. 
97 Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs (Edward Elgar 2009) 98–104; Kritikos, 
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Tummino (n.60), 170–71. 
98 Greenpeace (n.34). 
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100 Belluck, ‘Judge Strikes Down Age Limits on Morning-After Pill’ (5 April 
2013) New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/06/health/ 
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expansion would require a broad rethinking of the basis of administrative 
legitimacy. The challenge for advocates of regulation beyond safety is 
therefore in not just to convince regulators, politicians, and the public 
that risk regulation should be about more than safety, but also to 
construct new legitimacy narratives to support a broadened role for the 
administration in public law. As the analysis in this thesis shows, such a 
task would be formidable. It would require reassessing the relationship 
between the administration and other organs of government; it would 
require new standards for evaluating the procedural and substantive 
legality of administrative decisions; and it would probably require a new 
theory for democratic control of the administration. None of those tasks 
is simple or uncontroversial, and none can be addressed solely within the 
context of risk regulation. Instead, they would require a rethinking of EU 
and US administrative law generally.101 The scale of the challenge is of 
course no reason not to make the attempt, but progress cannot be made 
unless the full stakes of the problem are acknowledged. 
At bottom, the debate between advocates of the risk-as-safety and the 
technology choice frames is the fundamental conflict of administrative 
risk regulation in both the EU and the US. It is a conflict about legitimate 
administration and about legitimate government, and it must be 
addressed in those terms. Although questions regarding the role of 
scientific expertise in risk regulation continue to be (rightly) 
controversial, the limits of risk science are now widely understood and 
generally accepted. The significance of those limits, however, depends on 
the framing of the problem, and where one stands on that issue depends 
on one’s views about the proper extent of regulatory power and the 
necessary conditions for its exercise to be legitimate. These are basic 
questions about the nature of a good society, and cannot be answered by 
focusing on the concept of risk in isolation. 
                                           
101 Frug, ‘The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law’ (1984) 97 HLR 
1276, 1382–88. 
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II. Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter, and this thesis generally, I have focused on the 
many important differences in how EU and US administrative law 
respond to the problems of risk regulation. In this conclusion, however, I 
want to focus on the perhaps more important ways in which they are 
similar. To begin, both systems share a fundamental commitment to 
liberal democracy: that the exercise of government power requires 
democratic sanction and must be subject to the rule of law. Reconciling 
that commitment with the exercise of bureaucratic power is the 
fundamental challenge for both EU and US administrative law, regardless 
of the regulatory subject matter. Although the specific solutions 
developed differ in many respects, their basic approaches are similar. In 
both the EU and the US, the administration is seen as possessing a 
degree of democratic legitimacy, such that it is a constitutionally 
legitimate policymaker, but as being insufficiently democratic for its 
judgments to be valid on the basis of democracy alone. As a 
consequence, both jurisdictions have erected elaborate legal frameworks 
for the control of the administration. These frameworks rely on a complex 
of mutually reinforcing legitimacy vectors, including both scientific 
expertise and legal processes. It is the interplay of the various legitimacy 
vectors, rather than any one in isolation, that is essential for the 
reconciliation of administrative risk regulation with constitutional 
commitments to liberal democratic government. 
This thesis has also shown that there is a large degree of similarity in 
the ways in which the two jurisdictions approach risk regulation as a 
legal matter. Most importantly, both EU and US law tend to frame risk in 
terms of safety, meaning that both systems regard the primary goal of 
risk regulation as the protection of human health and the environment 
from physical harms posed by technology. In both systems, that framing 
mandates a place for science in setting risk standards, as science is the 
primary discourse for assessing the propensity of technologies to cause 
harm. Both jurisdictions thus have a strong commitment to science as a 
basis for risk regulation. At the same time, however, both jurisdictions 
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recognise that risk regulation standards are ultimately political decisions 
and must be justified and legitimated as such. 
At a high level, therefore, it is possible to see European and American 
approaches to risk regulation as similar. At a minimum, it is hard to 
escape the conclusion that the two systems are basically compatible in 
that they share similar constitutional values. That is not to minimise the 
many important differences in the two legitimacy narratives, but only to 
argue that we should not let attention to those differences crowd out 
recognition of the similarities. As a corollary, it is important to recognise 
that differences in policy preferences, even when deeply held, need not 
reflect differences in basic values. Questions of risk regulation are plenty 
complex and capacious that people of good faith, proceeding from similar 
premises, can sometimes reach very different conclusions.  
It also is important to bear these fundamental similarities in mind 
when we undertake a comparative analysis of EU and US risk regulation. 
One of the motivations for this thesis was my observation that Europeans 
and Americans mostly misunderstand each other’s systems of risk 
regulation, and that this was so despite a reasonably extensive 
comparative literature on the subject.102 The cause of the 
misunderstanding, I believe, is an overemphasis on specific regulatory 
controversies, particularly in the context of trade disputes.103 Indeed, I 
think it no great overstatement to say that the WTO Beef Hormones 
litigation has been responsible for spawning a generation-long cloud of 
misunderstanding on both sides of the Atlantic.104 When the issue for 
                                           
102 There are, of course, exceptions, including Elizabeth Fisher, e.g., 
(n.90), and Jonathan Wiener, e.g., ‘Whose Precaution after All?: A 
Comment on the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems’ 
(2003) 13 Duke.J.Comp.Intl.L. 207. Sheila Jasanoff has also done 
important comparative work, although her research is not focused on 
doctrinal legal analysis. E.g., Jasanoff, Risk Management and Political 
Culture (Russell Sage 1986). 
103 Young, ‘Confounding Conventional Wisdom: Political Not Principled 
Differences in the Transatlantic Regulatory Relationship’ (2009) 11 
BJPIR 666. 
104 By which I mean, it has become something of a political cypher. There 
has also been much thoughtful writing on the case. E.g., Fisher (n.90), 
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comparison is a specific regulatory outcome, it is natural for the analysis 
to focus on questions of good regulatory policy and to evaluate legal rules 
by reference to whether they promote that policy preference. There is of 
course nothing wrong with asking whether legal rules further good 
regulatory outcomes. The danger, however, is in committing the fallacy of 
concluding that a bad policy outcome must be the result of a bad legal 
rule. And the risk of confusion is all the greater when there is no prior 
agreement on what constitutes a good policy outcome. 
My aim in this thesis has been to undertake a comparative analysis 
focused on legal principles rather than regulatory outcomes. By doing so, 
I have presented a quite different, and more complicated, comparative 
picture from that presented in outcome-focused analyses. On one hand, 
my analysis has shown that the differences in EU and US administrative 
law on risk regulation run much deeper than a predilection for 
precaution or economic efficiency, and extend to basic differences in how 
the exercise of bureaucratic power can be made constitutionally 
legitimate. On the other, it has shown that both systems share important 
similarities in that they both proceed from similar conceptions of liberal 
democracy and both frame risk in similar ways. This type of analysis 
does not readily lead to neat conclusions and often raises as many 
questions as it answers. What it achieves, however, is a better 
understanding of the contexts in which regulatory programmes develop 
and of the often unspoken assumptions and commitments that structure 
and animate those programmes. My hope is that better understanding 
can lead to better and more productive dialogue between these two 
regulatory systems and the people who study them.  
 
                                                                                                                   
185–200; Joerges, ‘Law, Science and the Management of Risks to Health 
at the National, European and International Level—Stories on Baby 
Dummies, Mad Cows and Hormones in Beef’ (2001) 7 Colum.J.Eur.L. 1, 
9–14; Scott, ‘On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and 
Environment in the EU and WTO’ in Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO, and 
the NAFTA: Toward a Common Law of Intenational Trade? (OUP 2000), 
144–62. 
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